Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeated allegations that the Iranian government is "putting people into Iraq to do things that are harmful to the future of Iraq."

Speaking to reporters at a March 7 press briefing in Washington, Rumsfeld added that "they're putting Iranian Al-Quds Force-type people into" Iraq. Asked if these forces were carrying out violence or trying to instigate political instability, Rumsfeld replied: "I don't think we could consider them religious pilgrims."

General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the same briefing that the U.S. has found some improvised explosive devices and weapons that it believes can be traced to Iran. Pace added that there has been an influx of "individuals" across the Iran-Iraq border but declined to say how many. Asked if the people entering Iraq were backed by the Iranian government, Pace said simply "I don't know."

Asked the same question, Rumsfeld was more ominous. "Well, of course," Rumsfeld said. "The Revolutionary Guard doesn't go milling around willy-nilly, one would think."

He added that the Iranian government might some day view its role in Iraq as an "error in judgment."

Years Of Speculation

Iraq observers have spent much of the past three years debating the extent of Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs. There is a growing belief in both Iraqi and U.S. circles that Iranian agents have permeated the Iraqi security apparatus, as well as the extra-governmental militias that engage in armed conflict with Iraqi police and army units and multinational forces. Iranian-style weapons -- in particular, more powerful improvised explosive devices -- have also made their way to Iraq in increasing numbers, posing a considerable threat to Iraqi and U.S. security forces.

In an August 2005 feature, the newsweekly "Time" argued that the Iranian regime began planning its infiltration to Iraq in late 2002, setting up military units along the Iran-Iraq border. The units reportedly accompanied Iraqi opposition parties and militias when they entered Iraq during the opening days of the war. "Time" reported that as many as 12,000 people entered Iraq from Iran in the early days after the U.S-led invasion, including agents of the Iranian security services.

Three years later, Iran appears to have entrenched its intelligence and paramilitary forces in Iraq by playing two sides of the conflict: Shi'ite parties and militias who share a common religious outlook, and Sunni Arab Islamists bent on establishing an Islamic caliphate in Iraq.

Among the possible Iranian goals in Iraq that have been bandied about are (1) establishing an Islamic state and preventing the formation of a pro-Arab, pro-U.S., secularist regime; (2) driving U.S. forces from Iraq; (3) preventing the revival of Al-Najaf over Qom as the seat of Shi'ite scholarship; and (4) obtaining influence over the exploitation of Iraq's natural resources, namely oil. A fifth possible goal is to establish a secure route linking Iran to Syria, thereby enabling the movement of goods and hardware that could be used as leverage in Iran's relationship with Israel.

Moving In

Iraq's leading Shi'ite political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), was based in Iran for some 20 years prior to the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime. SCIRI's armed wing, the Badr Corps (now known as the Badr Organization) was trained by Iran's Al-Quds Force, a special-operations unit of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. The Cairo-based weekly "Al-Ahram" contended in 2005 that Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad played a role in the formation of the Badr Corps and hence wields influence over the organization today. However, the veracity of that allegation is not known.

As the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 got under way, Badr forces -- hundreds of whom are Iraqis with military training who defected to Iran in the 1980s -- entered Iraq. They quickly took control of security, local governance, and aid organizations in Shi'ite-populated towns in Mada'in, located some 30 kilometers south of Baghdad, and as far north as Samarra, located 100 kilometers north of Baghdad. Many analysts believe the Badr forces were accompanied by Iranian Al-Quds Force troops.

Within a month, their sphere of influence had spread to other areas of the country. SCIRI head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim announced on April 23, 2003, that Badr forces "are in most villages and areas" in the country. "Nobody can drive them out," he said. The lack of security along the 1,000-kilometer Iran-Iraq border allowed for the free flow of weapons into Iraq.

In areas where these forces could not seize overt control, they turned to local clerics to bolster their influence. In areas where they faced resistance, they bought influence in local councils or seized power by force. Meanwhile, Iranian intelligence agents employed a systematic program to eliminate anyone with close ties to the United States, as well as former military personnel and technocrats who served under Hussein, Cairo's "Al-Ahram Weekly" reported on July 6, 2005.

The Situation Today

Iran's influence in Iraq today reportedly extends to all corners of the country but is most pervasive in the south. Iranian-backed militia consolidated their control over Al-Basrah by 2004. Now, they dominate the police, governorate council, security apparatuses, and even humanitarian organizations. The militias in the city have virtually eliminated local opposition. Now, minority Christians, Sunni Arabs, and secular Shi'ites are subjected to strict Islamic conduct in the region. Journalists have either abandoned their work altogether or work clandestinely.

In central Iraq, Iran has reportedly funded insurgents through Syria, setting up intelligence networks that some have claimed were better organized than Iraqi intelligence. In its August 2005 report, "Time" magazine wrote that it had obtained IRGC files from August 2004 showing at least 11,740 Badr Corps members were still on the IRGC payroll.

In October 2005, London's "Sunday Telegraph" reported that the Al-Quds Force had established three main smuggling routes into Iraq through Al-Basrah, Al-Amarah, and Baghdad from a base in Ahvaz, which is located inside the Iranian border southeast of Al-Amarah.

Support For Al-Sadrists

Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr denies any relationship with the Iranian regime, but he visited Iran in June 2003, where he met with high-level Iranian officials. Al-Sadr visited Iran again in January 2006, meeting with Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani. Since that time, it appears relations have deepened, and some U.S. and Iraqi officials have alleged that Iran is funding al-Sadr's Imam Al-Mahdi Army.

Following the fall of the Hussein regime, al-Sadr, a low-level cleric, aligned himself with Qom-based Iraqi Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri, relying on the ayatollah to issue fatwas that supported his agenda. The relationship was soon on rocky ground after al-Sadr clashed with the clerical establishment in Al-Najaf in late 2003. Later clashes between al-Sadr loyalists and U.S.-led coalition forces in 2004 led to a severing of ties with al-Ha'iri -- leaving al-Sadr without the crucial backing of a senior cleric.

During this period Iran reportedly set up training camps for Al-Mahdi militia inside Iranian territory, according to several sources. According to the reports, the militiamen are trained in combat tactics, reconnaissance, and espionage.

