Emil Kastehelmi is an open source intelligence (OSINT) analyst and military history expert working at the Black Bird Group, which is headquartered in Finland and currently focused on following and analyzing Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
In a recent interview with RFE/RL's Georgian Service, Kastehelmi says Ukraine's incursion of Russia's Kursk region has caught Russian President Vladimir Putin off guard and proved that Ukraine is still capable of launching offensive actions, shifting attention from Kyiv's "problems to its achievements." But the operation is also fraught with risk, Kastehelmi argues, and its strategic value is still unclear.
RFE/RL: Let's start with a situational update of sorts, a brief summary of what has actually transpired, and how massive this incursion is in what has happened over the course of the war?
Emil Kastehelmi: Well, first of all, the Kursk offensive [is] most likely the summer offensive of Ukraine in 2024. It's not just the border incursion anymore, in my opinion. We can think about it in many ways. If we look at the gained square kilometers, it's, of course, rather successful. It has succeeded better than last year's summer offensive of Ukraine. It's the biggest offensive into Russian soil since World War II. It's also historically really a significant event.
But then when we look at what has actually materialized there, Ukraine has got a lot of square kilometers, but mainly what it consists of is small Russian border villages in the countryside. They got [the Kursk town of] Sudzha, but then again that's something around 5,000 to 6,000 [residents], so it's a really small town, and, at the moment, the movement has slowed down. Ukraine is still making some progress. They are getting a village here or there, but there's no rapid expansion of the area of control anymore.
So, it's still maybe not the best-case scenario for Ukraine, as I think that they would have wanted to gain even more in their first days of the offensive. But then again, Russians managed to scramble their defenses so that they could defend Korenevo (another village in the Kursk region), for example, and they could block some of the important roads, even though the Ukrainians pushed rather deep in the beginning.
RFE/RL: How much strategic value does this offensive have, both from a military perspective -- on the battlefield -- but also geopolitically?
Kastehelmi: Geopolitically, of course, all wars are fought on the land, but nowadays they are also fought in the information space. And in the information space, this has been like a nuclear bomb almost. It has really shifted attention from Ukrainian problems to Ukrainian achievements. It has also shown the world that Russia, even though it has an upper hand in Ukraine, still suffers from various kinds of problems, which will be hard to actually answer in full anytime soon -- be it securing their own borders with enough manpower or the lack of capabilities in their military intelligence.
When we look at the big picture, the land that Ukraine has taken in Kursk, at some point Russians will be able to stabilize it. And it hasn't really changed the [big picture] of the war."
The intelligence side can't provide an early warning, an adequate warning, so they could at least somehow prepare for a scenario like this, or maybe the intelligence side can provide such, but the leadership just didn't react. That would not have been the first time in military history that even though the intelligence side is working, the leadership side is not.
Going back to the strategic points: So, in the information space this has been a success, and it may convince, of course, Ukraine's allies that Ukraine is still capable. And it most definitely proves to Ukrainian citizens that Ukraine is still capable of offensive actions. But then again, I doubt that any Western country will be like, "OK, you successfully invaded Russia, now we believe in you, now you will receive a thousand more tanks." That's not really going to happen.
On the ground, there is a difficult point about the strategic side of things, because there is really not much at the strategic level to accomplish in the Kursk region. You can have operational opportunities, so there've been good achievements. But when we look at the big picture, the land that Ukraine has taken in Kursk, at some point Russians will be able to stabilize it. And it hasn't really changed the [big picture] of the war.
It's like a secondary area almost, because the main problems of Ukraine are still present in the east. Russia is still able to continue its offensive, at least in the main focus points in the east, especially Pokrovsk and [in] the Toretsk direction. (Pokrovsk and Toretsk are two strategically important cities in Ukraine's Donetsk region. -- Eds.)
RFE/RL: Speaking of the front line in the east, I've seen criticism leveled against Ukraine that by embarking on this operation, they've actually weakened the front line in the east. How valid is that criticism, do you think?
Kastehelmi: Well, we at Black Bird Group try to also observe the unit movements, and at the moment it seems that at least some [Ukrainian] units that have been fighting on the eastern front may have been transferred to Kursk. So, it seems that Ukraine is really putting a lot of resources into the Kursk offensive. And, of course, one of the main problems of the offensive is that Ukraine didn't really stop the Russian advance before starting the Kursk operation.
We have to remember this offensive into Kursk, even though it has been operationally successful in some areas, it hasn't been cheap either for Ukraine."
