At a summit in Washington on July 9-11, NATO announced a major aid package to support Ukraine's fight against Russia's full-scale invasion and said that Kyiv was on an "irreversible path" to membership.
That membership, however, is still likely a long way off. While the alliance has bolstered Ukraine's defenses, the United States, Germany, and other member states have indicated that Ukraine will not be offered membership as long as the country is at war.
A native Briton with a background working for the Ministry of Defense, Patrick Turner served as NATO assistant secretary-general from 2018 until 2022. On July 17, it was announced that he has been appointed to lead the NATO Representation in Ukraine (NRU). NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg outlined the NRU and its position for a civilian senior representative at the NATO summit last week in Washington.
In an interview with RFE/RL's Georgian Service, Turner discusses Ukraine's bid to join NATO, the alliance's recent summit, and the claim of Donald Trump, the former U.S. president and Republican presidential nominee, that he could end the Ukraine war in 24 hours.
RFE/RL: I wanted to ask about the U.S. political climate at the moment and all the recent developments that have been happening [with the U.S. presidential election race and questions about U.S. President Joe Biden's fitness for another term.] All of that cast a rather large shadow over the entire proceedings at the NATO summit in Washington. How much of a headache is that for the rest of the alliance? How could this affect the eventual outcome for Ukraine?
Patrick Turner: I'd say it's true that the American political debate, or crisis -- however you might term it -- tactically was a bit of a distraction during the summit. But it didn't affect the actual outcomes of the summit.... Europe, the rest of the world, are anyway waiting with more than considerable interest for what the outcome of the election in November is going to be.... I'd say on the NATO front, there is recent NATO polling evidence which shows strong support for NATO across the alliance and including in the U.S.
There continues to be strong support for NATO in Congress on both sides of the political aisle. There was strong support, thinking of Ukraine, actually from both sides of the political aisle when there was eventually a vote on the supplemental funding. So, I am rather confident, and I certainly have been hearing my old boss, Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary-general, being confident that irrespective of the outcome of the U.S. election, there will be good support for NATO.
[Stoltenberg] said, if we're thinking what would happen in the case of a second Trump presidency, he said in the case of the first Trump presidency -- and I was there during that time -- the focus was especially on defense spending. And [then] President Trump said -- and in my view, he was right to say -- it is not reasonable to expect American taxpayers to care more about defending Europe than European taxpayers.
So, if there are a large number of allies who are not meeting their commitments and their obligations, then that's unacceptable. And, indeed, it was unacceptable. So now you have 23 out of 32 allies...who have already got to 2 percent [of their gross domestic product spent on defense], and the remaining allies have plans to get to 2 percent. So, we're not in all respects where we need to be but much closer....
On support to Ukraine, I'm not going to make a prediction on how things might look here next year, what exactly that might mean. But my experience over the years is that some of the things said on a campaign trail, or quite a few of the things said on a campaign trail, don't necessarily translate into facts and policy. So, let's wait and see.
So far, support to Ukraine has been pretty unified and much stronger than [Russian President Vladimir] Putin would ever have counted on. And I count on that continuing to be the case. The package put together at the summit this week is a good signal of that, and it's designed to be a longer-term signal rather than just an interim signal for the next six months.
RFE/RL: If I might press you further on President Trump's statements that he could end the Ukraine war in 24 hours. Is that something that will end up being left on the campaign trail? Or do you think his proposal will be enacted? And if it were to be enacted, what would it look like?
Turner: I can't speculate on behalf of somebody else as to what that might mean in practice. I can imagine that some of that rhetoric may continue in the coming months. What is super clear now -- and has been made as explicit as it could possibly be -- is that Russia is not in the mood to negotiate. And they've been making clear this week during the summit that their strategic intent is to dismember Ukraine, for Ukraine as a separate country to cease to exist.
They very deliberately targeted one of their most vicious attacks in Ukraine on a hospital where children were being treated for cancer, so you can't imagine worse than that. [The Russians] were saying as clearly as they could: If anyone among you is dreaming of negotiating, then it's not a dream that we share.
And on the Ukrainian side, Ukrainian friends have been saying that we're not going to be engaging in discussions about losing Ukrainian territory or ceding Ukrainian territory. [And] there was a very successful, in terms of the degree of support for Ukraine, peace conference in Switzerland last month....
I don't like hypotheticals, but if negotiating with Putin were to mean making it even plainer than now that there is no path to victory, only a path to defeat [for Russia], and saying that more means will be used to achieve that, then I'd be in favor of that kind of negotiation. But I'm not sure whether that is what is meant. But more pressure on Russia, more clarity that there is no way that they're going to achieve their objectives, would only be a good thing.
RFE/RL: When you say that Russia demonstrated that it's not interested in negotiating, incidentally, President Putin recently spoke about President Trump's [statements about ending the war] and said that we don't know what they entail, but we at least know that he's being honest, that his intentions are honest. They are saying that they don't want to negotiate now. But would that preclude the possibility of them being more interested, more keen on negotiating, if there was a change of administration?