It was also during this time that a number of attempted assassinations were carried out against leading Shi'ite clergy. Some Iraqis accused the Iranian Al-Quds Force of carrying out the attacks, saying Iran's clerical leadership was worried about the revival of Al-Najaf's hawzahs (seminaries), which they viewed as a threat to Shi'ite seminaries in Qom.

The Al-Zarqawi Link

Iran has had links to key Al-Qaeda leaders since the mid-1990s. Al-Qaeda No. 2 leader Ayman al-Zawahri was the "frequent guest" of the Iranian intelligence ministry and Al-Quds Force commander Ahmad Vahidi throughout the 1990s, according to a January 20, 2003, report by the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism. Iran's relations with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization reportedly began in 2001. According to a December 2005 report prepared by Dore Gold and Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Haleve for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, al-Zarqawi visited Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) training camps and received logistical support from the Al-Quds Force in 2001. Likewise, al-Zarqawi spent time in Syrian training camps in 2002.

While an ideological divide separates al-Zarqawi's Salafist ideology and the Shi'ite ideology of Iran, the two share some common goals, including the overthrow of corrupt Sunni Arab regimes, the desire to establish Islamist rule across the Muslim world, and the destruction of Israel and its allies, namely the United States. Therefore, it is entirely plausible that al-Zarqawi and Iran's theocratic leaders have been able to come to some sort of strategic alliance.

Iran has reportedly aided Sunni Islamist terrorist organizations in the past -- in Algeria, Egypt, and Gaza. Western intelligence analysts claim that Iran's modus operandi is to "outsource" to proxy organizations the conduct of terrorist activities so that they cannot be linked to Iran.

Iranian Brigadier General Qasim Suleimani of the Revolution Guard Corps said in 2004 that Iran supported al-Zarqawi because his activities in Iraq coincided with Iran's goal of preventing the establishment of a pro-U.S. government there, the London-based "Al-Sharq al-Awsat" reported in August 2004.

Any al-Zarqawi-Iran connection may have been severed in recent months, however, as al-Zarqawi's ideology hardened. Al-Zarqawi announced in July that his group had formed the so-called Umar Brigade to hunt down and kill Shi'ite Badr Corps members. Despite warnings from Al-Qaeda leaders -- including No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahri -- that he should cease his attacks on Shi'ites, al-Zarqawi's group has continued its activities. Around the same time, al-Zarqawi also clashed with his one-time spiritual mentor, Jordanian-based Abu Ahmad al-Maqdisi over theological issues.

Iran's Ties To The Iraqi Government

Iran's strong relations with members of Iraq's Shi'ite-dominated government go back to the 1980s when groups like SCIRI and the Islamic Al-Da'wah (Call) party sought refuge in Iran from Saddam Hussein's regime.

Within this culture SCIRI's armed wing was born, and today members of those groups are prominent in the Iraqi government, including Prime Minister and Al-Da'wah Party leader Ibrahim al-Ja'fari and Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, who is a former leader of the Badr Corps. Jabr's leadership of the Interior Ministry has been called into question after dozens of attacks on Sunni Arabs in Iraq in the past year were purportedly carried out by armed men wearing ministry uniforms. Jabr has denied any wrongdoing by his forces, saying the uniforms were worn by insurgents hoping to spark sectarian violence in Iraq.

Other Iraqi Shi'ite leaders have also blamed insurgents for attacks on Sunni Arabs. Some observers have speculated that leaders such as SCIRI head al-Hakim and al-Ja'fari have lost influence over their original base of support among Iraqis living in Iran before the war. As a result, either they can't control armed Shi'a or they won't, because they are still dependent on Iranian financial support for their extra-governmental activities.

The outgoing transitional government has worked hard to secure stronger relations with Iran, signing a number of economic agreements with Iraq's eastern neighbor over the past nine months. Al-Ja'fari has in the past supported recognizing Iranians as a minority group in Iraq, "Time" magazine reported in August 2005. Although Iraqi Shi'ite leaders have maintained that they do not support the establishment of an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq, they did lobby intensively for the new constitution to spell out a greater role for Islam.

Iran has put forward a proposal to the United States and its Gulf Arab neighbors in an attempt to accelerate negotiations and ease concerns about its nuclear program.

The plan, presented by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi during a fourth round of talks with the United States in Oman on May 11, envisions the creation of a regional nuclear consortium that would include Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with the potential for American involvement.

With both Iranian and US officials silent, details about the consortium remain scarce.

What Do We Know About The Proposal?

The Iranian daily newspaper Khorasan, which was the first to report the story, said the proposed consortium is intended to reassure both Western and regional actors about Iran's commitment to nuclear transparency and safety while allowing the country to maintain control over its nuclear advancements through international cooperation.

Media quoting Iranian officials and sources familiar with the initiative say the consortium would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium but only to low levels suitable for civilian energy purposes -- well below the threshold required for nuclear weapons.

The enriched uranium would then be distributed to participating Arab countries for peaceful use. Crucially, the arrangement would involve the permanent on-site presence of representatives from the partner nations, and potentially the United States, to ensure transparency and compliance.

The proposal marks a significant departure from Washington's demand that Iran give up all uranium-enrichment capabilities and dismantle key nuclear facilities. US officials have so far not commented publicly on the offer, and it remains unclear whether President Donald Trump's administration will be open to any deal that allows enrichment on Iranian soil.

Mehran Mostafavi, a France-based academic and nuclear expert, said the initiative has potential but would be difficult to implement.

Speaking to RFE/RL's Radio Farda, he said the consortium could "significantly reduce the risk" of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East -- provided that major regional powers are involved.

"But the main issue is whether the Islamic republic can be trusted," Mostafavi said. "For trust to exist, the regime must be rooted in the will of the people -- but such a thing does not exist in Iran."

He added that, while establishing the consortium is "not impossible," the lack of trust in Iran's political system "undermines" its feasibility.

An Old Idea At A Critical Time

The consortium idea is not entirely new. In fact, Iran once proposed the creation of an international consortium back in 2008 to ease tensions and break a deadlock over its nuclear program. The initiative received little interest from Western nations, particularly because they opposed any enrichment taking place on Iranian soil.

