East European Perspectives: October 3, 2001

The Hungarian Status Law



By Klara Kingston

On 19 June 2001 the National Assembly passed a "Status Law," or, as it is now being called, a "Benefits Law," by an overwhelming majority of 92 percent. The law that will become effective as of 1 January sets out a framework for granting wide-ranging cultural, social, and employment rights in Hungary to ethnic Hungarians from Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia. Persons who want to receive these benefits must sign a written declaration claiming Hungarian identity. The law stipulates that on the recommendation by ethnic Hungarian organizations in the relevant countries, the Hungarian authorities will issue a Hungarian identity card to successful applicants ("Magyar Hirlap," 19 June; "Nepszava," 20 June 2001). There are also clauses in the law that stipulate financial support in these countries for the establishment, maintenance, and development of institutions and accredited bodies of higher education that guarantee Hungarian-language education. Families with a minimum of two children who receive their instruction in Hungarian-language education institutions will also be entitled to claim benefits ("Magyar Hirlap" 19 June 2001).

In order to understand the need for such a law it is necessary to briefly outline the circumstances surrounding its birth.

Following the election of the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ)-headed government in 1998, the intensification of transborder cooperation became one of the priorities on the political agenda. The ruling political elite, as well as ethnic Hungarian organizations in the neighboring countries, perceived that Hungary�s advanced state towards Euro-Atlantic integration, hand-in-hand with the pending implementation of the Schengen agreement, would isolate and hinder the cross-border mobility of ethnic Hungarians. This prospect prompted the government and ethnic Hungarian organizations to establish a platform called the Hungarian Permanent Conference (MAERT). The MAERT was empowered to examine and determine criteria for the formulation of a benefits-package that would help ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries. After numerous debates, the platform concluded that a special status, which falls short of dual citizenship, should be granted to ethnic Hungarians.

With regard to what this really means, Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi unequivocally declared that the law is not about the status, but about benefits ethnic Hungarians will be able to enjoy on Hungarian territory ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 22 July 2000). Furthermore, with this legislation the government hopes to eliminate the exploitation stemming from the rampant illegal employment of people from neighboring countries. He pointed out: "if they come here to work to improve the lot of their families, they should enjoy the same benefits as we do" ("168 ora," 31 May 2001). But over and above, there is a political message: "that we belong together and we will try to help each other" ("Magyar Hirlap," 6 July 2001). He went on to say that these communities constitute a significant political force that contributes considerably to their countries' socio-economic development, as well as their Euro-Atlantic integration and that the law will reinforce their endeavors to those ends ("Nepszava," 23 June 2001).

As far as the timing of the law is concerned, it must be pointed out that Hungary is in the process of preparing for next year's general elections. The law is undoubtedly a popular one and all parties know it. According to recent opinion polls the FIDESZ and the opposition Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) are currently running neck and neck ahead of next year's general elections. FIDESZ's motivation is clear. By urging passage of the law it is clearly targeting, on one hand, the disillusioned electorate from the camp of the disintegrated Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), and, on the other hand, the less radical elements of the ultraright Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP). There is already an agreement with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), one of FIDESZ's coalition partners, to run in the 2002 elections on a joint platform. It is too early to say, however, what the undecided electorate may do on the "day of reckoning."

Given the positive reactions to the law, especially amongst ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries, the MSZP felt obliged to jump on the bandwagon (MTI; "Magyar Nemzet," 23 June 2001). But immediately after the voting, the party leadership took steps to distance itself from possible tensions that may arise from a number of stipulations in the law. It declared in a memorandum that the main trajectory of the law should focus on encouraging ethnic Hungarians to remain and flourish at home by providing financial and moral support for local cultural and educational institutions ("Magyar Nemzet," 20 June 2001). The MSZP also urged transborder regional cooperation and close consultation with the governments of neighboring countries. The party has already taken steps to remove tensions between Hungary and Romania. At a conference in Lisbon of the Socialist International, MSZP Chairman Laszlo Kovacs and the chairman of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD), Adrian Nastase, discussed the problem. Both parties expressed hope that the tension caused by the Status Law could be relieved by bilateral consultations and political goodwill ("Magyar Hirlap," 29 June; "Nepszabadsag," 30 June 2001). The MSZP's candidate for the premiership, Peter Medgyessy (who, incidentally was born in Transylvania), reiterated this view during his visit to Romania. He pointed out that: "We are trying to find the best ways for implementing the Status Law in partnership, taking into account the sides' sensibilities." In turn, Nastase promised to advise Hungary's Romanian minority to vote for the MSZP in the upcoming elections (Rompres, 29 and 30 August 2001). It seems that at least at the interparty level, there is a will to take the edge off the dispute.

