Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: the upcoming OSCE ministerial meeting in Malta and the EU's latest (underwhelming) sanctions on Russia.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.

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Wider Europe Briefing: Is Lavrov Coming To The EU? (Listen)

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Briefing #1: Lavrov's Expected OSCE Appearance

What You Need To Know: One thing will overshadow the entire annual Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ministerial meeting taking place in Malta on December 5-6: the presence of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He has been invited and, if he shows up as expected, it would be his first visit to an EU country since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Lavrov remains sanctioned by the bloc, but the travel ban can be temporarily lifted to attend international meetings on EU soil.

Lavrov's possible visit comes amid increasing signs that many Western countries appear to reaching out to Moscow again diplomatically, notably with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz calling Russian President Vladimir Putin recently for the first time in over two years.

Sources inside the OSCE, who weren't authorized to speak on the record, told me that the organization wants to engage in dialogue in order to reach consensus on issues such as the four vacant senior positions in the Vienna-based body, upcoming chairmanships, and the budget of the 57-state organization.

On the other hand, little was achieved at last year's OSCE ministerial meeting in North Macedonia (an EU candidate country that aligns with the EU's sanctions policy) when Lavrov attended -- along with an entourage of nearly 90 people.

Not everything will go Russia's way on the Mediterranean island. For starters, Malta has limited the national delegations to six people. And while Lavrov is invited to the lunch on the first day, he won't be allowed to attend the dinner, which has "Russian aggression against Ukraine" as a topic.

At the official ministerial session, ballots have been drawn to determine in which order the countries will speak. Ukraine will go first. Russia was drawn to speak 20th but agreed to exchange places with Tajikistan so that it can go fourth.

It will be interesting to see what kind of reception Lavrov receives. In Skopje, representatives of Ukraine and the Baltic states, demonstratively stood up and left, something that could happen again in Malta.

A senior EU diplomat, who wasn't authorized to speak on the record, told me at the G20 foreign ministers' meeting earlier this fall that representatives of EU states remained in their seats as it was "better to stay and answer Lavrov and the huge amount of lies that he usually comes with."

Tellingly, I was told by diplomats that the practice of walking out when the Russian OSCE ambassador or deputy ambassador speak in Vienna almost ceased in 2024, whereas it was common practice among representatives of EU member states in 2022 and 2023.

Deep Background: So, what issues can potentially be solved by ministers and OSCE diplomats before the end of the year? Perhaps the most pressing issue is to fill the top four positions in the organization, which has been leaderless since early September. In the summer, Malta, in its current role as chair country, put forward: Igli Hasani, the current Albanian foreign minister, as the new secretary-general; Dutch diplomat Christophe Kamp to head the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); the former Georgian state minister for reconciliation and civic equality, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, as the new high commissioner on national minorities; and the post of representative on freedom of the media going to Jan Braathu, a Norwegian diplomat and current head of the OSCE mission in Kosovo.

An alternative Greek-Turkish counterproposal now seems to be favored. Under this proposal, Braathu and Tsikhelashvili would remain in the same positions, but Hasani and Kamp would be replaced by Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioglu as secretary-general and Greek diplomat Maria Telalian for the ODIHR job.

Moscow has indicated that it doesn't want Tsikhelashvili to fill any position as she worked as a minister to reintegrate Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia. It now appears that the compromise going into the Malta meeting is that the Georgian will be removed and Kamp will end up as the national minorities commissioner.