As we have seen in Kursk, Ukraine still has strategic reserves, but it decided not to actually use them in the east to stabilize the situation -- maybe freeze the situation -- but it instead went to Kursk. And it's very understandable that the soldiers on the ground criticize [this]; it's very understandable that analysts criticize it, because Russia has been making relatively large gains [in the east]. There have been quicker than usual advances in [the] Pokrovsk direction. And Pokrovsk, Toretsk...they have also larger meaning because they are the logistical hubs, the largest cities in that area.
So, after those, maybe Russia can go forward. For example, will Russia want to go to [Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk region] after the fall, after the possible war for Kursk? So, there's a multitude of problematic scenarios. And it's understandable from political reasons that Ukraine really doesn't want Russia to advance into new oblasts, because you can never know, maybe they [would get the idea] that this is Russian soil, too, as they have proclaimed in other oblasts.
RFE/RL: Limited strategic value or otherwise, let's still discuss what Ukraine can actually achieve or make use of what it has achieved in the Kursk direction. And there are two kinds of more intriguing points that I've seen discussed. One is actually trying and creating a buffer zone. And the second is using this Kursk offensive as a distraction for Russia. Let's discuss both scenarios. How likely are those?
Kastehelmi: Well, the buffer zone idea is kind of understandable. Ukraine has been worried about the border villages in [the northeastern region of] Sumy. So, by moving the area of control to the Russian side, then they will of course...also move at least some of the fighting to the Russian side and thus protect Ukraine's own infrastructure and villages.
RFE/RL: But that implies defending that territory, right? And that would probably require more manpower and more equipment, etc. Is it worth it?
Kastehelmi: Yes, that's a great question. In the current situation, it may not be worth it. At the moment, there has been more front line created, about 70 to 90 kilometers of new front line that Ukraine actually has to man to control. So, it will eat up more Ukrainian resources. It needs more brigades to control what they have got, so there's always a trade-off in order to protect some of your own [territory].
Ukraine has committed a lot of force to Kursk, and it's beginning to be a pretty expensive and heavy distraction operation."
And we have to remember this offensive into Kursk, even though it has been operationally successful in some areas, it hasn't been cheap either for Ukraine. Ukraine has also taken casualties, Ukraine has lost equipment, and it will continue doing so. It doesn't seem like there's anything catastrophic and Russians are most likely taking more casualties, but then again the Russians can take casualties, they can sustain the casualties.
RFE/RL: And what about the argument that Ukraine's incursion will force Russia to divert troops there and therefore alleviate pressure on the eastern front or allow Ukraine to launch another operation somewhere else?
Kastehelmi: Yes, at the moment it seems that Russia has been forced to pull reserves to the Kursk area, but Russia should have enough troops to at least continue their main efforts, especially in Donetsk and still somehow control the situation in Kursk. One possible scenario could be that the Russians simply spend just enough manpower to stop Ukraine in Kursk and maybe freeze the situation. But then they could decide that it's not really worth it to begin bigger counterattacks in the [Kursk] area.
They can just leave Kursk as it is and focus on the east where Russian political goals lie at the moment, and that's also a difficult area. It has been a difficult area for them to advance and now that they are making gains there it would be surprising if they would give that up in order to start some counterattacks in the countryside of Kursk.
RFE/RL: So Sudzha is not worth the cost?
Kastehelmi: Yes, it might not be worth it really. It's, of course, a problem for the Russian government, but if Ukraine occupies a certain part of Kursk, when you look at all of Russia, it's still a small part. So, the Russians can be like, "OK, we can sustain this, and let's just continue full steam ahead in Ukraine." And, of course, Ukraine has committed a lot of force to Kursk, and it's beginning to be a pretty expensive and heavy distraction operation. Ukraine still does have some reserves. They should have, for example, some of the tank brigades in reserve, but it's really difficult to say if those can be bunched up into a group that could have enough force to actually effectively take on the Russians in some other areas.
If Ukraine has decided that it will give up square kilometers in Donetsk in order to exchange them for land in Russia, then this can go on for some time. It's not like the Russians are making any great breakthroughs."
For example, in the [southeastern Ukrainian] Zaporizhzhya area, the same problems are still there. For example, in the Melitopol and Berdyansk directions, there are a lot of Russian fortifications. [The Ukrainian military] didn't really succeed last year, and I doubt that it would succeed now, especially when Ukraine has spent a lot of its force in Kursk. So, it may be a distraction, but, at the moment, I think it's less likely that they will begin another large-scale operation somewhere else. I wouldn't say it's impossible, but I find it unlikely.
RFE/RL: Here is a question that I probably should have asked earlier: How long can Ukraine sustain this? How long can it fight on two fronts, so to say?
Kastehelmi: Well, it depends on what Ukraine has decided at the moment. So, if Ukraine has decided that it will give up square kilometers in Donetsk in order to exchange them for land in Russia, then this can go on for some time. It's not like the Russians are making any great breakthroughs. They are accelerating their pace of advancement, but it's not at [an even] level. So, that's an interesting choice, but it's possible.