The opposition Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) alone voted against the bill, although the party acknowledged there was a need for legislation granting benefits to Hungarian ethnic minorities in the neighboring countries. Like the MSZP, the SZDSZ emphasized the need to discourage ethnic Hungarians from leaving their homes, but it vehemently objected to the planned issuance of ID cards ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 31 March 2001). SZDSZ parliamentary group leader Istvan Szent-Ivanyi criticized the law as formulated by the government for containing too many vague definitions, propositions, and suppositions, which may eventually render it unworkable. He called the law "a mirage," saying no one knows to whom it will apply, what kind of services it will offer to those affected by it, how much its implementation will cost, and who is going to cover those costs. But above all, Szent-Ivanyi emphasized the danger that the granting of employment rights could trigger mass immigration of ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries (Duna TV, 22 January 2001; "Heti Vilaggazdasag," 27 January 2001).

SZDSZ parliamentary deputy Tamas Bauer prophetically called the law "discriminatory," saying that it extends rights to ethnic Hungarians which majorities in the countries affected will not benefit from and warned that this would inevitably evoke negative responses from the countries concerned. He pointed out that the European Union had already raised objections regarding the term "neighboring countries," which would have included Austria as well. The EU prohibits discrimination against its citizens along ethnic lines ("Nepszava," 20 June 2001).

As Bauer had predicted, the passing of the law triggered reactions of various intensities from the governments of the neighboring countries. The most vociferous of these came from Romanian politicians. Slovakia's reactions were more muted, since that country hopes to soon join the EU, which would automatically take it off of the list of countries to which the law applies.

Romania repeatedly accused Hungary of "discrimination on an ethnic basis" and called the issuing of identity cards a "non-European" gesture, as well as an "infringement on other countries' sovereignty" ("Magyar Hirlap," 19 June 2001). But over and above, both countries complained about the lack of sufficient prior consultation at the governmental level.

Not all responses, however, were negative. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko expressed "understanding" for Hungary�s efforts to extend legislative practices to kinfolk living outside the confines of the national boundary ("Nepszava," 20 June 2001). Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister Nenad Prelog also said that Croatia itself intends to formulate a law that would enable ethnic Croatians to study and work in his country. He noted that Slovak and Hungarian "experiences" would be studied when preparing their own law ("Magyar Hirlap," 14 May 2001). Subsequently, the Croatian government officially welcomed the Hungarian law (MTI, 12 July 2001).

One of the main arguments for the law being "anti-European" was based on the fact that originally the benefits would have been extended to Austrians of Hungarian ethnic origin as well. But under pressure from the EU, Austria was struck off the list ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 23 June 2001). Both Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Zsolt Nemeth had been quick to admit that the government acted upon EU objections. But both stressed that Austrian Hungarians, and indeed Hungarians living in the Western diaspora in general, had no reason to fear they would be negatively affected by Hungary�s prospective membership of the EU, and that it would have been consequently superfluous to include them on the list of beneficiaries ("Magyar Hirlap," 31 May 2001). At the same time, Martonyi pointed out that the prohibition against ethnic discrimination in the EU itself does not extend to associate members, and that consequently the law does not violate EU regulations ("Magyar Hirlap," 7 June).

The most vulnerable among the Hungarian communities in the neighboring countries is the one in Ukraine. Its survival depends almost solely on cross-border economic and cultural activity ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 2 December 2000). Other communities are more self-sufficient and better off, but this does not necessarily mean that they can (or are allowed to) fully and independently attend to their economic or cultural needs. Nemeth pointed out that the law's primary aim is to enable these people to gain easier access to Hungarian economic and cultural resources after the country's full admittance to the EU ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 16 December 2000). To this end, the chairman of the European People�s Party (EPP), Wilfried Martens, acknowledged the legitimacy of Hungarian government's measures enveloped in a law aiming, he said, "to care for the 3 million Hungarians living outside the national borders" (MTI, 11 July).

