The Week In Russia: War, Peace, And 'Political Control'

A woman cleans debris from a heavily damaged apartment building following a Russian aerial attack on Selydove in eastern Ukraine.

I'm Steve Gutterman, the editor of RFE/RL's Russia/Ukraine/Belarus Desk.

Welcome to The Week In Russia, in which I dissect some of the key developments in the country and in its war against Ukraine, and some of the takeaways going forward.

A Ukraine peace proposal handed to former President Donald Trump ahead of the U.S. election would face huge hurdles, experts say, and critics fear it would benefit Russia.

Here are some of the key developments in Russia over the past week and some of the takeaways going forward.

'Easy'

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has said that repeatedly he will quickly bring an end to Russia's war on Ukraine if he returns to the White House in January.

"If I were president…I will end that war in one day -- it'll take 24 hours," he said in May 2023, adding that "it would be easy."

In the June 27 debate against incumbent President Joe Biden, Trump asserted that if he defeats Biden in the November 5 election, he will "have that war settled" before he even takes office on January 20. But he has said little about how he would hope to do it.

Enter Fred Fleitz and retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, advisers to Trump who were chiefs of staff on Trump's National Security Council during his 2017-2021 term and have presented him with a proposed path to peace, or at least to peace talks.

The proposal, which is part of a research paper written by Kellogg and Fleitz, both at the Washington-based Center for American Security, has made waves since it was first reported by Reuters on June 25.

'Come To The Table'

Kellogg told Reuters that it would be important to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table quickly. He made clear that the proposal would seek to use U.S. weapons supplies and financial aid to Ukraine as a lever of influence on both sides.

"We tell the Ukrainians, 'You've got to come to the table, and if you don't come to the table, support from the United States will dry up,'" he said. "And you tell Putin…if you don't come to the table, then we'll give Ukrainians everything they need to kill you in the field."

Along with that stick, a potential carrot for Russia would be an offer "to put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period," the report says. Ukraine would be offered security guarantees that Fleitz told Reuters would likely involve "arming Ukraine to the teeth."

The proposal calls for a cease-fire based on the existing battle lines during the peace talks -- and that underscores the massive obstacles such a plan would face from the get-go, because neither side is likely to be content with such a situation for long, if at all.

Rewarding Aggression?

Ukraine wants Russian forces out of Ukraine, of course. Describing a 10-point "peace formula" in 2022, months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion that February, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity was "not up for negotiation."

"What Kellogg is describing is a process slanted toward Ukraine giving up all of the territory that Russia now occupies," Reuters quoted Daniel Fried, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state, as saying.

"I see the proposal as unbalanced in favor of Russia's aims and likely to reward aggression and brutal violence," Gordon "Skip" Davis, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and a retired U.S. Army major general, told Newsweek magazine.

Russia now holds the Crimean Peninsula and parts of four other Ukrainian regions in the east and south, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson -- about one-fifth of the country.

'New Realities'

Russian officials have frequently said any talks to halt or end its war against Ukraine must take the "new realities" into account. While that might sound like it refers to Russia's control over that territory, it actually refers to something that does not reflect reality at all: Moscow's claim that those four regions, in their entirety, are part of Russia.

Putin stated that more clearly than ever on June 14, saying that Russia would start peace talks only if Ukraine cedes the four regions in their entirety and renounces its ambition of joining NATO.

Those remarks and other evidence suggest that the proposal to keep Ukraine out of NATO for an "extended period" would be dismissed by Russia. One of the demands Russia made in December 2021, as it was massing troops at Ukraine's border ahead of the full-scale invasion, was a binding guarantee that Ukraine would never join the alliance – and there is no sign that position has changed.

The prospect that the United States would continue to arm Ukraine, both during talks and as part of security guarantees after a deal is reached, is also likely to irk Russia, which has sought -- again, since before the invasion of February 2022 -- to secure an agreement under which Ukraine would be allowed only a limited -- and very small -- arsenal.

Arms And Energy

"The intention to continue arming Ukraine will be particularly unacceptable [to Russia] and is likely to be immediately rejected," Tatyana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said in a post on X.

She also indicated that a proposal to use levies on Russian energy sales to pay for reconstruction in Ukraine was unrealistic, writing that it "could only be taken seriously in the event of a Russian defeat -- which seems unlikely -- or a regime change."

But she and other analysts suggested obstacles to the proposal are broader than issues such as territorial control, weapons supplies, energy sales, and reconstruction. And that amount to this: Russia wants to subjugate Ukraine.

'Incompatible Objectives'

"This plan overlooks the core issue of the conflict," Stanovaya wrote. "For [Putin] it's not about territory but about ensuring Ukraine becomes 'friendly.' I don't think it's achievable (which is why Putin's war is doomed), but it remains Putin's primary and most compelling motivation for the war."

"The two countries' objectives are incompatible," Brian Taylor, a professor of political science at Syracuse University and the author of The Code Of Putinism, told Newsweek.

"Russia wants to have political control over Ukraine and eliminate the idea of Ukraine as a separate nation," he said, "and Ukraine wants to defend its territory, its people, and its democracy from Russian violence and domination."

Despite aspects that may be unpalatable to the Kremlin, Russia might agree to enter talks if Putin sees them as a chance to further the goals of undermining Zelenskiy's government, gaining control over Ukraine, and getting more of a say on decisions about regional and global security -- something he has been seeking for decades.

Putin often portrays Russia as being ready for talks and Ukraine as recalcitrant. Asked about the plan, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told Reuters that "Putin has repeatedly said that Russia has been and remains open to negotiations, taking into account the real state of affairs on the ground."

The proposal "has a specific feature that might appeal to Putin: It initiates a new geopolitical game where Moscow could have much more room to maneuver. The plan compels Ukraine to cease resistance -- exactly what Putin currently desires," Stanovaya wrote.

"It mandates direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, which, in Putin's view, could weaken Ukraine domestically," she wrote. "The plan could be seen as a tactical opportunity, a starting point for a new geopolitical scenario in which an exhausted Ukraine would have to reassess its domestic political situation, becoming more susceptible to Russian influence and more pliable."

That's it from me this week.

If you want to know more, catch up on my podcast The Week Ahead In Russia, out every Monday, here on our site or wherever you get your podcasts (Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Pocket Casts).

Yours,

Steve Gutterman

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