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Just nine months after his reelection for a second term as Republic of Ingushetia head, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is once again facing allegations of corruption and mismanagement on the part of the regional government.

Such allegations are not new: for years the opposition Mekhk Kkhel (shadow parliament) bombarded Moscow with denunciations of Yevkurov and his entourage, and pleas to replace him. Then, in June 2013, 17 political parties and groups convened a congress in Moscow at which delegates demanded not only Yevkurov's resignation, but also the holding of a referendum on whether the republic head should be elected by popular ballot or by the parliament.

This time, however, the criticism of Yevkurov came neither from the Mekhk Kkhel nor the broader informal congress, nor from indefatigable oppositionist Magomed Khazbiyev, but from Akhmed Belkhoroyev, an Ingush parliamentarian who began his career in the Interior Ministry, and Israil Arsamakov, a former advisor to Yevkurov.

Belkhoroyev, 28, is the sole representative in the Ingushetian legislature of the A Just Cause party. In May 2013, he was the only lawmaker to vote against amending the republic's constitution to abolish direct elections for the post of republic head.

One month later, he told the Moscow daily "Nezavisimaya gazeta" that it was endemic corruption and the republican leadership's inability to bring about any improvement in socioeconomic conditions in Ingushetia, which are among the worst in the entire Russian Federation, that impelled some 50,000 Ingush (out of a total population of 412,500) to sign a petition demanding such direct elections in the hope of voting Yevkurov out of office.

The Ingushetian human rights organization MASHR designated Belkhoroyev as one of its 2013 "heroes of civil society" for "decency in discharging his official duties."

Ingush parliamentarian Akhmed Belkhoroyev
Ingush parliamentarian Akhmed Belkhoroyev


Belkhoroyev repeated his criticisms of Yevkurov earlier this month. On June 9, he was quoted by the daily "Izvestia" as accusing Yevkurov of devoting his entire energy to undermining his political opponents rather than focusing on improving the socioeconomic situation.

Belkhoroyev said the republic is mired in corruption; that embezzlement of federal funds is "the norm;" that both the Russian Constitution and the law are routinely ignored; and that official statistics are falsified to show a steady decline in unemployment.

Arsamakov, for his part, told "Izvestia" that the process of creating a civil society has not even started in Ingushetia. He said the lack of employment prospects impels young men to "head for the forest" to join the Islamic insurgency, while government officials ignore the region's problems rather than seek solutions to them.

Moscow Unmoved

A commentary in "Moskovsky komsomolets" titled "Is Yevkurov Losing Control?" characterized the situation in even more apocalyptic terms as "an undeclared civil war" replete with "the killings of innocent civilians, abductions, interclan conflicts and political intrigue."

Belkhoroyev's allegations of corruption and embezzlement are apparently not unfounded. Just days earlier, "Izvestia" had reported that a probe conducted early this year by the North Caucasus Federal District Directorate of the Russian Prosecutor General's office revealed "a whole series of gross violations" in the use of budget funds that could jeopardize the successful implementation of a 79-billion-ruble ($2.23-billion) federal development program for Ingushetia approved by the Russian government in 2009.

Bekhoroyev has since appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin for protection, claiming to have received threats from Timur Khamroyev, head of the Interior Ministry Center for Combatting Extremism. Both in his appeal to Putin and in a separate letter to the Investigative Committee at the Prosecutor General's office, Belkhoroyev enumerated three instances of the recourse to torture by Republic of Ingushetia Interior Ministry personnel.

Meanwhile, Yevkurov convened a meeting with senior siloviki, parliamentarians and Security Council officials at which he made pejorative comments about Belkhoroyev and Arsamakov, thereby indirectly corroborating the former's charge that he spends too much time and energy trying to neutralize his political opponents.

The recently published effectiveness ratings for the heads of the 85 federation subjects nonetheless suggests that the Russian leadership is still inclined to believe Yevkurov's version of the state of affairs in Ingushetia.

Yevkurov ranked in joint 35th-38th place in that rating, in the second category (a score of 65-75 out of a maximum 100), after Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov (7th-9th place with a score of 92), Rashid Temrezov (Karachayevo-Cherkessia, 19th-20th ) and Ramazan Abdulatipov (Republic of Daghestan , 21st-22nd), but ahead of Aslanchery Tkhakushinov (Republic of Adygheya, 46th-48th), Yurii Kokov (Kabardino-Balkaria, 65th-69th) and Taymuraz Mamsurov (North Ossetia, 75th).

At the same time, it is conceivable, as this blog has hypothesized once before, that as long as the Kremlin continues to regard Yevkurov as a valuable counterweight to Kadyrov, any efforts to undermine him are a waste of time and energy.

Sergei Melikov, whom President Putin appointed in early May to head the North Caucasus Federal District, is currently touring the region and meeting one on one with republic heads. He has not yet visited Magas, but when he does, the published reports of his talks with Yevkurov may yield some indication of how seriously the Kremlin takes Belkhoroyev's corruption allegations.

-- Liz Fuller

Meeting on June 11 in Grozny’s central mosque, Chechnya’s religious leaders unanimously elected theologian Salakh Mezhiyev as their new mufti. Mezhiyev replaces Sultan-hadji Mirzayev, who at the proposal of then Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov was elected Chechnya’s mufti for life four years ago. On June 3, it had been announced that Mirzayev, 49, is no longer able to discharge his duties due to ill health. His first deputy, Magomed Khiytanayev, was “temporarily” appointed acting mufti in his place.

