Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationship with the Western Balkans and Europe's eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: What obstacles could slow down Finland and Sweden's NATO accession? And is Brussels edging closer to punishing third-party countries that help Russia?

Brief #1: What Could Spoil Sweden And Finland's NATO Accession?

What You Need To Know: Twenty-eight out of 30 NATO allies have now ratified Sweden and Finland's protocols of accession to the military alliance. Which two opted out? Turkey and Hungary. But there does seem to be some movement in Ankara and Budapest. According to Hungarian officials, the parliament should vote on the issue at the end of November and wrap up the process before Christmas. As for Turkey, which so far has chosen to see how Finland and, more importantly, Sweden implement the remainder of the trilateral memorandum signed in Madrid in June, there are also some signs of a window of opportunity opening.

Deep Background: The thing to look out for this week is the likely trip by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to Ankara. It comes after the new Swedish prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, had what he called "a constructive phone call" with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last week. Kristersson recently indicated he was ready to travel to Turkey "as soon as possible" and Erdogan confirmed a meeting will take place even though no date has been set.

Ankara will certainly look at how quickly and keenly Sweden implements provisions from the June memorandum. The previous Swedish government delivered on some aspects of the pact: A 2019 arms embargo on Ankara was promptly lifted, and there have been moves to stop financing and support for Kurdish groups in Syria. But those were the easy parts. The question now is how to deal with the trickier challenges, namely Sweden clamping down on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and extraditing people Turkey deems to be terrorists.

Both Finland and Sweden have long classified the PKK as a terrorist organization, but in the memorandum they committed to "preventing activities of the PKK and all other terrorist organizations and their extensions, as well as activities by individuals in affiliated and inspired groups or networks linked to these terrorist organizations." Exactly how to identify so many members of this network is anyone's guess, but Sweden -- home to an estimated 100,000 people of Kurdish origin -- will probably have to be more vigilant.

Drilling Down

• The extraditions will be the real litmus test for Sweden. So far, two extradition requests have been approved, but it is still unclear how many more Ankara is seeking. Numbers circulating in the media have ranged from 18 to 73 people, but officials I spoke to say what Turkey is looking at more than anything is Sweden’s willingness to at least entertain the requests.
• The new Swedish government, established in mid-October after a tight election win a month earlier, might find it easier than its predecessor to deal with Ankara for several reasons. The three right-wing parties that make up the minority government are all staunchly pro-NATO, which wasn't the case with their main governing predecessor, the Swedish Social Democratic Party. They might also find the extraditions easier to swallow considering it’s no longer an electoral issue and Swedish Kurds have traditionally been left-leaning -- in other words, they're not a hugely important voting base for the right-wing parties in power. Notably, Amineh Kakabaveh, an Iranian-born Kurd and former peshmerga fighter who in the previous Swedish parliament was an independent deputy and political kingmaker, lost her bid for reelection in the latest polls.
• The government, however, relies on the support of the far-right Sweden Democrats to secure a working majority. The Sweden Democrats have switched their position on NATO and are now in favor of joining, but the party’s anti-immigration rhetoric and swipes against Islam could create further tensions with Ankara.
• When can Sweden and Finland finally become members? Some officials say everything could be done and dusted by the end of this year, but the process could very well spill over into early 2023. It's worth considering, too, that Erdogan is set to fight a protracted presidential election next June and the Finns head to the polls in early April. According to EU diplomats familiar with the issue, there is a renewed willingness to sort this out well before then.

Brief #2: What's Next For EU Sanctions?

What You Need To Know: In the latest sanctions package imposed on Russia, adopted by the European Union earlier this month, the bloc opened up the possibility of targeting individuals and companies in third countries for helping EU entities circumvent the restrictive measures imposed on the Kremlin.

This could become an important tool to use against countries in the bloc's neighborhood; it would also be a significant U-turn for the EU. After having railed against the United States for applying and threatening companies with secondary sanctions for years -- including some EU firms -- Brussels now appears to be moving in the same direction in an attempt to choke the Russian war machine through its secondary and tertiary partners.