Technically speaking, the law seems to be in conformity with European practices. And, after having studied it, European Commissioner for Enlargement Guenter Verheugen said he had found nothing in the law that would violate EU principles (MTI, 11 July). In Romania itself, Smaranda Enache, chairwoman of the Targu-Mures based Pro Europe League, pointed out that the law fits into EU logistics on minority protection ("Magyar Nemzet," 23 June 2001). But one should hasten to add that Enache was a lonely voice in Romania when it came to the Status Law and that Romanian intellectuals known for their support of Hungarian minority grievances -- not to speak of those who regard anything emerging from Hungary with suspicion -- distanced themselves from the Status Law's implications on several grounds (see the reaction by Romanian League for the Defense of Human Rights-Helsinki Committee Co-Chairman Gabriel Andreescu in "Observator cultural," 29 May-4 June 2001).*

Moreover, the law is aiming to implement legal exigencies enshrined in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Europe. Articles 18.1 and 18.2 of the Convention state: (1) "The Parties shall endeavor to conclude, where necessary, bilateral and multilateral agreements with other States, in particular neighboring States, in order to ensure the protection of persons belonging to the national minorities concerned. (2) Where relevant, the Parties shall take measures to encourage cross-frontier cooperation." And � 80 in Article 15 points to the desirability of "involving these persons in the preparation, implementation and assessment of national and regional development plans and programs likely to effect them directly" (text in: Kovacs 2000, pp. 149-151).

Still, the law could be construed as "anti-European" in the sense that it seems to go against trends in the EU to create a more open society in which, at least in theory, ethnicity and nationality are not criteria for any kind of discrimination.

In response to numerous criticisms -- mainly from Romanian politicians -- that the Hungarian law entails discrimination against national majorities, Martonyi admitted that it does indeed imply "positive discrimination" toward ethnic Hungarian minorities, but emphasized that this under no circumstances entails negative discrimination against the majority ("Magyar Hirlap," 31 May and 6 July 2001).

Positive discrimination as such does not contravene EU legislation. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Article 7 (2) states: "The adoption of special measures in favor of regional or minority languages aimed at promoting equality between the users of these languages and the rest of the population or which take due account of their specific conditions is not considered to be an act of discrimination against the users of more widely-used languages" (text in: Kovacs, 2000, 149).

Furthermore, the Council of Europe actively applies positive discrimination in order to encourage the maintenance of cultural and linguistic identities of ethnic minorities living in member states by providing funds for multilingual cultural and informational programs. These states include Austria, Italy, Spain, and France ("Magyar Nemzet," 23 June 2001). The largest EU country, Germany, in its Basic Law (Grundgesetz) ("BVFG," 23 October 1961 art. 116) on appertaining to the German nationality ("Deutsche Volkszugehoerigkeit") offers German citizenship to all ethnic Germans regardless of their place of residence. Greece, another EU country, also has "preference laws" for non-Greek citizens. Not to mention Israel, which extends the "Right of Return" to kinfolk (Jews) all over the world. In the case of Israel, however, "kinfolk" should be considered differently from those living in "neighboring" countries, with their unsettled historical differences.

However, positive discrimination as such is not the contentious issue around the Status Law, but its perception as being discriminatory. As former Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Severin put it, the law was formulated "at the wrong time in the wrong place." For perceived discrimination of any sort, Severin said, may arouse strong sentiments, frustrations, and fears, and these apprehensions -- even if groundless -- may trigger conflicts and instability ("Nepszabadsag," 27 June 2001).

