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Supporters of Kyrgyz Prime Minister Sadyr Japarov attend a rally near the Ala-Archa presidential residence in Bishkek on October 15. There are suspicions that organized-crime groups are supporting Japarov.
Supporters of Kyrgyz Prime Minister Sadyr Japarov attend a rally near the Ala-Archa presidential residence in Bishkek on October 15. There are suspicions that organized-crime groups are supporting Japarov.

For the third time in a bit more than 15 years, large protests in Kyrgyzstan have forced a president from power.

But these latest demonstrations that started the day after the October 4 parliamentary elections have led to a rare situation in which a change of power in post-Soviet Central Asia is not providing optimism for the future.

That might sound like an overly broad statement, but consider the changes of power in Central Asia since Kyrgyzstan's People's Revolution in March 2005 that chased President Askar Akaev from office. Excluding Tajikistan's first 15 months of independence in the early 1990s, the ousting of Akaev was the first leadership change in the region since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Relief In Turkmenistan

Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, who preferred to be called Turkmenbashi ("the head of the Turkmen"), died in late December 2006. He had been the country's president since independence in 1991 and for some six years before that the Soviet leader of the republic of Turkmenia.

Whatever qualities he may have possessed that led the Kremlin to select him to head Turkmenia, after he was left to his own devices following independence it was difficult to see them.

Niyazov oversaw the creation of a bizarre government with the person of the president playing a central part in every aspect of life in the country. Turkmenistan became the most repressive state among the former Soviet republics.

Upon his death, the country's little-known health minister, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, came to power.

At the time, the means of Berdymukhammedov's ascendance to the presidency did not make much difference to the people of Turkmenistan. Most were simply glad to see the end of Niyazov's rule.

Berdymukhammedov talked about reforms, and in February 2007 ran in a presidential election -- only Turkmenistan's second since independence -- and unlike the October 1992 election, when Niyazov ran unopposed, Berdymukhammedov faced two challengers.

The international community was cautiously encouraged.

The younger and seemingly more coherent Berdymukhammedov made official visits to the East and the West and was even invited to the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.

Berdymukhammedov eventually dashed any hopes of democratic change and has quite possibly become an even worse leader than his predecessor.

Still Hopeful In Uzbekistan

Uzbek President Islam Karimov died in the late summer of 2016, but not before spending 25 years presiding over a dictatorship that left the people of Uzbekistan without basic freedoms and no means to seek change.

His replacement was his prime minister of 13 years, Shavkat Mirziyoev, which inspired little optimism that the country's future would be much different than its recent past.

But Mirziyoev quickly spoke about implementing reforms, several older political prisoners were freed, the government began a campaign to eradicate forced labor in the cotton fields, and Uzbekistan opened itself up to tourists.

Uzbekistan had a new feel to it and people gained hope that things would change for the better.

The international community noticed these changes and -- before the coronavirus pandemic broke out -- trade and investment in Uzbekistan reached new heights. Many still hold hope that Mirziyoev can bring more improvements to Uzbek society.

Change In Kazakhstan?

Kazakhstan's longtime leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev, stepped down as president in March 2019 and essentially handed the post to Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, a loyal technocrat.

Many believe Nazarbaev is still in charge, and the manner in which power was transferred troubled many. Renaming the capital after Nazarbaev also did not help Toqaev's image.

But Nazarbaev's official departure awoke some sections of society, particularly among the country's youth, that were waiting for a change in power and wanted that to translate into change for their own lives.

There have been many protests in Kazakhstan since March 2019, sometimes only involving a single person, and the authorities have forcibly broken up almost all of them.

But there is a new energy in civic activism in Kazakhstan that has not been seen for many years and shows no signs of dissipating any time soon.

Stolen Revolution

When Akaev was ousted in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, there was a sense that the people had rallied to rid the country of a leader who had stayed too long, had increasingly tried to gain more power, and was bringing family members into government to establish a sort of dynasty.

Unfortunately, the expectations that followed the 2005 revolution were dashed by Akaev's successor, Kurmanbek Bakiev, who fell into a familiar pattern but proved more avaricious than Akaev. Bakiev was chased from power in 2010.

Once again, hopes were raised. The constitution was rewritten to move Kyrgyzstan toward a parliamentary form of government, the presidential term was limited to one six-year stint in office (which was honored by President Almazbek Atambaev), and both the 2010 and 2015 parliamentary elections were marked by improvements over previous elections and given a seal of approval by Western observers.

