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Steve Gutterman's Week In Russia

At least 10 people were killed and scores injured when a Russian missile hit an apartment building in Lviv on July 6.
At least 10 people were killed and scores injured when a Russian missile hit an apartment building in Lviv on July 6.

I'm Steve Gutterman, the editor of RFE/RL's Russia/Ukraine/Belarus Desk.

Welcome to The Week In Russia, in which I dissect the key developments in Russian politics and society over the previous week and look at what's ahead. To receive The Week In Russia newsletter in your inbox, click here.

Attacks in Ukraine and Chechnya, horrific but now not unusual, lay bare President Vladimir Putin’s legacy at home and abroad. Meanwhile, two of his most prominent foes languish in prison, one in Russia and one in Georgia.

Here are some of the key developments in Russia over the past week and some of the takeaways going forward.

The Prisoners

There are plenty of differences between Aleksei Navalny and Mikheil Saakashvili, but there are also some striking similarities.

Both are foes of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both are serving long prison terms following convictions on charges they say were fabricated for political reasons. And both are being tried on additional charges that could keep them behind bars even longer.

If they survive, that is. Both men have suffered serious health problems in prison and say they have been mistreated, denied adequate medical care, and even poisoned by their jailers.

Another similarity is linked closely to the first: While Navalny and Saakashvili have many detractors whose criticism draws on their actions and their words over the years, they represent, for many in Russia, Georgia, and other former Soviet republics who want change, the idea that the political landscape could be different from what it is -- that there must be another choice, another way. The hope, that is, for a nonviolent change of power.

In Georgia, Saakashvili embodied that hope 20 years ago and rode it to the top office, winning the presidency after the Rose Revolution of late 2003 -- massive protests over disputed parliamentary elections and the government of former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, which was seen by many citizens as corrupt, ineffectual, and mired in the Soviet era more than a decade after the U.S.S.R. fell apart.

Saakashvili launched major reforms in the South Caucasus country and sought close ties with the West, portraying Georgia as the cradle of Europe. Over two terms as president, his popularity faded, and he came to be accused of the same crass practices he had stood against. In November 2007, four years after the Rose Revolution, state security forces violently crushed anti-government protests, badly tarnishing his reputation, and further troubles followed.

Peaceful Transfer

Saakashvili appeared no less enamored of power than Putin, say, or Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has held onto it in Belarus since 1994 by jailing opponents, suppressing protests, and staging votes marred by ample evidence of fraud. But he ceded power to the opposition after his party lost parliamentary elections in 2012, and he stepped down peacefully as president the following year.

That sets Georgia apart from several former Soviet republics -- including Russia.

Putin was appointed prime minister in August 1999 and became acting president when Boris Yeltsin abruptly resigned on the last day of that year, giving his chosen successor a huge edge in the first election he faced, in March 2000. When Putin stepped away from the presidency for four years in 2008, becoming prime minister again, it was a carefully arranged move that left little or no room for chance.

Unlike in Georgia in 2003, Russian government forces cracked down harshly on a wave of protests that were sparked by anger over alleged fraud in parliamentary elections in 2011 and dismay over Putin’s decision to return to the presidency the following year. He started his fourth term in 2018 and -- when faced with constitutional term limits that would have made this one his last -- he changed the constitution, pushing amendments through in a vote that was also marred by evidence of fraud.

Navalny was one of the leaders of the protests that erupted in 2011 and contends that his repeated prosecutions -- not to mention a weapons-grade nerve-agent attack that nearly killed him in 2020 -- are aimed at thwarting his efforts to challenge Putin in elections. He was barred from the ballot in 2018, and the extensive political network he established to support his campaign, which was banned before it officially began, has been destroyed and outlawed by the state. He is now being tried in prison on extremism charges.

Of course, while Navalny is probably Putin’s most prominent opponent, it’s impossible to know what the results of a free and fair presidential election in Russia would bring. It’s also impossible to know how much Russia would differ under Navalny -- or almost anyone else who might come to power, for that matter -- both domestically and in terms of foreign policy.

Prigozhin's Rebellion

After all, perhaps the greatest challenge to Putin’s grip on power in nearly 24 years as president or prime minister occurred just last month -- and it came from Wagner mercenary group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, for whom violence appears to be a way of life, or at least a frequent means to whatever end he is pursuing on any given day.

As for Ukraine, Prigozhin has advocated an even more aggressive pursuit of the war against Ukraine, despite suggesting on the eve of his mutiny that one of the main narratives Putin has used to justify the full-scale invasion of February 2022 -- the claim of an imminent threat from NATO and Ukraine -- was false.

Still, it is Putin, for example, who put Ramzan Kadyrov in charge of Chechnya, where human rights activists say he rules through violence and fear, fostering an atmosphere of impunity for abuses by security forces in order to maintain control of the restive region in Russia’s North Caucasus.

Amid the daily atrocities of the war in Ukraine, an incident in Chechnya this week underscored Kadyrov’s method of rule -- and therefore Putin’s, because he cannot or will not rein the regional leader in and, in any case, has shown no inclination to try.

Yelena Milashina, an award-winning journalist who has doggedly reported on abuses in Chechnya, was severely beaten by attackers while en route from Chechnya’s main airport to the capital, Grozny, on July 4. A lawyer she was traveling with, Aleksandr Nemov, was also attacked.

Putin's Appointee

Milashina and Nemov were on their way to a courthouse to attend the verdict hearing in the trial of Zarema Musayeva, the mother of three Chechen opposition activists who have fled Russia in the face of harassment and threats by Chechen authorities over their online criticism of Kadyrov.

Kadyrov and several allies, including a member of the Russian parliament, have publicly vowed to kill brothers Ibragim, Abubakar, and Baisangur Yangulbayev, as well as all members of their family, calling them "terrorists."

Hours after the attack on Milashina and Nemov, the court convicted Musayeva of fraud and assaulting a law enforcement officer -- charges critics said were outrageous and politically motivated -- and sentenced her to 5 1/2 years in prison.

Meanwhile, every attack Russia launches against Ukraine, in a war that is motivated in part by Putin’s personal vagaries, bogus historical assertions, and apparent obsession with controlling or obliterating the independent nation next door, once again raises the question of how different things might be today if democracy had progressed steadily in Russia over the decades since the Soviet collapse of 1991, when Moscow accepted it sovereignty and its borders without condition, instead of backsliding badly under Putin.

And in Ukraine, where the full-scale invasion reaches its 500th day this weekend and Kyiv’s forces push ahead with a crucial counteroffensive in the east and south, there is no letup in the Russian attacks and no place in the country where civilians are safe.

Hours before dawn on July 6, Russia targeted the western city of Lviv, hundreds of kilometers from the front lines, with a barrage of missiles apparently fired from warships on the Black Sea.

At least 10 people were killed when an apartment building was hit, destroying the roof and top two stories and creating a terrible but familiar sight: rescue workers digging through rubble to search for survivors and the dead.

'Sing Loudly Of Life'

On the evening of June 27, a similar scene played out much further east, closer to Russia and to the front. A Russian rocket attack hit a busy pizza restaurant in the city of Kramatorsk in the Donbas, where the war began -- fueled by Russian efforts to stoke separatism following the downfall of Moscow-friendly President Viktor Yanukovych -- eight years before the invasion of 2022.

Among the 13 civilians killed in Kramatorsk were twin sisters Yulia and Anna Aksenchenko. Born in September 2008, they were starting the 15th summer of their lives.

One of the victims survived until July 1: Viktoria Amelina, 37, an award-winning author from Lviv and an activist who had been documenting evidence of crimes by Russian forces since the invasion. She was at a restaurant in Kramatorsk with a group of Colombian writers and journalists when Russia launched the attack.

Amelina “was writing a book on women's experiences of the war,” according to Uilleam Blacker, a British-based scholar who is a translator of Ukrainian literature.

