Professor William C. Wohlforth, an expert on U.S. foreign policy at Dartmouth College, spoke to RFE/RL's Georgian Service about U.S. President Joe Biden's likely foreign policy legacy and how it could change if Trump is elected president in November.
Wohlforth, known as a founder of neoclassical realism in foreign policy, says that "the U.S. standing in the world is...not what it was five, 10 years ago," and it's possible that Trump believes in "a grand bargain with Putin," although the Russian leader's hard-line position may deter him. More than NATO membership, Wohlforth also argues what Kyiv really needs is a long-term military commitment from the West.
RFE/RL: To start off with, how do you assess the times we are living in from a grand strategy perspective?
Wohlforth: Well, if I can speak from a narrow American perspective, we live in a time where there is more potential for substantial change in America's fundamental approach to pursuing its interests, namely its grand strategy, than we've seen in many, many, many decades -- really since the early formation of the post-World War II, U.S.-led international system under the auspices of American power and purpose in the years around 1950.
The U.S. could be poised for a pretty substantial change in the way it approaches the pursuit of its interests, and I've not seen anything like that in my lifetime. I want to stress that it's potential; we really have a very hard time estimating what is likely to happen given U.S. domestic politics. But I see more realistic potential for a shift than I've seen in a very long time.
RFE/RL: We'll discuss those alternate scenarios in a bit, but before that, I wanted to ask you about U.S. President Joe Biden's legacy. Can we already talk about his legacy, about his victories and failures, or should we wait until his term ends?
Wohlforth: In foreign policy we have some questions that are unresolved whose resolution will determine his historical place. But I think it's fair to begin making a scorecard about President Biden's foreign policy successes and failures and his overall legacy.
He assembled a highly competent national-security team and pursued a fairly coherent strategy of attempting to hold on to, to sustain, the commitments to alliances and institutions that this administration thinks are necessary for U.S. security but [also] to begin the careful trimming of what they understood to be some overcommitment by the United States.
You saw that, obviously, in their completion of the process of the disengagement from Afghanistan. They really did want to see an attenuation or a diminution of U.S. engagement in the Middle East, but they failed to do that for reasons outside of their control. When Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023, this basically was the kind of event that administrations can't control, and they had to react to that.
Regarding Europe, you saw a massive increase of America's commitment to NATO, a serious effort to aid Ukraine in its defense from Russia's assault, and managing that process competently with a theory.
Now, you might disagree about their theory of the case. You might think that they were too concerned about escalation. You might think that they were too careful in the speed with which they enabled Ukraine to take advantage of different U.S. weapon systems. We can have that debate, but they had a coherent approach to Ukraine -- Russia's war against Ukraine -- and they put it in place with a high degree of competence.
Then if you look at Asia, you've seen a further strengthening of the U.S. alliance with Asia, and with Asian partners, South Korea, in particular, and Japan. You've seen them manage the cross-strait issue [between Taiwan and mainland China] with significant confidence.
You've seen them engineer a change to our approach to our economic relations with China -- that is recognizing that China's policy is essentially to take advantage of the openness of the U.S. [in order to] speed its own geopolitical challenge to the United States. So you see a fairly substantial effort to try to maintain general economic engagement with China while, at the same time, constricting the access to the very things that will hasten the pace of their challenge to the United States.
If you put all those things together, you see a coherent, professional implementation of a slight course correction in fundamental U.S. grand strategy.
RFE/RL: We are looking basically at two possible Americas, aren't we? Those two possible futures might be mutually exclusive depending on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November. How different are those two Americas?
Wohlforth: I would have to place a question mark over this question of whether everything hinges on the election [on November 5]. The reason is the Republican Party is not unified on foreign policy. In some sense, this is obscured by the fact that the party is now in [an election] campaign and is seeking to present a unified position against Biden and now [presumptive Democratic Party nominee] Kamala Harris.
But underneath that [there] are different strains in Republican foreign policy. And it's very difficult to predict which of these strains would emerge dominant if [presumptive Republican Party nominee] Donald Trump were to win in November.
There are three basic strains. There's kind of a continued robust, Republican, Reagan-style foreign policy, which we're all familiar with. There is a what we might call extreme or strong version of rebalancing, which is to dramatically de-emphasize European security, force the Europeans to take more of the responsibility, and pivot the United States much more toward Asia and, to a lesser degree, the Middle East.
The third is a much stronger America First element, which sees an overall decrease in the need for American engagement overall across the world. It's far more dramatic. It's coupled with more protectionism and high tariffs. If the third approach becomes dominant in [a potential] Trump administration, then you will see that dramatic shift in American foreign policy.