Turner: So far, whenever Russia has said we might be interested in talking or we have a peace proposal -- [or] for that matter when China came up with a peace proposal -- the proposals mean we get to keep what we've taken. So that's not a peace proposal.
RFE/RL: Would you consider such a solution unthinkable and absolutely unacceptable for a future Trump administration?
Turner: I can't see how it is an acceptable outcome [for Ukraine]. The friends of Ukraine, NATO allies, the summit this week, have said we will never recognize Russian annexations in Ukraine.* So not Crimea, not the Donbas, not territory currently occupied beyond the Donbas. So we will never recognize [Russian annexations].
NATO and NATO allies have been in this position before. I think there were over 50 U.S. statements while the Baltic states were occupied: We will never recognize that the Baltic states are part of the Soviet Union; they are independent countries. So, it may be that we're going to be in the position for many years, and we will never recognize [Russian annexations].
So, no, I think a path to carving up somebody else's country is not a path that we should be traveling on. And were it our own country, were it the U.K. -- I'm British -- or Germany or France or the U.S., we would not be willing to contemplate that path. But, as ever, we will have to see what the future holds....
Ukraine has been amazingly clear and resolute. They've held the line in an extraordinary way against a much larger and more capable adversary. Russia suffered incalculable losses that would be politically impossible to bear in any of our countries. And Ukraine is showing no signs of saying, "We've had enough." I think they've been successful in revamping conscription in Ukraine and making sure that they continue to be able to fight. So, I think it is clear that we should continue to support them.
RFE/RL: Would it still be fair to say that diplomatically, or rather politically, [the recent NATO summit] has been another instance of kicking the can down the road when it comes to Ukraine's NATO membership?
Turner: Yes, I think on a number of issues covered by the summit, it's almost a holding position. So, on defense spending, there could have been a raising of the level of ambition or the level of commitment. The reality is the Europeans allies and Canada have spent 18 percent more this year, so that's extremely impressive. But there could have been a move to sign up for a 2.5 [of GDP defense spending] percent target, for example, so theoretically that will be thought about next year. There could have been a clearer long-term financial commitment to Ukraine, and that will be thought about next year. There could have been a bolder approach to inviting Ukraine [to join NATO], but for some obvious [U.S.] domestic political reasons that was never likely to be the case this year.
In a way, some of these issues are deferred but, in each case, there has been some progress.... If you step back, it's not surprising, given particularly the upcoming election here in the U.S., that some of these issues have been treated in a short-term rather than longer-term way.
RFE/RL: There was also another thing that was mentioned [in the final NATO summit communique]: China being an enabler of Russia. It is one thing to mention it; it is another to hold [China] accountable. Have there been any steps made in that direction?
Turner: So the [NATO] secretary-general has been saying publicly for some months that China is, in effect, a major enabler of the largest war in Europe since World War II and that China cannot ride two horses at the same time: both be an economic partner -- or partner in other senses -- of our countries on the one hand and, on the other, be the key enabler in terms of providing dual-use capabilities to arm Russia to engage in a huge war against Ukraine. And [he has said] that there will need to be consequences....
The Tavberidze Interviews
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.
RFE/RL: Do you think we'll see these consequences in the short term?
Turner: The language in the statement issued by the summit on China is strong, and it's not just the secretary-general saying it, and it's not just an individual NATO ally saying it -- it's all 32 allies with their range of views on China, and there [really] are different views. But [it's] a strong statement on China's really unacceptable behavior in a number of domains: aggressive actions, cyberactivities, activities in space, disinformation, attempts to gain control of critical infrastructure. And then this language about [China] being a key enabler for Russia.
So, that is a strong statement by NATO, probably the strongest to date. Does that mean that the allies will actually take action in the near term to ensure that there are consequences? I don't know, but it certainly increases the pressure on themselves to take action to ensure there are consequences. And I think there will be more of a mood [to go] in that direction.
If you go back a few months, certainly a year, [NATO's] public narrative was: We're watching to see if China is arming Russia. The statement now says, in effect, yes, China is arming Russia, not by providing finished weapons systems but by providing key components, which enable Russian production of weapons systems.
So, I would say that the political pressure to act has gone up substantially. Sitting in Washington, the mood on China is pretty tough on both sides of the political aisle. There's almost competition between the Democratic and Republican sides to be tougher on China. In a way, especially for European countries, [there are] some difficult choices, and the EU has perhaps been more hopeful for longer than the U.S. on being able to find ways of having a slightly more cooperative relationship with China.
Now it's clear that they -- along with Iran and North Korea -- are [in] a pretty bad club, a very bad club to be in, and they are enabling Russia. I think the pressure to take measures is materially increased.