Drilling Down

• On the yearly chairmanship, Russia is clearer on its goals: It should not go to a NATO member state. While Finland, which joined the military alliance last year, will take over on January 1, 2025, that was a decision taken several years ago and can't be changed. But what about for 2026 and beyond? There are no official candidates yet but there are whispers among diplomats in Vienna that Switzerland might be ready to step in. That might not satisfy Russian officials, though, as they have voiced criticism of Switzerland, noting that the country isn't neutral anymore as it hosted the Ukraine-initiated peace summit earlier this year.
• A country in Central Asia could become chair for 2026 and 2027, or a European microstate such as San Marino or Liechtenstein. Turkey is another strong candidate, and it would be something of a coup for Ankara and its growing role as a real political player if it got both the new secretary-general position and an upcoming chairmanship. Turkey has also been toying with the idea of hosting an OSCE summit, for example, in Istanbul, where all the members' heads of state and government would be invited. Such a summit has not been held since Astana back in 2010.
• And then, of course, there is the OSCE's budget, which is financed by contributions from member states. This is not a new issue as a budget hasn't been passed since 2021 when it stood at 138 million euros ($144 million) per year. The proposed budget for 2025 is 158 million euros, with the increase justified due to the indexation of salaries and inflation.
• Russia has not agreed with the budget, as Moscow wants considerably less money to go to the ODIHR, which it considers politically biased.
• Azerbaijan also has issues. This is because the proposed budget still contains money for the OSCE Minsk group, which was set up to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku is arguing that the conflict is over and therefore the group is redundant, whereas Yerevan maintains that no peace deal has been signed and the body is still needed.
• The likely solution to the budget impasse -- as has been common in recent years -- will be that other members will offer extra off-budget contributions to keep the OSCE limping along.

Briefing #2: The EU's Latest (And Weakest) Sanctions On Russia

What You Need To Know: The European Commission on November 22 finally presented to the 27 EU member states a new Russia sanctions package proposal -- the 15th round since the full-scale invasion nearly three years ago.

It is the first in a long time, with the last one agreed in June. One of the reasons for the gap is that Hungary, possibly the most sanctions-skeptic country, took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in July and the sense in Brussels was that there was little point in trying to get anything substantial passed.

Regardless, there is little collective desire in Brussels to deepen sanctions, for example, by targeting Russia's nuclear or gas industries.

The result was the EU's puniest package to date, with Brussels hoping that it can pass without much fuss before the winter holidays in December.

Deep Background: Why puny? Well, firstly because the proposal, seen by RFE/RL, doesn't target any sectors of the Russian economy, whereas previous rounds sanctioned wood, oil, and diamond exports. Instead, there are new names on only three existing blacklists.

The European Commission is proposing that another 54 people and 29 entities should be targeted with asset freezes and visa bans for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, adding to the 2,300 entries already there.

Then there is a substantial addition of vessels to be blacklisted that Brussels believes are part of Russia's shadow fleet -- meaning boats with unclear ownership used to mainly circumvent already agreed international sanctions on Russian oil and petroleum products.

As of now, 27 vessels are listed, which means that they aren't allowed to call at EU ports or be serviced in any way, and now Brussels wants an additional 48 to be added.

The final item in the sanctions package is adding more proposed names to a list of companies in third countries that EU companies must restrict trade with.

It is not a full ban but rather export restrictions on dual-use goods and technology that the bloc believes have contributed to Russia's war machine.

There are already 675 companies on the list and now the proposal is that another 33 be added.

They are mostly Russian companies as well as some from from China, Iran, India, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Two Serbian entities are also included in the proposal.

