David Ignatius: Despite War Fatigue, Gaza, Putin Should 'Be Pretty Careful About Making Bets' In Ukraine

David Ignatius is a veteran journalist and an associate editor and foreign affairs columnist at The Washington Post, as well as the author of 11 novels, including the 2007 spy thriller, Body Of Lies.

He has written extensively in his twice-weekly columns about Russia's invasion of Ukraine and chats twice a month with Washington Post readers about the conflict.

Ignatius talked recently to RFE/RL's Georgian Service about the war in Ukraine, how the conflict in Gaza and next year's U.S. presidential election might shape international support for Kyiv, and why the world needs "police, but not 'a policeman.'" He also talked about his forthcoming novel, Phantom Orbit, calling it "a love letter to the Russia that once was and might still be."

RFE/RL: You have written extensively on the U.S. stance on the Israeli conflict with Hamas. (Editor's note: Hamas has been designated by the United States and European Union as a terrorist organization.) Is it a battle on two fronts that the United States is having right now -- one in Gaza and another in Ukraine? Would that be a correct reading of the situation?

David Ignatius: I think so. They're two big wars that will shape those two parts of the world. I was in Ukraine, I was coming home, on the day (October 7) that Hamas broke through the fence in Israel. But my feelings about Ukraine…after the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to achieve sufficient gains to force the Russians to consider what I think would have been a Chinese request that they seek a diplomatic resolution. I think that was the idea all along: to gain enough on the battlefield that the Chinese get nervous and the Russians have to listen to their Chinese friends, and then you have negotiations in the spring. That now seems very unlikely.

On my trip to Ukraine at the end of September and early October, I heard, for the first time, a real debate among young Ukrainians about how much the country can handle. I had a sense of commitment, as always, from Ukrainians, but also of exhaustion. I've been trying to think how, through the winter, can they get stronger? The things that you need to let yourself think about that would provide for some period going forward a strong Ukraine that's in Europe, that defers the reacquisition of its stolen territories until the time when it's stronger.

As always, I think [the] Ukrainians have to lead that conversation…. I think it's their decision to make; that's what I've always heard sincerely from top people at the [U.S.] State Department and the [National Security Council].

RFE/RL: These two large wars that you mentioned, one in Gaza and another in Ukraine -- how does one affect the other?

Ignatius: Famously, we're a country that has trouble, to put it in a vulgar way…walking and chewing gum at the same time. Our national security process is good at concentrating on one thing but not so good at concentrating on two things. So, I think since Gaza became the overwhelming subject, there just has been less focus on Ukraine.

The Tavberidze Interviews

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.

We have a new chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. [General Mark] Milley had developed quite a close relationship with [Ukrainian commander] General [Valeriy] Zaluzhniy. It will take a while for his successor, General Charles Q. Brown Jr., to develop something similar. Zaluzhniy's own extraordinary essay in The Economist, essentially admitting we're in a stalemate, struck me as a very interesting message. I thought the primary audience was probably [Volodymyr] Zelenskiy, his own president.

But what was it that he was saying? That either [you] have to step it up, but there are limits to how much you can step it up, given American constraints, or we have to think about an alternative, longer-term strategy. It's as if the last chapter of Zaluzhniy's essay was left unwritten. But I'd love to know what it would say.

RFE/RL: In this situation that the United States finds itself in, one particular metaphor keeps popping up: the United States as the "world's policeman." Does the world need one? And, if it does, how good is the United States at being one?

Ignatius: The world needs the order that comes from the norms and rules of behavior being enforced. I don't think it needs a "policeman" so much as a collection of police that together form a coherent rule-enforcement system. In the United States, we have more than 50 different police forces; so, in some states, law enforcement is better than others.

But I think when the United States tries to be this single superpower, it gets in trouble. It creates resentments. It makes mistakes. The period of the Iraq War is a classic example where the United States did something that, in retrospect, is just incredibly stupid. Other countries warned us that we were being a dumb policeman, that we were chasing the wrong criminal, but, you know, we did it anyway.

RFE/RL: Which is, by the way, what Russians very often point fingers at and say, "If the United States could do that, why can't we be allowed to do this?"

Ignatius: Yes. I think the Russians are making a mistake probably as consequential as the Iraq War that will leave them weakened as much as the Iraq War left us, probably more. So, it's just a misuse of your police powers.

My simple answer is that the world needs police but not a "policeman." I think there is a diminished will among some Americans -- simple shorthand would be to say among [former U.S. President Donald] Trump supporters -- for America playing a strong role as an international keeper of order. People say, "Ah, you know, people aren't grateful. It costs us too much. Let's worry about things at home" -- all the arguments people know. But I don't think that that group is anything close to a majority. And, for example, I think the aid package for Ukraine will end up being passed….

So, the Europeans' worry is whether America [is] reverting to a neo-isolationist, anti-globalist, America-first country. And my answer would be, no, I don't think that's happening.

RFE/RL: We kind of edged closer to the next topic that I wanted to ask you about. And that would be the U.S. election, taking into consideration your much-talked-about column where you say that President Joe Biden shouldn't run again. Let's look at it through the Ukrainian prism. If not Biden, then who? And what would it bring to Ukraine?

Ignatius: Biden has been the leader who, on the one hand, was determined to support Ukraine, [and] on the other hand was determined not to get into a war with Russia. And there is an argument that he was so worried about the second part -- not getting into a war with Russia -- that he didn't do as well as he should have on the first part, that he deterred himself from taking actions that might have been more effective.

So, it is conceivable that another Democrat, if that person replaced Biden, would have a different view. At [the moment], it still looks as if Biden is sailing toward renomination and is going to run, even though it looks more and more like he might lose if he does that.…

The other thing I'd say about Biden is that, although he's not getting any younger, and he doesn't look any younger, he has been behaving very vigorously. I think his policies generally in dealing with the war in Gaza and dealing with the war in Ukraine have been good. He continues to manage a good foreign policy process.

RFE/RL: We covered the Democratic side of things. What would the Republican candidate mean for Ukraine, considering the selection that is available?

Ignatius: The assumption is that if Trump or some Trump-lite candidate won, that they'd make a deal with Russia. It's not very complicated. That they would make a deal to end the war quickly, giving Russia pretty much what it wanted. And I think there's one problem with that, which is that it implies that Ukraine itself isn't a factor. And I don't think Ukraine is ready to be Donald Trump's sacrificial lamb to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin….

RFE/RL: Trump famously said he'd end the war in one day.

Ignatius: I think he believes it. But I think that when you actually think about it, it's very unrealistic, and he would quickly discover [it] was unrealistic, and he'd probably have to back away from it. And [there could be a] situation in which Republicans eager to make a deal with Donald Trump…as president might be willing to make concessions to get the deal that they wouldn't otherwise, [which] would end up being attractive enough to Ukraine. So, you can imagine that situation.

The next strongest candidate after Trump -- and I still have to say I strongly suspect that Trump won't be the nominee -- right now seems to be [former South Carolina governor and UN ambassador under Trump] Nikki Haley. And Nikki Haley is an internationalist. Of this whole group of Republicans, she's probably closest to the traditional hawkish Republican national security view in terms of the Ukraine war. If she was the candidate, or if she was vice president even, I think that would be a factor for continuation of something like the Biden policy, maybe even escalating support for Ukraine.

So, I think if you're Putin, you have to be pretty careful about making bets. He seems to think things are going his way. And…obviously, if you read Zaluzhniy's analysis, they haven't been going Ukraine's way. But there are a lot of problems ahead for Putin -- and, in some ways, the expectation that they would change radically if the Republicans won, I'm less convinced than some people are of that.

RFE/RL: You say that Ukraine won't be so eager to become Trump's sacrificial lamb. What happens if the United States stops providing military support, would that not be a decisive factor in this regard?

Ignatius: Well, if the U.S. stops providing military support entirely, that would be significant. It would be hard for any coalition of countries to make up for that. I think Trump would get so much resistance from Republicans that that complete cutoff is actually a tail event -- that's outside the normal distribution of what's likely. You know, it could happen, and it would have disastrous effects. But I don't think, even with a Trump-as-president scenario, it's all that likely.

RFE/RL: Back in 2014, when Putin annexed Crimea, you wrote that "Putin's gambit will fail over time, if Europe and the United States remain resolute and patient." How big an "if" has this proved to be?

Ignatius: So, patience is not the United States' strongest quality.

RFE/RL: "Resolute" is?

Ignatius: When we're in a fight, so long as it doesn't become politicized, our military is very resolute. Look at the fight against ISIS (the Islamic State extremist group). I traveled to Syria five or six times and to Raqqa (the Syrian city where IS was headquartered) twice, and I have to tell you, Raqqa looks worse than anything in Gaza City.

So, you know, we took apart that adversary. We were resolute. And the American conduct in war has often been resolute until there is an intersection with politics. And then, in Vietnam obviously, but you could cite lots of other examples, people get tired, they want results, generals trying to give them results do the wrong thing. I mean, it's a chain of error.

