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A demonstrator holds a placard depicting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban as Mao Tse-tung during a protest against the planned Chinese Fudan University campus in Budapest in June 2021.
A demonstrator holds a placard depicting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban as Mao Tse-tung during a protest against the planned Chinese Fudan University campus in Budapest in June 2021.

BUDAPEST -- A few months after leaked documents first showed the Hungarian government's plans to use an estimated $1.8 billion in taxpayer funds to build a satellite campus for a Chinese university, more than 10,000 people took to the streets in Budapest to protest the controversial project.

The June 5, 2021, protests signaled a mounting public backlash against plans to host Shanghai's prestigious Fudan University in the capital and represented a high-water mark for Hungary's disparate opposition as it targeted Prime Minister Viktor Orban's warm ties with Beijing.

In the wake of the protests, the government sought to distance itself from the project and other Chinese investment projects in the country that have drawn accusations of corruption and misuse of state funds, with Orban saying the future of the campus would be put to a referendum -- which was a demand of the protesters.

But a year later, the government is backtracking on that pledge, with the Constitutional Court ruling on May 18 that the referendum on the Fudan University campus in Budapest -- which reached the court after opposition activists gathered more than 200,000 signatures -- was unconstitutional, as it concerns an international agreement between Hungary and China.

The decision is part of a wider set of moves by the nationalist Orban following his April 3 landslide victory that analysts say is designed to consolidate his hold on power and use the court to sideline the political opposition while clearing the way for the Chinese project.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban celebrates with supporters after the announcement of preliminary results showing his reelection in Budapest on April 3.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban celebrates with supporters after the announcement of preliminary results showing his reelection in Budapest on April 3.

"The court's ruling on the referendum was a political decision," Andras Jambor, an activist who helped organize the June 2021 protests and was elected to parliament in April for the left-wing Spark Movement, told RFE/RL.

The ruling Fidesz party has been accused by activists and watchdog groups of stacking Hungary's top court with its own candidates in order to further support its agenda and remove obstacles to the democratic backsliding that the country has undergone in the last decade.

Jambor says that while the decision to block the referendum is another step forward for the Fudan campus, the ruling should be seen primarily as part of Fidesz's postelection strategy of preventing the opposition from having "any or even partial successes" to point to.

The Hungarian prime minister's office did not respond to RFE/RL's requests for comment.

Pushing Forward

Since the election, the government has also returned to more explicitly endorsing and defending its plans for the Chinese campus.

"If we do not build Fudan University [it] would be like voluntarily cutting off one of our arms," Culture and Innovation Minister Janos Csak said at a May 18 parliamentary hearing. "We in Hungary have to look both to the East and to the West, just as Western countries do. We need to understand both worlds -- not for political reasons -- but because this kind of knowledge is also needed for innovation in Hungary."

The deal would make Fudan the first Chinese university in the European Union and the first foreign outpost for the Shanghai-based school, which the Hungarian government has argued will raise higher-education standards in the country.

The logo for Fudan University on the door of its Shanghai campus
The logo for Fudan University on the door of its Shanghai campus

Csak continued with this justification in a June 1 interview with the pro-government outlet Mandiner, where he called Fudan "one of the best universities in the world" and said Hungary "needs to understand China on a level that we understand Western civilization," and that a Chinese university would be a great tool for this.

Hungary remains China's closest ally in the EU and Orban has capitalized on the bloc's requirement for unanimity in crafting foreign policy to block numerous resolutions targeting Beijing and Hong Kong and gain political room to maneuver with Brussels amid rule-of-law violations by Budapest that could block billions of euros in funding to Hungary.

But despite the high-level endorsement from Beijing and Budapest, plans for the university will need to overcome several obstacles.

Jambor says that the Fudan campus still faces economic and political problems. The total price tag for the campus is $1.8 billion, with $1.5 billion paid for with a Chinese loan. Concerns around funding and debt could be an issue, especially as the university is not a standalone construction project but rather bundled with a wider development venture for an entire neighborhood that will require navigating local politics in Budapest.