The question of sovereignty (and not only the strictly territorial aspects of it) is probably one the most sensitive issues in East-Central Europe. Having lost sovereignty so often through history, many --perhaps even a majority -- among East-Central Europeans shudder at the thought of having to give it up again, even if and when they join the EU. But there seems to be a curious paradox here. While on one hand there is a strong tendency to hold on to the "nation-state" concept, on the other hand there is an overwhelming impetus for joining the EU melting pot. In that pot, however, it seems that each side wishes to renounce as little as possible of its sovereign national-state prerogatives, while at the same time gain as much as possible from (to put it in odd Marxist terminology) the state's gradual "withering away" in order to enhance ties with kinfolk beyond its borders. Nothing illustrates better this anachronism than recent statements made by Orban, Martonyi, and Romanian President Ion Iliescu, respectively.

With regard to membership in the European Union and the place of ethnic minorities within the union, Orban categorically stated: "We do not favor a United States of Europe and we must protect our multiple cultural and national identities. Every minority living in the midst of another nation is in danger of assimilation. Hence, national identity is a value to be protected and this is what we are aiming at in Central Europe" ("La Libre Belgique," cited by MTI on 11 July 2001). Martonyi expressed similar views, but with a subtle difference. He envisages a new type of Europe in which individual states, as sole decision-making bodies, would assume a secondary role, while the future of the continent will largely be determined by its "communities" ("168 ora," 31 May 2001). Echoing Martonyi's words, Iliescu said: "European borders cannot be changed, but integration into the EU will inevitably relegate the importance of national borders. For this reason, Romania supports the integration of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine into European structures. Bucharest wants to preserve the cultural and linguistic unity of Romanians all over the world" ("Magyar Hirlap," 7 July 2001 cited MTI).

It thus becomes clear why Romanian (and to a lesser extent Slovak) perceptions of the Status Law primarily reflect the still domineering nation-state primacy and why, viewed from the nation-state perspective, any interference on their territory is by definition "sovereignty infringement." And indeed, the Hungarian Status Law stipulates such interference by intending to appoint ethnic Hungarian organizations to decide who does and who does not count as Hungarian. On the other hand, according to Martonyi, there is an addendum at the end of the law stating that the issuance of ID cards need not depend on recommendations by outside organizations. The decision would rest solely with the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and will be subject to the approval of the foreign minister in office at the time ("Magyar Nemzet," 6 July 2001).

If this second method of implementation were to be applied, the objections stemming from "sovereignty infringement" ought to lose their acuteness. This, it appears, will in fact be the case. According to the latest reports the decision-making regarding the issuance of the ID cards would fall under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian authorities ("Nepszabadsag," 24 September 2001), and the cards are to be issued in Hungary itself. If that will be the case, it is difficult to envisage objections continuing on "infringement of sovereignty" grounds, for even Severin remarked in his capacity as current chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE that "every country has a right to formulate laws on its territory designed to provide benefits to specific persons based on specific criteria" ("Nepszabadsag," 27 June 2001).

But, as always, the devil is in the details. Even if eventually it will be up to the Hungarian authorities to decide who would be entitled to the benefits, there remains a problem of preliminary administration. According to the latest reports, there are plans to establish bureaus in the neighboring countries solely in order to register would-be applicants. That, it seems, has created a rift between the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (UDMR) and the "historical" Churches in Transylvania. The honorary chairman of the UDMR, Bishop Laszlo Tokes, insists that these planned administrative bodies be empowered to decide who should, or not, qualify for the Hungarian ID. UDMR President Bela Marko, on the other hand, exercises caution. He points out that as there are still no agreements at the intergovernmental level regarding the law's implementation, any action or decision can be only conjectural ("Nepszabadsag," 24 September 2001). For now, the sides reached an agreement to equally participate -- if at all -- in the process of candidate-registration (MTI, 25 September 2001).

Certainly it does not serve the interest of ethnic-Hungarian communities to have their representative bodies at loggerheads with each other. Moreover, it is premature to take any steps towards implementation, because the law is currently being scrutinized by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (MTI, 9 July 2001) as well as by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in the context of other European Union practices ("PACE," 28 June; "PACE," 3 July 2001). The verdict is expected later in the fall.