Drilling Down

• The most interesting aspect of the sanctions package is the proposals for asset freezes and visa bans. Most of the new names are military officers whom the bloc is punishing for the missile strike in July on the Okhmadyt children’s hospital in Kyiv. These listings are largely symbolic as they target people who are unlikely to have many assets in the EU or have opportunities to travel to the bloc very often.
• Yet, there are a few on the proposed blacklist who may have that opportunity. One is Larisa Dolina, a legendary Russian singer and actress. The EU wants to sanction her as she has "worked with the Russian Defense Ministry and led entertainment campaigns on behalf of the Russian government to reward Russian military personnel for their participation in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine."
• Others listed include the general directors of Investneftetrade, Rosnefteflot, and Prime Shipping -- all companies involved in the shipping of Russian oil. The companies are also subject to proposed asset freezes in the EU. Senior figures involved with the Russian state energy giant Gazprom's liquefied natural gas business are also targeted
• While most of the listings hit Russian citizens, this round of sanctions also includes a surprising number of foreigners, reflecting the view in Brussels that more nations and individuals need to be targeted for supporting Moscow. For the first time ever when it comes to the war in Ukraine, Chinese nationals and companies are being targetted by sanctions. One person has been proposed to be listed for circumventing the EU's sanctions on Russia by trading with Unimatik, a large Russian military company. Six Chinese companies are also being targeted for helping Moscow's war effort. North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang Chol and the deputy chief of staff of the North Korean Army, Kim Yong Bok, are included, as soldiers from their country are now deployed alongside Russian troops. As is Walid Abdelfattah Farghal Abdallah because, as the director of the Annual Investment Meeting Congress in the U.A.E., he "signed a cooperation agreement with Andrei Kalyuzhny, the acting chairman of the board of State Corporation 'Donbas Development Corporation,' which is responsible for ensuring the economic development of Russian-occupied Donbas."
• There is also an EU citizen on the list, Dutch businessman Niels Trost, who is being targeted because his companies are believed to have been trading Russian crude oil above the G7-imposed oil price cap, thus circumventing sanctions against the Kremlin. It's rare that the bloc targets its own citizens. It happened when Jozef Hambalek, a Slovak national and head of the Russian nationalist Night Wolves motorcycle club in Europe, was sanctioned in 2022, although he was later delisted. In such cases the asset freeze is applied but not the visa ban, as those targeted obviously don't need a visa to live or visit their own country.

Looking Ahead

NATO foreign ministers meet in Brussels on December 3-4. Don't expect any big decisions, but it will be U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's last meeting at the military alliance before the new Washington administration takes over in January. The ministers will likely discuss damaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, with many suspecting sabotage.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on one big issue: The future of NATO going into 2025.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.

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Wider Europe Briefing: NATO Braces For An Unpredictable 2025 (Listen)

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The Briefing: NATO Braces For An Unpredictable 2025

When speaking to NATO officials about the incoming U.S administration, I generally hear some variation on "We'll make it work," immediately followed by a reassuring, "Don't worry, we're not in panic mode." But will they? And aren't they, actually?

In his first term as U.S. president, Donald Trump was said to have been toying with a possible U.S. withdrawal from the military alliance over burden-sharing (notably at a summit in Brussels in 2018). Then, on the campaign trail earlier this year, he said he would encourage Russia to do "whatever the hell they want" with NATO members that didn't spend enough of defense -- essentially casting doubt on Article 5, the collective-defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty that is the cornerstone of the organization. Trump's nominee for defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, has also questioned why the United States should be the European "emergency contact number," and has described the continent's NATO allies as "outdated, outgunned, invaded, and impotent."

Many NATO diplomats I've chatted with have tried to make sense of the U.S. president-elect's flurry of cabinet picks. In the first administration, you had what one source called "NATO guardrails" in the form of seasoned U.S. generals like Jim Mattis and H.R. McMaster -- people who were very much shaped by the Cold War and NATO's role as a fundamental Western building block. It was pointed out to me that Hegseth has instead been influenced by the Iraq war, and more importantly by Afghanistan. Whisper it if you're in the alliance's Brussels corridors, but Afghanistan is widely seen as a major failure in which NATO pulled out after 20 years and let the Taliban reconquer the place. Moreover, no one's saying it very loudly but inside NATO it's seen as a conflict in which the United States was doing the heavy lifting while many Europeans were present but avoided much of the action.

