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Tracking Islamic State

Kurdish pop star Helly Luv recounted the almost daily torrent of death threats and abuse she received -- from Islamists, jihadists, and IS sympathizers -- and, most critically of all, her repeated reporting of all of it to both Twitter and Facebook.
Kurdish pop star Helly Luv recounted the almost daily torrent of death threats and abuse she received -- from Islamists, jihadists, and IS sympathizers -- and, most critically of all, her repeated reporting of all of it to both Twitter and Facebook.

Earlier this month I attended the Web Summit conference in Lisbon where, among an assorted crowd of politicians, coders, and Silicon Valley millionaires born in the 1990s, I sat on a panel discussing the role narratives play in 21st-century terrorism. Speaking alongside me was Helan Abdulla -- known as Helly Luv, a Kurdish-Finnish singer, dancer, and actress -- who told our audience a story.

As a Kurd, Luv told us, she had taken an interest in the Syrian civil war from its beginnings. In a February 2014 music video titled Risk It All and filmed inside a Syrian refugee camp filled with Kurdish refugees fleeing the war, Luv proudly sang about Kurdish independence dressed in high heels and a short dress, while backing dancers held AK-47s.

Luv received a barrage of online abuse -- including death threats -- both for its political content as well as its supposed provocative imagery. Things only worsened with her next video, Revolution, which continued the central themes of Risk It All.

But it was with the emergence of the extremist group Islamic State (IS) into the global consciousness -- with its capture of Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, in June 2014 -- that things got really bad for her. It was Mosul's fall that prompted the autonomous Kurdish regional government to expand its borders, seizing vital oil areas as the Iraqi military retreated in the face of the IS's blitzkrieg across the country.

Just weeks after Mosul fell, she posted photos to her Facebook account of her visiting Kurdish Peshmerga troops, who had recently been involved in fighting IS, and told Reuters she had been close to Mosul, which lies less than 10 kilometers from Kurdish territory.

As we sat on the panel in Lisbon, Luv recounted the almost daily torrent of death threats and abuse she received -- from Islamists, jihadists, and IS sympathizers -- and, most critically of all, her repeated reporting of all of it to both Twitter and Facebook. Despite the clear threats against her life, nothing was done. No accounts were taken down; the threats continued.

Luv's story is a key to a central problem of battling terrorism in the age of social media. IS has become arguably the most effective and globally renowned terrorist group in history because of its effective use of social-networking sites. IS is not just an extremist organization, it is a brand -- and a global one at that. Its ability to recruit members everywhere from France to the United States and to get its message into the international mainstream media is only possible through the ability of sites like Facebook and Twitter to do two things above all else -- to mobilize people and to amplify messages.

IS understood this from the beginning -- and it also understood something else, too. Social-media sites, from which we increasingly get our news and information about the world are, above all, capitalist enterprises. Facebook and Twitter may be so ubiquitous as to seem a part of the fabric of life, but they are not neutral -- they are designed to generate as many clicks and shares as they can, to encourage as many users to join. The more of these they get, the more advertising revenue they generate, the more their shareholders benefit. It's a story as old as capitalism itself.

Using West's Freedom Against It

Social-media platforms also have something else of great use to extremist groups like IS: A libertarian ethos; the belief that people should be free to say what they want is more or less the idea at the heart of the founding of social networks. If there is any doubt over this fact then a quick scroll through Islamist or alt-right Twitter accounts should rapidly assuage it. The idea is especially embedded given the censorship of the Internet that goes on in countries like Iran and China. No American company wants its practices to be compared to those of a totalitarian state. And rightly so.

So in its early days IS was able to rely on a vast network of thousands of "fan boys," sometimes deemed -- with grandiose hilarity -- the "Knights of the Uploading" to promote the group's content; everything from fatwas and pronouncements to videos showing idyllic life in the caliphate to, of course, barbaric videos of killings. The fan boys would also, of course, threaten and harass anyone, especially high-profile targets, deemed to be pushing against their narrative.

U.S. government officials involved in anti-IS counter-messaging have spoken to me of their frustration at this: at how their adversary was able to wage information war using Western technologies to promote their narratives so successfully. But Facebook and Twitter, which have more users than most countries have populations, carry huge lobbying power in Washington and the major European capitals. Until recently, the social-networking giants largely left these accounts alone, and there was little that U.S. officials could do to change that.

Thinking began to shift with the horrific video of the beheading of journalist James Foley on August 19, 2014. There had been beheading videos before, of course, but this was of a different order entirely. This was an American civilian beheaded in a video with high production values that went global. Almost every major news network carried the story, with many showing the video as well.

The uproar was international and -- critically -- much of it came from tens of thousands of Facebook and Twitter users, many of whom castigated the companies for allowing the video to be broadcast on their platforms, while others vowed not to retweet or share it.

Pressure from the U.S. State Department was one thing, but criticism from users was another. Finally, Facebook and Twitter began to dramatically up the rate at which they took down pro-IS accounts. For every one taken down a new one would invariably spring up -- it became a game of cat and mouse between users and the platforms -- a war of attrition.

Finding The Limits Of Online Behavior

And to a degree it has worked: Many pro-IS accounts still undoubtedly remain; but the fan boys can no longer act with near impunity on Twitter and Facebook and have been forced to take refuge in services like Telegram, the private messaging app. Recruitment still goes on as before but spreading propaganda virally across networks has become more difficult.

But not, alas, impossible: High-profile anti-IS tweeters and Facebookers are still harassed and attacked with regularity. The propaganda still flows. Freedom of speech is sacrosanct but many think the time has come for governments and the networks to come together to create a formal, legally binding code of conduct of what is acceptable behavior on social-networking sites.

