'Escalation? The Russians Have Already Escalated': Former Estonian Spy Chief On Why The West Should Continue To Support Ukraine

Politico dubbed him the "Baltic James Bond" for his spy past and an ascribed willingness to "move in shadows and operate on the edge."

Eerik-Niiles Kross is a Soviet-era dissident who later headed independent Estonia's foreign intelligence service. Now a lawmaker for the Estonian Reform party, Kross is a longtime critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was an adviser to the Georgian government during its brief 2008 war with Russia, and the author of dozens of articles on Russia and NATO.

He has even been sought internationally by Russian authorities over the alleged hijacking in Baltic waters in 2009 of a Russian-crewed cargo ship, called the Arctic Sea, that was subsequently rumored to have been transporting weapons. (The allegation was described as nonsense by Kross and Estonian officials.)

Kross talked to RFE/RL Georgian Service fellow Vazha Tavberidze on August 10 about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, why he's OK with the EU excluding Russians who won't "defect," a narrowing identity gap between "Old" and "New" Europe, and critical lessons from the West's experience with post-Soviet Georgia.

RFE/RL: As a former intelligence chief, you must be quite adept at reading the psychology of an opponent. How big of a blow is it when, out of the blue, the Russians get a nasty surprise like the [explosions at the Saky air base] in Crimea?

Eerik-Niiles Kross: First of all, it's not the first time Ukrainians have hit targets inside Russian territory, or, let's say, Russia proper -- Crimea is to be considered Ukraine. They probably were surprised by the distance, which is farther than usual. And we don't know at this point if it's some longer-hitting ammunition [from the U.S.-supplied] HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) or Ukrainian ammunition.

(Editor's note: Since this interview, the Russian Defense Ministry has publicly denied the blasts were the result of an attack and blamed the explosions on carelessness. Kyiv has publicly distanced itself from the explosions, while U.S. media have quoted unnamed Ukrainian officials as saying Ukrainian forces were responsible.)

I think probably it's more important for the Ukrainians themselves, because that definitely gives them more confidence. It's a very good development in that regard: Crimea is not out of reach. It has been a little bit of a burden for them. It's definitely a psychological blow to the pro-occupation population in Crimea, and tourists, and all that.

To the Russian operational command, I think it's not such a big surprise. They have been worried about it and they have been losing ammunition depots for weeks now, some of them 80 or 90 kilometers behind the front line. So I would think that the Russian operational planners have taken that into consideration. But it's good proof of the capabilities of Ukrainians. I wouldn't call it a strategic breakthrough yet, but the trend is positive, let's say.

RFE/RL: What do you expect Russia to do in retaliation? Do you expect anything specific?

Kross: They probably will do more of the same that they have been doing, routinely targeting random Ukrainian towns and villages. So they will respond with what they know best: killing civilians. It doesn't really change the balance on the battlefield.

RFE/RL: How do you think this will also affect the West's willingness to further assist Ukraine? Is the narrative advocating for "not giving Ukraine weapons that would shoot too far" finally dying down now?

Kross: It's not going to go away. It's been there from the very beginning. The same people who said in the beginning that there is no sense giving the Ukrainians any weapons because that wouldn't help anyway and it wouldn't make any difference because the Russians would win anyway, [because] they have an upper hand, now they're saying: "We can't let the Ukrainians get more weapons because that will backfire."

This excuse that we shouldn't give [Ukraine] weapons because there would be an escalation, I mean, what does it even mean? What escalation? The Russians have already escalated to the hottest conflict since World War II. I would assess that the actual threat of nuclear escalation is reduced because, you know, they would have done it already.

It's a serious issue. We can't disregard the problem with the nuclear power plant [at Zaporizhzhya] that is being used as a shield by the Russians, and all those risks are there. But the worst thing to do as a response to a blatant open nuclear threat from the Russians -- because rhetorically they keep bringing it up -- would be to give in to it. Going down that road would basically mean that anytime the Russians really want something, they say "nuclear bomb" and then they get it. And where would that end? With Russians at La Manche (the English Channel)?

RFE/RL: Your own prime minister, Kaja Kallas, seems to be unhappy with Russians being allowed to travel to Europe while their government is killing innocents in another country. "To visit Europe is a privilege, not a right," she says. Are you on board with that statement? And if so, what would be your answer to those who claim that Russian tourists have nothing to do with what Putin is doing?

Kross: First of all, in principle, yes, of course, I'm on board. And [Russian] demands that "we need to be let into Europe because it's our right, and we need to be able to travel, and we have nothing to do with war, and we're a separate thing," to some extent, on a personal level, that might be correct.

But we can't forget that Putin and his gang has been voted in -- maybe not fairly in the latest elections, but anyone who has grown up in the Soviet Union and witnessed Putin's coming to power had enough information to understand what they are about already back in 2000. So to say that the Russian voter has nothing to do with it is wrong. They do have some responsibility, [although] not personal responsibility for the war.

And then the behavior of far too many Russian tourists in Europe has not been exemplary. All those cases of harassing Ukrainians or demanding to take down Ukrainian flags. Why?

So I don't think we should totally stop giving Russians any visas. I think we should keep open the possibility for them to "defect" if they want to, if someone needs protection. But I very much like the idea that has been floated by the Russian opposition organizations, which basically says that any Russian citizen -- and there are lots of Russian citizens residing already in the European Union with long-term visas or residency permits, etcetera -- but there should be some way for Europeans to start to handle them and to understand who is who. And even if that wouldn't give you any guarantees -- to begin with, the idea is that in order for a Russian citizen to prolong a visa or apply for EU residency or a visa, they first need to sign a written statement that says, "I'm against the war, the war is criminal, and the sanctions need to continue until all of Ukraine is free and the war criminals are sentenced."

At least right now, it seems there are several countries -- not just Baltic states -- that are coming to the conclusion that you can't entirely separate the war and average Russians, you know, demanding a vacation in Italy.

RFE/RL: Regarding the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, I interview high-ranking Western politicians who claim that the chronology is very important of whether that war began on August 7 or August 8, 2008. They say, "[Georgians] shouldn't have [sent troops in to the breakaway regions]. That was detrimental to Georgia." In the case of Georgia, plenty of people have bought into the debate over who sparked that conflict.

Kross: Probably, yes. They're the same kind of people who now say, "Let's have a cease-fire in Ukraine because, you know, the bloodshed. Let's give Russians territory." They're asking nicely and [saying], "Why doesn't Ukraine say that we will never join NATO," and so on. Because it was absolutely clear, and is even more clear now, that Putin had decided to punish Georgia, to project [and] to establish further military control over at least Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And probably the plan was also to topple the [Georgian] government.

The assumption was that once we go in, we get rid of [then-President Mikheil] Saakashvili and we stop this nonsense about NATO. So if Georgia retaliated to the days-and-days-long shelling...of villages -- no government should actually be able to tolerate that, you know, on your territory. A foreign military is using heavy weapons against your people. What do you do? That's not a government, if they tolerate that.

So if Georgia wouldn't have responded to that, then there would have been a next step and a next step and a next step. And at the end of the day, as we know, they [in Moscow] don't really need any excuse. They didn't have any excuse in Crimea [in 2014]. They just came in. They just didn't bother to make something up.

So, yes, you can argue that tactically it wasn't the right moment and something else should have been tried. But negotiations were tried for months [in the Georgian case].

Yes, war could have been avoided if Georgia had said, "Fine, we no longer join NATO. Fine, we want to be friends with Russia. Fine, we give you some of our territory." But I mean, basically, there would have been the war goals achieved through pressure and threat.

What also shouldn't be forgotten is that the Russians have not fulfilled any of the six-point cease-fire plan [agreed to halt the Georgian war]. [For Russia,] a cease-fire is never a cease-fire; it's just a continuation.

RFE/RL: We had an interview three years ago and there was a particularly prophetic quote. You said, "If the West continues the current appeasement policy toward Russia, it might cost us a lot in the very near future." It appears you were right. What course would you advocate for now, in order not to pay an even higher price in the future?

Kross: Right now, it looks like, so far, the West has not entirely failed. We have a chance to get this right. Of course, a lot of us would have liked the assistance to Ukraine to have happened faster, and there should be more, and there should be bigger resolve. But overall, mostly thanks to the Ukrainians themselves -- the Ukrainians keep fighting, and that keeps the world in the fight -- we might get this right, [although] it's not going to be easy. But if Ukraine, together with Western assistance, manages to kick the Russians out at least up to the February 23 borders or control lines -- but preferably from all of Ukraine -- that would then give us time to realign and build in Europe so that we will see a very new Eastern Europe.

You can see new military alliances emerging, for the first time since like 1919, where you have Finland, Romania, Ukraine, Poland, the Baltics, all these countries, even Sweden, are pretty much on the same [page], with defense policy, with the threat picture, and there are no major frictions between those countries. And that is a very hopeful situation.

Of course, the Russians will do all they can to break that up and play those countries against each other -- the Old West against Eastern Europe. But I think what this war has done is also to reduce significantly the sort of psychological gap, the identity gap, between the Old West and this New Europe. Like it's all the same Europe. At least a lot more on a people's level.

And the voters matter. If you have Irish fishermen asking for Ukrainian refugees to be supported, through their Catholic priests, and you have Spanish taxi drivers driving Ukrainian war refugees to Spain from the Polish border, you know, it's a new thing in Europe.

The Tavberidize Interviews

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.

RFE/RL: Well, with all that in mind, how would you rate the current Georgian political course? (Editor's note: The Georgian government's expedited request for EU membership was deferred in June by the bloc, which demanded specific reform and action priorities before it next evaluates Tbilisi's bid. At the same time, the EU gave Ukraine and Moldova candidate status.)

Kross: It's very worrisome. Countries like Estonia and Poland -- the traditional allies and friends of Georgia, countries that supported Georgia in 2008 and have always supported Georgia's NATO accession and EU accession -- are saying, "You are our friend, and we need Georgia in the Western realm." It's unfortunate to say, but we're making the same mistake now with Georgia that we blame Western governments, like the Germans and the Americans and the French, for making with the Russians in the 1990s and in 2000.

RFE/RL: How do you mean?

Kross: The signs of off-railing from the democratic path are there. We see that the Georgian government is imprisoning opposition [figures], it's closing down media, it's polarizing, it's flirting with the Russians. There are a lot of signs that are worrisome. It doesn't respect the EU-facilitated agreement with the opposition. And we are sort of still saying, "Yes, but they are our friends and they're actually good guys." And we are not critical enough at this point. We think there's still time to bring Georgia back. [What] if the Georgian government gets away with it and can say, "You know, the European values are not for us, we are different, but we still want the money," and we say, "Yes, yes"?

Now I better understand this attitude that was in Berlin and Paris [regarding Russia]. It was actually in their interest; they wanted Russia to be the partner and then have business with Russia and, you know, you close an eye when Putin starts to do bad things. We're now doing the same thing with Georgia because we want Georgia to be in NATO and with us, and so the Georgian government is getting away with things that it shouldn't.