RFE/RL: Would it be fair to say that the second and the third strains can coexist with each other, but the first one cannot?
Wohlforth: Yes, I think that the second approach -- de-emphasizing Europe but not de-emphasizing other aspects but [which] also is much more nationalistic and transactional in nature as opposed to a fealty to institutions and fealty to principles -- is the strain that seems to be most likely.
RFE/RL: It looks like it could be married quite comfortably with the third approach as well, don't you think?
Wohlforth: It could be. Again, it's a matter of how does the United States respond to its alliances in the eastern region. Is it going to continue to prioritize those, or is it going to take a Trump transactional, tough-guy approach to Japan, to South Korea, to Australia, to other regional allies? And that's hard to see.
Most people [are] treating the [Trump] appointment as vice president [candidate] J.D. Vance as a move toward the direction of the second and third approach [and] away from the first.
RFE/RL: Let's assume this amalgamation of the second and third strains happens and this dramatic shift becomes a reality. What does it spell for the United States's standing in the world?
Wohlforth: The U.S. standing in the world is already, obviously, not what it was five, 10 years ago. We have a clear situation in which many actors in the world -- and I'm thinking about elites, governments, intelligence agencies, as best as can be judged -- have assessed [that] the United States's power position is declining.
RFE/RL: Would it be fair to say America is now at the weakest it has been this century?
Wohlforth: In this century, yes; it's weaker than it has been since 2000. I would say both objectively but also subjectively. What I want to say, however, is I believe many of these actors exaggerate the degree of American decline. That includes, I think, [Russian President] Vladimir Putin and [Chinese President] Xi Jinping, but it also includes some of these Republicans who see the United States' position as far more stressed than I think it is, based on my best efforts with colleagues, co-authors, and researchers who try to figure out where the United States actually stands.
I'm trying to tell you two things: Yes, the U.S. position has declined. [But] the perceptions of that decline are more dramatic than the reality of that decline.
RFE/RL: Let's also discuss this age of scarcity that J.D. Vance is preaching. What does it entail and what does it spell for the rest of the world? Especially keeping in mind your recent essay where you argued that the United States does not have to choose between Taiwan and Ukraine.
Wohlforth: That's right, I don't think it does. However, that's in the general sense that the United States and its allies do have the resources to sustain its commitments to giving Ukraine the best chance it feasibly can to emerge from this conflict in the best possible position as a democratic, flourishing, wealthy state that gets integrated into Europe. And that Taiwan will be defended sufficiently, robustly, [so] that China will be forced to stay [with] peaceful means to resolve its issue with Taiwan. It will look down at the potential to use force and decide that that is not a game worth the candle.
I believe the United States does have those capacities. However, you have to acknowledge that, in certain areas, this war and this global crisis that we're now in have revealed weaknesses in the U.S. and [its] allied industrial base.
The fact of the matter is we've been preparing and thinking for the last 25, 30 years about a very different kind of war than a long, drawn-out war of attrition between highly substantial modern militaries. And the degree to which Russia's war against Ukraine is destroying [military] gear is quite extraordinary, and people really hadn't thought of that.
So J.D. Vance is correct, in the narrow sense, that we do face a resource shortage in certain munitions that are needed by Ukraine. However, some experts will tell you that most of them -- except in a few instances -- are not the same as what is needed in East Asia and what is needed in Taiwan.
The other thing to bear in mind is that with time, I should say, we are already seeing the defense industrial base respond to this new demand, and you're seeing increased production in both European and U.S. defense industrial facilities, such that I think that this shortage that he's referring to can be overcome with some lag time.
RFE/RL: If the China pivot is indeed inevitable, how wise is it to not deal with Russia and leave it as a menace to at least Eastern Europe?
Wohlforth: It's unwise. Even though the best military analysts estimate that...let's say you ended the war today, the Russian military is going to take seven to 10 years to reconstitute itself after all the damage that it received. That doesn't necessarily mean that Russia is now reconciled to a European security order that we have created.
The strong evidence is that the Russian political establishment remains deeply dissatisfied with the European security architecture as it exists. And this is the architecture that we support; therefore Russia will seek various means to try to undermine that order until it achieves a different kind of European security order, which would not be good for the United States.
That's why I think to rapidly shift away from Europe, to leave the Europeans the entire burden of the task of trying to help Ukraine defend itself, would be a mistake for U.S. interests.
RFE/RL: Those who adhere to that narrative that you just criticized, what's their vision of dealing with Russia? Would the much-talked about statement from former President Trump about ending the Ukraine war in 24 hours be an example of that kind of statecraft?