Deep Background: Even though Brussels is edging closer toward to what is known as sanctions extraterritoriality, there are still limits. While any potential future measures apply equally to EU and non-EU actors, there must be a clear EU link. Thus, the measure is only applicable to people or companies if they help EU people or companies circumvent EU sanctions on Russia.

In that respect, they lack the sweeping global scope of U.S. secondary sanctions and would likely lack the same depth. For example, Brussels would only target a company or person with visa bans and asset freezes, whereas Washington can cut off any sanctioned entity entirely from its financial system, creating much larger economic consequences and reputational damage. The main question remains, however, as to whether extraterritoriality measures will be used at all; so far even the United States has refrained from using its secondary sanctions toolkit in relation to third countries' dealings with Russia.

Drilling Down

• The EU diplomats I spoke to on the condition of anonymity indicated that the move to broaden the scope of EU sanctions should primarily be read as scare tactics to force third countries into aligning with the EU position on the issue. Some countries, notably EU candidate countries Serbia and Turkey, have not followed Brussels' lead on sanctions to date. Brussels, however, remains reluctant to target countries in its neighborhood, the main thinking being that it doesn’t want to be seen as pushing them away from the bloc.
• Diplomatic capacity is another potential obstacle. So-called sanctions evidence packages need to be prepared by member states and the European External Action Service, the EU's diplomatic service, which is already working overtime to find reasonable legal grounds to target Russian industries. Investigating third-country dealings might be too much of a bureaucratic strain. In many ways, Brussels is missing its own version of the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, which administers and enforces American sanctions.
• Then there is the issue of legality. Even if evidence packages were to be prepared, they must also stand up to a potential challenge in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Once again, Washington appears to have a smoother setup, as hinted at by one high-ranking EU diplomat: "The EU is accountable to the ECJ; the U.S. is accountable only to God."
• If the EU manages to overcome these hurdles and decides to use the new, widened scope, who will be targeted? That's anyone's guess, but it was telling that it was Cyprus and Greece who were allegedly instrumental in pushing for the bloc going toward extraterritoriality.
• Does that mean Turkey might be in the crosshairs? In a leaked European Commission document assessing the impact of the EU's Russia sanctions so far -- a document seen by RFE/RL -- Turkey, alongside China, is mentioned in a subchapter on circumvention with the text stating that "the value of Turkey's exports to Russia nearly doubled since the second quarter [of 2022]." The document also states that "exports of some member states to Turkey have also risen sharply over 2022."

Looking Ahead

This week will be a bit slower due to the All Saints holiday on November 1, marked across some parts of Europe. There are still, however, two meetings in Germany to watch. On November 3, the leaders of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia will be in Berlin to sign three agreements.

One agreement enables people from these six Western Balkan countries to only use IDs to travel across their respective borders. The other two agreements will ensure mutual recognition of university diplomas as well as vocational qualifications. And on November 3-4, G7 foreign ministers will convene in the German city of Munster. Talks will mainly focus on Ukraine, including more potential sanctions, financial aid, and weapons deliveries.

We are slowly approaching the end of the year, and that usually means one thing in Brussels: summit time. In December, the EU squeezes in yet another meeting: a first-ever EU-ASEAN summit slated for December 14. Diplomats are already working on a draft leaders' statement for the meeting, and the war in Ukraine will likely feature prominently.

The EU was badly damaged by accusations, largely from the Global South, that its sanctions on Russia caused food prices to soar worldwide. And in the latest draft leaders' statement, seen by RFE/RL, Brussels is pushing for language that states that "we condemn the use of disinformation by Russia on this crucial issue, aimed at distorting the link between global food prices and Russia's actions in Ukraine."

The draft statement adds that "in this context, we recall Russia's blockage of Ukrainian ports, the deliberate destruction of Ukrainian agricultural facilities, and Russia's restrictions imposed on its own export of agricultural products and fertilizers."

That’s all for now. I really hope you enjoyed the first edition of Wider Europe. To subscribe, click here. Please feel free to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have. You can also follow me on on Twitter @RikardJozwiak.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: Will the European Union slap more sanctions on Russia and Belarus? And is Brussels really ready to up its game when it comes to financing Ukraine?