Ukraine is still a large country. And also Ukraine most likely hasn't had so many casualties that there would have been many battalions that would have lost their combat capabilities. The attrition levels are still most likely manageable. So, Ukraine can still continue [its] offensive in Kursk for at least some time, but it's really difficult to assess, because there's a limited amount of information.
The Tavberidze Interviews
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.
RFE/RL: From the battlefield proper, let's move into more of the diplomatic dimension. Another widely discussed aspect of this has been if Ukraine can use this offensive and territory it gained in the upcoming negotiations as leverage. How potent a bargaining chip would that territory be?
Kastehelmi: It depends also how long are they going to continue the operation, but as a general rule, I would maybe compare the Ukrainian control in Kursk [to] what Russia controls in Kharkiv. So that could be comparable, for example, to all of these areas which Russia controls in Kharkiv: The sizes of the areas are rather comparable.
But it's clear that even if Ukrainians expand their control, even if they would double the size [of their territory], it's still really difficult to try to use that as a bargaining chip. For example, far larger Ukrainian cities have fallen during this war. It's extremely unlikely that by exchanging Kursk they would then get, for example, a corridor to the Azov Sea.
RFE/RL: How humiliating would it be for Russia to leave this territory in Ukrainian hands even until negotiations? What's the cost?
Kastehelmi: If they leave that in Ukrainian hands until the negotiations, we shouldn't overestimate the humiliation factor. It is, of course, humiliating, but most likely it doesn't really affect the power dynamics that much. The Kremlin will not fall because Ukraine has these areas, and I think that politically they may prioritize success in Ukraine over the political nuisance of Kursk.
It still shows that Ukraine is capable of surprises, and Ukraine is maybe thinking outside the conventional frames of operations. It may not always be a logical thing or a good thing."
Of course, some civilians will be angry; there'll be a sentiment of civilians in Russia who most likely will criticize: "How can a foreign power continue invading Mother Russia?" But then again, when has the Kremlin really cared about [the nagging] of ordinary civilians? It's a dictatorship, it doesn't have to [care].
RFE/RL: This also leads us to a discussion about the red lines. Where are the red lines for Russia? Because this was supposed to be one of the biggest red lines, and it appears it's not as red as previously thought.
Kastehelmi: Yes, that's very much true. The discussion of the red lines has been really interesting, because they have been continuously tested, and, at the moment, there's no hard red lines to be seen that would trigger Russia to do something on a whole other level. Western tanks were the red line; Western fighter jets were the red line; invading Russia with a multi-brigade operation apparently wasn't a red line.
So, it seems that Russia is making empty threats after empty threats. Sometimes the Western leaders have taken them seriously, so even if you're not going to do anything, even if you are just a dog who barks, sometimes it may be useful.
RFE/RL: Sometimes barking is enough?
Kastehelmi: Yes, sometimes it is enough. And, of course, Russia has been escalating some actions that we have seen. Different kind of hybrid operations: sabotage, strikes inside of Europe that we can argue that they may not have happened if the West wasn't so heavily supporting Ukraine. But, then again, even if some things are sabotaged in some areas, for example, in my home country Finland, those are still kind of small, and it's nothing compared to the doomsday scenarios that have been floating around.
RFE/RL: Finally, if you're sitting in the West, in the camp of Ukraine, if your country supports Ukraine, what conclusions do you draw seeing this unfold, seeing Russia being invaded and it basically struggling to mount an effective comeback?
Kastehelmi: It's interesting that this is something that Ukraine decided to do. This has also surprised Western allies at the high level. So, it still shows that Ukraine is capable of surprises, and Ukraine is maybe thinking outside the conventional frames of operations. It may not always be a logical thing or a good thing. It [still remains] to be seen if it ends badly for Ukraine, because there are risks.
So, it's possible that thinking outside the box is not really a good thing always, but at least it shows that Ukraine is ready to take action, it's ready to do what it wants, and it can also outplay Russia, at least locally, which is an important thing to also show. I've been pretty critical and [doomful]; that's also partly because I'm Finnish and we cannot find joy in anything. But there's so many dimensions in this situation.
RFE/RL: It's better to err on the side of realism?
Kastehelmi: Yeah, it is. But the operation is still ongoing. There can be more surprises. I would say it's possible. There can be new directions, there can be new developments. And, of course, there's still the possibility that Russia will switch even more heavily to Kursk for political reasons if Ukraine is able to bait them by taking even more land from Russia, because we know that the Russians may not always be logical either. So, there're still a lot of possibilities in the developing situation.