With European powers threatening to trigger the 2015 nuclear deal's "snapback" of UN sanctions against Iran if there is no deal by the end of the June, the window is closing for Tehran to settle the issue with Washington.

Trump echoed this sentiment during his visit to Saudi Arabia this week, reiterating his desire for a diplomatic solution but warning that time is running out for Iran to make concessions before facing increased economic pressure.

Iran has been trying to strengthen its relations with both the Saudis and the Emiratis over the past two years. The Saudis, who are pursuing their own civil nuclear program with Washington's cooperation, have backed US talks with Iran.

Araqchi traveled to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi just ahead of Trump's regional tour, likely to discuss the initiative with the Arab states to get Trump on board.

Some analysts see the proposed consortium as a potential confidence-building measure that could open the door to broader regional security talks, but whether Washington sees it that way remains unclear.

With reporting by Hooman Askary of RFE/RL's Radio Farda

In a policy shift that has unsettled officials in Israel, the United States under President Donald Trump is no longer conditioning Saudi Arabia's civil nuclear ambitions on normalization with Israel.

The move, first reported ahead of Trump's May 13 visit to Riyadh, marks a sharp departure from the Biden administration's approach, which had linked nuclear cooperation and security guarantees to a broader regional deal involving Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts.

Under Biden, Saudi nuclear talks were tied to progress on normalization with Israel, with Washington hoping Riyadh's leverage could help extract concessions from Israel toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.

But with normalization effectively frozen -- due largely to the war in Gaza and Saudi Arabia's insistence on Palestinian statehood -- the Trump administration has opted for a more transactional approach.

This decoupling is seen by some as a reflection of Trump's priorities.

Gregory Brew, a senior analyst with the New York-based Eurasia Group, said the policy shift "isn't too surprising" given Washington and Riyadh's mutual interest in forging closer ties.

He told RFE/RL that, for now, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman is content with "getting massive arms sales and a verbal commitment to assisting Saudi Arabia should it come under attack," even as normalization remains off the table until "the situation in Gaza is resolved and progress is made toward a Palestinian state."

For Trump, economic deliverables appear paramount -- and the Saudis seem to understand that.

Michael Horowitz, an independent analyst based in Israel, suggested that Riyadh may have tailored its offer to Trump's interests.

"I think they grasp what motivates Trump and played their cards well," Horowitz told RFE/RL. "Trump wants his first regional tour to be a success, which entails securing major announcements, including Saudi investments in the United States."

A Deal at Any Cost?

Trump is keen on securing major Saudi investments and ensuring the United States is involved in the kingdom's nuclear program, regardless of the implications for Israel or the Middle East.

"[Trump] will view this as a victory on two fronts -- without looking at the possible consequences regionally or for Israel -- particularly if he feels Israel is being ‘difficult' on other topics, including Gaza and Iran," Horowitz said.

While some disagree , tensions between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been mounting, with the US president reportedly frustrated over Netanyahu's reluctance to align with Washington on key regional initiatives. For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia has been a strategic goal and a critical component of any future US-Saudi deal.

Now, that deal appears to be moving forward without Israeli input, presenting a "major setback" for Israel, according to Horowitz.

"What the Saudis are trying to secure is US approval for a program that does not follow [the] gold standard and would allow them to enrich uranium domestically. This is another layer of concern for Israel," he added.

Israeli leaders have also voiced doubts that a Saudi nuclear deal can pass the US Senate without Israeli involvement. But the Trump administration appears determined to press ahead.

The Iran Angle

Analysts warn the implications could reverberate across the region -- particularly in Iran, where nuclear talks with the United States remain fragile .

Washington says Tehran should abandon enrichment and instead import uranium, assuming it is even allowed to maintain a civil nuclear program. Iran, however, maintains that its enrichment capabilities are "nonnegotiable."

If the United States agrees to let Saudi Arabia enrich uranium, "it will have an even harder time arguing that Iran shouldn't do so itself," Horowitz said.

"This would be another clear signal that the United States isn't looking to ‘fully dismantle' the Iranian program as Israel demands, but to simply put limits," he added.

For the Saudis, the ability to enrich uranium is about more than energy -- it carries strategic weight. It keeps the option of weaponization on the table, serving as a form of deterrence.

"It presents a credible threat that any Iranian weaponization would likely trigger a similar response by Saudi Arabia," Brew said. "That's not something the Iranians would welcome."

The fourth round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States has ended in Muscat, with Tehran suggesting a new round will be scheduled by Omani mediators.

Iranian Foreign Minister spokesman Esmail Baqaei wrote on X that the talks on May 11 were "difficult but useful" to help "better understand each other's positions and to find reasonable and realistic ways" to resolve differences.

"Next round will be coordinated and announced by Oman," he wrote.

There were no immediate comments from the White House or the State Department on the talks, but US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff had suggested earlier that the outcome of the Oman talks could decide whether diplomacy continues or collapses.

Deep divisions have emerged over red lines in the past several weeks that threaten to derail the negotiations.

Witkoff, who is Washington's chief negotiator, stated in an interview ahead of the talks that Washington's position is "no enrichment," meaning Iran must dismantle its nuclear program, including key facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan.

"If Sunday’s discussions do not yield positive results, we will have to explore alternative approaches," Witkoff warned, strongly implying that a lack of progress in Oman could end the current negotiation track.

Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, who serves as Tehran’s top negotiator, has said enrichment is "nonnegotiable" and rejected the possibility of dismantling the nuclear program.

Speaking ahead of the talks in Oman, Araqchi said a deal can be reached with the United States if Washington’s goal is to ensure that Tehran does not acquire nuclear weapons.

“But if the goal of the negotiations is to deprive Iran of its nuclear rights, I state clearly that Iran will not back down from any of its rights,” he added.

Speaking ahead of the talks in Oman, Araqchi said a deal can be reached with the United States if Washington’s goal is to ensure that Tehran does not acquire nuclear weapons.