The response to the tainted October 4 parliamentary elections seemed to be a victory for the Kyrgyz people.

Once again, the people had risen up when the authorities had gone too far and another president was about to be forced from office.

But the appearance of Sadyr Japarov -- a former nationalist politician freshly sprung from prison who was somehow nominated and approved as prime minister -- quickly muted any celebrations.

There does not seem to be any sense of victory or cause for celebration in Kyrgyzstan yet, except for the supporters of the populist Japarov.

The rules are being changed and there are plans to change some laws -- even the constitution -- but all the modifications seem designed to suit one person -- Japarov.

There are suspicions that organized-crime groups are supporting Japarov, which could help explain his rapid rise from prison to prime minister and simultaneously acting president in less than three weeks.

The so-called supporters of Japarov who have regularly gathered outside the government building more closely resemble soccer hooligans than political activists.

Some parliament members and opposition parties say they have received threats and believe the source of those threats is Japarov's supporters.

Foreign Friends Not On Board

The Kremlin has shown it is not keen on the change of leadership in Kyrgyzstan.

Russian President Vladimir Putin described the change of power in Bishkek as a tragedy and Moscow has suspended $100 million in financial aid to Kyrgyzstan.

The United States released a statement saying Kyrgyz "citizens and their leaders must continue to fight against the influence of organized crime and corruption in politics."

After two unsuccessful attempts to name Japarov prime minister, both of which were hastily arranged and failed to gather a quorum, the European Union issued a statement that noted "the concerns raised by Kyrgyz citizens and the international community about possible procedural flaws during the designation of the new prime minister."

The protests against the October 4 parliamentary elections that led to the results being annulled and repeat elections being called should have been a major triumph for the country.

But the subsequent events with Japarov in full power doused any feelings of euphoria over this victory and in its place is a sense of foreboding and unfinished business.

Kyrgyz Prime Minister Sadyr Japarov
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Sadyr Japarov

Kyrgyzstan’s courts have never been truly impartial and the country's presidents have often used the courts to punish their political foes, media outlets, and individual journalists.

On October 14, the day parliament deputies finally and officially voted to make Sadyr Japarov Kyrgyzstan’s prime minister, he said: "I, as prime minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, do not have the moral right to influence courts, the prosecutor’s office, or investigations."

Subsequent events seem to cast some doubt on that assertion.

Japarov -- as is known to anyone who has followed Kyrgyzstan in the last three weeks -- was in prison when mass protests erupted over the results of the tainted October 4 parliamentary elections.

He had been there since his August 2017 conviction on kidnapping charges and was due to stay behind bars until 2027.

On the evening of October 6 -- less than 24 hours after protesters had freed Japarov from prison -- a group of some 30 deputies from the 120 total tried to make Japarov prime minister at a session in a Bishkek hotel.

The person just elected speaker of parliament at the session, Myktybek Abdyldaev, immediately turned to the matter of Japarov’s nomination to be prime minister and said there was no legal reason Japarov could not serve in that post since the Supreme Court had acquitted him of his kidnapping conviction.

It seemed unlikely that in the midst of the unrest that broke out on October 5 in Bishkek, the Supreme Court would have met the next day to consider overturning the conviction of someone who had been let out of prison by demonstrators just hours before.

On October 9, the court denied it had acquitted Japarov, though Chynara Mamytkanova from the court’s press service told RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service (known locally as Azattyk), that Japarov’s lawyer had filed a motion for acquittal in 2019 and a panel of judges had satisfied the petition to annul the previous court decision and sent that to the Prosecutor-General’s Office for pretrial proceedings.

On October 19, the Supreme Court did overturn the convictions against Japarov, Kamchybek Tashiev, and Talant Mamytov for trying to overthrow the government in October 2012.

The three had been sentenced to 18 months in prison but all were released after spending just a few months in confinement.

Melis Myrzakmatov, the infamous former mayor of Osh, finally returned to the southern Kyrgyz city on October 7 after fleeing the country in 2014 to avoid charges of abuse of office and corruption.

Myrzakmatov was convicted in absentia of those charges and sentenced to seven years in prison in 2015.