One of the most obvious of contentions is that of attitudes. Romanian Public Communications Minister Vasile Dancu, ("Nepszava," 29 June) as well as the Hungarian opposition parties, criticized the Hungarian government's blatant "insensitivity" towards the country's neighbors. Unfortunate and rather irresponsible remarks made by Nemeth, suggesting "transborder reunification of the Hungarian nation" may indeed be said to be oblivious to feelings among majorities in the neighboring countries ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 23 June 2001). Such remarks are immediately translated into the intent to create a "virtual" Greater Hungary, and Nemeth should know better.

In efforts to take the heat out of the situation, a number of high-ranking EU officials univocally called on the Hungarian government to hold intensive consultations with the governments of the relevant countries in a "good neighborly spirit" ("Magyar Nemzet," 10 July; MTI, 25 July 2001).

Unnamed EU diplomats have pointed to the danger that the law may play into the hands of political forces in neighboring countries that are attempting to curb the rights of the ethnic Hungarian minority ("Nepszabadsag," 10 July 2001). Warnings also came forth from the opposition about the likelihood the law might in fact act against the interests of those it is trying to protect. As already mentioned, one of the points raised by several critics is that the law will prompt mass immigration. But Martonyi rejected such suggestions as unfounded ("168 ora," 31 May). Let, however, facts speak for themselves. According to the Interior Ministry's Immigration and Citizenship Department, currently there are over 80,000 immigrants in Hungary, 37,000 of which are from Romania. Moreover, 90 percent of these are ethnic Hungarians (MTI, 25 July). On the other hand, another survey commissioned by the Illyes Foundation in conjunction with the Office for Affairs of Hungarians Living Abroad, indicated that the law would encourage 80 percent of ethnic Hungarians to stay in their countries ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 2 December 2000).

To make things worse, Orban put his head in the noose when he declared: "If we want to sustain economic growth in Hungary, 10 million Hungarians will not be enough" ("Heti Vilaggazdasag," 16 June 2001). Minority leaders from Slovakia and Romania, Bela Bugar and Bela Marko, respectively, reacted to the prime minister's allusions, which implied that a manpower shortage might be replenished by importing labor from the neighboring countries. They pointed out that if this is what the prime minister meant, the law would achieve the opposite of its intended mission of encouraging ethnic Hungarians to stay where they are ("168 ora," 14 June 2001).

Furthermore, Orban's statement provided the Romanian media as well as Nastase with ammunition for attacks. The "Jurnalul National" accused Hungary of playing on the poverty in Romania as well as of intending to exploit the difference in the two countries' living standards (MTI, 30 July 2001). Nastase said in reaction that Romania is not a "colony" for Hungary to import cheap labor from. In order to counter this danger, Romania would have to introduce incentives for its citizens to remain at home, he said ("Nepszava," 20 June 2001). The Romanian premier added that if the law were to be implemented, the number of people claiming Hungarian identity in Transylvania could double the next day ("Magyar Nemzet," 26 April 2001).

This can hardly be said to have been a display of self-confidence on the part of the head of a government who has so often in the past defended the state's national character. But if Nastase's predictions are right, then surely it is not in the interest of Hungary to upset the applecart. It could lead to the export of political instability through upsetting the interethnic balance in some areas, such as Transylvania, and the import of social difficulties, taking into account that approximately 35 percent of Hungary's population lives at or below the subsistence level.

Moreover, there are no stipulations in the law about the situation of the Hungarian-speaking Romany communities in neighboring countries. There are indications, in Slovakia as well as Romania, that large numbers of Roma in both countries intend to declare themselves Hungarians in the hope of improving their lot under the Status Law. There are an estimated 3 million Roma in Romania, of whom a very large part live among the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. According to one of the leaders of the Romany community in Romania, "King" Florian Cioaba, the introduction of the Hungarian ID card would result in a large-scale assimilation of Hungarian-speaking Roma. He fears this would upset interethnic harmony in the region, reducing the number of Roma on the one hand and increasing the number of Hungarians on the other. The leader of the Romany community in the Harghita county, Tibor Sinka, summed up the dilemma facing the Roma. "We are Hungarian speakers, but over and above we are Gypsies. If the law is not meant for us, then thank you very much, we don�t want any of it" (MTI, 22 July 2001).