Activists hold up a Tibetan flag on a street renamed Uyghur Martyrs' Road, near the planned site of the Fudan University campus in Budapest.
Activists hold up a Tibetan flag on a street renamed Uyghur Martyrs' Road, near the planned site of the Fudan University campus in Budapest.

He also warns that the campus could find itself targeted by the EU as it becomes stricter about monitoring Chinese investment within the bloc that could create further headaches for Orban. Similarly, Jambor says that concerns are currently being raised about whether Hungary will want to use taxpayer money for the costly project amid a gloomy global economic picture for the coming years.

"I've met government officials who have knowledge on this investment, and they've subtly hinted that the investment is not on solid ground at all," Jambor said.

Too Big To Fail?

Despite these obstacles, analysts believe that the project is too important for Hungary's relations with China for it to not come to fruition.

Charles Dunst, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told RFE/RL that the project could pave the way to further Chinese investment inside Hungary, "which could benefit Orban politically depending on how he plays it."

Strengthening ties with Beijing by building the campus despite opposition could be valuable for Orban as his warm relationship with Moscow and resistance to sanctions against Russia comes under further scrutiny amid the Ukraine war.

"Orban could wield stronger ties with China to extract more benefits from the EU," Dunst said. "Just as Budapest blocked the EU's proposed Russian oil embargo until Brussels gave Hungary some special carve-outs, Orban could...use his Chinese ties to demand more from the EU."

Tamas Matura, an assistant professor at Corvinus University in Budapest and the founder of the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies, told RFE/RL that given the high-level endorsement from both Orban and Chinese President Xi Jinping that the university has received, neither party is likely to walk away from the agreement.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (not pictured) during a 2019 bilateral meeting in Beijing.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (not pictured) during a 2019 bilateral meeting in Beijing.

"Based on what we know about the financial agreement, Beijing does not have anything to lose if the project gets implemented, while abandoning it may be perceived as a loss of face," Matura said.

Domestic pushback to the project is not gone, however. Opposition politicians and activists against the project are currently exploring new avenues following the court ruling, with Krisztina Baranyi, the mayor of Budapest's ninth district, where the campus would be located, telling the Hungarian outlet ATV on June 1 that preparations were already under way to organize a local referendum as opposed to the nationwide vote that was struck down in May.

Opposition lawmaker Jambor says a local referendum could be a valuable political tool in resisting the campus and that he and other politicians are currently exploring any other legal tools available for stopping the investment moving forward.

But he adds that Hungary's opposition parties are deflated and regrouping after their decisive loss in April.

"This means the opposition is not ready to organize any counteraction or larger demonstration at least in the next few months," Jambor said.

Written and reported by Reid Standish in Prague with reporting by Akos Keller-Alant in Budapest
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video conference on June 28, 2021.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video conference on June 28, 2021.

As NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg warned Beijing at a March 23 press conference not to aid Russia in the Ukraine war, a batch of e-mails believed to be sent by Chinese state-sponsored hackers landed in the inboxes of researchers and engineers at several Russian military-development institutes.

The e-mails all carried the same headline purporting to contain Russian names on a U.S. sanctions list over Moscow’s war in Ukraine, but according to a recent report by the Israeli-American cybersecurity firm Check Point, they were part of a multiyear Chinese spy operation against Russia that actually contained documents that installed malware on the sensitive networks after being opened.

Taken together, the two events on the same day in March exemplify the increasingly complex relations between the two countries as they build solidarity over their antagonism toward the United States while simultaneously being tested by the political and economic fallout from Russia’s February 24 invasion.

After three months of war in Ukraine, Beijing still refuses to condemn Moscow's actions and Chinese President Xi Jinping is among the few world leaders yet to have direct talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. China has also continued to speak out against Western sanctions targeting Russia and has begun ramping up purchases of Russian oil at bargain prices, helping to fill the vacuum left by Western buyers that backed away from the market following the start of the war.

“Now that the West has taken a ‘dictator's position’ [against Russia], our economic ties with China will grow even faster,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on May 23.