Wohlforth: Again, there are other foreign policy voices associated with the Trump campaign that speak of a much more careful and responsible pivot or renewed pivot to Asia, pivot away from Europe.
However, J.D. Vance says he doesn't care about what happens to Ukraine, and he says he doesn't believe it has any meaning for American interests. I disagree with that.
You have Trump basically arguing "We'll settle the war in 24 hours and we'll do a deal with Putin." And I think both of those things are quite delusional. They are ill-founded. I'm not sure they are likely to lead to a good outcome for the United States, letting aside, obviously, not [being] a good outcome for Ukraine.
Their theory is that Europe will rapidly rise to deal with the Russia challenge…. As Vance says, if they care so much about Ukraine, why can't they simply transfer some money out of their welfare states into their military and deal with it? Russia, they think, is a completely manageable problem for Europe without the United States. And what they would say is the only way Europe will ever do this is if we seriously and credibly start pulling back.
RFE/RL: You don't believe that [Europe] can?
Wohlforth: I don't. I think it has to be a much more gradual process, and there are many types of capabilities that Europe doesn't have: There's intelligence capabilities; there's key air-defense capabilities; there's key command, control, and communications kinds of capabilities; transport; logistics; that take a very long time and a lot of investment to overcome.
It seems to me that the U.S. can play a role in helping Europe become more strategically autonomous. I know that sounds like a contradiction in terms. The U.S. should be playing some sort of benevolent, paternalistic role in helping to foster a strategic autonomy.
If it doesn't do that, if it pulls out quickly, I think you will see contradictions among European states. You will see coordination problems. Let's face it: In security matters, Europe remains sovereign countries. Getting sovereign countries to cooperate on things like nuclear weapons [and] defense procurement is really, really hard without some leading state.
If the Americans are out of it, who's the leading state? Is it going to be Germany? Is it going to be France? Is it going to be both? How does the U.K. fit in now that it's out of the EU? Very difficult. So I think the U.S. has to be incredibly committed to Europe to help Europe gain greater strategic capabilities to deal with Russia in the long term.
RFE/RL: Would that involve another reset with Russia? If so, why would this one work when all the previous ones failed?
Wohlforth: I don't see it. It's possible that Trump himself or maybe people in the Trump foreign policy orbit think that a grand bargain with Putin is possible. Maybe that's what they have in mind with this notion that somehow they will back away from Ukraine and create some sort of modus vivendi and rapprochement with Putin. I see very little chance that that would be successful. Very little chance.
One of the things that I would forecast here is that we have heard from Moscow recently what their terms are to have a conversation about a cease-fire, not to mention a peace settlement. And to talk about a cease-fire requires Ukraine accepting as legitimate Russia's annexation of the four oblasts in eastern Ukraine. I think once this becomes evident that this is their minimum position to even start talks, I have a hard time imagining even Trump would accept those terms for the conversation.
The Tavberidze Interviews
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.
RFE/RL: That leads us to the obvious question: If that's unacceptable, what is acceptable? What's an acceptable off-ramp for Putin that the West and the United States can offer?
Wohlforth: I wish I knew. I really wish I knew. Most people who analyze this war don't see these conditions being in place right now, the conditions for any kind of settlement. As I read the Kremlin's most recent statements about talks and terms, they sound to me like they're saying the following: We think we're going to get stronger in the future; if you feel like these conditions are unacceptable, the ones in the future are going to be even worse. So you better take these.
Whereas we in the West still think that with sufficient arms to Ukraine and sufficient support Ukraine could be in a position to get much better terms [and] that Russia is actually under considerable stress. I'm not sure which of those is true.
RFE/RL: What should the U.S. red lines be when it comes to this war? What happens if Russia doesn't respect them?
Wohlforth: For the United States, the obvious red line is an unambiguous attack on a NATO country. The United States has committed to respond over and over again that this would be an active war. This has been made clear by the highest level of the Biden administration.
RFE/RL: Those red lines are vivid red. Let's move to more blurry ones, such as, for example, hitting Russian targets inside Russia.
Wohlforth: Yes, what the U.S. -- my understanding of American thinking on this -- is worried about is a process of escalation that gets out of control. O.K., let's say Ukraine starts hitting targets wider throughout Russia using American weapons. And then the Russians respond in some way, like what they're basically probably doing, with the sabotage campaign that we've been observing in Europe. They're going to start to escalate in some other subtle way.... And then suddenly we feel compelled to respond.
RFE/RL: So a spiral?
Wohlforth: Yes. The U.S. is trying to aid Ukraine as much as possible while avoiding any pathway that would heighten the possibility of a war with Russia or with direct confrontation with Russia. We have a huge amount of dispute among experts as to whether this is reasonable.
Many really smart people say, "[It's] crazy, you are far too concerned about Russian escalation." If you're asking me for my answer, I actually am much more sympathetic to the Biden administration's slow approach, where it slowly increased what Ukraine can do and worried about the spiral that you refer to. But I completely respect the view that says this is crazy, this is too conservative.
You're dealing with a very large nuclear power, and the Biden administration has made perfectly clear the American interest does not involve a direct fight with Russia for Ukraine. If you accept those premises, I view the way the Biden administration has managed escalation to be understandable, reasonable, and defensible.
RFE/RL: I want to ask you about the recent Washington NATO summit. You were one of the signatories to a letter published in The Guardian that argued it would be unwise for NATO to invite Ukraine to join the military alliance, but it didn't provide an alternative solution that could protect Ukraine from Russian aggression. Can you offer that alternative? What would you offer in return if Ukraine were to abandon its hopes of joining NATO?
Wohlforth: My understanding and that letter may have different views. I can't speak for everyone. I mean, we agree to what the text says. You can't promise NATO membership now because of what I just said, and I would invite you to find any evidence to the contrary. I just said the American official position, which is unlikely to change, is that it is not prepared to fight Russia over Ukraine. That's what NATO membership means.
Talking about Ukraine's NATO membership is a diversion from the real policy. The real policy that could help to answer your question is the one [outgoing NATO Secretary-General] Jens Stoltenberg suggested, which is what we needed to deliver in Washington: a long-term, credible commitment to continue aiding Ukraine so that Putin knows, hey, the West is in this for the long haul.
If Putin knew that for the next 10 years, if [Ukraine is] still fighting, we're in there, he would change his assessment about negotiating terms in this war.Professor William C. Wohlforth
Sadly, we don't have a political consensus for that long-term commitment. We have to keep fighting the battle to get Ukraine aid every single six months or every single year. That is the worst possible outcome.
What I would say -- the reason I put my name on that letter -- is because talking about NATO expansion to Ukraine is utterly not going to solve the problem. They're saying these high-flying words, but they're not able to deliver what Ukraine really needs, which is a consistent, credible, long-term program of assistance. It's what we should do. I think we can afford it. I don't agree with J.D. Vance that we can't afford it. I think we can, and it's in our interest.
If Putin knew that for the next 10 years, if they're still fighting, we're in there, he would change his assessment about negotiating terms in this war.
RFE/RL: The letter says that "some claim that the act of bringing Ukraine into NATO would deter Russia from ever invading Ukraine again. That is wishful thinking." But what about the Baltics? Poland? Finland? Sweden? The entire point of why they wanted to become a NATO member is to be secure and protected in the future. What's the future that you see when it comes to NATO and Ukraine?
Wohlforth: First of all, you don't make a country secure by simply declaring that it's a member of NATO. To be honest, the United States and NATO accepted the Baltic states before [NATO] had any credible way of defending them. It still in a way doesn't, but it has other things it can do to Russia presumably in response to a Russian incursion into those countries.
Adding a country the size of France with a massive border with Russia to an alliance when you don't have the political will, you don't have the capacity to defend it, is crazy. But could there be other guarantees that could be offered to Ukraine as part of a settlement of the war? For sure. And [could] they look a lot like NATO membership? Maybe.
Indeed, when I signed the letter, I mainly was against the idea of announcing an inevitable NATO future for Ukraine, which is what they actually said in Washington. There's the possibility that maybe in a future settlement you could create a situation where Ukraine could be defended by the United States and its allies in Europe. But right now it can't be. I don't want to rule out the possibility that someday in the future it could be possible.
But there are lots of different ways of providing security to countries that don't necessarily involve [NATO's] Article 5 commitments (that an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on the entire alliance). I think those need to be considered as a possible part of a solution ultimately down the road.
RFE/RL: Do you believe that without a hard security guarantee peace in Ukraine can be sustained for the long term?
Wohlforth: It's going to be very hard, but I think it's possible mainly because Ukraine has shown itself to be an extremely tough, defensive country. It's very hard to take it. Now, getting its territory back that Russia stole from it violently is going to be unbelievably difficult. But taking Ukraine, defeating Ukraine, who wants to take on that? Who wants to fight Ukraine? I don't want to. They're a very, very strong country. And they're defending themselves the old-fashioned way, which is they're defending themselves, of course, with a lot of material aid. That, to me, is the most fundamental deterrent to Russia. It's credible.