So, the standard retort when people say, "Oh, you Americans are impatient, you don't have the staying power, you're feckless" -- let's look at the Cold War. America sacrificed for a generation, basically for almost 50 years, to prevail in a conflict that it felt went to the core of its values and interests. And it made enormous sacrifices, and the world is immensely better for it. Like World War II, I mean, you know, you think of all the countries that were just battered, and America did come to the rescue.

And you look at all those graves in Normandy, all those Americans who came and gave their lives for the sake of a free Europe. And I think there's something similar with the Cold War. There's a generation of Americans who believed in it, who spent the money, who spent the time. And as I look at a free Eastern Europe -- Warsaw is one of my favorite cities in the world -- and when I go for a walk in Warsaw, I'm reminded that the United States isn't quite as fickle, unreliable as we sometimes think.

RFE/RL: So, you think that the United States and the West will remain resolute in this conflict as well.

Ignatius: I've been more impressed with European resoluteness than American. I think one of the great things that's happened is that the Ukraine war tapped idealism and commitment in Europe and determination to be a good ally for Ukraine and its struggle. And I've written often: Europeans have been a lot more resolute than Republican members of Congress.

You know, even with the concerns about German staying power, the Germans are still committed, they're still supplying weapons, they're going to build weapons in Ukraine. So, I think something has changed in Europe, and I find it encouraging and, ideally, we have a world in which the United States is a little less the "world's policeman" and Europe is a little more. And maybe that's where we're heading.

RFE/RL: Speaking of Germans, in that very essay, you placed high hopes into then-Chancellor Angela Merkel "being an iron lady of this crisis." How would you rate her performance in that role?

Ignatius: She had an unfortunate ending to her chancellorship. And it was a surprise: Why did she become so pliant with Russia and Putin toward the end, after being the person, famously, who, having grown up in the East, understood the nature of communism and the danger it posed, and I think was a wonderful leader for Germany in the process of reunification. I think it's a great, enduring achievement for her.

But I think toward the end, she made mistakes, and I think history will judge the end of her chancellorship pretty harshly. My own feeling is she kind of got worn out. It's hard for me to explain otherwise…. It wasn't uniquely her problem, but in terms of the hopes I was expressing that she would be an iron lady, too. She wasn't.

RFE/RL: Besides being a journalist, you're also a celebrated, best-selling author in the spy-fiction genre. And I can't help but ask why none of your spy novels features Russia prominently? Surely Vladimir Putin would be a tailor-made villain for a spy thriller, no?

Ignatius: It just so happens that in April or May of next year, I'll publish a novel called Phantom Orbit, which has as its hero a Russian. It's set in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine, but its roots as a story go back to 1995. I won't go into all the detail, but it gave me a chance to think about what I think is the most interesting issue in both warfare and intelligence, which is space systems.

I think space will be where wars begin and certainly where intelligence collection will focus.

And to think about Chinese and Russian systems that operate in space, as we've seen them in Ukraine: They've been more important to the Ukrainian war than I think is realized. I've said in the afterword of this book that it's a love letter to the Russia that once was and might still be. I hope readers will find an enthusiasm for the kind of sentimental Russian values that animate the Russian fiction that we all grew up reading. Anyway, that hole in my literary shelf is now going to be filled.

RFE/RL: You mentioned that it will be set in the aftermath of the invasion in Ukraine. Does that mean the beginning of the invasion, or has the conflict already run its course in the book?

Ignatius: No. I don't dare predict how it will turn out. The book is about a Russia that has been crushed emotionally in the way that I think Putin's Russia has been crushed. The hero is from a town in the eastern Urals called Magnitogorsk, which is Russia's Pittsburgh. It's the place where Russia made steel. Magnitogorsk is a reference to a magnetic mountain, a mountain of iron ore. And much like in Pittsburgh in America or towns in Europe that were steel-making towns, it feels like it's been defeated in a war. People there feel crushed.

And so, the hero of this book comes from that place, a country that feels twice-over defeated, with the end of the Soviet Union and the end of his world. And so, he tries to find his way as a scientist in a different world. So, I was on my way to Magnitogorsk to do research for this novel when I got sanctioned by Russia. I am on the sanctions list. I am the rare journalist [on the sanctions list], so I had to abandon my travel plans.

RFE/RL: So basically, the hero of your book will be the kind of guy that we all one day hope to take Putin's place.

Ignatius: He has qualities that are like [Russian opposition leader Aleksei] Navalny's: funny, cynical. I find Navalny just endlessly interesting to watch. He makes me laugh; his wry, ironic view of Putin and all these thieves who surround him makes me laugh out loud. And so, my character and his son, who also goes into this business, both have those qualities.

This interview has been edited for clarity and length.