Brief #1: Piling On The Pressure

What You Need To Know: The European Union is slowly edging closer to a new set of sanctions aimed at Russia and Belarus, just a few weeks after it signed off on its eighth package of restrictive measures since the start of the war in Ukraine in late February.

Prompted by the recent missile attacks on various Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv, EU foreign ministers discussed the issue when they met in Luxembourg on October 17. There was a "rather broad consensus, without any concrete dissenting voices," to continue piling on the pressure, according to one senior EU official familiar with the talks.

A few days later, EU leaders met in Brussels and signed off on summit conclusions. They stated that "the European Union has further reinforced its restrictive measures against Russia and stands ready to continue to do so," after having been addressed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy via video link. The president implored them to move swiftly toward the ninth installment of punitive measures against Moscow and Minsk.

Deep Background: The truth is that if a new round of sanctions is adopted anytime soon, it won't be particularly hard-hitting. Partly this has to do with the fact that the bloc has covered a lot of ground already, slapping asset freezes and visa bans on 1,239 individuals and 116 entities. It has also targeted Russian coal, steel, wood, and closed its airspace to Russian flights -- just to mention a few measures adopted in the last nine months.

But the other and more significant reason is that there are political realities that could curtail Brussels' ambitions. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has increased his rhetoric against EU sanctions in recent weeks and started a "national consultation" with his fellow Hungarians -- basically, surveys are mailed out and the answers to the leading questions will be used to show support for the government's position.

With soaring energy prices, it also seems inconceivable that any more measures will be taken regarding energy. Ninety percent of Russian crude oil imports will be banned across the EU as of early December after a protracted decision was made in the summer. Don't, however, expect the bloc to ban the remaining 10 percent.

Similarly, the EU likely won't impose further sanctions on gas, and Russia's Gazprombank will continue to avoid being excluded from the SWIFT payment system. It looks like the same goes for nuclear, as some member states are still maintaining extensive cooperation with the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom.

An import ban on liquefied petroleum gas products such as propane and butane has been considered before -- and, this time, it might just fly, largely because, all in all, it doesn't cause a great deal of damage.

Drilling Down

• So, what can be included in a potential new package? The use of Iranian drones by Russia in Ukraine already prompted Brussels to blacklist three Iranian officials and the manufacturer, Shahed Aviation Industries, last week. More could follow. Also, don't rule out that an export ban on all unmanned aerial vehicles, in addition to the already targeted military ones, will come into force.
• Much of the future sanctions work will be about "closing loopholes" in already existing measures, essentially adding to an ever-growing list of various items that can't be exported to Russia -- be it filters, plastics, or lasers, to give just a few examples. This is often a cat-and-mouse game, in which even a small component change can give the product a different industrial code, enabling it to get around sanctions. It's often not headline-grabbing stuff, but this type of nitty-gritty work is "a death by a thousand paper cuts for Russian industry," as one EU diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, put it to me.
• Expect that there might be a push to act on items that were proposed in previous sanctions rounds but for various reasons didn't pass. This time around, will Belgium be OK with a ban on diamond imports? And will Cyprus green-light a prohibition on selling EU property to Russian citizens? Are some maritime nations ready to restrict access not only to Russian-flagged vessels but also to those owned or operated by a Russian individual or company? Is there now enough evidence to sanction the cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab and de-SWIFT the largest Russian private bank, Alfa-Bank?
• Work is already under way in the European Commission to propose ways on how to legally recover frozen Russian assets in the bloc and use them to support Ukraine's reconstruction efforts. EU leaders and officials will have to decide what to do with the 17.4 billion euros ($17.2 billion) worth of assets seized from sanctioned individuals and entities in the 27 member states.
• Belarus was spared in the previous sanctions round on October 6, but with EU leaders last week calling out Minsk for permitting Russian armed forces to use Belarusian territory, more restrictive measures could be on the horizon. The idea is to "mirror" the sanctions already imposed on Moscow and then apply a similar package on the regime of Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka. One of the chief aims of the sanctions would be to prevent Belarus from becoming a hub for Russian sanctions circumvention. Details still need to be worked out but, for example, there is a ban on importing timber placed on both countries. In addition, there is also a ban on importing wooden furniture from Russia, but there is no similar measure on Belarus. Closing those loopholes might mean a raft of new measures targeting Belarus.