Ill-health was the reason adduced in May 2005 when Mirzayev was first appointed mufti in place of Akhmad-hadji Shamayev. Shamayev admitted, however, that the real reason he stepped down was his disapproval of unspecified developments in Chechnya and inability to influence the situation there. It is not clear whether he was alluding to the appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov as deputy prime minister one year earlier.

Mirzayev studied theology in Daghestan prior to the demise of the Soviet Union. Following the 1994-1996 war, he served under Chechen Republic Ichkeria President Aslan Maskhadov as imam of the Ichkeria National Guard and chairman of the republic’s Sharia court.

When Russia again sent troops into Chechnya in the fall of 1999, Mirzayev switched sides and aligned himself with Moscow, as did Kadyrov’s father Akhmad-hadji, who had been mufti under Maskhadov. In 2000, Mirzayev was named an advisor to Akhmad-hadji, and two years later – first deputy mufti.

For years, Mirzayev has unquestioningly supported and promoted Ramzan Kadyrov’s obsessive inculcation of a bizarre syncretic amalgam of Chechen Sufism and popular Islam; canonical Sunni Islam, as represented by the Shafii legal school; and, more recently, Christian practice.

He has never publicly challenged Kadyrov’s outrageous and at times heretical statements, such as that Islam was brought to Chechnya from Turkey, or his characterization of Sufi saints as “companions of God.” Neither did he raise any objection to Kadyrov naming new mosques after himself or members of his family. Some theologians consider that practice heretical.

In 2011, Mirzayev ordained that Ramadan should begin in Chechnya one day later than in the rest of the Muslim world. He has also issued a formal ban on the burial of slain insurgents in Muslim ceremonies with the appropriate religious rites.

Assuming that Mirzayev’s health is not the primary reason why he has been replaced, it is not easy to guess what he may have said or done (or not done) to incur Kadyrov’s displeasure. Over the past six months, Kadyrov has identified as a new threat to the “purity” of the bastardized Islam he espouses, and called for a resolute campaign to eradicate, the Habashi ideology formulated by Ethiopia-born Islamic scholar Sheikh Abdullah Al- Harari, of which Ukrainian mufti Sheikh Akhmed Tamim (who is originally from Lebanon) is reportedly an adherent. That ideology is described as “combining Sunni and Shi’i belief systems under the umbrella of Pan-Sufism, specifically of the Rifa’iyya, Qadiriyya, and Naqshabandi religious orders (tariqa).”

Why Kadyrov should nonetheless consider Habashism (which is not banned in the Russian Federation) so pernicious is not clear – unless a comparison highlights the extent to which he has bastardized Chechen Sufism. (Could the Ukrainian Habashi connection have been a contributing factor to Kadyrov’s repeated expressions of support for the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine?)

At the same time, since the start of 2014, the Chechen authorities have launched a wave of reprisals against young believers suspected of preferring Salafism to Kadyrov’s reinvention of Chechen Sufism. The targets are those young men whose beards are considered “too long” (meaning longer than Kadyrov’s) and women who wear a black hijab. Young men who were found to have downloaded sermons by Salafi preachers to their mobile phones were detained for questioning; some were reportedly beatn or tortured. Between January 1 and March 7, the insurgency website Kavkazcenter reported 13 such incidents at mosques in Argun, Avtury, Gudermes, Alkhan-Yurt, Urus-Martan, and various districts of Grozny.

If Kadyrov’s primary concern is to wean the younger generation away from beliefs he considers anathema, the question arises: why did he then promote as Mirzayev’s successor Mezhiyev, rather than Khiytanayev? A graduate of the Al-Fatih Islamic Institute in Damascus, Khiytanayev served for the past two years, until January 2014, as chief qadi in Grozny. During that time, he met more than once with university students and reportedly succeeded by virtue of his “charisma and refined sense of humor” in establishing a rapport with his listeners and convincing them of the perils of heeding “dubious persons who seek to lure you from the one true path.”

On the other hand, Khiytanayev may have forfeited all credibility with those young believers who reject Kadyrov’s version of Islam.

Mezhiyev for his part is widely respected as a learned scholar and a decent human being, according to RFE/RL’s Radio Marsho. Kadyrov characterized him as a very moral person with a secular education in addition to his profound knowledge of theology, “who for long years has worked to spread genuine Islamic values,” meaning the values tolerated by Moscow and considered by the Chechen strongman himself as correct and unquestionable. That seems to be the most important reason why he was picked as a successor to the inarticulate, inefficient, and unpopular Mirzayev. Besides, Mezhiyev as a fluent speaker of Arabic and respected theologian is likely to find favor with visiting Muslim clerics who may look askance on some of Kadyrov’s more egregious pronouncements.

-- Liz Fuller, Aslan Doukaev

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About This Blog

This blog presents analyst Liz Fuller's personal take on events in the region, following on from her work in the "RFE/RL Caucasus Report." It also aims, to borrow a metaphor from Tom de Waal, to act as a smoke detector, focusing attention on potential conflict situations and crises throughout the region. The views are the author's own and do not represent those of RFE/RL.

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