If the Hungarian government really intends to extend the benefits to the Hungarian-speaking Roma in the neighboring countries then it must take steps, in addition to the benefits law, to encourage them to stay in their countries. Otherwise, the mass influx of an already disadvantaged group of people would put such a strain on Hungary's social structure that it would lead to dire consequences. Moreover, the EU considers the Roma question to be one pertaining above all to human rights, rather than merely an economic issue. Even at present, without exception, the East and East-Central European countries are grappling with the problem, and it is not in the interest of any of them to be landed with a human rights issue on their way to the EU.

The law might also adversely affect democratic evolutions in some neighboring countries. For example, in Transylvania, there have been strenuous moves towards achieving devolution on the basis of regional "local specificity," as advocated by the recently-established and not-yet registered Pro-Transylvania Party led by Sabin Gherman. This objective is supported by the UDMR as well ("Nepszabadsag," 30 August 2001). But any move towards devolution in Romania is being viewed with a great deal of hostility, since it would call into question the "unitary" character of the state. Nastase has made no bones about this when he declared: "the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia owes much to similar trends," adding that the Romanian authorities "are determined not to allow the 'national and unitary' state disintegrate" ("RFE/RL Newsline," 28 August 2001)

Many Romanians in Transylvania feel that the status law, as they perceive it, creates inequalities between them and ethnic Hungarians in the region. What is more, a survey conducted by the Metro Media Transylvania public opinion research institute revealed that nearly half of those polled opined that ethnic Hungarians are already enjoying too many rights in Romania. Furthermore, they perceive that ethnic Hungarians in Romania in general, and in Transylvania in particular, are loyal to Hungary rather than to the Romanian state. In addition, 86.6 percent suggested that the Romanian government use all its legal instruments to prevent the law from being implemented in their country (MTI, 27 July 2001). It must be borne in mind, however, that the polling institute that carried out the survey was, until recently, headed by Public Communications Minister Dancu. The poll was released at a time when the Romanian government was obviously interested in manipulating public opinion against the Hungarian Status Law, and its results may indeed have reflected that effort.

In light of the political storm evoked by the Status Law, it is obvious that the UDMR is balancing on a double-edged sword. Its support for Nastase's minority government is vital for the democratization processes needed for Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration. If the relationship between the PSD and the UDMR were to disintegrate, the alternative would only benefit such extreme nationalist formations as the Greater Romania Party (PRM). Nastase had hinted that if the cabinet were "forced to choose between national interests and cooperation with the UDMR," he would vote for the first option ("Nepszava," 29 June 2001). Severin has indeed warned -- in connection with the debates on the Status Law -- that nearly one-third of the electorate had voted in November 2000 for the PRM, and that the ruling PSD minority government "feels obliged to adopt a more nationalistic rhetoric in order to take the wind out of the nationalists' sails" ("Ziua," cited by "Nepszabadsag," 17 June 2001).

In conclusion it must be said that the Status or Benefits Law in its present form has created more problems than intended. Most of the controversies could have been avoided with foresight and in-depth analysis. Too much attention had been paid to achieving "technical" legitimacy vis-a-vis the EU at the expense of recognizing prevailing political and emotional realities in the neighboring countries, Romania in particular. However, the law is only a framework and by close bilateral and multilateral cooperation in a "good-neighborly spirit," an acceptable solution may yet be worked out.

*the author wishes to thank "EEP" editor Michael Shafir for drawing her attention to this article

Klara Kingston is a Hungarian-born writer and freelance journalist.

SOURCES

BVFG 23 October 1961, Article 116.

"Heti Vilaggazdasag" (Budapest), 2000-2001.

Kovacs, P., 2000, International Law and Minority Protection: Rights of Minorities or Law on Minorities? (Budapest: Akademia Kiado).

"Magyar Hirlap" (Budapest), 2001.

"Magyar Nemzet" (Budapest), 2001.

MTI 2001.

"Nepszabadsag" (Budapest), 2001.

"Nepszava" (Budapest), 2001.

"Observator cultural," (Bucharest), 2001.

"PACE" 2001, "Two Views on the role of kin states in protection of minorities," Online at http://www.egroups.com/group/balkanhr

"RFE/RL Newsline," 2001.

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