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Wednesday 11 December 2024

A Ukrainian serviceman launches a combat drone from his frontline position near the town of Pokrovsk in October.
A Ukrainian serviceman launches a combat drone from his frontline position near the town of Pokrovsk in October.

Escalating trade hostilities between China and the United States are putting drone supplies critical to Ukraine’s war effort in the crosshairs.

Ukraine Invasion: News & Analysis

RFE/RL's Ukraine Live Briefing gives you the latest developments on Russia's invasion, Western military aid, the plight of civilians, and territorial control maps. For all of RFE/RL's coverage of the war, click here.

U.S. media reports suggest Chinese manufacturers are limiting the sale of vital drone components to companies in the United States and the European Union that supply the parts to Ukraine.

The Chinese restrictions could hinder Ukraine on the battlefield, where drones have played a pivotal role. Kyiv’s arsenal of cheap but effective drones is used for reconnaissance, dropping explosives on targets, and defending against Russian attacks.

Beijing’s move is seen as a response to Washington’s decision in December to restrict the sale of high-bandwidth memory chips and additional semiconductor equipment to China. In reaction, Beijing has already banned the sale of dual-use items to the American military and several materials with high-tech and military applications to U.S. companies.

But cutting supplies to drone components that form a key part of Ukraine’s war effort against Russia marks a new element of the escalating trade tensions.

The Chinese move, experts say, also sends a message to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration of China’s ability to counter sanctions imposed by Washington.

“This is partly a response to U.S. tariffs and a form of punishment for American export control measures,” said Joseph Webster, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. “But restricting this drone tech will have battlefield consequences for Ukraine and could be important ahead of potential cease-fire negotiations.”

Ukraine's Long-Range Attack Drones Help It Strike Deep Inside Russia (Video)
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Affordable and commercially available drones have become a staple of the nearly three-year war in Ukraine for both Kyiv and Moscow.

The United States maintains an edge in larger military drones. But China dominates the market for cheaper and smaller drones and their components, which have dual-use civilian and military applications.

Several independent surveys estimate that China controls 90 percent of the drone market in the United States and 80 percent globally.

Given this foothold, experts have warned about a growing dependence on China’s control over the global supply chain for drones. Washington has expressed a need to create new supply chains as tit-for-tat trade moves between Beijing and Washington are poised to escalate under the second Trump administration.

“These new controls only underscore the importance of strengthening our efforts with other countries to de-risk and diversify critical supply chains away from [China],” a State Department spokesperson told RFE/RL.

China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology did not respond to RFE/RL’s request for comment.

The Trade War Meets The Drone War

Since 2019, China has created what it called an “unreliable entity list” to penalize companies that undermine Chinese national interests and introduced rules to punish firms that comply with U.S. restrictions on Chinese entities.

The broader reach of these laws enables Beijing to potentially choke global access to critical components, including materials like rare earths and lithium that form essential components in everything from smartphones to electric vehicles.

In terms of the latest limits on shipments of drone components to the United States and Europe, Chinese producers of motors, batteries, and flight controllers have cut the quantities they deliver or in some cases stopped shipments altogether.

Ukrainian servicemen attach munitions to a modified drone.
Ukrainian servicemen attach munitions to a modified drone.

One notable example occurred in October when the U.S. drone maker Skydio, which supplies Ukraine’s military, was hit by Chinese sanctions in response to winning a contract from the Taiwanese government.

Skydio has been heralded as a homegrown U.S. alternative to Chinese manufacturers and dependence on Chinese supply chains.

While the U.S. firm had spent years building a supply chain outside China for its products, it still relied on the country for one vital component: batteries.

The Chinese restriction on the supply of batteries to Skydio left the company scrambling to source the items and set back shipments to its clients, which includes the U.S. military, which in turn supplies Kyiv.

In Search Of New Supply Chains

For Kyiv, lessening its dependence on the Chinese supply chain to source drones for the battlefield has proved elusive, with many Ukrainian drone producers still relying on Chinese parts to make the cheap and effective weapons.

China in July announced a ban on exports of drones for military use, and Beijing has claimed that it does not provide weapons to Russia or Ukraine.

But the continued flow of dual-use equipment from China to Russia has aided the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Now, the new restrictions by the Chinese government have made it more difficult for Ukraine to acquire drones and their parts.

In the case of Skydio, Beijing imposed sanctions before the company had secured alternative suppliers, but the firm is reportedly in talks with several companies in Asia, including those in Japan and Taiwan.

Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, is looking to shore up its own drone supply chain given their growing importance in modern warfare and the specter of a potential conflict with Beijing that could see Taiwan cut off.

The self-governing island has stepped up its efforts and has also formed ties with European countries around drone technologies. Its foreign minister led a delegation to discuss the topic in Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in November and signed memorandums of understanding to advance drone development with all three countries.

“These Chinese trade restrictions could lead to new supply drone chains popping up,” said Webster of the Atlantic Council. “But expect China to also want to restrict their development.”

Chinese leader Xi Jinping shakes hands with ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during a state visit to China in 2023.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping shakes hands with ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during a state visit to China in 2023.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and I'm back after a reporting trip in Taiwan. I'm off again for the holidays but will be back here with another newsletter at the end of the year.

Here's what I'm following right now.

Beijing Watches Assad Fall

The full effects from the swift collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria is still playing out on the ground, but his sudden fall is set to shake up the Middle East and beyond.

Here's what it means for China.

Finding Perspective: China has been aligned with Assad since Syria's civil war began in 2011 but largely through its close ties to Russia and Iran, which backed the Syrian leader.

At the United Nations, Beijing has often voted with Moscow, blocking condemnations of Assad as well as cross-border aid. Beijing supported the Assad regime with eight vetoes at the UN, which is half the total vetoes China has ever used.

Beijing significantly reduced its presence in Syria amid the conflict, though it kept building close ties with Assad, eventually culminating in his state visit to China in 2023.

Chinese investment in Syria was scarce, and beyond a strategic partnership agreement and a pledge to join the Belt and Road Initiative there has been essentially no Chinese investment in Syria and no major contracts with Chinese firms in the country since 2010.

So why did Beijing throw its weight behind Assad?

Revisiting The Arab Spring: For Beijing, the biggest issue was the symbolism and appearance of stability that Assad represented, especially given he was first threatened by a popular uprising that then set the Syrian civil war in motion.

The spread of revolutions in the Arab world in 2011 was alarming for the Chinese Communist Party.

Inside China at the time, popular grumbling with corruption at various levels of government was common, and the party was concerned the protests across the Middle East could inspire its own population, especially given simmering tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang at the time.

Added to that was the rise of the Islamic State in Syria. The war led to thousands of Uyghurs, the predominantly Muslim group from western China, traveling to Syria to fight against the Syrian government.

Many of those fighters said they were there to learn how to use weapons and then return to China, and fears over the return of battle-hardened fighters to Xinjiang was one of the pretexts Xi expressed to top party brass to launch the crackdown and camp system in western China that targeted the Uyghur population, according to a set of leaked internal government documents obtained by the New York Times.

Why It Matters: From this logic, Beijing's support for Assad makes sense, but it's a big bet that hasn't paid off.

The fall of Assad is also a reflection of the weakened regional power of two of its main partners: Iran and Russia.

Their inability to prop up Assad indicates they've been consumed by the wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Ukraine, which may be a concern for Beijing looking ahead.

The rapid collapse of the Syrian government is also an unwelcome message at home for Beijing, which was reflected in the way Chinese media covered the events for Chinese viewers.

As images circulated around the world of jubilant crowds and the toppling of statues, Chinese state media's coverage on CCTV mostly centered around a fixed live shot of Damascus without a crowd in sight.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. China Flexes Its Muscles Around Taiwan

Beijing said it is taking "necessary measures" to defend the country's sovereignty and will not tolerate "separatist" activities, as Taiwan reported another rise in Chinese warplanes and ships near the island.

The Details: Taiwan's Defense Ministry said China was deploying its largest navy fleet in regional waters in nearly three decades, posing a threat to Taiwan that is more pronounced than previous Chinese war games.

China, which views Taiwan as its own territory, had been expected to launch drills to express its anger at President Lai Ching-te's tour of the Pacific that ended last week, which included stopovers in Hawaii and the U.S. territory of Guam.

Without any announcement from China on military drills, Taiwan officials are calling the ongoing activity a training exercise and warned it could be used to further violate Taiwan's territorial boundaries.

China, which views Lai as a separatist, held major military exercises around Taiwan following his inauguration in May and his National Day speech in October. It also held a major drill after Nancy Pelosi, then the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan in 2022.

2. The California Connection

A Chinese company that owns a California electronics distributor has sent hundreds of shipments of restricted dual-use technology to Russia since the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine, including to sanctioned companies with ties to the Russian military, my colleagues Mike Eckel and Mark Krutov report.

What You Need To Know: The findings further highlight the difficulty Western countries have had in trying to choke off the Russian military's access to Western technology for use in its weapons and operations as its war on Ukraine continues.

At least one component manufactured by the company, Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic Technology Company Limited, was found in a Russian weapons guidance system recovered from the battlefield in Ukraine, according to a public database maintained by the Ukrainian military.

Yangjie Technology, located in the city of Yangzhou northwest of Shanghai, has sent more than 200 shipments of specific goods to Russia since the start of its full-scale invasion in February 2022, according to customs records obtained by C4ADS, a Washington-based, nonprofit data-analysis and global-research organization.

The listed contents of those shipments -- totaling at least 238 -- included electronic components categorized as "high-priority" by the United States due to their potential use in Russian weapons systems, according to the data obtained by C4ADS and shared with RFE/RL, which independently corroborated more than 150 such shipments.

3. China And Serbia Eye New Cooperation On Extraditions

Serbia has extradited five Chinese citizens in the past five years, according to data obtained by my colleague Mila Manojlovic from RFE/RL's Balkan Service.

What It Means: The data shows extraditions are already taking place. That cooperation is also set to grow as Serbia's Justice Ministry prepares to submit to parliament a draft extradition law with China that, if passed, would expand the scope of cooperation between Beijing and Belgrade.

That extradition deal, which would regulate the bilateral extradition of citizens charged with crimes, is seen by experts as a response to the influx of tourists and Chinese nationals to Serbia that have corresponded with high-profile Chinese investments and loans for projects through the BRI.

According to data from Serbia's National Employment Service, more than 45,000 work permits have been issued to Chinese citizens since 2016, the year the ruling Serbian Progressive Party started intensifying relations with Beijing and expanding BRI projects.

Serbia's Interior Ministry told RFE/RL there are currently 3,433 Chinese citizens registered in the country.

Across The Supercontinent

Looking at 2025: Here's my look at what's on Taiwan's agenda as we prepare to enter 2025, as part of a wider lookahead from across RFE/RL coverage region. My segment begins at 7:25.

Train Links: The first train carrying goods from China to Afghanistan arrived in Mazar-e Sharif on November 23 after crossing through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The Taliban said 55 containers arrived in Afghanistan after a 22-day journey, marking the inauguration of the first direct train link between China and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

The New Normal: From attacks in Pakistan to new episodes in Tajikistan, my colleagues Bashir Ahmad Gwakh and Frud Bezhan look at how new violence in South and Central Asia could affect Chinese investment projects across the region.

A Late Warning: German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock on December 2 warned her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi that Beijing's support for Russia would "impact" ties with Europe.

One Thing To Watch

According to a draft sanctions package obtaind by RFE/RL, the European Union has proposed for the first time to target Chinese companies and individuals with visa bans and asset freezes over their dealings with Russian firms linked to Moscow's war effort in Ukraine.

The draft version of the sanctions package was first shared with EU countries on November 22 and would still need to be approved before the end of the year by all 27 member states in order to come into effect.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Wednesday.

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

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