Mikhail Zygar is a Russian journalist who publicly condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and fled into exile days later. Before that, he was the founding editor in chief of TV Rain (Dozhd TV), an independent news and current affairs channel. He authored the 2016 book All The Kremlin's Men: Inside The Court Of Vladimir Putin, a bestseller in Russia that has been translated into over 20 languages. His latest book is an overview of Putin's purported plans for Ukraine titled War And Punishment.
He spoke to RFE/RL's Georgian Service about the lead-up to the invasion of Ukraine, collective conscience and responsibility, and whether Putin needs this war to keep Russia.
RFE/RL: Let's go all the way back to February 24, 2022. When the full-scale war started, there was this meme floating around -- I'm sure you've seen it as well -- it's a startled man awake at night checking whether [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskiy is alright or not. What were the first days of the war like for you?
Mikhail Zygar: That morning, I realized that's probably the end of my life in Russia -- that I couldn't continue living in a country that had become a fascist country, a fascist regime. I needed to do something about that as a journalist and, as an author, I should continue writing about it. And I had to leave because that profession [of journalist] was abolished in Russia.
RFE/RL: On this realization that you had to leave Russia, that you could no longer stay there, and probably a new chapter of your life was beginning: We recently interviewed a Russian researcher who also lives in exile, Margarita Zavodskaya, and she said that to be a citizen of an aggressor country feels like a curse. Does it feel like a curse to you?
Zygar: I'm trying to be less emotional. I think that many people feel very differently. We talk a lot about collective guilt and collective responsibility, and actually, until now, I don't understand what's the difference between guilt and responsibility and why we should talk about "collective guilt" and "collective responsibility." I only believe in personal guilt and personal responsibility, and I definitely feel my personal guilt and my personal responsibility, and I can speak about that.
The Tavberidze Interviews
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.
As an author, not as a Russian citizen but as an author, as a journalist, as a historian, I definitely feel responsibility. I feel that I'm guilty of having been blind for so many years. Not in terms of the current Russian political situation -- I was very vocal and very open about that -- but I was blind about Russian history and the Russian Empire, and for so many years we didn't pay attention to that imperial and colonial nature of the Russian state. That part of Russian history was somehow neglected. And we, Russian intellectuals, Russian society as well, we have never touched upon that topic; we have never started that conversation.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was so much effort to discuss the crimes of Bolsheviks [Vladimir] Lenin and [Josef] Stalin that we overlooked -- we didn't touch -- the much bigger picture. We have never started the conversation about the Russian Empire as such. And I think that's the problem, that's the guilt of Russian authors, Russian historians, Russian journalists, and mine as well. I was deaf to the pains of other people. I didn't hear what many Ukrainians or people from other countries -- from Belarus, from Georgia, from Armenia -- were saying to me. I was not careful enough. And yes, I feel guilty for that.
RFE/RL: In your book War And Punishment, that theme -- of responsibility and guilt -- plays a central role. In fact, if I'm not mistaken, the book starts with the words "I'm guilty," right? You already made the distinction between personal responsibility and collective responsibility. But you're just one man and I'm sure there's more than one man who feels guilty in Russia. How many don't feel guilty?
Zygar: The problem is that the situation is changing. The problem is that people don't feel the same as they felt at the beginning [of the invasion]. The problem is that a lot has changed since last February, [and] a lot is going to change. And, so far, we unfortunately see a process that could be called normalization of the war. And unfortunately that's a very complicated issue.
It's happening not only because people are scared and prefer to pretend that nothing is happening, but it's also a political issue. It happens because the West was not ready and was not able to support all those Russians who were shocked and who wanted to leave Russia and didn't want to support Putin and didn't want to have business in Russia and wanted to leave. But we had that reality, we have the reality, where a lot of people were pushed back to Russia. A lot of people stayed there.
That very anti-Western atmosphere that we have now in Russia is partially due to that Western policy, and I guess that was a mistake, but it was not the only reason for the process that we are seeing. The propaganda is another very important factor. The course of the war is another important factor.
RFE/RL: Would it be fair to say that the longer the war drags on, the less responsible, the less guilty, Russians will feel about it?
Zygar: No, I hope it's not that straightforward. And we know that historically the truth is going to be revealed anyway. It's not a matter of years; it's a matter of generations, but it will happen. I have no doubts about that. We have never seen a brutal war that has remained unnoticed in history. And I have no doubts that the generation of Russians that is born after the end of this war will be free of that hysteria and will be free of all the imperial attitudes. I'm sure that this war is the moral bankruptcy of the Russian imperial myth.
RFE/RL: Doesn't that depend on the outcome of the war? We've seen there are plenty of brutal wars that have been glorified by those who won them.
Zygar: I actually do not understand how Russia can win this war. And it's important that the goal is not to win this war, but to have this war.
Why did Putin start this war? He probably had the idea of conquering Kyiv quickly, within three days, and he really had that delusion. After that he wanted not to have Kyiv but to have the war. He needs this war to keep Russia, he needs it to remain in power. Only in those moments when he feels vulnerable does he start another war to maintain his power. So he needs the war. And I do not believe that this war can be over until the moment he's gone. So I think it's going to be, unfortunately, a long war. And do I believe that he can conquer Kyiv? I don't believe that. But I believe that that he can try again, and again, and again.
We see that his strategy is to wait until Western support fades away, and after the American presidential election he will probably be willing to try again.
RFE/RL: Try another offensive, or try to reach some sort of conclusion?
Zygar: To go to Kyiv.
RFE/RL: Is Kyiv the minimum that he wants out of this? What's the minimum requirement for him to declare victory?
Zygar: He doesn't need to conquer anything to declare victory. He doesn't need anything.
RFE/RL: I've heard that being said -- that he can wake up one day and say the war is won and people will come out and cheer for him. But realistically, is there something that he wants that can make him believe that he won?
Zygar: There is a very important mystic factor of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, and it has a special significance. (Editor's note: Also known as the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, this monastery was founded in the 11th century and is widely regarded as a regional hub of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.)
You probably remember that there were some protest rallies against Russia in Tbilisi, and Margarita Simonyan, the editor in chief of RT, wrote on her Telegram channel: "Georgians, don't you understand that you don't have anything sacred in your city, we won't stop, we will destroy Tbilisi with our missiles easily, because you have nothing like Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra there." And it was very revealing, because she knows, people know, that for Putin there is some kind of mystical feeling about Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. When he last visited Kyiv in 2014, Putin spent almost all his time in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. So, yes, it's something sacred.
But he doesn't really need anything to declare victory. He can do it anytime. But he doesn't need to; he prefers the war because now they have declared that they are fighting against the Americans, not against the Ukrainians.
RFE/RL: And along with these mystical notes, increasingly, the retelling of history comes to the fore. On that subject, you had an essay in The New York Times recently about the new historic textbook that has come out with Vladimir Medinsky, Putin's aide, whom you dubbed "Putin's ghostwriter," as one of the principal authors. Particularly interesting for Georgians is the revisionist take on Stalin. Has Stalin officially become an example of a great wartime Russian leader?
Zygar: Yes, we know Putin has a much more positive attitude toward Stalin than most Russian politicians. And in my book I tell the story that former Polish President [Aleksander] Kwasniewski told me once that, back in the beginning of his presidency, Putin was talking to him about Russian history and told [him] that his moral examples as Russian rulers are Peter I, Catherine II, and Josef Vissarionovich [Stalin]. He didn't even call him by his surname; for him, he was Josef Vissarionovich.
For Kwasniewski, that was very important; they spoke in Russian and Kwasniewski was left impressed by that naming. But still, I think that in terms of using history, he is rather cynical, as Medinsky is very, very cynical. He is not a historian, he is a professional PR specialist, not a professional historian.
RFE/RL: Didn't he also say that facts are not important and interpretations are what matter?
Zygar: Yes. He started his career as a PR historian from explaining that historical figures in Russia were not as terrible as they are described by the Western historians. He wrote many articles trying to prove that [Russian Tsar] Ivan the Terrible was not terrible, that he was very humane and not as bad as some Western leaders of that time. Cruelty for the Middle Ages was OK, and Ivan the Terrible was more or less better than others. He uses the same method for Stalin.
When he wrote that about Ivan the Terrible, it sounded funny; but when he writes that about Stalin, it's no longer funny. Because since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we had most of our archives -- at least from the Stalinist period -- open and we know what [that period was like]. Only a lunatic can claim that Stalin was not a murderous dictator.
In his textbook, he hints that probably all the victims of Stalin's purges were not so innocent. "They were blamed for being enemies of the people, and maybe some of them were not to blame, but actually, after all, it was the right thing to do." That's the narrative.
RFE/RL: I want to ask you about your previous book, All The Kremlin's Men. I'm told that Zelenskiy, before his first meeting with Putin, used it as some sort of primer to prepare.
Zygar: I don't know when exactly [he read the book]. Аs we talked, he once mentioned that the book was helpful. But I don't know if he read it before his first meeting with Putin or after.
RFE/RL: In a time-travel scenario, if you had been there to advise Zelenskiy before his first meeting with Putin, what would have been your principal advice?
Zygar: It's a very complicated issue. If my goal had been to avoid the war… [and] I think that the major reasons for this war were in Russia, not in Ukraine. Obviously there was a possibility to do [something] from the Ukrainian side to minimize the risks, but I guess that the most important factors were not in Zelenskiy's hands. I guess that the revolutionary situation in Belarus, the situation in Russia, the poisoning of [Russian opposition leader Aleksei] Navalny and [the subsequent] investigation of Navalny and imprisonment of Navalny were much more important [factors] for this war to start.
RFE/RL: So no advice would have helped?
Zygar: I do believe that nothing is predetermined. I do believe that we were not doomed to have this war. So I guess that probably some very cunning game was possible. Zelenskiy is a political animal; he has very good instincts. So probably, if he had known, if he had had a crystal ball, and if he had known what was at stake, probably he could play with it. He might have known what he should avoid. I think that all of us underestimated the level of his [Putin's] madness.
RFE/RL: And finally, the much-discussed Zelenskiy profile piece in Time magazine, which I'm sure you've read too. What was your impression? What are your takeaways?
Zygar: First, I think it's very important to distinguish between the text itself and the reaction within Ukrainian society, in Ukrainian social media, especially. I guess that the outburst to some extent is not a reaction to the article but maybe to [former Zelenskiy adviser Oleksiy] Arestovych's tweets, a reaction to a reaction. The text is not complimentary, but it's not anti-Zelenskiy.
We all know [the Time article's author] Simon Shuster. He is a great journalist, he spent more than a year with Zelenskiy, he is very close to him. He is probably the closest foreign journalist to Zelenskiy. He has written a book; he is Zelenskiy's biographer. So he knows what's happening. And he was obviously trying to remain unbiased, to write what he thinks is right, no matter how close he is to Zelenskiy. He cared very much about his independence as a journalist while writing that piece.
Obviously the situation in Ukraine is rather complicated right now. People are more fragile; they are in pain for so many months. And now with the Middle East crisis, everyone understands that the level of attention to Ukrainian problems is not going to rise. A lot of people who sympathize with Ukraine here in America -- I'm talking to a lot of people, and I've heard the idea that Ukraine kept America's attention for a year and a half and that's a record-breaking result, [that] even the war in Iraq was forgotten in two months, [and that] no American international problem has kept [the country's] attention for so long.
So, unfortunately, many people who care about Ukraine in America are saying that Ukraine is probably not going to be issue No. 1 for American politicians, and in the wake of the American elections it's going to be harder to be the top priority. And that's the context and everyone understands that. Ukrainian authorities understand that; Zelenskiy understands that. They are fragile because of that inevitable situation.
But the interpretations of this process could be terribly wrong and terribly exaggerated. And when Arestovych compares Zelenskiy to [Nazi leader Adolf] Hitler hiding in his bunker, that's just outrageous manipulation, and I don't know, I guess that's something like political suicide for Arestovych. (Editor's note: Arestovych resigned as Zelenskiy's aide in January and this month announced his own candidacy in the next, as yet unscheduled, Ukrainian presidential election promising to seek peace with Russia.)