“Another Ukrainian book that will never be finished because of Russian bombs and bullets,” Blacker wrote in a Twitter post. It included his translation of her Poem About A Crow, which he said was inspired by her work interviewing women who have lived through Russian occupation in Ukraine.

One stanza reads like this:

She’ll cry each name into the ground,

As though sowing the field with pain,

From pain and the names of the women,

New sisters will grow from the earth,

And, again, will sing loudly of life.

That's it from me this week.

If you want to know more, catch up on my podcast The Week Ahead In Russia, out every Monday, here on our site or wherever you get your podcasts (Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, Pocket Casts).

Yours,

Steve Gutterman

"Putin today is not who he was last week," political analyst Andrei Kolesnikov wrote of the Russian leader.
"Putin today is not who he was last week," political analyst Andrei Kolesnikov wrote of the Russian leader.

I'm Steve Gutterman, the editor of RFE/RL's Russia/Ukraine/Belarus Desk.

Welcome to The Week In Russia, in which I dissect the key developments in Russian politics and society over the previous week and look at what's ahead. To receive The Week In Russia newsletter in your inbox, click here.

In the wake of the Wagner mutiny, President Vladimir Putin looks vulnerable, but the consequences of the short-lived revolt are far less clear than its causes. And while the political landscape may have shifted, Russia's war on Ukraine and repression at home continue unabated.

Here are some of the key developments in Russia over the past week and some of the takeaways going forward.

Altered Image

The fallout from Wagner mercenary force leader Yevgeny Prigozhin's short-lived mutiny is far from over, but one effect seems all but certain: Putin has been weakened.

Countless observers have said so, though their assessments differ in degree. Some say that Putin is "over" or "finished." Others say the dramatic events of June 24 may mark "the beginning of the end" for the former KGB officer who has been president or prime minister of Russia for nearly 24 years.

Strictly speaking, none of those is true. Putin remains the Russian president, and at this point the most likely outcome of the election due next March appears to be that he secures a new six-year Kremlin term.

And if one were to try to pinpoint the beginning of the end for Putin, the search would probably go back more than a year, to his launch of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, or more than a decade, to his decision to return to the presidency in 2012 -- if not further.

In terms of accuracy, the headline on a June 27 guest essay in The New York Times by Russian political analyst Andrei Kolesnikov appeared to hit the nail on the head, describing a palpable truth without predicting the future: "Yesterday's Putin is gone," it read.

The disappearance of the Putin of the past seemed to be both a subjective and objective matter.

Objectively, his image was altered, maybe irrevocably, by the mutiny, in which Wagner forces essentially took control of Rostov-on-Don, a city of more than 1 million, and had advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow when Prigozhin abruptly called off the "march for justice."

Putin's "system survived," at least for now, wrote Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

But "Putin today is not who he was last week," he wrote. Prigozhin "showed Russians a fleeting glimpse of an alternative future and, by doing so, gave more Russians reason to doubt their leadership. Is Mr. Putin really the all-powerful, czarlike figure they thought he was? That is the question most ordinary Russians will now, finally, begin to ask themselves."

'So Shocking'

And not just ordinary Russians. The so-called elites are also seeing a different Putin, Tatyana Stanovaya, a political analyst who studies these groups, suggested.

"This mutiny was so shocking that the regime appeared to many as near to collapse, which significantly undermines Putin's ability to secure control in the eyes of the political class," Stanovaya, head of the consultancy R.Politik and also a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, wrote on Twitter on June 29.

Still, a "fleeting glimpse" is all anyone got, in Russia, Ukraine, or anywhere else -- leaving aside the fact that, given who Prigozhin is and what he has done in the past, an "alternative future" that might have unfolded had things gone another way last weekend might not be the kind that millions who hope for change in Russia would welcome.

In the days that have passed since Prigozhin halted the "march for justice," Putin has been busy trying to portray the developments as a win or at least do damage control, suggesting that the Russian military had headed off the challenge from Wagner and that the Russian people had rallied in his support -- two assertions for which there is little or no evidence.

