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One of the leaders of the Abkhaz opposition, Raul Khajimba (left), looks the most likely victor, especially after receiving the backing of actingPresident Valery Bganba (right).
One of the leaders of the Abkhaz opposition, Raul Khajimba (left), looks the most likely victor, especially after receiving the backing of actingPresident Valery Bganba (right).

On August 24, the 132,861 registered voters in Georgia's breakaway Republic of Abkhazia will elect a new president to succeed Aleksandr Ankvab, who stepped down in early June, five days after protesters mobilized by the opposition Coordinating Council stormed the presidential administration building.

The outcome of the ballot is too close to predict, although the most recent in a series of weekly opinion polls suggests that longtime opposition leader and Coordinating Council head Raul Khajimba, who is running for the fourth time, might just receive the 50 percent-plus-one vote required for a first-round victory.

The election campaign has been tense, turbulent, and controversial, despite what Russian analyst Alla Yazkova termed the widespread perception of Abkhazia as "a fortress under siege." On August 20, Central Election Commission Chairman Batal Tabagua escaped injury when someone tossed an explosive device into the courtyard of his home in Sukhumi. It is not clear whether there is any connection between that incident and the systematic official disenfranchisement of some 22,800 Georgian residents of Abkhazia's Gali, Tkuarchal, and Ochamchira districts who are deemed to have been granted Abkhaz citizenship in violation of the law.

A public expression of support for Khajimba's candidacy by the acting president and parliament speaker, Valery Bganba, and 19 other parliament members was denounced by a rival candidate and members of the Public Chamber as a violation of the constitution and/or the election law.

Of the five men who officially sought to register as candidates, four were successful. The fifth, former Deputy Prime Minister Beslan Eshba, failed the mandatory examination to assess his fluency in the Abkhaz language.

The four registered candidates, all of them with a background in the military, police, or security forces, are

• Khajimba, 56, is a career KGB officer who despite the Kremlin's overt support lost the first round of the November 2004 presidential ballot to Sergei Bagapsh. Khajimba then ran as vice-presidential candidate with Bagapsh in the repeat vote, but resigned in May 2009 due to unspecified disagreements. He ran unsuccessfully against Bagapsh in the December 2009 ballot in which Bagapsh was reelected for a second term, and placed third with 19.83 percent of the vote in the August 2011 election necessitated by Bagapsh's premature death. His support base is the parties aligned in the Coordinating Council, the intelligentsia, and owners of small and medium businesses.

• Mirab Kishmaria, 53, was a career officer in the Soviet Army (he was wounded in Afghanistan) who in 1989 returned to Abkhazia, where he distinguished himself as a commander during the 1992-93 war with Georgia that culminated in Abkhazia's de facto but unrecognized (until 2008, by Russia) independence. In November 1993 he was named Abkhazia's deputy defense minister and in June 2007 defense minister. He enjoys the backing of the military and of the population of his native Ochamchira district.

• Aslan Bzhania, 51, began his career as a Komsomol activist then entered the KGB. He returned to Abkhazia in 1992 to work in the State Security Service, but left after the end of the 1992-93 war to engage in business in Moscow. He also served from 2009-10 as an adviser at the Abkhaz diplomatic representation in Moscow. In February 2010, Bagapsh appointed him to head the State Security Service. He is supported primarily by the government and bureaucracy appointed by outgoing President Ankvab, Russian businessmen with interests in Abkhazia, and the impoverished rural population desperate for state support.

• Leonid Dzapshba, 53, is a retired police major general who spent virtually his entire career in the Interior Ministry, serving as Abkhazia's interior minister from September 2010 until October 2011, when he was constrained to resign over the illegal distribution of passports.

The candidates' priorities are strikingly similar in most respects, even though none of them has prepared a detailed election manifesto. Kishmaria and Bzhania both admit that they do not have a detailed presidential program as they were not anticipating an early election and "you can't draft such a program in the space of one month." Even Khajimba is quoted as saying he would need 100 days to do so. All agree on the need to negotiate a new framework treaty with Russia , on which the region is heavily dependent financially, and for a comprehensive program to galvanize the economy.

The four candidates have nonetheless endorsed a 15-point "Social-Political Agreement" enumerating the "first essential steps" the new president should take, regardless of his political and ideological views, and stipulating the time frame for doing so. They include preserving the region's "sovereign status"; adopting measures to improve the demographic situation; cracking down on corruption; and drafting medium- and long-term social and economic development programs and a military doctrine.

Khajimba, Kishmaria, and Dzapshba signed the agreement on August 11, while Bzhania, who initially proposed unspecified revisions, did so a week later.

In fact, the sole major issue on which the four disagree is the chain of events that led to Ankvab's resignation. Kishmaria argues that while the opposition's frustration and anger with Ankvab's refusal to discuss their demands was entirely justified, "removing the president from power by force cannot be considered a legal basis for the president's resignation."

Bzhania for his part told a congress of the political party Amtsakhara on July 17 that supports his candidacy that "what happened on May 27 is clearly defined in Abkhazia's Criminal Procedural Code." Khajimba's supporters immediately construed that statement as a threat to bring to trial not just those persons who forced their way into the presidential palace on the night of May 27, but the organizers (including Khajimba himself) of the protest meeting that preceded it.

Bzhania subsequently backpedalled, affirming his intention to "turn the page and make a fresh start," and stressing that the most important thing is to ensure that a situation never again arises in which such action is perceived as the sole solution. But his rating has fallen since then, calling into question the conviction, widely held at the start of the campaign, that a runoff will be required between himself and Khajimba.

As in 2011, the candidates signed a formal Agreement of Social Accord pledging to ensure that the ballot is free and fair and not to resort to unethical behavior or to badmouth each other. But that commitment has not been universally honored. On August 17, Khajimba supporters temporarily occupied the state TV and radio building with the stated objective of preventing the broadcast by Bzhania's campaign staff of what Khajimba termed "inflammatory" and derogatory material.

The Karachayevo-Cherkessia Republic, with a total population of just 480,000, has brought more men to trial over the past 15 years on charges of plotting coups d’etat than any other Russian Federation subject. In the past five years alone, at least 76 men, in groups ranging in size from four to 29, have stood trial on charges of seeking to overthrow the republic’s leadership with the aim of establishing an Islamic state, and/or of attacking police, illegal possession of weapons, and membership of an illegal armed group.

Most of those accused have received prison terms ranging from two to 20 years; a handful were acquitted, or avoided imprisonment by virtue of having spent months, if not years, in pretrial detention. Sentence was passed on August 8 on the 16 defendants in the most recent such case.

The incidence of such alleged plots and the imputed objective of establishing a state based on shariat are all the more implausible given that Karachayevo-Cherkessia is one of the least Islamicized republics of the North Caucasus, in contrast to Chechnya at the other end of the spectrum. (The Muslims of the northwest Caucasus are Hanafis, whereas in Chechnya canonical Islam of the Shafii legal school co-exists with, but is losing ground to, republic head Ramzan Kadyrov’s bastardized version of traditional Sufi Islam.)

Local journalist Murat Gukemukhov has pointed out that while some young men in Karachayevo-Cherkessia have indeed taken up arms to oppose the authorities, the primary motivation for doing so is adverse socioeconomic conditions, corruption, and inequality. “This is not so much Salafism as Che Guevara-ism,” Gukemukhov said.

Information about the earliest “coup” trials, in 2002 and 2007, is fragmentary, and even media reporting of more recent cases is sketchy and sometimes based solely on the prosecution’s indictment. Informed observers acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining a halfway clear picture of what happened but nonetheless question the assumption that the men sought to seize power, a charge to which none of them has been quoted as pleading guilty. As Gukemukhov asked rhetorically, how could such small numbers of men have any realistic hope of doing so?

Other charges too have been unconvincing. For example, some of the murders that 29 men who went on trial in April 2009 were accused of had been previously attributed to a militant group that the authorities claimed to have wiped out in 2006.

The defendants in that trial, as in earlier ones, were said to be members of the local wing of the North Caucasus insurgency. A group of 16 young men who went on trial in August 2013 was similarly said to have belonged to an illegal armed group formed in April 2011 by Islam Uzdenov, who was killed together with two other members of the group in December of that year during a special operation by the FSB.

Two of the 16, Denislam Semyonov and Osman Baychorov, had been apprehended during a special police operation in February 2013 during which Semyonov allegedly tried to shoot a senior police officer. They were sentenced earlier this month to 18 and 17 years’ imprisonment respectively, despite pleading not guilty to the coup charge.


Semyonov pleaded guilty only to illegal possession of weapons and membership in an illegal armed group, but denied attacking police. Baychorov pleaded not guilty to all four charges; he further said his pretrial testimony was extracted under torture. Eight other group members were jailed for up to two years.

While at least some members of the “Uzdenov Group” apparently did take up arms, even if they never fired them, a second group of 13 men who went on trial in April 2012 on similar charges of setting up two illegal armed formations with the aim of seizing power were not even in possession of weapons, according to their defense lawyers. The men were characterized as law-abiding practicing Muslims from rural areas, all with university educations and gainfully employed. Not all of them were acquainted among themselves, and those who did were not in constant contact. They apparently incurred suspicion by spending several days together discussing their shared fear of being targeted for “not praying correctly.”

Svetlana Avdjayeva, representing one of the 13, Artur Ismailov, said the prosecution did not adduce a shred of evidence to substantiate the charge of plotting to overthrow the authorities. What is more, the prosecutor reportedly failed to ask Ismailov a single question about the imputed coup, focusing exclusively on how often he prayed or went to the mosque. Avdjayeva claimed the men were beaten or tortured to induce them to confess. Lawyers for other defendants similarly said the charges against them were fabricated and unsubstantiated. All were nonetheless jailed for between six years and 10 months and 12 years.

The fact remains that despite changes in the republic’s leadership in 2008 and 2011, the KChR prosecutor’s office and courts have resorted for years to the same dubious “coup” charges against successive groups, reportedly underpinned by testimony from the same witnesses. Over the same time period, the KChR Interior Ministry has routinely resorted to the beating of suspects to extract incriminating testimony.

Discussing the jail terms handed down to the “Group of 13,” Moscow-based analyst Aleksei Malashenko drew a parallel with the systematic reprisals meted out by police in the early 2000s to young practicing Muslims in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic that borders on Karachayevo-Cherkessia. The victims of that harassment finally launched multiple retaliatory attacks on police and security facilities in Nalchik, the republican capital, in October 2005.

-- Liz Fuller

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About This Blog

This blog presents analyst Liz Fuller's personal take on events in the region, following on from her work in the "RFE/RL Caucasus Report." It also aims, to borrow a metaphor from Tom de Waal, to act as a smoke detector, focusing attention on potential conflict situations and crises throughout the region. The views are the author's own and do not represent those of RFE/RL.

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