The Trump team's selection of former acting Attorney-General Matthew Whitaker as ambassador to NATO also raised eyebrows, as he doesn't appear to have much foreign policy experience. The press release announcing the nomination sent mixed messages, saying that Whitaker will both "strengthen relationships with our NATO Allies" and "put AMERICA FIRST." I should note that Trump's NATO ambassador during his first term, Kay Bailey Hutchison, also had little foreign policy experience but ended up being well regarded within the alliance. Diplomats told me it's a good sign that the new pick for NATO ambassador has been announced so early; Trump didn't nominate Hutchinson until June 2017, more than six months into his presidency. Many also seemed reassured by the presumptive national security adviser, Michael Waltz, and by the man picked for secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, who is known to many in Europe and co-authored U.S. legislation in 2023 barring any president from exiting NATO without Senate approval or an act Congress.

Keeping The Alliance Relevant

What many say they learned from the first Trump term is that one should heed actions rather than the "noise" playing out in the media. They noted, for example, that Trump increased the U.S. military presence on NATO's eastern flank. They do, however, acknowledge a certain nervousness about the perceived "unpredictability" of the incoming president and his team. All organizations want some sort of stability, but even more so a military one and especially NATO, where even annual summits are carefully choreographed: Major decisions are generally made weeks, if not months, in advance and the final meeting communique is rarely tampered with during the actual summit (unlike, for instance, European Union meetings, at which leaders can fight on for days over every comma).

The key is essentially to keep NATO relevant. And that can only happen if the military alliance can defend every inch of its territory. Simply put: deterrence. And that means 1) plenty of powerful military gear, which the United States has; and 2) the political will to honor Article 5. It's the second of those two things that people at NATO are fretting over.

The Two-Pronged Tactic

The NATO tactic to keep Washington coupled with the alliance going forward is two-pronged and can be detected in pretty much everything that NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has said since taking up the hot seat in October. The first is higher defense spending among NATO's European members; the second is a greater focus on China. In fact, it was Trump who hammered home these two things in his first term, and that has not gone unnoticed inside the alliance. When Trump was last president, just a handful of countries were spending the required 2 percent of GDP on defense; today, it's 24 of the 32 allies, and many credit the rise to Trump's scare tactics (although the war in Ukraine has obviously been a contributing factor). Rutte has been on the record from the very start saying that 2 percent is not enough. NATO officials I've spoken to argue that most must reach 3.5 percent in order to be competitive. The official commitment is there, but the question is whether it's accompanied by political will -- particularly considering that many European economies, notably Germany's, are hardly growing. Another problem is that the European defense market remains fragmented. And while the continent produces good stuff, it's rather "artisanal" in its approach -- in other words, its goods are high-end but take time to manufacture and don't come in bulk. Another NATO diplomat I spoke to was more blunt: "The Americans have better [aircraft] carriers, better drones, better air defense -- just better capabilities in general. Plus, the size of their army dwarfs every European one." Don't rule out European allies buying American in an attempt to please the new administration, instead of going through the longer-term and more painstaking ordeal of ramping up their own domestic production.

On China, NATO has already moved toward a much tougher stance on Beijing. The leaders of the alliance's four Asia-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) have already attended the last three NATO summits, and will be welcomed in the future. The quartet will also have a seat at the table in defense and foreign affairs meetings going forward. NATO diplomats keep arguing that the alliance is good for the United States, as its 32 members account for half the world's military and economic might, while China doesn't have 31 friends or allies. The European Commission recently slapped tariffs on Chinese-produced electric vehicles, and Sino-European relations might further sour following two recent events. The first was news that European intelligence believes Chinese-made military drones have been sent to Russia. The second was the severing last week of two Internet cables under the Baltic Sea, with a Chinese vessel reportedly spotted near both locations. Given that another Chinese ship destroyed the Balticconnector natural gas pipeline that runs between Estonia and Finland in 2023 and that Beijing declined to cooperate on any international investigation (although it acknowledged fault), many European governments might join Washington in becoming more hawkish on China.

The Trump-Whisperer And The EU Problem

Then, of course, there is NATO Secretary-General Rutte himself. The former Dutch prime minister was chosen in part because of a near-mythical belief in Brussels that he is something of a "Trump-whisperer" who developed a good relationship with the American during his first administration. People close to Rutte believe he's one of the few European leaders whom Trump actually respects, and he hasn't been shy about crediting Trump for the increased European defense spending. It's not for nothing that he was at Trump's Mar-a-Lago residence over the weekend. Ever the pragmatist, Rutte famously noted before he got his new gig at NATO that Europe must stop worrying about who's in the White House and "dance with whoever is on the dancefloor."

Despite the preparations, people I speak to still ponder what might go wrong. One scenario involves Americans conflating NATO with the European Union. While the belief within the military alliance is that Trump is OK with NATO as long as Europeans pay more, the European Union is bracing for a trade war. Billionaire entrepreneur and avid Trump supporter Elon Musk is a key individual in that context. Musk has sparred publicly with European politicians on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter that he bought two years ago. The fear is that Musk's interests will become very much intertwined with those of the U.S. administration. X is in the EU's regulatory crosshairs, notably in connection with the recently enacted Digital Service Act (DSA) that governs online content moderation in the EU. Most Internet giants try to comply with it; but the European Commission recently opened formal DSA proceedings against X that could result in fines of up to 1 billion euros ($1.04 billion). The fear is that this could erupt into an almighty transatlantic rift, with NATO suffering collateral damage.

Poland's Moment

There is perhaps one European country to watch out for in particular: Poland. Irrespective of the government in Warsaw, relations with Washington are warm. That's for good reason; Poland is spending more than any other NATO member on defense (a projected 4.7 percent of GDP in 2025). It has also invested massively in U.S. weapons: A new U.S. ballistic-missile-defense base was opened there in November, a U.S. company is building nuclear reactors in the country, and 10,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Poland. Will Warsaw be the county that keeps the U.S. anchored in Europe? Many officials I speak to hope so.

Something else to monitor is what might happen to the 90,000 or so U.S. troops deployed elsewhere on European soil, and whether they are redeployed outside Europe or mostly moved from Western Europe to the eastern flank. Poland could prove crucial, with Emmanuel Macron's France hobbled by a government dependent on the support of the far-right National Rally. For its part, Germany is facing federal elections in February that are likely to be followed by protracted coalition talks. But it's also the case that the person tipped so far to emerge as German chancellor, center-right candidate Friedrich Merz, could strike up a well-functioning relationship with Trump, thanks in part to his roots in the business sector and his hawkishness on the issue of immigration.

Ukraine In The Balance

It is ultimately the future of nonmember Ukraine that will shape much debate at NATO in the coming months. Publicly at least, European allies have clung to the notion of "nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine." But there are signs that Washington is moving in the direction of "land for peace" despite Kyiv's insistence that it won't cede territories to Russia.

While no one I've spoken to is privy to any concrete negotiation plan with Russia, one way or another, NATO will be part of any conversation. For instance, might NATO membership be offered to a "reduced Ukraine"? And would all 32 allies agree to such a thing, as is required for any accession? The concern I invariably hear in this context is that Moscow might immediately test Article 5 by sending a rocket into "reduced Ukraine" in the hope that there's no appetite within the alliance to fight Russia -- a hope informed, perhaps, by recent NATO summits at which Ukraine's invitation to NATO remained as elusive as ever.

Instead, it could be that NATO membership will be on hold for a longer period of time. European diplomats I've spoken to have instead suggested more robust bilateral security deals with Kyiv, sending greater quantities and more sophisticated arms so Ukraine could defend itself if Moscow decided to heat up what could be a budding frozen conflict.

Looking Ahead

Check out the European Parliament plenary this week. On November 27, the chamber is voting on confirmation of the next European Commission, which, if green-lighted, will officially start working on December 1. Then, on November 28, MEPs will vote on a nonbinding resolution on Georgia; the key point to watch is whether they demand new elections there.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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