But on October 8, a panel of judges from the Supreme Court ruled to overturn Myrzakmatov’s convictions and send his case back for review by the Osh city court where it was -- in fact -- sent six days later.

When Myrzakmatov returned to Osh he came to support embattled President Sooronbai Jeenbekov who is from the region.

Former Kyrgyz President Sooronbai Jeenbekov
Former Kyrgyz President Sooronbai Jeenbekov

Jeenbekov officially resigned as president on October 15, but Myrzakmatov remains in Kyrgyzstan, apparently confident he will be exonerated of the charges against him.

Japarov has also promised to get tough on organized crime, even though some believe it is organized criminal groups that have supported Japarov’s meteoric rise to power.

On October 20, Raimbek Matraimov, the subject of several lengthy investigative reports from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Kyrgyzstan's independent Kloop news website, and Azattyk, was detained.

Conveniently, Matraimov was at a gas station near the security committee building when he was taken into custody and was quickly let go on his own recognizance and told not to leave the country.

Raimbek is one of the three brothers who make up the influential Matraimov family.

One of his brothers, Tilek, was detained by Uzbek border guards on October 7 after he tried to illegally cross into Uzbekistan.

Tilek Matraimov has been the head of the southern Kara-Suu district since 2012. Kara-Suu -- which borders Uzbekistan and is a key trade juncture -- is the most-populous district in Kyrgyzstan.

Uzbek border guards handed him over to Kyrgyz authorities on October 9 but by October 15 he had been released from custody and put under house arrest.

Meanwhile, all the members of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan who were freed overnight on October 5-6 were sent back to prison by October 10, except for two who fled the country (former Prime Minister under Atambaev, Sapar Isakov, and former Bishkek Mayor Albek Ibraimov).

Former President Almazbek Atambaev was one of those freed and then returned to his cell, though he was transferred on October 26 to the Bishkek detention center where, according to his lawyer, Atambaev was put in a basement cell where the heating had only been turned on the previous day and where his toilet reportedly does not work.

Some of Atambaev’s supporters -- such as Temirlan Sultanbekov -- were detained for their alleged roles in unrest on October 9 during which several groups demonstrated in Bishkek, including Japarov’s supporters.

Kursan Asanov, who in the wake of the October 5 protests had briefly acted as commandant of Bishkek and also acting interior minister, was detained on October 10 on suspicion of helping organize the unrest on October 9.

But none of Japarov’s supporters were detained even though they seem to have played a major role in the October 9 events when they attacked a rally of opposition parties on Ala-Too Square as well as in the days after an emergency situation was declared, when Japarov supporters continued to gather in Bishkek and called for the ouster of various officials.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) has also proven malleable for years and even during campaigning managed to deny the Kyrgyzstan party registration when the party’s documents were not delivered by the authorized party representative. When a court ruled against that decision, the CEC registered the party without appealing the court decision.

The same thing happened to the Butun Kyrgyzstan party, which was denied registration when its original list of candidates did not match the list given to the CEC for registration.

The party appealed the decision in court, which then ruled in favor of the party. The CEC again did not appeal the court decision and allowed Butun Kyrgyzstan to enter the race.

The CEC is getting credit, at least temporarily for insisting on October 26 that parliamentary elections be reheld in December, going against Japarov's call that they be held several months after that.

Meanwhile, Ata-Meken leader Omurbek Tekebaev was stripped of his deputy mandate in 2017 after he was charged with fraud. Tekebaev has been trying to get his seat in parliament back but, on October 12, the CEC rejected his request because “there is not a vacant seat in parliament.

On October 14, Tekebaev met with Japarov.

The next day the CEC gave Tekebaev his parliament seat back after another member of the Ata-Meken faction in parliament, Sadyk Sher-Niyaz, decided to give up his seat.

The law has rarely been impartial in Kyrgyzstan, but it has usually been at least reflective and court cases could go on for weeks or months.

Thus far that has not been the case in the weeks since Japarov came from nowhere to become Kyrgyzstan’s prime minister and acting president.

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About This Blog

Qishloq Ovozi is a blog by RFE/RL Central Asia specialist Bruce Pannier that aims to look at the events that are shaping Central Asia and its respective countries, connect the dots to shed light on why those processes are occurring, and identify the agents of change.​

The name means "Village Voice" in Uzbek. But don't be fooled, Qishloq Ovozi is about all of Central Asia.

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