Wider Europe

Wider Europe Briefing: Georgia's Vanishing EU Dreams

A demonstrator holds an EU and a Georgian national flag at an opposition protest against the results of the parliamentary election in Tbilisi on October 28.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: what the EU can do about Georgia and the potential changes 2025 will bring for people entering the EU.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.

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Wider Europe Briefing: Georgia's Vanishing EU Dreams (Listen)

Briefing #1: The EU's Dwindling Options On Georgia

What You Need To Know: More than three weeks after the Georgian parliamentary elections, which saw the ruling Georgian Dream party winning with 54 percent of the vote but has also led to opposition protests and a boycott of parliament, the European Union remains unsure of how to react.

Generally speaking, this is connected to three things: a paucity of options going forward, divisions within the EU, and a lack of clarity over what actually took place on election day and during the run-up to the parliamentary vote.

The EU was cautious in its first statement after the vote, quoting the OSCE/ODIHR preliminary findings and noting that "irregularities" had occurred. Three days later, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell ramped up the pressure somewhat with another statement asking for a transparent inquiry and noting that international observers "have also not declared the elections to be free and fair."

Then, at a debate on the Georgian elections in the European Parliament on November 13, came the strongest rebuke so far of the ruling authorities in Tbilisi when European Commission Vice President Margaritis Schinas said that "these elections were marked by serious irregularities, with violations reported both during the election campaign and the election day itself. These elections fall short of the standards expected of a country holding EU candidate status."

Deep Background: Yet, the EU already seems to be forgetting about Georgia. You could see it at the summits in Budapest in early November. Attending the European Political Community (EPC) summit in the Hungarian capital, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze took the floor after warm congratulations from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who had raced to Tbilisi directly after the elections to celebrate Georgian Dream's success and thus publicly breaking the EU's unity.

In Budapest, Kobakhidze reportedly criticized "some Europeans" for expressing their disappointment at the election result, called for Georgia to be treated fairly by the EU, and said that the opposition didn't enjoy the support of the Georgian people. The Georgian leader spoke at the end of the meeting, and, with Orban only giving the floor to non-EU country leaders, there were no direct reactions to his speech.

EU leaders were supposed to discuss Georgia in depth on the second day of the EPC summit, but the reelection of Donald Trump as U.S. president and a presentation by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi on the bloc's competitiveness dominated the proceedings. That day, only the Estonian and Lithuanian leaders mentioned Georgia at all.

Diplomats I spoke to were a little peeved that European Council President Charles Michel had a bilateral meeting with Kobakhidze but didn't mention anything about that meeting or about Georgia at the final press conference. That meeting was described by a senior EU official who wasn't authorized to speak on the record as lasting "less than 10 minutes" and Michel, according to the diplomat, expressed "deep concerns" about alleged electoral violations and called for an investigation.

Drilling Down:

  • There were other signs the issue is already on the back burner. During the hearing in the European Parliament of the incoming new EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, Georgia was not mentioned at all during the three-hour grilling. The incoming new EU enlargement commissioner, Marta Kos, also didn't mention Georgia in the introductory speech to her hearing, but was asked about the issue by a member of the European Parliament. She did say that the process of Georgia applying to join the EU, which has been put on hold, could resume if the government nixed the recently adopted and controversial "foreign-agent" law and "anti-LGBT law."
  • Ultimately, the EU will (perhaps reluctantly) have to engage with the Georgian Dream government. According to the EU officials I've spoken to, there is definitely a sense that they are the only ones on the dance floor, so the EU doesn't really have much choice.
  • Part of the problem for EU officials is that there isn't really a smoking gun when it comes to accusations of widespread fraud. There is skepticism that the ruling party got 54 percent suppport in the elections, but it's hardly an outlandish claim. (Something more realistic would perhaps have been support of somewhere between 40 and 50 percent.)
  • Given that the OSCE election-monitoring report can take around three months to appear, there isn't much that can be done now except wait.
  • Meeting on November 18, EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss Georgia. But they are likely to discuss the same options paper on how Brussels could reorient its policy toward Georgia that they discussed in June. And can anything new be decided? Georgia's EU accession has already stalled, and political contacts between the bloc and Tbilisi have been downgraded. Thirty million euros ($31.7 million) in military aid and 120 million euros in direct assistance to the government remain frozen.
  • Sanctions would require a consensus that doesn't exist. It is not only Hungary and Slovakia who would oppose but also Bulgaria and Italy, to name just two. Visa-liberalization suspension has been mooted, but many, including Germany, aren't keen to target the general population.
  • Potentially, one measure that only requires a qualified majority (55 percent of member states, representing 65 percent of the total EU population) would be to introduce visa requirements for Georgian officials traveling into the bloc.
  • Some member states, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, will likely push for some sort of international investigation into the possible election violations. But this has its pitfalls as well. Firstly, would the Georgian government accept it? And would an EU-backed investigation come up with something radically different to what the OSCE is already working on? And, as one diplomat told me: Is now really the time to start questioning the findings of OSCE/ODIHR electoral missions in general? There has been an agreement to send a so-called "technical mission" of diplomats from the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's diplomatic service. They will speak to all stakeholders in the country and report back to Brussels.
  • At the end of November, the European Parliament is likely to pass a nonbinding resolution on Georgia. That could look similar to the resolution the parliament adopted in February following the December 2023 Serbian parliamentary elections, which were marred by irregularities. That document both called for "an independent international investigation by respected international legal experts and institutions" and urged the European Commission "to launch an initiative to send an expert mission to Serbia to assess the situation as regards the recent elections and postelection developments." It's worth noting that, in the case of Serbia, neither the investigation nor the expert mission has materialized yet. Relations with Belgrade remain frosty but intact. With the ongoing war in Ukraine and a new U.S. administration coming in January, the bloc will most likely be focused elsewhere.