The freedom to offend and to discomfort must remain -- this is an inviolable element of free speech, and one guaranteed by law in the constitutions of countries like the United States. At the same time, terrorists must not be given a platform through which they can manufacture more murderers.

The task is a difficult one. But the time has come to face it.

The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect the views of RFE/RL
While life under IS was horrific for many Sunnis in Mosul, the thought of the Popular Mobilization Forces coming to "liberate" them is also terrifying.
While life under IS was horrific for many Sunnis in Mosul, the thought of the Popular Mobilization Forces coming to "liberate" them is also terrifying.

On June 30, 2014, around three weeks after the extremist group that was then known as Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) captured Iraq's second city of Mosul, its spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declared the establishment of a caliphate across Iraq and Syria. ISIL, he continued, was no more: instead the group would know be known as Islamic State (IS). With the capturing of vast swaths of territory, the most successful terrorist brand in modern history had been born.

Just over two years later things look vastly different. Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, backed by U.S. air strikes, recaptured many of the cities and towns lost to IS over the course of 2013-14, notably Sinjar and Ramadi late last year, while the Iraqi Army retook Fallujah in June.

Just recently, IS lost Dabiq, an insignificant town strategically, but vital to the group's theological message, being the purported site of battle between Muslims and infidels that will bring about the end of days.

IS's Iraqi franchise is in retreat everywhere. Mosul is its last major stronghold in the country and, unlike Dabiq, with a population of 1.8 million it is a major strategic city and carries significant symbolic value. It was the capture of Mosul in 2014 that allowed the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to announce that IS had achieved its goal of establishing a caliphate in the Middle East, bulldozing the British- and French-created Sykes-Picot border between Iraq and Syria in the process. After all these other defeats, if Mosul falls, IS, at least in its present incarnation, will have been defeated. Claims of it controlling a state-like caliphate will no longer be credible.

IS forces have long been preparing for the coming battle and reportedly have 3,000-5,000 fighters inside the city, along with networks of tunnels and booby traps they have constructed. On October 31, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi told them that there was "no escape" and to "surrender or die."

But as IS retreats from the villages surrounding Mosul it is forcing locals to march to the city to act as human shields against the inevitable onslaught. The battle will be bloody; neither side will yield.

What Then?

In the end though, Mosul will fall. The question is not if but when. The combination of forces allied against the extremist group is simply too strong. And herein lies the problem. The alliance against IS is a loose and disunited triumvirate of Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Shi'ite militias, many backed by Iran, known in Arabic as Al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces). In the background, supporting all three, are U.S. air strikes and special forces on the ground. Between these disparate forces is a gulf of mistrust and, in some cases, barely concealed hostility.

The first problem lies with the fear these forces instill in many of those they are coming to "save." Oz Katerji, a writer and journalist embedded with the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and ISF, has been as close as 15 kilometers from Mosul and has spoken to many in the surrounding villages that have been liberated. "The civilians in these areas suffered greatly under IS but were also terrified of the shelling and bombardment," he told me. And while life under IS was horrific, the thought of the Popular Mobilization Forces coming to "liberate" them is also terrifying. "Many of these people suffered immensely under the rule of sectarian Shi'a militias," he continued, "and tit-for-tat sectarian violence has been an almost daily routine in Iraq for many years now."

"Reports from liberated residents vary, but some have spoken of a very heavy-handed nature by those freeing them from IS rule. Militias moving in and putting all the men in blindfolds and arresting innocent people."

When the Shi'ite militias freed Fallujah from IS in June, they reportedly executed more than 300 Sunni residents of the city as well as torturing many more. Iraq's Sunnis do not forget.

"I've seen many Iraqi Army units drive around flying Shi'a religious flags. This is worrying many Sunni locals who fear reprisal attacks against civilians," Katerji adds. And the militias are not the only ones liberated locals fear and mistrust. "Families have been killed by coalition air strikes and this has naturally enraged locals and increased hostility towards both Baghdad and the West."

The second, perhaps even greater problem lies within the coalition itself. The Iraqi Kurdish region's prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, has said Peshmerga forces will play a "central role" in Mosul's liberation. That puts him at odds with the ISF, which has insisted that the Kurds confine themselves to the city's surrounding areas. The Kurds are also demanding a referendum on Kurdish independence once IS is defeated -- part of a quid pro quo for the huge role they have played in fighting and weakening the group; a demand opposed by both Baghdad and Washington.

Meanwhile, the Shi'ite militias have also demanded a central role in the capture of Mosul, alarming the United States, ISF, and Kurds, who view with trepidation the possibility of more sectarian killings if the militias enter Mosul.

Tensions are already building. "There is great mistrust and hostility growing between Kurdish forces and Iranian-backed groups. Many of the Kurds I have spoken to out here are terrified of Hashd al-Shaabi," Katerji told me.

The problem thus presents itself: what happens once IS loses Mosul? Without a common enemy to fight, the loose bond between Iraqi Sunnis, Shi'a, and Kurds will dissolve. As Katerji concludes:

"Ultimately Iraq has deep problems; removing the IS threat only solves one problem but opens a new one -- who will move in to control Sunni-majority areas and how will those relationships progress? As sectarian attacks continue to proliferate and suicide bombings still occur frequently, there are no easy answers here. There needs to be a great deal of collaborative international involvement to ensure civilians of all sides and sects are afforded the protection of their human and civil rights."

The next fight may well be an internal one -- for control of Iraq. And it may well be even bloodier.

The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect the views of RFE/RL

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About This Blog

"Under The Black Flag" provides news, opinion, and analysis about the impact of the Islamic State (IS) extremist group in Syria, Iraq, and beyond. It focuses not only on the fight against terrorist groups in the Middle East, but also on the implications for the region and the world.

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