Brief #2: How To Help Kyiv

What You Need To Know: EU leaders are also looking for other ways to help Ukraine, besides sanctioning its enemies. Having signed off on a mission to train Ukrainian soldiers earlier this month and pledged more funds for arms going to Kyiv, attention will now turn to how to financially support the beleaguered country through the winter and next year.

Ukraine's government has estimated that it would need $3.5 billion per month next year, with the United States already promising to pledge $1.5 billion per month. The big question is, can the EU match that?

Deep Background: Regarding this issue, there are two events to watch out for in the coming weeks:

Firstly, there will be an international expert conference in Berlin on October 25 dedicated to the recovery, reconstruction, and modernization of Ukraine. The conference is being co-hosted by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and, with Germany currently holding the rotating G7 presidency, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Several officials have been keen to point out that it is not "a donors or a pledging conference" but rather an important meeting to chart a way forward in supporting Ukraine.

Secondly, a document by the European Commission on future financial support for Kyiv is scheduled to be issued the next day, October 26. Initially, it was slated to come weeks before the Berlin conference, but a lack of clarity -- both on how much Brussels can offer and how to raise it -- has pushed the date back and could push it back even further.

Drilling Down

• To understand the hesitancy, look no further than the 9 billion euro macro-financial assistance that Brussels promised to Ukraine back in May. Of that 9 billion euros, only 3 billion has reached Kyiv's coffers so far. There is agreement that another tranche of 3 billion will be disbursed in 2022, but disagreement on when the final payment should be dispersed. There are indications that Germany is pushing for the final 3 billion euros to instead be rolled into a new and, as of yet unpublished, EU financial package for Ukraine for 2023. According to several sources familiar with the discussion, Kyiv's financing needs for the rest of 2022 have already been covered.
• EU leaders discussed the matter at their summit in Brussels last week and agreed to conclusions that stated: "The European Council calls for the timely provision of the remaining 3 billion euros in macro-financial assistance for Ukraine. It invites the Commission to present, and the Council to work on, a more structural solution for providing assistance to Ukraine." How to define "timely provision" is, of course, a key question.
• Perhaps more importantly, there is a reference to "a more structural solution." The crux of this matter is if the money should come in the shape of loans or grants, or a combination of both. Germany once again has played a key role here as the economic motor of the club by pushing for grants, as it is reluctant to provide guarantees for more loans.
• Berlin has also argued that countries that have already provided bilateral support could see their contributions under a new joint package lowered. As an example, Berlin pointed to a 1 billion euros grant given by Germany within the framework of the G7.
• The European Commission hopes to solve the issue of member states slowing down the process by borrowing on capital markets and using the EU's budget as a guarantee. This would mean that EU member states, as the main contributors to the EU budget, are indirectly becoming guarantors of the loan. So don't expect this one to be solved any time soon!

Looking Ahead

After much speculation in recent weeks, a decision was finally made over the weekend that Tirana will host the next EU-Western Balkans summit, slated for December 6. There has been a push to have the gathering in the Western Balkans, making it the first time ever that such a summit would be held outside the European Union.

Keep an eye out for developments surrounding Operation Althea, the EU's military deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina that has been in operation since 2004. Every year, the United Nations must renew its mandate. This year, several EU diplomats have told me, on the condition of anonymity, that this might be a problem, as Russia has voiced objections. A decision is needed by November 2, so the end of October will see some frantic diplomacy to make sure the mission doesn't fall apart. An UN diplomat in New York, who wished to remain anonymous, said that "work on a technical rollover is still ongoing.

That’s all for now. I really hope you enjoyed the first edition of Wider Europe. To subscribe, click here. Please feel free to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have. You can also follow me on on Twitter @RikardJozwiak.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak