Qishloq Ovozi (Archive)

A recent meeting of officials from Uzbekistan and Iran was a curious event. Central Asia has seen a reshuffling of relations over the past couple years, and improved relations between Tashkent and Tehran is one of the more intriguing developments.

Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov led the Uzbek delegation that also included Foreign Trade Minister Elyor Ganiev and Uzbekneftegaz chief Alisher Sultanov. During their October 16-18 visit, members of the Uzbek delegation met with Iranian President Hassan Rohani, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh.

Agreements worth some $25 million were signed for agricultural and textile products, but for Uzbekistan the more important talks were on oil imports from Iran.

Zanganeh said on October 18 that Uzbek oil officials were in talks with the National Iranian Oil Company about exporting Iranian oil to Uzbekistan.

Zanganeh did not mention any figures.

Since Shavkat Mirziyoev took over as Uzbekistan’s president last year, Uzbekistan has been moving to alleviate the country’s chronic shortages of oil and gasoline.

Already this year, Mirziyoev has secured agreements for oil imports from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

In the case of Kazakhstan and Russia, work must first be done to repair and extend an existing pipeline that connects Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before any oil can be imported.

"Exports to [Uzbekistan] need to be conducted overland and probably by rail," Zanganeh said.

Such a rail line already exists, so it should not take long for shipments of Iranian oil to start arriving in Uzbekistan after the two countries finalize a deal.

If Uzbek-Iranian relations continue to warm, there is always the possibility that the same railway could one day be used to carry Uzbek goods to Iran and the Persian Gulf.

China would likely back such a plan, as it would integrate well with Beijing’s One Belt, One Road global trade initiative.

It might also breathe some new life into the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman international trade and transport corridor, a project that was signed in 2011 but which has made little progress since.

For Iran, the timing of the Uzbek delegation’s visit is fortuitous.

Tehran’s ties with Tajikistan, Iran’s natural partner in Central Asia due to the linguistic and cultural affinities they share, have been fraying for many months, in large part due to a vigorous push by Saudi Arabia -- Iran's regional rival -- to court better relations with Tajikistan.

Iranian-Turkmen ties hit a new low recently due to a dispute between the two countries over the price of Turkmen natural-gas exports to northern Iran.

Turkmenistan stopped gas supplies to Iran at the end of 2016, citing Iranian debt, and Iran has mentioned several times since that it is prepared to take Turkmenistan to international arbitration for price gouging and failure to respect contracts.

A new partnership with Uzbekistan would help Iran not only maintain a presence in Central Asia but probably boost Iranian influence in the region since, at 32 million people, Uzbekistan’s population is more than twice the combined populations of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (8.6 million and 5 million, respectively).

It is admittedly early to predict the course of Iranian-Uzbek relations.

These new ties are again the result of the change in leadership in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s longtime president, Islam Karimov, was always worried about Islamist-inspired groups challenging his regime. When Uzbekistan became independent in late 1991, Iran was seen as the Islamic-fundamentalist threat, despite the fact that Iran is mainly Shi’a and most Central Asians, certainly most Uzbeks, are Sunnis.

Karimov shunned Iran even later, when Sunni groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the so-called Islamic State extremist group appeared.

But Mirziyoev seems determined to jump-start Uzbekistan’s economy, and Iran presents some attractive trade possibilities.

Given the increasingly complicated security situation in central, south, and western Asia, Uzbekistan and Iran have common security concerns that also provide a basis for new cooperation.

The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

Members of Tajikistan’s Ulema Council showed up suddenly in Russia on October 18.

Officially, the Tajik delegation led by Ulema Council chairman Saydmukarran Abduqodirzoda intended to "take part in religious activities in the Russian Federation," part of which included "meeting with labor migrants of Tajikistan in this country (Russia)."

The visit came one day after the chief mufti of Moscow and Central Russia, Albir Krganov, expressed concerns about Tajik migrant laborers.

"Unfortunately," he claimed, "we observe the radicalization of our migrants." He referred specifically to migrant laborers from Tajikistan, calling them a "vulnerable group."

Krganov explained that "currently on the borders of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan, a large new extremist group numbering several thousand people is being created under the name 'Khorosan.'"

The Khorasan Province group is an affiliate of the so-called Islamic State extremist group.

Krganov noted the Tajik-Afghan border is porous and said that "there is a danger...of links between these extremists and a large part of the Tajiks who are living in the Russian Federation."

Krganov pointed to a cooperation agreement Russia’s Muslim Spiritual Assembly had signed with Uzbekistan’s Muftiat, noting that "the Uzbek side is taking preventative measures against extremism and terrorism among its nationals." Tajikistan, he added, was "doing the opposite."

Krganov said Russia does not want to see the radicalization of migrant laborers, "in the first place, for the security of our country, and [Tajik authorities] should understand this and the national organizations and diplomatic offices we have [in Russia] should work more concretely. So far, we have not seen this."

The message was quickly received in Tajikistan, where shortly after Krganov spoke Tajikistan’s Committee for Religious Affairs said it was looking into sending a group of imam-khatibs to Russia.

No further details were released about the Tajik clerics’ meeting with Tajik nationals in Russia, though Tajikistan's State Migration Service rejected Krganov’s claims.

So Qishloq Ovozi turned to Edward Lemon, a postdoctorate fellow at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute who is an authority on the radicalization of Central Asians, including Central Asian migrant laborers in Russia.

Lemon pointed out that, in fact, "most Central Asian militants have been recruited while working in Russia," and he noted that recently "[Russian] security services have arrested a number of Tajik citizens. It does seem that Tajiks have been arrested more frequently than citizens of the other Central Asian states in recent months."

Lemon said that "although the muftiats of Russia and Tajikistan have enjoyed close cooperation...we cannot rule out that there has been a falling out between leaders there."

Lemon noted that while linguistic links to Afghanistan might help Islamic extremist groups in Afghanistan target Tajiks, there is little evidence to suggest a "large part" of Tajik migrant laborers in Russia are joining such groups.

"If 1,000 or so of the 1 million or more Tajiks in Russia have been recruited since 2013, this is still only 1/1000. That is not a large part of the migrant community, almost all of whom abhor [Islamic State]," Lemon said.

Russian officials have been known to make alarming statements about the security situation in Central Asia going back to the days when the Taliban first appeared in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.

These dire warnings have often stoked fears among leaders in Central Asia.

But in the past, it was Russian government officials voicing these concerns.

Mufti Krganov publicly chiding Tajikistan is a new tactic, but whether his concerns are more legitimate than those voiced previously by secular Russian officials is unclear.

As Lemon suggests, "My understanding is that Khorasan [Province group] is based far from the Central Asian border in Nangahar [and] its threat to Central Asia appears limited."

Tohir Safarov of RFE/RL’s Tajik Service contributed to this report.

The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.