But despite drawing closer in many respects -- a fact laid bare by a February 4 announcement by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in which they heralded a new era of “no-limits” partnership -- distrust, criticism, and a quiet rivalry remain part of the two countries’ complicated ties.

“The so-called revitalization of Russia under Putin's reign is based on a false premise,” said Gao Yusheng, who served as China's ambassador to Ukraine from 2005 to 2007. “Russia's decline is evident in all areas...and has had a significant negative impact on the Russian military and its combat capabilities.”

Veiled Critiques

Gao’s comments came at a Beijing seminar in April that was later published by Phoenix News Media, a partially state-owned Chinese television network, as a transcript on May 10.

“The Russian military’s economic and financial strength, which are not commensurate with its status as a so-called military superpower, could not support a high-tech war,” Gao said. “The Russian Army’s poverty-driven defeat was evident.”

The article was taken down within hours of being posted, but the public criticism by Gao is part of a growing number of Chinese analysts and former officials who have voiced skepticism about Moscow's motives for invading and its future as a partner given the military failures it has suffered in Ukraine.

“I still don't see how any country would have dared to invade the world's [number] 2 military power,” Gong Fangbin, a military strategist and retired professor at China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University, wrote in a recent article on WeChat. “Russia has shown the world time and again that no one dares touch an inch of its land.”

The article by Gong was also censored, but it points toward growing frustration among Chinese experts and scholars with Moscow’s argument that it's being cornered by NATO, a claim it has used to rationalize the invasion of Ukraine.

A TV shows news about Russia's invasion of Ukraine at a shopping mall in Hangzhou, in eastern China, on February 25.
A TV shows news about Russia's invasion of Ukraine at a shopping mall in Hangzhou, in eastern China, on February 25.

While such commentators are still blaming Washington for the conflict, they highlight a growing vein of criticism of Russia’s actions that first appeared in early March when Hu Wei, vice chairman of the Public Policy Research Center, which sits under an advisory agency to China’s state council, called on Beijing to distance itself from Russia as soon as possible over its war in Ukraine.

As the nature of the war in Ukraine has continued to evolve, Beijing has become increasingly cautious in dealing with Moscow. Chinese companies and the government have not sent economic or military aid to Russia and Chinese brokers have been careful to avoid secondary sanctions in dealing with the Russian economy.

Elsewhere, Chinese diplomats have looked to portray themselves as neutral in the Ukraine war and gone into damage control to avoid reputational blowback.

“Russia's war with Ukraine, no matter how reasonable in responding to NATO’s expansion, cannot be said to be legitimate,” Zhou Bo, a retired senior PLA officer, said on May 9 at an event hosted by an Indian think tank in Delhi. “Both [India and China] have suffered a bit in terms of our credibility and reputation because we refuse to overtly condemn Russia.”

Below The Surface

While Beijing shows no signs of dropping Russia as a partner, the Ukraine war has strained how many Chinese policymakers and thinkers view the country’s future trajectory.

“We have a fundamental difference in our overlooks and outlooks regarding an international order,” said Zhou, who added that Russia’s growing isolation will lead to its export-dependent economy coming under increasing strain.

This could mask a growing imbalance between the two countries, as they remain together in their shared desire to push back against U.S. influence around the world, but increasingly divergent in their abilities to do so.

Chinese tanks roll about 250 kilometers southeast of the Russian city of Chita during the Vostok 2018 military exercises in September 2018.
Chinese tanks roll about 250 kilometers southeast of the Russian city of Chita during the Vostok 2018 military exercises in September 2018.

Given the Chinese espionage operation, which according to Check Point began as early as July 2021, Beijing wants access to Russian military technology and secrets, something that China is believed to have been targeting for decades.

Despite the war, military cooperation is also still under way. China and Russia held their first joint military exercise since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on May 24, with both countries sending out nuclear-capable bombers over areas of northeast Asia in a display of force while U.S. President Joe Biden visited the region.

Still, the Ukraine war has damaged Russia’s image in the eyes of a growing array of Chinese analysts.

“So, apart from the largest nuclear arsenal, how important [will] Russia be 20 years from now?” Zhou said.

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

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