Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: the upcoming OSCE ministerial meeting in Malta and the EU's latest (underwhelming) sanctions on Russia.
Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.
Briefing #1: Lavrov's Expected OSCE Appearance
What You Need To Know: One thing will overshadow the entire annual Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ministerial meeting taking place in Malta on December 5-6: the presence of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He has been invited and, if he shows up as expected, it would be his first visit to an EU country since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Lavrov remains sanctioned by the bloc, but the travel ban can be temporarily lifted to attend international meetings on EU soil.
Lavrov's possible visit comes amid increasing signs that many Western countries appear to reaching out to Moscow again diplomatically, notably with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz calling Russian President Vladimir Putin recently for the first time in over two years.
Sources inside the OSCE, who weren't authorized to speak on the record, told me that the organization wants to engage in dialogue in order to reach consensus on issues such as the four vacant senior positions in the Vienna-based body, upcoming chairmanships, and the budget of the 57-state organization.
On the other hand, little was achieved at last year's OSCE ministerial meeting in North Macedonia (an EU candidate country that aligns with the EU's sanctions policy) when Lavrov attended -- along with an entourage of nearly 90 people.
Not everything will go Russia's way on the Mediterranean island. For starters, Malta has limited the national delegations to six people. And while Lavrov is invited to the lunch on the first day, he won't be allowed to attend the dinner, which has "Russian aggression against Ukraine" as a topic.
At the official ministerial session, ballots have been drawn to determine in which order the countries will speak. Ukraine will go first. Russia was drawn to speak 20th but agreed to exchange places with Tajikistan so that it can go fourth.
It will be interesting to see what kind of reception Lavrov receives. In Skopje, representatives of Ukraine and the Baltic states, demonstratively stood up and left, something that could happen again in Malta.
A senior EU diplomat, who wasn't authorized to speak on the record, told me at the G20 foreign ministers' meeting earlier this fall that representatives of EU states remained in their seats as it was "better to stay and answer Lavrov and the huge amount of lies that he usually comes with."
Tellingly, I was told by diplomats that the practice of walking out when the Russian OSCE ambassador or deputy ambassador speak in Vienna almost ceased in 2024, whereas it was common practice among representatives of EU member states in 2022 and 2023.
Deep Background: So, what issues can potentially be solved by ministers and OSCE diplomats before the end of the year? Perhaps the most pressing issue is to fill the top four positions in the organization, which has been leaderless since early September. In the summer, Malta, in its current role as chair country, put forward: Igli Hasani, the current Albanian foreign minister, as the new secretary-general; Dutch diplomat Christophe Kamp to head the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); the former Georgian state minister for reconciliation and civic equality, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, as the new high commissioner on national minorities; and the post of representative on freedom of the media going to Jan Braathu, a Norwegian diplomat and current head of the OSCE mission in Kosovo.
An alternative Greek-Turkish counterproposal now seems to be favored. Under this proposal, Braathu and Tsikhelashvili would remain in the same positions, but Hasani and Kamp would be replaced by Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioglu as secretary-general and Greek diplomat Maria Telalian for the ODIHR job.
Moscow has indicated that it doesn't want Tsikhelashvili to fill any position as she worked as a minister to reintegrate Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia. It now appears that the compromise going into the Malta meeting is that the Georgian will be removed and Kamp will end up as the national minorities commissioner.
Drilling Down
- On the yearly chairmanship, Russia is clearer on its goals: It should not go to a NATO member state. While Finland, which joined the military alliance last year, will take over on January 1, 2025, that was a decision taken several years ago and can't be changed. But what about for 2026 and beyond? There are no official candidates yet but there are whispers among diplomats in Vienna that Switzerland might be ready to step in. That might not satisfy Russian officials, though, as they have voiced criticism of Switzerland, noting that the country isn't neutral anymore as it hosted the Ukraine-initiated peace summit earlier this year.
- A country in Central Asia could become chair for 2026 and 2027, or a European microstate such as San Marino or Liechtenstein. Turkey is another strong candidate, and it would be something of a coup for Ankara and its growing role as a real political player if it got both the new secretary-general position and an upcoming chairmanship. Turkey has also been toying with the idea of hosting an OSCE summit, for example, in Istanbul, where all the members' heads of state and government would be invited. Such a summit has not been held since Astana back in 2010.
- And then, of course, there is the OSCE's budget, which is financed by contributions from member states. This is not a new issue as a budget hasn't been passed since 2021 when it stood at 138 million euros ($144 million) per year. The proposed budget for 2025 is 158 million euros, with the increase justified due to the indexation of salaries and inflation.
- Russia has not agreed with the budget, as Moscow wants considerably less money to go to the ODIHR, which it considers politically biased.
- Azerbaijan also has issues. This is because the proposed budget still contains money for the OSCE Minsk group, which was set up to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku is arguing that the conflict is over and therefore the group is redundant, whereas Yerevan maintains that no peace deal has been signed and the body is still needed.
- The likely solution to the budget impasse -- as has been common in recent years -- will be that other members will offer extra off-budget contributions to keep the OSCE limping along.
Briefing #2: The EU's Latest (And Weakest) Sanctions On Russia
What You Need To Know: The European Commission on November 22 finally presented to the 27 EU member states a new Russia sanctions package proposal -- the 15th round since the full-scale invasion nearly three years ago.
It is the first in a long time, with the last one agreed in June. One of the reasons for the gap is that Hungary, possibly the most sanctions-skeptic country, took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in July and the sense in Brussels was that there was little point in trying to get anything substantial passed.
Regardless, there is little collective desire in Brussels to deepen sanctions, for example, by targeting Russia's nuclear or gas industries.
The result was the EU's puniest package to date, with Brussels hoping that it can pass without much fuss before the winter holidays in December.
Deep Background: Why puny? Well, firstly because the proposal, seen by RFE/RL, doesn't target any sectors of the Russian economy, whereas previous rounds sanctioned wood, oil, and diamond exports. Instead, there are new names on only three existing blacklists.
The European Commission is proposing that another 54 people and 29 entities should be targeted with asset freezes and visa bans for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, adding to the 2,300 entries already there.
Then there is a substantial addition of vessels to be blacklisted that Brussels believes are part of Russia's shadow fleet -- meaning boats with unclear ownership used to mainly circumvent already agreed international sanctions on Russian oil and petroleum products.
As of now, 27 vessels are listed, which means that they aren't allowed to call at EU ports or be serviced in any way, and now Brussels wants an additional 48 to be added.
The final item in the sanctions package is adding more proposed names to a list of companies in third countries that EU companies must restrict trade with.
It is not a full ban but rather export restrictions on dual-use goods and technology that the bloc believes have contributed to Russia's war machine.
There are already 675 companies on the list and now the proposal is that another 33 be added.
They are mostly Russian companies as well as some from from China, Iran, India, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Two Serbian entities are also included in the proposal.
Drilling Down
- The most interesting aspect of the sanctions package is the proposals for asset freezes and visa bans. Most of the new names are military officers whom the bloc is punishing for the missile strike in July on the Okhmadyt children’s hospital in Kyiv. These listings are largely symbolic as they target people who are unlikely to have many assets in the EU or have opportunities to travel to the bloc very often.
- Yet, there are a few on the proposed blacklist who may have that opportunity. One is Larisa Dolina, a legendary Russian singer and actress. The EU wants to sanction her as she has "worked with the Russian Defense Ministry and led entertainment campaigns on behalf of the Russian government to reward Russian military personnel for their participation in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine."
- Others listed include the general directors of Investneftetrade, Rosnefteflot, and Prime Shipping -- all companies involved in the shipping of Russian oil. The companies are also subject to proposed asset freezes in the EU. Senior figures involved with the Russian state energy giant Gazprom's liquefied natural gas business are also targeted
- While most of the listings hit Russian citizens, this round of sanctions also includes a surprising number of foreigners, reflecting the view in Brussels that more nations and individuals need to be targeted for supporting Moscow. For the first time ever when it comes to the war in Ukraine, Chinese nationals and companies are being targetted by sanctions. One person has been proposed to be listed for circumventing the EU's sanctions on Russia by trading with Unimatik, a large Russian military company. Six Chinese companies are also being targeted for helping Moscow's war effort. North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang Chol and the deputy chief of staff of the North Korean Army, Kim Yong Bok, are included, as soldiers from their country are now deployed alongside Russian troops. As is Walid Abdelfattah Farghal Abdallah because, as the director of the Annual Investment Meeting Congress in the U.A.E., he "signed a cooperation agreement with Andrei Kalyuzhny, the acting chairman of the board of State Corporation 'Donbas Development Corporation,' which is responsible for ensuring the economic development of Russian-occupied Donbas."
- There is also an EU citizen on the list, Dutch businessman Niels Trost, who is being targeted because his companies are believed to have been trading Russian crude oil above the G7-imposed oil price cap, thus circumventing sanctions against the Kremlin. It's rare that the bloc targets its own citizens. It happened when Jozef Hambalek, a Slovak national and head of the Russian nationalist Night Wolves motorcycle club in Europe, was sanctioned in 2022, although he was later delisted. In such cases the asset freeze is applied but not the visa ban, as those targeted obviously don't need a visa to live or visit their own country.
Looking Ahead
NATO foreign ministers meet in Brussels on December 3-4. Don't expect any big decisions, but it will be U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's last meeting at the military alliance before the new Washington administration takes over in January. The ministers will likely discuss damaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, with many suspecting sabotage.
That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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