But even if yesterday's Putin is gone, Russia looks a lot like it did yesterday and the day before, for that matter: a place where the state is trying hard to suppress dissent. Those efforts seem unlikely to flag in the foreseeable future -- and they might, on the contrary, grow more intense if Putin senses that he is vulnerable or that widespread tacit support for the war against Ukraine is under threat.

In any case, the clampdown continued apace in the wake of the mutiny. One example: Roman Ushakov, a blogger who said he was tortured with electric shocks following his arrest in December, was sentenced to eight years in prison over anonymous posts that, among other things, referred to the killings of civilians and the destruction of the city of Mariupol by Russian forces in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the multipronged prosecution of Aleksei Navalny also continued. Already serving terms totaling 11 1/2 years following convictions in two cases he has dismissed as politically motivated fabrications, the 47-year-old opposition politician went on trial this month on a raft of new charges including creating an extremist group, and his lawyers say he could face an additional 30 years in prison.

If Prigozhin's mutiny gave Russians a glimpse of an alternative future, Navalny has sought to do that in a strikingly different way: at the ballot box. He tried to challenge Putin for the presidency in 2018 but was barred from running in the election, and the network of campaign offices h established across Russia was later deemed extremist and shut down, as was his Anti-Corruption Foundation.

Who's The Extremist?

In a Twitter thread posted by his associates, Navalny wrote that he had not learned of the mutiny -- or the deal with the Kremlin under which Prigozhin is to escape prosecution -- until a court hearing on June 26, when his lawyers told him about it and showed images of the scenes in Rostov and the advance toward Moscow. The irony was not lost on him.

"I kept expecting someone to suddenly yell, 'You got punk'd,'" he wrote. "But no one did. Instead the prosecutor came in and we continued the trial in which I stand accused of forming an organization to overthrow President Putin by violent means."

Prigozhin's mutiny, of course, is a result of Russia's war on Ukraine -- it came after he had lashed out with growing vehemence against Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, over their conduct of the invasion and what he asserted was the military's mistreatment of Wagner forces, who have played a prominent role in the fighting.

It also came after Prigozhin suggested that the February 2022 invasion was unjustified and unprovoked, contesting the claim that Russia faced a threat of attack from Ukraine and NATO. He again laid the blame on Shoigu, but it was a striking statement -- particularly because Putin has increasingly tried to cast the war as a necessary measure to protect Russia from Washington and the West.

Death In Kramatorsk

"On February 24 [2022], there was nothing extraordinary happening," Prigozhin said in a video released on June 23. "Now the Defense Ministry is trying to deceive the public, deceive the president, and tell a story that there was some crazy aggression by Ukraine, that -- together with the whole NATO bloc -- Ukraine was planning to attack us."

For some in Ukraine, the sight of a weakened Putin has raised hopes that an end to the war -- on terms acceptable to Kyiv -- could be closer than it may have seemed. But there are also concerns that Putin could take escalatory action in an attempt to show strength.

For now, amid a Ukrainian counteroffensive that began in early June, the deadly Russian attacks also continue, and civilians are frequently the victims.

At least 11 people were killed and dozens wounded after a Russian missile strike hit a packed pizza restaurant in the eastern city of Kramatorsk on June 27, Ukrainian authorities said. Among the dead: twin sisters Yulia and Anna Aksenchenko, who would have turned 15 in September.

That's it from me this week.

If you want to know more, catch up on my podcast The Week Ahead In Russia, out every Monday, here on our site or wherever you get your podcasts (Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, Pocket Casts).

Yours,

Steve Gutterman

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About This Newsletter

The Week In Russia presents some of the key developments in the country and in its war against Ukraine, and some of the takeaways going forward. It's written by Steve Gutterman, the editor of RFE/RL's Russia/Ukraine/Belarus Desk.

To receive The Week In Russia in your inbox, click here.

And be sure not to miss Steve's The Week Ahead In Russia podcast. It's posted here or you can subscribe on Apple Podcasts.

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