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Meeting on June 11 in Grozny’s central mosque, Chechnya’s religious leaders unanimously elected theologian Salakh Mezhiyev as their new mufti. Mezhiyev replaces Sultan-hadji Mirzayev, who at the proposal of then Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov was elected Chechnya’s mufti for life four years ago. On June 3, it had been announced that Mirzayev, 49, is no longer able to discharge his duties due to ill health. His first deputy, Magomed Khiytanayev, was “temporarily” appointed acting mufti in his place.

Ill-health was the reason adduced in May 2005 when Mirzayev was first appointed mufti in place of Akhmad-hadji Shamayev. Shamayev admitted, however, that the real reason he stepped down was his disapproval of unspecified developments in Chechnya and inability to influence the situation there. It is not clear whether he was alluding to the appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov as deputy prime minister one year earlier.

Mirzayev studied theology in Daghestan prior to the demise of the Soviet Union. Following the 1994-1996 war, he served under Chechen Republic Ichkeria President Aslan Maskhadov as imam of the Ichkeria National Guard and chairman of the republic’s Sharia court.

When Russia again sent troops into Chechnya in the fall of 1999, Mirzayev switched sides and aligned himself with Moscow, as did Kadyrov’s father Akhmad-hadji, who had been mufti under Maskhadov. In 2000, Mirzayev was named an advisor to Akhmad-hadji, and two years later – first deputy mufti.

For years, Mirzayev has unquestioningly supported and promoted Ramzan Kadyrov’s obsessive inculcation of a bizarre syncretic amalgam of Chechen Sufism and popular Islam; canonical Sunni Islam, as represented by the Shafii legal school; and, more recently, Christian practice.

He has never publicly challenged Kadyrov’s outrageous and at times heretical statements, such as that Islam was brought to Chechnya from Turkey, or his characterization of Sufi saints as “companions of God.” Neither did he raise any objection to Kadyrov naming new mosques after himself or members of his family. Some theologians consider that practice heretical.

In 2011, Mirzayev ordained that Ramadan should begin in Chechnya one day later than in the rest of the Muslim world. He has also issued a formal ban on the burial of slain insurgents in Muslim ceremonies with the appropriate religious rites.

Assuming that Mirzayev’s health is not the primary reason why he has been replaced, it is not easy to guess what he may have said or done (or not done) to incur Kadyrov’s displeasure. Over the past six months, Kadyrov has identified as a new threat to the “purity” of the bastardized Islam he espouses, and called for a resolute campaign to eradicate, the Habashi ideology formulated by Ethiopia-born Islamic scholar Sheikh Abdullah Al- Harari, of which Ukrainian mufti Sheikh Akhmed Tamim (who is originally from Lebanon) is reportedly an adherent. That ideology is described as “combining Sunni and Shi’i belief systems under the umbrella of Pan-Sufism, specifically of the Rifa’iyya, Qadiriyya, and Naqshabandi religious orders (tariqa).”

Why Kadyrov should nonetheless consider Habashism (which is not banned in the Russian Federation) so pernicious is not clear – unless a comparison highlights the extent to which he has bastardized Chechen Sufism. (Could the Ukrainian Habashi connection have been a contributing factor to Kadyrov’s repeated expressions of support for the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine?)

At the same time, since the start of 2014, the Chechen authorities have launched a wave of reprisals against young believers suspected of preferring Salafism to Kadyrov’s reinvention of Chechen Sufism. The targets are those young men whose beards are considered “too long” (meaning longer than Kadyrov’s) and women who wear a black hijab. Young men who were found to have downloaded sermons by Salafi preachers to their mobile phones were detained for questioning; some were reportedly beatn or tortured. Between January 1 and March 7, the insurgency website Kavkazcenter reported 13 such incidents at mosques in Argun, Avtury, Gudermes, Alkhan-Yurt, Urus-Martan, and various districts of Grozny.

If Kadyrov’s primary concern is to wean the younger generation away from beliefs he considers anathema, the question arises: why did he then promote as Mirzayev’s successor Mezhiyev, rather than Khiytanayev? A graduate of the Al-Fatih Islamic Institute in Damascus, Khiytanayev served for the past two years, until January 2014, as chief qadi in Grozny. During that time, he met more than once with university students and reportedly succeeded by virtue of his “charisma and refined sense of humor” in establishing a rapport with his listeners and convincing them of the perils of heeding “dubious persons who seek to lure you from the one true path.”

On the other hand, Khiytanayev may have forfeited all credibility with those young believers who reject Kadyrov’s version of Islam.

Mezhiyev for his part is widely respected as a learned scholar and a decent human being, according to RFE/RL’s Radio Marsho. Kadyrov characterized him as a very moral person with a secular education in addition to his profound knowledge of theology, “who for long years has worked to spread genuine Islamic values,” meaning the values tolerated by Moscow and considered by the Chechen strongman himself as correct and unquestionable. That seems to be the most important reason why he was picked as a successor to the inarticulate, inefficient, and unpopular Mirzayev. Besides, Mezhiyev as a fluent speaker of Arabic and respected theologian is likely to find favor with visiting Muslim clerics who may look askance on some of Kadyrov’s more egregious pronouncements.

-- Liz Fuller, Aslan Doukaev
Comments made by Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili have caused controversy in the run-up to local elections. (file photo)
Comments made by Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili have caused controversy in the run-up to local elections. (file photo)
Georgia holds its third national election in less than three years on June 15. Following the parliamentary ballot of October 2012 in which then-President Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement (ENM) was defeated after 10 years in power by the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition headed by billionaire philanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili, and the election one year later as Saakashvili's successor of Georgian Dream candidate and former Education Minister Giorgi Margvelashvili, on this occasion voters are called on to elect new municipal councils and the mayors of the country's 12 largest cities and towns.

The two previous ballots were characterized by what commentator Gela Vasadze describes as "Shakespearean passions," but were nonetheless unequivocally rated by the international community as free, fair, and democratic.

This time, however, the campaign has been marred by allegations of government pressure on opposition candidates in some districts to withdraw, and clashes between rival political forces. Those alleged violations resulted in expressions of concern from human rights watchdogs, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Central Election Commission chair Tamara Zhvania.

What is more, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili has incurred harsh criticism from opposition politicians who construed a statement he made at a campaign rally in western Georgia as a call for rigging the outcome of the ballot in favour of Georgian Dream.

According to the NDI's interim report on the election campaign, some 400 candidates (of the 15,900+ who registered) have since withdrawn, more than 30 of them because of pressure from local police and other officials. Most of those instances of alleged pressure took place in areas of southern Georgia where the population is predominantly Armenian or Azerbaijani.

The Georgian Interior Ministry has denied any such pressure was exerted. The Prosecutor General's office investigated 80 such complaints, and stated that, in 76 of them, the candidates denied they were subjected to pressure. Criminal cases have been opened in the remaining four.

Violent Incidents

There have also been repeated violent incidents involving rival supporters of GD and the ENM, again mostly in the south (in Rustavi on May 24 and Gardabani on May 26). On some occasions, eggs were thrown, a practice that Justice Minister Tea Tsulukiani, who chairs an interagency body tasked with ensuring the fairness of the ballot, condemned as "not characteristic of a civilized society."

Injudicious statements by Prime Minister Gharibashvili have reinforced the perception among opposition parties that Georgian Dream is now resorting, or will resort, to the kind of election malpractice that the ENM had engaged in during its decade in power. Speaking in western Georgia in late May, Gharibashvili declared that "in the local elections as in the parliamentary and presidential elections, Georgian Dream will win worthily and convincingly and will not permit the victory of any other political force in a single region or town." Gharibashvili subsequently sought to justify and rationalize that statement, explaining that he was speaking not in his capacity as premier but as a leading member of Georgian Dream.

The NDI report nonetheless commented that such statements by the prime minister "could have the effect of challenging the impartiality that election and other government authorities have worked hard to establish. They also present the risk of being misconstrued by electoral authorities as a directive to ensure the victory of the ruling party."

This week, former Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti governor Tenigiz Gunava, who is the ENM's candidate for the post of Zugdidi mayor, brought a libel suit against Gharibashvili for allegedly implicating him in the murder five years ago of Defense Ministry official Paata Kurdava.

On the plus side, the NDI report gives a positive assessment of recent amendments made to Georgia's election legislation. Among other things, they increase the number of seats on local councils allocated under the party list system and lower the threshold for representation from 5 to 4 percent, a move that will help small, nonparliamentary parties secure a voice at the local level. A related provision allows parties or blocs that receive at least 3 percent of the vote to claim reimbursement of up to 500,000 laris ($282,752) spent on campaign expenses.

In addition, the changes raise to 50 percent the minimum vote a mayoral candidate needs for a first round victory. The then ruling ENM lowered that threshold to 30 percent in run-up to the previous local elections in 2010 to facilitate the victory of its candidate for the mayor of Tbilisi.

Out of a total of 34 parties and blocs that applied to participate in the ballot, 20 parties and four blocs (including the ENM, Georgian Dream, and the Nonparliamentary Opposition comprising the New Rightists and Free Georgia) were formally registered. Two parties, former parliament speaker Nino Burdjanadze's Democractic Movement-- One Georgia and Jondi Baghaturia's Kartuli Dasi (Georgian Group) subsequently withdrew their lists of candidates for local councils, but Burdjanadze's party is still fielding mayoral candidates in 10 cities jointly with the Christian Democratic Movement.

Possible EU Setback

Local elections almost invariably attract a lower voter turnout than do parliamentary or presidential ballots, and several Georgian commentators believe that these elections will not prove an exception. Whether they will corroborate Gharibashvili's assertion that the ENM is "disappearing off the radar screen" remains to be seen. A poll conducted on behalf of the NDI in mid-April found support for Georgian Dream at 48 percent, with the ENM a distant second at 15 percent; Burdjanadze's bloc and the Labor Party both rated 4 percent.

In Tbilisi, Georgian Dream's candidate David Narmania enjoyed 39 percent support followed by Nika Melia (ENM, 10 percent) and Dmitry Lortkipanidze (Burdjanadze's bloc, 9 percent), suggesting that contest may go to a second round runoff.

While the conduct of the vote is unlikely to derail the signing, scheduled for June 27, of Georgia's Association Agreement with the European Union, blatant recourse to administrative leverage to secure the landslide win that Gharibashvili predicted for Georgian Dream or violence on polling day could demolish Georgia's already dwindling hopes of being offered a MAP (Membership Action Plan) at the NATO summit in Wales in September.

-- Liz Fuller

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About This Blog

This blog presents analyst Liz Fuller's personal take on events in the region, following on from her work in the "RFE/RL Caucasus Report." It also aims, to borrow a metaphor from Tom de Waal, to act as a smoke detector, focusing attention on potential conflict situations and crises throughout the region. The views are the author's own and do not represent those of RFE/RL.

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