“But if the goal of the negotiations is to deprive Iran of its nuclear rights, I state clearly that Iran will not back down from any of its rights,” he added.

US President Donald Trump has warned of the possibility of military action if diplomatic efforts collapse, with Israel likely taking part in strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran has vowed to respond to any attack and has been showcasing its military capabilities in recent weeks, including the unveiling of a new missile and underground drone base.

Meanwhile, the United States in March deployed at least six B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia, a joint US-British military base on a remote island in the Indian Ocean. Last month, the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier was dispatched to join the USS Harry S. Truman, which is already stationed in the region.

Welcome back to The Farda Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter that tracks the key issues in Iran and explains why they matter.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Kian Sharifi. In this edition, I examine how Iranians are rallying against a reported plan by the Trump administration to rename the Persian Gulf -- an issue experts say could damage the US president's standing among Iranians.

What You Need To Know

• Alleged US Plan To Rename Persian Gulf Draws Ire: A reported plan by US President Donald Trump to rename the Persian Gulf as the "Arabian Gulf" or "Gulf of Arabia" has sparked a rare unity of outrage among Iranians across the political spectrum -- including his supporters -- who see the name as a matter of national identity and historical legitimacy.

• Iran Touts New Missile: Iran this week claimed to have successfully tested a new ballistic missile, the Qassem Basir, which can reportedly reach Israel and evade advanced US defense systems like Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh said the missile, with a range of 1,200 kilometers, was improved after Iran's past attacks on Israel. The missile uses electro-optical seekers, making it resistant to jamming. Footage of the test was aired on state TV.

• Early Rolling Blackouts Hit Tehran: Iran is experiencing worsening electricity shortages, prompting early rolling blackouts in Tehran despite mild weather. Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani cited rising demand for electricity, water, and gas as causes, and said the administration needs time to address the crisis. Experts warn that no short-term fix exists, with demand rising 7 percent annually and peak consumption exceeding generation capacity. Officials argue for nuclear energy to meet demand, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi saying Iran aims to build 19 reactors and is open to foreign investment if sanctions ease.

The Big Issue

Is Trump Alienating His Iranian Support Base?

The Associated Press on May 7, citing US officials, reported that Trump was planning to announce the name change during a scheduled trip to the Middle East next week.

Commentators, including Iranian supporters of Trump's Iran agenda, cautioned such a move could alienate Iranian Americans who support Trump's Iran policies and that it could even undermine nuclear negotiations.

Asked about the report, Trump told journalists he had not yet decided whether to change the name but was sure he would be asked about it on his Middle East trip. "I don't want to hurt anybody's feelings," he said in the Oval Office.

Why It Matters: The name "Persian Gulf" is a source of deep national pride in Iran, and any attempt to rename it is seen as an affront to the country's identity and history.

While the US government officially uses the term Persian Gulf, the military has occasionally used "Arabian Gulf" to align with Arab allies.

While the administration has yet to comment, there is precedent: Trump issued an executive order earlier this year to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the "Gulf of America," which led to a legal battle with the Associated Press, ending with a court ruling that defended press freedom.

What's Being Said: Analysts warn this could have real geopolitical consequences. For example, it could derail sensitive nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Washington or embolden Iran's regional rivals, especially regarding disputed territories such as Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb -- strategic islands in the Persian Gulf claimed by the United Arab Emirates but controlled by Iran.

Iran's conservative Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf hinted that Arab states in the region may have offered the US president an incentive in return for the name change.

"You might be able to buy shoes and clothes with dollars and dirhams," he wrote on X, referring to the Emirati currency, "but history and geography cannot be bought."

Meanwhile, Iran's former crown prince Reza Pahlavi said changing the Persian Gulf's name in the United States would be "an affront to the people of Iran."

"The Persian Gulf is our national inheritance, and the defense of its honor and its name is a national responsibility for each of us to bear in any way we can," he added.

Expert Opinion: Farzan Sabet, managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute, blamed the Islamic republic, writing on X, "They have made Iran so weak and have lost so much influence in the West and beyond that many non-Arab states have already changed their usage. This is just one of the many humiliations Iranians have suffered due to their mismanagement."

That's all from me for now.

Until next time,

Kian Sharifi

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Friday.

If there's one thing that transcends Iranians' personal beliefs and politics, it's the name of the body of water historically known as the Persian Gulf -- a name that has become a point of national pride amid efforts by some Arab states to rename it the Arabian Gulf.

So it came as little surprise that Iranians responded with outrage after a report that US President Donald Trump had endorsed the suggested name change.

The Associated Press reported on May 7 that Trump was planning to announce a change to either the "Arabian Gulf" or the "Gulf of Arabia."

The announcement, the AP report said, would come during Trump's visit to the Middle East next week.

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi on May 7 dismissed the report as likely part of a "disinformation" effort to "provoke and agitate Iranians worldwide."

He warned that while such a move would carry "no validity or legal or geographical effect," it would "only bring the wrath of all Iranians from all walks of life and political persuasion in in Iran, the US, and across the world."

Can It Hurt Opposition Support For Trump Policies?

Behnam Taleblu, senior director of the Iran program at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), warned that the move risked alienating Trump's support among Iranians who back his strong stance against the Islamic republic.

"This decision will have the inadvertent effect of watering down [Trump's] pro-max pressure constituency inside and outside the US and Iran that has supported the White House's Iran agenda while bolstering voices skeptical of his approach," he wrote on X.

The State Department and White House have consistently used the name Persian Gulf in line with the official policy of the US Board on Geographic Names, which has rejected proposals to change it to "Arabian Gulf."

In contrast, US Central Command and the US Navy often use "Arabian Gulf" in regional communications and documents, especially to align with Arab partners, though their usage sometimes varies between "Arabian Gulf" and the more neutral "the Gulf."

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, noted that the US military has used the term "Arabian Gulf" for years. But, he added, "In my experience, there's one thing that unites Iranians: ensuring it's called Persian Gulf."

Indeed, Iranian-American organizations with sharply differing political views issued separate statements on X opposing any name change.

"There has always been and will only ever be one name for the Persian Gulf," declared the National Union for Democracy in Iran. The National Iranian American Council echoed the sentiment: "It's the Persian Gulf -- today, tomorrow, and forever."

The name of the waterway is a deeply emotional issue for many Iranians, tied to pride in their country's heritage as the heart of the ancient Persian Empire.

Tensions flared in 2017 during Trump's first term when he referred to it as the "Arabian Gulf," prompting then-President Hassan Rouhani to quip that Trump should "study geography."

At the time, Iran's former crown prince Reza Pahlavi wrote a letter to Trump urging him to refrain from referring to the "historically unchallengeable Persian Gulf" by any other name. Pahlavi's supporters have been reposting his letter on X, though some have questioned the veracity of the reported plan to change the name.

Implications Beyond National Pride

Some have argued that changing the name of the Persian Gulf in the United States can do more than just hurt the pride of Iranians, such as leading to a breakdown in nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington.

Abdolrasool Divsallar, a security expert and adjunct professor at the Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan, said the move would be "a very bad decision in a very bad time."

He argued that it would "certainly have major negative implications on the nuclear talks, likely to cause Iran's unexpected reactions."

Meanwhile, Iran-based political commentator Mostafa Najafi speculated that the move could affect the legal status of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb -- three small but strategically important islands in the Persian Gulf that are controlled by Iran but claimed by the United Arab Emirates.

"Tehran backing down in the face of Trump's potential move, encouraged by Arab emirs and monarchs, would deal a major blow to Iran's national security and regional standing," he wrote on X.

This comes months after Trump’s executive order in January to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the “Gulf of America.”

The AP declined to adopt the new terminology, prompting the White House to restrict its journalists from covering most official events.

In response, the AP filed a lawsuit against the administration. In April, a US district judge ruled that the First Amendment protects the wire service from government retaliation over editorial decisions and ordered that its full access to White House events be reinstated.

US President Donald Trump said on May 6 that he's ordering a halt to US air strikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen after the Iran-backed group agreed to stop attacking ships on important shipping routes in the Middle East.

“We’re going to stop the bombing of the Houthis, effective immediately,” Trump said at the start of a meeting at the White House with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.

After Trump made the announcement, Oman said it had mediated the cease-fire, and confirmed that the US campaign was ending.

“In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi said on X, calling the agreement a “welcome outcome.”

The United States launched a campaign of air strikes in March, and Trump promised to use “overwhelming lethal force.”

That came after the Houthis said they would resume attacks on Israeli vessels sailing off Yemen in response to Israel's mounting another blockade on the Gaza Strip.

Trump said on May 6 that the Houthis had indicated to US officials that “they don’t want to fight anymore. They just don’t want to fight. And we will honor that, and we will stop the bombings.”

He said the announcement means the Houthis “will not be blowing up ships anymore.”

The Houthis have been firing at shipping in the Red Sea and at Israel since Israel began its military offensive in Gaza against Hamas, which has been designated by the United States and the EU as a terrorist organization, after the Palestinian militant group launched a deadly attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

The statement from Oman did not mention whether the Houthis had agreed to stop attacks on Israel.

The head of Yemen's Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, said the group would continue to support Gaza.

Separately, the head of Yemen's Houthi supreme revolutionary committee, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, said on X that the US halt of "aggression" against Yemen would be evaluated.

Israel’s military on May 6 launched air strikes against the Houthis that it said fully disabled the international airport in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa. Israel’s attacks were in retaliation for a Houthi missile strike on May 4 on Israel’s international airport.

Gregory Brew, a senior analyst with the Eurasia Group risk-analysis firm, said on X that the Houthis have not fired on a commercial ship since December.

“They are likely, however, to continue shooting at Israel,” Brew said.

From November 2023 until January 2025, the Houthis targeted more than 100 merchant vessels with missiles and drones. That has greatly reduced the flow of trade through the Red Sea corridor, which typically sees $1 trillion of goods move through it annually.

With reporting by AP and Reuters

Iran’s continued struggle with electricity shortages has led to the implementation of rolling blackouts in the capital, Tehran.

Power cuts have become a fixture of both summer and winter months, but rolling blackouts this year have started earlier than usual despite the temperatures being relatively low.

Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said during her weekly press conference on May 6 that the country was facing “multiple imbalances,” referring to rising demand for electricity, water, and gas.

She said the government of President Masud Pezeshkian “needs time” to address the energy shortage, without explicitly saying how much time was required. Experts say electricity consumption in Iran rises by about 7 percent, or 5,000 megawatts, every year.

Dalga Khatinoglu, an energy expert based in Azerbaijan, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda that Iran has no short-term solution for its electricity shortage, and even if it were to triple or quadruple its power production, it might only reach a balance sometime in the next decade.

Meanwhile, Tehran city Councilor Jafar Bandi Sharibani accused the authorities of discriminatory practices by imposing longer blackouts in lower-income neighborhoods.

Electricity consumption in Iran peaked at over 72,000 megawatts in the Iranian year 1402 (March 2023-23), while actual power generation capacity in the summer maxed out at around 60,000 megawatts.

Mostafa Rajabi Mashhadi, a spokesperson for Iran’s state-run power distribution company Tavanir, said that electricity consumption nationwide in the last two weeks rose by 9,000 megawatts compared to the same period last year.

Despite sitting atop the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves, Iran continues to face recurring energy shortages in both summer and winter.

Generous energy subsidies keep household bills low, but they also fuel excessive consumption.

Amid the struggle to keep the lights on, proponents of Iran’s nuclear program argue the country needs nuclear energy to generate electricity.

US President Donald Trump has called for the “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program, but has said he is open to considering allowing Iran to maintain a civil nuclear program to generate electricity.

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi last month said his country aims to build 19 more nuclear reactors -- a goal it has been pursuing since the 2000s. He teased that "tens of billions of dollars in potential contracts are up for grabs" and open to US investment, should Tehran and Washington reach a deal on Iran's nuclear program.

Iran says it has "successfully" tested a new ballistic missile that it claims can reach Israel and penetrate some of the most advanced missile-defense systems in the world.

Amid growing concerns in the West over Tehran's advancing nuclear and missile programs, Iran's state TV on May 4 aired footage of the Qassem Basir missile being tested and apparently hitting its target.

Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh said the solid-fueled missile has a range of 1,200 kilometers and can penetrate Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), an advanced anti-missile system that the United States deployed to Israel last year.

Nasirzadeh said the new missile was developed by addressing weaknesses revealed during operations True Promise 1 and 2 -- Iran's missile and drone attacks on Israel in April and October last year.

The minister asserted that the missile had been upgraded in both guidance and maneuverability to help it get through layers of air defense and claimed it was resistant to electronic jamming.

Tasnim news agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), said Qassem Basir is an upgraded version of the Martyr Hajj Qassem missile, which was named after slain IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and unveiled in 2020.

The missile was unveiled on the same day that Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen launched a missile attack near Israel's Ben Gurion Airport, injuring several people and briefly disrupting air traffic.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed the attack on Iranian support for the Houthis and pledged retaliation against both the Yemeni group and Tehran.

The missile notably evaded sophisticated air defense systems. Israel is said to have had two THAAD batteries and at least one Arrow 3 interceptor system in operation at the time of the attack.

Experts say the Qassem Basir missile marks the first usage by Tehran of optical seekers on a medium-range ballistic missile.

Russian-based weapons expert Yuri Lyamin noted that the new medium-range ballistic missile was now Iran's "most long-ranged" missile equipped with electro optical (EO) seekers, replacing the short-range ballistic missile Zolfaghar Basir.

Fabian Hinz, a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, explained that -- in theory -- this missile uses its own camera to navigate by matching what it sees against stored visual information. This means there's no external radio signal to interrupt, making it effectively jamming-resistant.

Hinz told RFE/RL that the accuracy of Iranian missiles that struck Israel, especially last October, "was not great." He attributed it to potential signal jamming, which is what prompted Iran to work on developing missiles that use EO seekers.

Nasirzadeh warned that any military aggression from the United States or Israel would prompt a global response targeting their assets and bases.

He stressed that while Iran does not seek confrontation, it will respond "firmly" if challenged.

US President Donald Trump says the goal of negotiations with Iran is to ensure the "total dismantlement" of Tehran's nuclear program but would consider allowing Iran to maintain a civilian nuclear energy program.

In an interview with NBC on May 4, Trump said tearing down Iran's nuclear program would be "all I'd accept."

The comment marks the first time Trump has explicitly said what he hopes to do with Iran's nuclear program, which Tehran maintains is peaceful.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested last week that Washington would be open to letting Iran operate a peaceful civil nuclear program, saying, "There's a way to do it."

"You build the reactors and you import enriched uranium to fuel those reactors. That's how dozens of countries around the world do it," he told Fox News on May 1.

Trump appeared to echo Rubio's remarks, telling NBC that he would be "open to hearing it."

"Civilian energy, it's called. But you know, civilian energy often leads to military wars. And we don't want to have them have a nuclear weapon. It's a very simple deal," he added.

Trump said a civilian nuclear program would be used to generate electricity, but given Iran is an energy-rich country it would not really need it.

"My inclination is to say, 'What do you need that for? You have a lot of oil,'" he said.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, said Trump's comments had made it clear the administration was not looking for a revamped version of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

"This interview calls that fantasy into question," he wrote on X.

Meanwhile, others insist Trump's comment suggests he is still undecided.

"Maybe one could argue that Trump's team still does not exactly know what it wants from Iran, but he himself desires a deal different from the JCPOA," wrote Iran-based foreign policy analyst Rahman Qahremanpour, referring to the 2015 nuclear deal.

Iran has rejected calls to dismantle its nuclear program and give up its ability to enrich uranium.

Responding to Trump's comment, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman on May 5 said Iran has "a right to peaceful nuclear energy" and dismissed Trump's oil remark.

"Iran's peaceful nuclear program goes back to the 1970s, when Iran had more fossil fuel and less consumption," Esmail Baqaei said during a weekly press conference.

"Therefore, some fallacious comments about Iran having access to expansive fossil fuel reserves and not needing nuclear energy have no basis in science or reality."

Iran and the United States have held three rounds of nuclear discussions since last month. Mediated by Oman, a fourth round was slated for May 2 in Rome but was postponed due to what Muscat called "logistical reasons."

British police have arrested eight men -- including seven Iranian nationals -- in two apparently unrelated counterterrorism operations, officers said on May 4, and authorities are attempting to determine if there are “any further risks” to the public.

"These were two major operations that reflect some of the biggest counter-state threat and counterterrorism operations that we have seen in recent years," Interior Secretary Yvette Cooper told reporters on May 4.

Specific details remained scarce regarding to two actions.

London's Metropolitan Police said five men, including four Iranians, were arrested on May 3 over a suspected plot to target a specific, undisclosed site. Authorities said they were still attempting to determine the nationality of the fifth suspect.

Separately, three Iranian nationals aged between 39 and 55 were arrested in London in a second operation that was not related to the first matter, the Metropolitan Police said.

The Iranian Embassy in London did not immediately comment on the arrests.

In the first incident, the men, aged 29 to 40, were detained in West London and in Swindon, Stockport, Rochdale, and Manchester, police said.

"The investigation relates to a suspected plot to target a specific premises. Officers have been in contact with the affected site to make them aware and provide relevant advice and support, but for operational reasons, we are not able to provide further information at this time," a police statement said.

Commander Dominic Murphy, chief of London police's Counter Terrorism Command, said, "We are exploring various lines of enquiry to...identify whether there may be any further risk to the public linked to this matter."

Authorities said the suspects are undergoing questioning and have not yet been formally charged.

In the second case, the three Iranian nationals were detained under the National Security Act, authorities said, without disclosing further details.

Searches were ongoing at their addresses, the police statement read.

The arrests come at a time of intensified tensions over suspected Tehran-supported activities in Britain.

Last year, Ken McCallum, the head of Britain's domestic spy service, said that since 2022, authorities had responded to 20 Iran-linked plots that potentially posed lethal threats to the public.

At the time, McCallum said hostile states, radicalized individuals, and the revitalized Islamic State (IS) terror group have combined to create “the most complex and interconnected threat environment we’ve ever seen.”

In March 2024, Pouria Zeraati, a presenter at a Persian-language media organization in London critical of the Iranian government, was stabbed in the leg outside his home in London.

Two men were later arrested in Romania and charged over the attack on Zeraati, a TV host for the Iran International news network.

With reporting by Reuters and AP

Since March 15, the United States has intensified its aerial campaign against Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels, claiming to have hit more than 1,000 targets.

Dubbed “Operation Rough Rider,” the campaign is intended to halt Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and ratchet up pressure on Tehran amid ongoing nuclear negotiations.

But despite the scale of the strikes, analysts question whether the effort has made any lasting impact.

“The Houthis remain undeterred,” said Colin Clarke, director of policy and research at the New York-based Soufan Group, an intelligence and security consultancy.

He noted that, while some Houthi infrastructure has been destroyed and personnel killed, the group appears to have turned the campaign to its advantage.

“Any losses are likely short-term and temporary,” he told RFE/RL, citing a boost in Houthi recruitment and fundraising.

Jeremy Binnie, a Middle East defense analyst with the global intelligence company Janes, added that the Houthis’ continued ability to launch attacks -- particularly against Israel and US drones -- undermines US claims of degrading their capabilities.

“It is arguably getting increasingly embarrassing for the United States every time the Houthis launch an attack on Israel or shoot down an MQ-9,” Binnie said.

A recent admission by the US Navy that an F/A-18 fighter fell off the USS Harry S. Truman during a maneuver to avoid a Houthi strike has only reinforced perceptions that the group remains a potent threat.

Meanwhile, the group has continued launching missiles toward Israel, claiming responsibility on May 2 for two strikes that prompted the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to intercept both and activate nationwide sirens.

US Central Command insists that the campaign has degraded the pace and effectiveness of the group's attacks.

"Ballistic missile launches have dropped by 69 percent. Additionally, attacks from one way attack drones have decreased by 55%," CENTCOM said in a statement on April 27. "Iran undoubtedly continues to provide support to the Houthis. The Houthis can only continue to attack our forces with the backing of the Iranian regime."

Have The Attacks Impacted Relations With Iran?

Analysts warn that the strikes may be having the opposite effect on regional dynamics, driving the Houthis closer to Tehran rather than isolating them.

The group -- formally known as the Ansarallah movement and designated a terrorist organization by the United States -- is a key member of Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance,” a network of nonstate actors that has faced setbacks over the past year.

But since the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, the Houthis have elevated their role within that alliance, claiming attacks on Israel and Israeli-linked shipping in solidarity with Palestinians.

While their growing prominence has afforded them some autonomy, experts say they remain deeply reliant on Iran for weapons and strategic support.

“You know very well what the US military is capable of -- and you were warned,” US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth posted on X on May 1, addressing Iran directly. “You will pay the CONSEQUENCE at the time and place of our choosing.”

Still, Clarke argues that the strikes may have only deepened the Houthi-Iran alliance.

“If anything, the strikes have pushed the Houthis closer to Iran,” he said, casting doubt on whether a future nuclear agreement would change Tehran’s behavior.

Binnie echoed Clarke’s skepticism. “US officials might hope the campaign pressures Iran,” he said, “but it’s difficult to say if that is happening.”

A fourth round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States was initially slated for May 3 in Rome but has been postponed due to what Omani mediators described as “logistical reasons.”

With weeks of sustained bombing behind it, the United States appears no closer to deterring Houthi attacks or weakening their political backing -- raising hard questions about the strategic value of the campaign.

Welcome back to The Farda Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter that tracks the key issues in Iran and explains why they matter.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Kian Sharifi. In this edition, I'm looking at the potential economic impact of a massive explosion at Iran's Shahid Rajaei port and whether it will impact Iranian trade and hopes for foreign investment.

What You Need To Know

• Trade Braces For 'Shock' After Port Explosion: The massive explosion at Iran's Shahid Rajaei port on April 26 is unlikely to cripple Iran's economy, but it poses a "big shock" to the country's international trade, analysts say. Iranian authorities say the blast was caused by "noncompliance with safety precautions and negligence," but it remains unclear what exactly caused the blast that killed at least 70 people and injured more than 1,000.

• Nuclear Talks In Rome Postponed: A fourth round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran was postponed. Mediated by Oman, the talks have reached a crucial phase where bridging differences on key issues were expected to be discussed. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei said in a statement on May 1 that the decision to postpone the talks in Rome had been taken based on the proposal of Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, who cited "logistical reasons" for the delay. He said the meeting was being rescheduled. State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce said the meeting had never been confirmed. The United States expects another round of talks "will take place in the near future," she said.

• Hijab Warning Text Message Raises Eyebrows: Some women in Tehran have received a text message from a state institution telling them that they have been observed in the city not complying with the mandatory hijab. The move has sparked widespread criticism, with many questioning how these individuals were identified and how their private phone numbers were obtained.

The Big Issue

Scaring Off Investors?

Analysts say the explosion will have major ramifications for not only Iranian trade through its busiest port but will also hinder the country's ability to attract investment.

The explosion obliterated over 10,000 shipping containers and set fuel storage tanks ablaze, causing a temporary suspension of foreign trade.

Paris-based economist Djamchid Assadi told RFE/RL's Radio Farda that while the explosion was unlikely to cripple Iran's sanctions-hit economy, it would have a "very negative" effect on both the supply of goods and securing foreign investment.

He said, regardless of whether the accident was caused by incompetence or sabotage, it raises questions about the level of safety in Iran's business environment.

"How can you hope to attract investment when you cannot ensure safety and security in that port?" Assadi argued.

While the authorities insist operations at the port have resumed, Azerbaijan-based energy and economy expert Dalga Khatinoglu said it will be a while before the port can return to business as usual.

"This will be a big shock to Iran's international trade," he told Radio Farda.

Why It Matters: The Shahid Rajaei port in Bandar Abbas is located near the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of the world's oil trade passes.

Commonly dubbed Iran's "golden gateway" to international commerce by Iranian media, Shahid Rajaei port manages about 85 percent of the nation's container throughput, over half of its overall trade, and 70 percent of its transit shipments.

