Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: Will the European Union slap more sanctions on Russia and Belarus? And is Brussels really ready to up its game when it comes to financing Ukraine?

Brief #1: Piling On The Pressure

What You Need To Know: The European Union is slowly edging closer to a new set of sanctions aimed at Russia and Belarus, just a few weeks after it signed off on its eighth package of restrictive measures since the start of the war in Ukraine in late February.

Prompted by the recent missile attacks on various Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv, EU foreign ministers discussed the issue when they met in Luxembourg on October 17. There was a "rather broad consensus, without any concrete dissenting voices," to continue piling on the pressure, according to one senior EU official familiar with the talks.

A few days later, EU leaders met in Brussels and signed off on summit conclusions. They stated that "the European Union has further reinforced its restrictive measures against Russia and stands ready to continue to do so," after having been addressed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy via video link. The president implored them to move swiftly toward the ninth installment of punitive measures against Moscow and Minsk.

Deep Background: The truth is that if a new round of sanctions is adopted anytime soon, it won't be particularly hard-hitting. Partly this has to do with the fact that the bloc has covered a lot of ground already, slapping asset freezes and visa bans on 1,239 individuals and 116 entities. It has also targeted Russian coal, steel, wood, and closed its airspace to Russian flights -- just to mention a few measures adopted in the last nine months.

But the other and more significant reason is that there are political realities that could curtail Brussels' ambitions. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has increased his rhetoric against EU sanctions in recent weeks and started a "national consultation" with his fellow Hungarians -- basically, surveys are mailed out and the answers to the leading questions will be used to show support for the government's position.

With soaring energy prices, it also seems inconceivable that any more measures will be taken regarding energy. Ninety percent of Russian crude oil imports will be banned across the EU as of early December after a protracted decision was made in the summer. Don't, however, expect the bloc to ban the remaining 10 percent.

Similarly, the EU likely won't impose further sanctions on gas, and Russia's Gazprombank will continue to avoid being excluded from the SWIFT payment system. It looks like the same goes for nuclear, as some member states are still maintaining extensive cooperation with the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom.

An import ban on liquefied petroleum gas products such as propane and butane has been considered before -- and, this time, it might just fly, largely because, all in all, it doesn't cause a great deal of damage.

Drilling Down

• So, what can be included in a potential new package? The use of Iranian drones by Russia in Ukraine already prompted Brussels to blacklist three Iranian officials and the manufacturer, Shahed Aviation Industries, last week. More could follow. Also, don't rule out that an export ban on all unmanned aerial vehicles, in addition to the already targeted military ones, will come into force.
• Much of the future sanctions work will be about "closing loopholes" in already existing measures, essentially adding to an ever-growing list of various items that can't be exported to Russia -- be it filters, plastics, or lasers, to give just a few examples. This is often a cat-and-mouse game, in which even a small component change can give the product a different industrial code, enabling it to get around sanctions. It's often not headline-grabbing stuff, but this type of nitty-gritty work is "a death by a thousand paper cuts for Russian industry," as one EU diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, put it to me.
• Expect that there might be a push to act on items that were proposed in previous sanctions rounds but for various reasons didn't pass. This time around, will Belgium be OK with a ban on diamond imports? And will Cyprus green-light a prohibition on selling EU property to Russian citizens? Are some maritime nations ready to restrict access not only to Russian-flagged vessels but also to those owned or operated by a Russian individual or company? Is there now enough evidence to sanction the cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab and de-SWIFT the largest Russian private bank, Alfa-Bank?
• Work is already under way in the European Commission to propose ways on how to legally recover frozen Russian assets in the bloc and use them to support Ukraine's reconstruction efforts. EU leaders and officials will have to decide what to do with the 17.4 billion euros ($17.2 billion) worth of assets seized from sanctioned individuals and entities in the 27 member states.
• Belarus was spared in the previous sanctions round on October 6, but with EU leaders last week calling out Minsk for permitting Russian armed forces to use Belarusian territory, more restrictive measures could be on the horizon. The idea is to "mirror" the sanctions already imposed on Moscow and then apply a similar package on the regime of Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka. One of the chief aims of the sanctions would be to prevent Belarus from becoming a hub for Russian sanctions circumvention. Details still need to be worked out but, for example, there is a ban on importing timber placed on both countries. In addition, there is also a ban on importing wooden furniture from Russia, but there is no similar measure on Belarus. Closing those loopholes might mean a raft of new measures targeting Belarus.