Briefing #2: Will 2025 Be A 'Big Bang' Moment For Travelers To The EU?

What You Need To Know: The weekend before last could have been the big unveiling of the EU's new Entry/Exit System (EES). This new system will mean that when a non-EU citizen crosses any border or enters any airport or harbor in 25 EU countries (all the member states apart from Cyprus and Ireland) and four non-EU countries (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein), they would have to register their full name, nationality, and have their fingerprints and photo taken, possibly in a newly installed self-service kiosk.

The EES has been in the works ever since it was approved by the EU in late 2017 and will do away with the manual stamping of non-EU passports, replacing the old system with a large electronic database. According to the European Commission, the EES will help prevent irregular migration, help third-country nationals travel more easily, plus identify attempts at overstaying or identity fraud. Yet the grand unveiling never happened, not on November 10 as planned, nor on the back-up date, November 17.

Deep Background: To be fair, the dates were never actually set in stone. There was also vaguer talk of it happening sometime in the final quarter of this year. And it also wasn't the first time it was delayed. In 2020, it was the coronavirus pandemic that prevented it. Then, in 2022 and 2023, the new system still wasn't ready.

So why the constant delays? A generous answer is that this is a massive IT undertaking and the technology is untested at this scale. When, back in October, interior ministers agreed that a November rollout wasn't possible, it was France, Germany, and the Netherlands -- three member states with multiple entry points -- that were putting on the brakes.

The German Interior Ministry noted then that the central computer system underpinning the EES, which is overseen by the EU agency eu-LISA, lacked "the necessary stability and functionality."

An EU diplomat familiar with the issue was more brutal, telling me that the entire system was "shoddy" and complaining about a lack of testing before the official launch. While eu-LISA has said that all EU member states were technically ready, there were widespread fears that the new system would create chaos at the continent's key hubs, hitting crucial business and tourism with massive border queues.

There is a fear among EU officials that the teething issues with a system of such magnitude run the risk of causing massive reputational damage, potentially jeopardizing years of planning.

Drilling Down:

  • One of the problems is that the EU wanted to launch it everywhere all at once. A "big bang" of sorts. The thinking now in Brussels, however, is a more phased-in approach, which means that the already agreed upon operating regulations will have to be amended. This can be done if there is political will (which seems to exist) but it is now up to the European Commission to define what exactly this phased-in approach means.
  • Does it mean that it will be gradually rolled out geographically, for example, in just a few countries or some specific airports? Or does it mean that only some biometric details will be registered but not all -- for example, skipping the taking of fingerprints? The new European Commission, which is likely to be sworn in in December, will have to tackle this as a matter of urgency.
  • In the meantime, many hubs and border crossings will continue to prepare for an eventual launch in 2025 by adding more automatic barriers, self-service kiosks, tweaking the preregistration app, and training staff and border guards.
  • There is another thing for non-EU citizens traveling into the visa-free Schengen zone to consider. The plan is that once the EES is operational, the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) will follow some six months later. ETIAS is something like an EU equivalent to the already functioning U.S. Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) and the recently established U.K. Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA). This will cover all visa-exempt travelers to the EU, with an estimated 1.4 billion people needing to apply. This includes, for example, U.S. and British citizens but also Ukrainians, Georgians, and Moldovans, as well as citizens of the non-EU Western Balkan states.
  • It is worth pointing out that getting ETIAS approval is not a visa, nor does it guarantee entry. The authorization, valid for three years, will cost seven euros and will have to be completed by everyone between the ages of 18 to 70. Some people will be able to get exemptions. Among them are individuals with visas and residence permits, refugees, diplomatic passport holders, and airport transit passengers.
  • ETIAS was agreed by the EU in 2018 and, like the EES, is part of the push to make the Schengen zone more robust by having greater control of who is entering. With immigration once again top of the political agenda across the bloc, there is likely to be a firm push by several member states, as well as the European Commission, to have both systems up and running in 2025.

Looking Ahead

On November 22, the interior ministers of Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, and Romania will assemble to try to iron out the final details of the latter two countries' full entry into the Schengen zone. Since the start of this year, both countries are part of Schengen when it comes to air and maritime travel but not land crossings, with Vienna blocking it due to migration concerns. There are indications, though, that a deal can be struck, which would mean EU ministers could finally give an official green light when they meet in Brussels on December 12.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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