What's Being Said: Hossein Zafari, a spokesman for Iran's crisis management agency, suggested the explosion may have resulted from improperly stored chemical materials within containers at the port.

Publicly available data indicate that shipments of chemical components used in missile propellant were received from China at the port in February and March. Nonetheless, a Defense Ministry spokesman has refuted claims that any military-related cargo, including missile fuel, was present at the explosion site.

Renowned Iranian filmmaker Jafar Panahi described the explosion as a symbol of "the collapse of a regime that has led Iran into ruin for nearly half a century" and demanded a referendum to "restore sovereignty to the people."

Expert Opinion: "There will be a big shock, particularly if administrative buildings in the terminal are also destroyed, which will cause a serious disruption to imports and exports," Khatinoglu said.

That's all from me for now.

Until next time,

Kian Sharifi

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here . It will be sent to your inbox every Friday.

Iran’s judiciary said it has executed Mohsen Langarneshin for allegedly spying for Israel and being involved in the high-profile assassination of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) colonel in 2022.

In a statement on April 30, the judiciary described Langarneshin as a “high-ranking spy” for Israel who had “supported several Mossad operations in Iran.”

In addition to his alleged involvement in the killing of IRGC Colonel Hassan Sayyad Khodaei in May 2022, Langarneshin was also accused of playing a role in a January 2023 drone attack on a military factory in Isfahan.

Iran’s judiciary also claimed that Langaranshin had met twice with senior Mossad intelligence officers -- once in Georgia and once in Nepal -- and described him as a “highly trained operative” who had undergone “extensive espionage training and was fully capable of carrying out assigned missions.”

Foreign-based Iranian human rights-focused news outlet HRANA said on April 28 that Langarneshin had made three separate requests for a retrial, all of which were rejected.

The HRANA report said he was moved to solitary confinement in the Ghezel Hesar Prison on April 29, a day before his execution, and allowed a final visit with his parents.

His father, Masud Langaranshin, released a video stating that his son had been sentenced to death “without a fair trial” and that the case was riddled with “inconsistencies and legal flaws.”

Quoting a source close to Langaranshin, HRANA claimed that “he was pressured during detention to make forced confessions” implicating him in the assassination of Sayyad Khodaei.

A shadowy figure in the IRGC, Sayyad Khodaei was killed by gunmen outside his home in Tehran. Israeli media have described Sayyad Khodaei as a key figure behind “plots to kill Israelis and Jews” and to attack Jewish interests around the world.

In an annual report on human rights, Amnesty International said on April 29 that Iran "arbitrarily" executed hundreds of people last year as authorities "used the death penalty as a tool of political repression against protesters, dissidents and ethnic minorities."

The death toll from a massive explosion at Iran’s key Shahid Rajaei port has hit 70, local authorities said, as the interior minister blamed “negligence” for the incident, which injured more than 1,000 people.

Eskandar Momeni told Iranian state television late on April 28 that “noncompliance with safety precautions and negligence” had caused the incident, though it was not immediately clear what started the fire at the hazardous and chemical materials storage depot.

Momeni said several “culprits have been identified and summoned” but did not share further details.

Mehrdad Hassanzadeh, the director of the crisis management office in the southern Hormozgan Province where the port is located, told state television that most of the injured had already been released from hospital.

On April 27, a day after the explosion happened, Hossein Zafari, a spokesman for Iran's crisis management organization, appeared to blame the blast on poor storage of chemicals in containers at the port.

Open-source data suggests that Iran took shipments of chemical ingredients from China used in missile fuel at the port in February and March. However, an Iranian Defense Ministry spokesman has denied that any cargo used for military use, including missile fuel, was being stored at the blast site.

The New York Times quoted an unnamed source with ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as saying the substance that exploded was sodium perchlorate, a key component in solid missile fuel.

Amid mounting criticism of officials over the incident, renowned Iranian filmmaker Jafar Panahi called for a “free and transparent referendum under international supervision to restore sovereignty to the people.”

In a post on Instagram, Panahi described the explosion as a symbol of “the collapse of a regime that has led Iran into ruin for nearly half a century.”

Iran's top diplomat has accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of trying to dictate US policy toward Iran after the premier renewed his call for the full dismantlement of Tehran's nuclear program.

Iranian and US negotiators concluded a third round of indirect talks over Iran's nuclear program on April 26, with a fourth round scheduled for May 3, likely in a European country.

Speaking in Jerusalem a day after the talks, Netanyahu said any deal with Iran must aim for the complete dismantling of the nuclear program and also address Tehran's missile capabilities.

"The real deal that works is the deal which removes Iran's capacity to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons," Netanyahu said, adding that a good agreement should also "bring in the prevention of ballistic missiles."

Writing on X, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said it was "striking…how brazenly Netanyahu is now dictating what President Trump can and cannot do in his diplomacy with Iran."

The Iranian diplomat maintained that his country was "strong and confident enough" to "thwart any attempt by malicious external actors to sabotage its foreign policy or dictate its course."

"We can only hope our US counterparts are equally steadfast," he added.

Netanyahu's comment came after a deadly explosion hit Iran’s Shahid Rajaei port, killing at least 46 people and injuring more than 1,000.

Some speculate that the explosion was linked to a shipment of a chemical ingredient used to make ballistic missile fuel, though Iran denies any sort of fuel was being stored in the container terminal.

Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda that the sharp orange color of the initial fire was consistent with burning sodium perchlorate, a component used in rocket fuel. Open-source data suggests Iran took shipments of the chemical at the port earlier this year.

According to various reports, the Donald Trump administration previously held Netanyahu back from launching strikes on Tehran's nuclear facilities. However, the US president has said he himself would be "leading the pack" toward war with Iran if he cannot clinch a deal.

Ali Shamkhani, a senior aide to Iran's supreme leader and former national security adviser, warned on April 28 that Israel would face "unimaginable consequences" if it attacked Iran's nuclear sites.

"The question is: Are these threats the result of Israel acting on its own, or are they coordinated with Trump to push forward negotiations with Iran?" he wrote on X.