Brief #2: How To Help Kyiv

What You Need To Know: EU leaders are also looking for other ways to help Ukraine, besides sanctioning its enemies. Having signed off on a mission to train Ukrainian soldiers earlier this month and pledged more funds for arms going to Kyiv, attention will now turn to how to financially support the beleaguered country through the winter and next year.

Ukraine's government has estimated that it would need $3.5 billion per month next year, with the United States already promising to pledge $1.5 billion per month. The big question is, can the EU match that?

Deep Background: Regarding this issue, there are two events to watch out for in the coming weeks:

Firstly, there will be an international expert conference in Berlin on October 25 dedicated to the recovery, reconstruction, and modernization of Ukraine. The conference is being co-hosted by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and, with Germany currently holding the rotating G7 presidency, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Several officials have been keen to point out that it is not "a donors or a pledging conference" but rather an important meeting to chart a way forward in supporting Ukraine.

Secondly, a document by the European Commission on future financial support for Kyiv is scheduled to be issued the next day, October 26. Initially, it was slated to come weeks before the Berlin conference, but a lack of clarity -- both on how much Brussels can offer and how to raise it -- has pushed the date back and could push it back even further.

Drilling Down

• To understand the hesitancy, look no further than the 9 billion euro macro-financial assistance that Brussels promised to Ukraine back in May. Of that 9 billion euros, only 3 billion has reached Kyiv's coffers so far. There is agreement that another tranche of 3 billion will be disbursed in 2022, but disagreement on when the final payment should be dispersed. There are indications that Germany is pushing for the final 3 billion euros to instead be rolled into a new and, as of yet unpublished, EU financial package for Ukraine for 2023. According to several sources familiar with the discussion, Kyiv's financing needs for the rest of 2022 have already been covered.
• EU leaders discussed the matter at their summit in Brussels last week and agreed to conclusions that stated: "The European Council calls for the timely provision of the remaining 3 billion euros in macro-financial assistance for Ukraine. It invites the Commission to present, and the Council to work on, a more structural solution for providing assistance to Ukraine." How to define "timely provision" is, of course, a key question.
• Perhaps more importantly, there is a reference to "a more structural solution." The crux of this matter is if the money should come in the shape of loans or grants, or a combination of both. Germany once again has played a key role here as the economic motor of the club by pushing for grants, as it is reluctant to provide guarantees for more loans.
• Berlin has also argued that countries that have already provided bilateral support could see their contributions under a new joint package lowered. As an example, Berlin pointed to a 1 billion euros grant given by Germany within the framework of the G7.
• The European Commission hopes to solve the issue of member states slowing down the process by borrowing on capital markets and using the EU's budget as a guarantee. This would mean that EU member states, as the main contributors to the EU budget, are indirectly becoming guarantors of the loan. So don't expect this one to be solved any time soon!

Looking Ahead

After much speculation in recent weeks, a decision was finally made over the weekend that Tirana will host the next EU-Western Balkans summit, slated for December 6. There has been a push to have the gathering in the Western Balkans, making it the first time ever that such a summit would be held outside the European Union.

Keep an eye out for developments surrounding Operation Althea, the EU's military deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina that has been in operation since 2004. Every year, the United Nations must renew its mandate. This year, several EU diplomats have told me, on the condition of anonymity, that this might be a problem, as Russia has voiced objections. A decision is needed by November 2, so the end of October will see some frantic diplomacy to make sure the mission doesn't fall apart. An UN diplomat in New York, who wished to remain anonymous, said that "work on a technical rollover is still ongoing.

That’s all for now. I really hope you enjoyed the first edition of Wider Europe. To subscribe, click here. Please feel free to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have. You can also follow me on on Twitter @RikardJozwiak.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the agreement by the European Union to finally set up a military assistance mission to Ukraine, and the potential breakthrough when it comes to visa liberalization for Kosovo.

Brief #1: A Military Assistance Mission For Ukraine

The Big Issue: It has been in the works since the spring, but on October 17, EU foreign ministers are expected to finally green-light the bloc's first-ever military assistance mission for Ukraine, christened the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM).

It has long been a sensitive topic, with the bloc reluctant to be dragged into the conflict in any way. But now Brussels is stepping up to coordinate efforts that have been in place since the start of the war in February by individual member states in an attempt to avoid duplication and boost Brussels' overall support for Kyiv.

A concept note, written by EU diplomats and seen by RFE/RL, states that if launched swiftly, the mission can "make a positive difference to the outcome of the war."

What You Need To Know: The goal is to have the mission up and running this fall to train around 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers on EU soil, ideally by the winter. There is also a possibility to scale up if needed.

The training will take place in several EU member states, but there will be two "headquarters"-- one in Germany, which will offer specialized training such as demining; and the other in Ukraine's neighbor, Poland, which will offer air defense, cyberwarfare, and artillery training, among other things.

With Poland already being a major hub for humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine and enjoying increasingly close cooperation with crucial NATO allies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the choice was obvious, with an EU document stating that providing training close to the border "could significantly reduce the supply routes from Ukraine for the recruits and trainees and the return…to the front line of the war."

Deep Background: Two questions are worrying Brussels: Firstly, is it really necessary for the European Union to step up involvement on this front, considering NATO and its allies are already doing so much? And, secondly, how will Russia react?

After a lot of initial hesitancy over the summer, the mission did get an extra push at an informal EU defense ministers' meeting in Prague in late August when Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov requested extra support for the Ukrainian Army. A leaked document authored by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and seen by RFE/RL also came to the conclusion that "not enhancing the support to Ukraine now would leave the Ukrainian armed forces short of vital training for its personnel during a critical period of the war."

The fear of how it would be perceived in Moscow has lingered, with the concept note acknowledging that the mission could be interpreted by Russia "as an escalatory move." The concept note does add that "this risk, however, is mitigated by the fact that the proposed mission would not constitute a direct involvement by the EU and its member states in the conflict."

EU member states were adamant that no training would take place on Ukrainian soil for security reasons. The Russian air strike in March on the International Center for Peacekeeping and Security -- a military training ground near Lviv that had hosted foreign fighters -- was a cautionary example. Liaison officers from the EU, however, will be stationed in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv.

Drilling Down

Why has the decision not been taken quicker? Partly because of fears of a potential Russian response but also because developments on the ground have shifted faster than the slow grind of the Brussels bureaucratic machine. What first seemed like a fairly low-key training mission focusing on very specific tasks has slowly morphed into what is likely to be a substantial coordination effort. Another reason for the delays in recent weeks was a discussion between Germany and Poland on where the headquarters will be based, with several diplomats that I spoke to on the condition of anonymity saying that Berlin argued that it would look better if Germany hosted the headquarters, as Warsaw had struck too much of an aggressive tone with Moscow. In the end, Poland's advantageous geography meant that a compromise could be made.

How long will the mission last? Two years, with an assessment of its usefulness in 2023. But the EU seems to have adopted NATO's mantra of supporting Ukraine for the long haul, with the concept note stating that "the EU will support Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression, as much as needed and for as long as it takes."

How much will it cost? The initial budget of 106 million euros ($103.6 million) is coming from the EU's European Peace Facility (EPF), which "expands the EU's ability to provide security for its citizens and its partners." The facility has already provided 2.6 billion euros to finance Ukraine's purchase of military weapons from EU member states, with another tranche of 500 million euros expected to be agreed by the bloc's foreign ministers on October 17. Some of that might be used for EUMAM, but the main costs will still be borne by individual member states by providing military trainers and instructors to boost the capabilities of the Ukrainian Army.

Brief #2: Will There Finally Be Visa Liberalization For Kosovo?

The Big Issue: After years of stalling, there might finally be some movement when it comes to visa liberalization for Kosovo's citizens. With all other Western Balkan countries enjoying visa-free travel to the vast majority of EU member states for over a decade, the fact that Pristina still doesn't have this right has been a source of tension for some time.

Already in 2018, the European Commission confirmed that Kosovo had fulfilled all the required conditions. And then last week, the commission once again issued a paper stating that its recommendation from four years ago "to exempt Kosovo nationals from visa requirements in respect of short stays remains fully valid."

The problem, however, is that not all the member states agree.

Deep Background: This summer, there were signals from France and the Netherlands, the two last holdouts against visa liberalization for Kosovo, that they were willing to reconsider their positions. The Dutch had already previously indicated that they could be willing to move if the European Commission gave its thumbs up after looking into the matter again. But for France -- who previously had showed little willingness to budge, citing fake asylum applications from Albania and Georgia -- there has seemingly been a change of heart.

The Czech Republic, which currently holds the rotating European Council Presidency until the end of 2022, hopes to resolve the issue on its watch. On October 13, the topic was for the first time discussed by the council's visa working group that brings together home affairs experts from the 27 member states to Brussels once a month.

Drilling Down

• At the meeting, France threw a bit of a curveball: Paris wants to link visa liberalization for Kosovo to the entry into force of the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS). ETIAS is the EU-version of the U.S. Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) -- essentially a digital system to keep track of non-EU visitors to the Schengen zone. It will cover every traveler from the currently 63 nations that have a visa-free regime with the EU, be they Brits or Bosnians. Under the scheme, to enter Schengen an applicant would just have to fill in a form and pay 7 euros.

• One problem is that no one quite knows when ETIAS will enter into force. It was supposed to be up and running in 2022, but the start date has already been postponed several times. Now, the working assumption is that it should start up sometime in 2023, most likely November, but that is not set in stone.

• France is not alone in liking the idea of linking ETIAS to visa freedom for Kosovars. Belgium and Spain also support the idea, and Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy are also considering it. Germany, however, is strongly against the proposal. Paris might reportedly also push for other conditions, such as Pristina striking readmission agreements with all EU member states.

• The next step will be written comments from all EU member states by a deadline of October 21. There will be another meeting of the visa working group on November 9-10, where an agreement could be reached. The most likely outcome is that there is an agreement in principle already this year but that the actual visa-free regime enters into force in late 2023. For Kosovo, this is both a glass half-full and a glass half-empty. On the one hand, no one is de facto objecting any longer. On the other hand, there are new obstacles and it doesn't look like Kosovars will be able to travel visa free to the EU imminently.

Looking Ahead

• Politics in the EU this week will likely be dominated by the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on October 18 and the EU summit in Brussels on October 20-21. More sanctions on Russia will be on the agenda, just weeks after the bloc adopted its eighth package of measures.

Some ideas floating around include: ways on how to seize frozen Russian assets in the EU; a ban on Russian citizens acquiring property in the bloc; and more restrictive measures on Belarus, which was spared in the latest sanctions round. That said, no decision is expected this week, with the draft EU summit conclusions that leaders will likely adopt currently stating that "the European Union has strengthened its restrictive measures against Russia. The European Council discussed how to further increase collective pressure on Russia to end its war of aggression." Expect that wording to sharpen in the run-up to and during the summit.

• Having missed out on the Nobel Peace Prize recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will be awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize. Or at least sort of. Several political groups in the European Parliament, who nominate candidates for the prize, had proposed either Zelenskiy, "the people of Ukraine," or a combination of the two.

In the end, the three biggest groups in parliament settled for a proper Brussels compromise by backing "the brave people of Ukraine, represented by their president, elected leaders, and civil society." That will at least make the final decision, set for October 19, a foregone conclusion. The final choice always rests with the president of the European Parliament, together with the leaders of the various political groups, but with the key political powers already backing the "Ukrainian bid," the other two short-listed candidates, Julian Assange and Colombia's truth commission, stand no chance.

That’s all for now. I really hope you enjoyed the first edition of Wider Europe. To subscribe, click here. Please feel free to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have. You can also follow me on on Twitter @RikardJozwiak.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak