Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on one big issue: What to expect from the EU this autumn.
The Briefing: A Busy Brussels Autumn
The Brussels autumn normally kicks into gear by mid-September, when the president of the European Commission delivers the State of the European Union address (referred to as “SOTEU” by EU types) to the European Parliament. The speech, which tends to last about an hour, outlines policy priorities the EU executive aims to launch or complete in the coming months.
But this is no normal Brussels autumn, since the EU is in the middle of a changing of the guard. In June, EU leaders decided that former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa would replace Charles Michel as president of the European Council on December 1. Weeks later, the European Parliament approved a decision by EU leaders to give Germany’s Ursula von der Leyen another five years at the helm of the European Commission. But instead of delivering another SOTEU in September, von der Leyen will be busy composing her new team of 26 commissioners, one from each of the other EU member states. Some capitals have already presented their respective commission candidates ahead of the August 30 deadline. Once von der Leyen has interviewed them all, she will earmark a policy portfolio for each one.
Calling Kallas And Axing Oliver?
So far, we know just one name and portfolio: Alongside the Costa and von der Leyen appointments in June, EU leaders decided that Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas should follow outgoing Spaniard Josep Borrell as the EU's next foreign policy chief. That is not a done deal, however. Like each of the other 25 commission candidates, Kallas will face grueling hearings among the relevant committees in the European Parliament. In Kallas’s case, that is the Foreign Affairs Committee, whose members also will sink their teeth into the next EU enlargement commissioner, whoever that may be.
I’ve heard from EU diplomats that the Kallas hearing is slated for September 29. In fact, the Brussels news cycle in the latter half of September and early October will be dominated by these hearings. They offer the European Parliament the opportunity to flex its muscles by rejecting a handful of commission candidates who it believes fared poorly under questioning. (Last time, in 2019, MEPs rejected three candidates, after which it was up to their “sponsor” states to quickly propose new individuals for new hearings.)
One who is almost certainly in MEPs’ crosshairs is Hungarian candidate commissioner Oliver Varhelyi. He has been nominated by Budapest for a new term following a controversial five years as the bloc’s enlargement supremo. Accused by many diplomats of putting Budapest’s interests ahead of Brussels’ -- with a soft spot for Serbia and Georgia but not so much for Ukraine -- he was caught in a hot-mic incident at a plenary session calling MEPs “idiots.”
While Varhelyi is unlikely to be offered the enlargement portfolio again, he is sure to face a tough task convincing lawmakers that he is the right person for any portfolio that von der Leyen might entrust him with. The hope in some quarters is that each commissioner and the new European Commission as a whole will get a pass by the European Parliament so they can start working on December 1, but don’t rule out the possibility that it drags out longer than that.
Not So Hawkish After All
None of the EU officials I’ve spoken to expects the Kallas approval to be in any real danger. But it will still be interesting to hear what she and any incoming enlargement commissioner say on Ukraine, Russia, the Western Balkans, and the prospect of adding more members to the bloc. I don’t expect any radical changes on this front. EU policy is rather set on full support for Ukraine and a renewed push for enlargement once the bloc has reformed and candidate countries are fulfilling all preconditions. But the emphasis and how these messages are delivered will be of the essence.
Kallas comes in with a reputation as a “Russia hawk” -- arguably the first EU foreign policy chief with such a strong position vis-à-vis Moscow. It should, of course, be noted that the entire bloc has moved closer to the Baltic states’ view on Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began 2 1/2 years ago, but doubts remained when her name first popped up that she was too outspoken to be the EU’s top diplomat.
So expect her to tone it down slightly when she faces MEPs and for her to talk about much more than just Russia and Ukraine. In fact, it wouldn’t be surprising if she spoke at equal length about the war in Gaza, relations with countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, and the need for stronger relations with other big powers of the so-called “Global South,” including Brazil and India. And don’t rule out that the first foreign trip in her presumptive new post might be to visit EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans, rather than Ukraine, simply to emphasize the importance of those countries.
I also hear from Brussels diplomats that they expect that she is ready to tackle head on the thorny EU-initiated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Current EU foreign policy chief Borrell enlisted former Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak in 2020 to serve as special EU representative for the dialogue, but there has been little real progress, and it appears that function might be scrapped altogether with Kallas in charge.
Enlarging The EU?
It will also be fascinating to see who von der Leyen opts for as enlargement commissioner. With EU expansion once again a hot topic -- with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine most recently invited to join the bloc and the latter two seen as making real progress -- more EU member states are interested in securing that portfolio, unlike back in 2019 when only Budapest truly pushed for it and got it. Since Estonia, which is regarded as an “eastern” member state in Brussels, got the foreign policy position, it would be a real surprise if another “easterner” got the commission’s enlargement portfolio. My guess is that von der Leyen will look to the south or west to ensure geographical balance -- and avoid accusations that the bloc’s sole focus is Ukraine. The thing to look out for with the enlargement commissioner is, of course, any reference to dates when the next EU expansion might happen.
It is almost impossible to guess exactly when any country might be added to the bloc, but the latest high-level attempt to promote a time frame came from outgoing European Council President Michel when last year he challenged the EU to be ready for expansion by 2030. That is not his call, of course, and he’ll be out of office soon anyway; but the truth is that even that date looks ambitious, since no candidate country seems particularly close to joining. But the bigger emphasis both in the hearings and in the years ahead will likely be on the reforms the EU itself must undergo in order to accept new members.
Discussions have already started; but if Brussels is serious, those changes will have to be made rather soon. Will the EU budget be increased? (The current candidate countries all are poorer than the EU average.) And what political reforms are necessary for an EU that might go from 27 to well over 30 members in the coming years? Fewer veto opportunities for national capitals is a common refrain, but achieving that without anyone vetoing such a move in the first place is a formidable challenge. You won’t hear it this autumn, but there are persistent fears that it’s the EU itself that isn’t ready to grow bigger.
Positive Reports For (Some) Western Balkan States?
Separately, the outgoing European Commission will most likely issue its annual enlargement report outlining progress (or lack thereof) among EU hopefuls. The tone will be positive on Moldova and Ukraine, but don’t expect those countries to open any EU accession chapters this year. The screening for both -- in which the EU considers national legislation and highlights how they need to adopt it to EU rules and laws in various policy fields -- should conclude in the first half of 2025, if all goes well; only then could negotiations commence in earnest.
For Georgia, which has increasingly been at odds with Brussels for years, the report will be less pleasant: No real progress is expected, and the EU is also likely to take into account how free and fair the parliamentary elections on October 26 are before deciding on any further action. The EU has already paused high-level visits and military aid to Georgia over the recently enacted “foreign influence” law, and further sanctions loom if the situation deteriorates further.
On the other hand, genuine progress toward the EU could be in store for some Western Balkans countries this autumn. Don’t rule out Montenegro closing some negotiation chapters, something it hasn’t managed do to since 2017. This would signal that Podgorica, after years of standing still on EU membership, is once again proceeding, at least slowly. Montenegro remains the presumptive front-runner among candidate countries, with all 33 accession chapters open and some finally even starting to get closed.
There is also an expectation that Albania will start de facto accession talks this autumn, finally decoupling from North Macedonia as Skopje still hasn’t changed its constitution to reflect demands imposed by member state Bulgaria. Few expect North Macedonia to manage the feat this year. Meanwhile, although some countries are pushing for Serbia to open accession chapters, that may still be a bridge too far for EU member states rattled by Belgrade’s close relations with Moscow.
Battling With Budapest
Some political decisions might land this autumn as well. More money will have to be generated to support Ukraine, and frozen Russian assets can now be used. Hungary, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, has kept Brussels on its toes over the summer. The EU seems unlikely to help Budapest secure the Russian oil imports that Budapest has requested, and the issue of Hungary easing working visas for Russian and Belarusian citizens will continue to reverberate, even if it’s hard to see the bloc doing anything concrete about it.
Expect both issues to arise once the bloc’s foreign ministers assemble in Brussels on August 29. That meeting, which is informal, was supposed to take place in Budapest before Borrell decided to move it to the EU capital after several member states vowed to boycott any meeting in Hungary following Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s surprise trips to Moscow and Beijing in early July.
Two other Hungary-related issues that will also be worth following this autumn: First, there’s Budapest’s refusal to greenlight the eighth tranche of the European Peace Facility (EPF) for Ukraine, worth 500 million euros of military aid. The tranche has been blocked for nearly 18 months, and few believe the Hungarians will budge during their EU Presidency, despite member states’ mounting pushes for it in the upcoming months.
Then there are further sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The bloc passed its 14th round of restrictive measures against Moscow and a separate spate of sanctions against Minsk just before the Hungarian Presidency began on July 1. The common line from most EU diplomats I’ve spoken to is that no new sanctions packages will be proposed because Hungary, which has on numerous occasions questioned their effectiveness, won’t entertain the idea of new sanctions during its six-month presidency. The question is whether the European Commission, which normally initiates new sanctions proposals, is willing to test that resolve, especially in the event of an escalation of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population or infrastructure this autumn.
Looking Ahead
On August 30-September 1, the biggest think-tank event in Central Europe, the Globsec Forum, will take place in Prague. Political leaders and experts will discuss security and defense, EU and NATO enlargement, and the ongoing war in Ukraine, among other things. I’ll be there for all three days and will share my impressions in the next edition of this newsletter on September 3.
That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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