Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: In light of Azerbaijan's lightning takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, what can the EU do for Armenia now? Plus, is Brussels capable of slapping more sanctions on Moscow?

Also, last week, I sat down with the European Commission's vice president for values and transparency, Vera Jourova. In the interview, she said that to unblock EU funding, Hungary must meet set conditions on reforming its judiciary and ensuring the protection of fundamental rights.

Brief #1: What Now For EU-Armenia Relations?

What You Need To Know: On October 18, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian will address the full plenary of the European Parliament. It comes just a month after Azerbaijan's military carried out an offensive that overwhelmed breakaway ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku now controls territory that has been under ethnic Armenian rule for decades, forcing up to 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee Karabakh for Armenia.

It also comes at a time when the European Union is getting increasingly engaged in a diplomatic settlement between Baku and Yerevan -- while pondering what its relations with Armenia might look like in the future. In the coming weeks, European Council President Charles Michel is expected to host Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels for talks.

For Brussels, it is important to get this peace process started, after the failure of the trio to meet in the Spanish city of Granada on October 5, along with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Aliyev backed out, reportedly after his request that Turkey participate in the talks to counter France's supposed pro-Armenian bias was denied. The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stayed away from Spain altogether, focusing on the congress of his Justice and Development Party that took place a couple of days later. Despite the snag, Michel remains an acceptable interlocutor to both sides and, for the EU and the United States, the ultimate goal would be to have some sort of peace treaty, preferably by the end of the year.

Deep Background: EU leaders, officials, and diplomats are now wondering what to with Armenia, especially as Pashinian made it clear that he wants closer ties with Brussels. In a statement issued after the Granada meeting on behalf of the Armenian leader, Macron, Michel, and Scholz, they "expressed their support to the strengthening of EU-Armenia relations, in all its dimensions, based on the needs of the Republic of Armenia."

EU officials have told me on background that the European Commission, the bloc's top executive body, now has an "internal reflection exercise" ahead of it on how to best help Armenia. Brussels has already provided 10.5 million euros ($11 million) in immediate humanitarian support and will soon provide another 15 million euros to help support the Armenian government.

There has also been talk among EU officials of setting up some sort of macro-financial assistance to Yerevan with regular payment cycles, similar to what Brussels has done to aid Moldova and Ukraine. But what Armenia also needs is security, with Yerevan fearing that Azerbaijan might make more military advances in the future. Earlier this year, the EU began an unarmed monitoring mission in Armenia, along parts of the border with Azerbaijan, and while more people could be added to boost the mission capacity from today's 150 people, they will remain unarmed. Armenia might also explore options of getting money from the European Peace Facility (EPF), the same pot the EU is using to purchase arms and other military gear for Ukraine.

Drilling Down:

• There are, however, two considerable hurdles to pass: Firstly, the EU is wary of antagonizing Azerbaijan and handing over EPF cash could be seen as too much of a risk. And secondly, there is Armenia's relationship with Russia. Yerevan is still a member of the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Area, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance. Yerevan's commitment to the latter probably makes EPF funding difficult.
• Many in Brussels think that Armenia is slowly pivoting away from Russia. Speaking on background as they are not permitted to speak on the record, a senior EU official recently told me, "It strikes me that Armenia has perhaps made a very accurate conclusion that the security guarantees that they have been given in the past by Russia are not worth the paper they are written on."
• An obvious indicator of that was Armenia's recent decision to ratify the International Criminal Court's Rome Statute, which could obligate the country's authorities to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he were to visit the country.
• More long-term, Armenia could hope to upgrade its current Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU to something more like the association agreements that Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine enjoy.
• An upgraded agreement could also pave the way for Armenian citizens to benefit from the current visa-facilitation agreement with the EU to full visa liberalization.
• Then there is the question of punishing Azerbaijan. A recent discussion paper, authored by the EU's diplomatic corps, EEAS, and seen by RFE/RL, noted it was possible to enact "sanctions in case serious human rights violations are committed."
• A European Parliament resolution, passed on October 5, called for the EU to impose sanctions on Azerbaijanis responsible for human rights violations in Nagorno-Karabakh and reconsider the "strategic partnership" with Azerbaijan in the field of energy.
• Despite the resolution garnering considerable media attention, it's worth noting that the resolution was nonbinding for member countries and EU institutions and the bloc is unlikely to take any significant punitive measures against Baku. Hungary has already indicated as much in public, and countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Romania -- interested in buying Azerbaijani gas or getting access to even more lucrative Turkmen gas through Azerbaijan -- would likely block such a measure.

Brief #2: Can The EU Muster Up More Sanctions Against Russia?

What You Need To Know: There was a time, not long ago, when a substantial amount of EU diplomats' time was devoted to designing and adopting sanctions against Russia. Immediately after the country's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the bloc imposed its first sanctions package and, to date, another 10 have followed. Those sanctions have targeted the Russian oil, mining, lumber, and coal industries; have closed EU airspace and ports for Russian-flagged flights and vessels; have cut Russian banks off from the international SWIFT bank-payment system; and have imposed asset freezes and visa bans on over 1,800 individuals and firms, including President Putin and many in his closest circle.

The period of frenzied sanctions work in Brussels is now over. And it is already slowing down. In 2023, only two rounds have been adopted, with the latest agreed at the end of June. Some diplomats are saying that there isn't that much left to target, whereas others are pointing to the increasing difficulty in getting all 27 member states to come to an agreement -- the most recent package only saw the light of the day after almost eight weeks of negotiations.

So, it comes as no surprise that, in her big "state of the European Union" address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen didn't mention Russian sanctions at all. EU sources -- speaking on the condition of anonymity as they weren't authorized to speak on the record -- told me that only a handful of member states had mentioned more Russian sanctions.

Deep Background: The sands are shifting within the European Union. Migration has crept up to the top of the agenda again, with a 28 percent jump in asylum requests in the bloc this year, compared to the same time period in 2022, according to data from the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). With the populist leftist party Smer winning the most votes in Slovakia's recent parliamentary elections and now looking set to form the next government, Hungary could have a new ally in its fight against further Russian sanctions. On the campaign trail, Smer's leader, former Prime Minister Robert Fico, said no more weapons will be sent to Ukraine and praised Moscow.

Despite this reluctance, EU sanctions experts are holding preliminary talks and it's possible that a new package could be presented to member states, most likely some time in November. A lot will depend on what other priorities there are, vis-a-vis Ukraine, which need to be adopted before 2023 is rung in. For example, all the member states need to give the green light in order for Kyiv to start EU accession talks in December. Plus, there will be an EU drive to reach agreement on a 20 billion-euro ($21 billion) fund to pay for military aid for Ukraine over the coming years, and then another proposal of 50 billion euros to finance the country's reconstruction between 2024 and 2027. And on top of that, more sanctions. Not everything will get over the line in 2023.

Drilling Down:

• If there is a new sanctions proposal, what will it contain? The best bet is to look at two sanctions discussion papers, seen by RFE/RL, recently produced by perhaps the two biggest Russian sanctions hawks, Lithuania and Poland. Their proposals are likely the maximum the bloc would go.
• Perhaps the four most obvious areas for new measures, which are mentioned in both papers, would be liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), steel, and diamonds.
• The last sector is perhaps the most realistic to target. Raw diamond exports from Russia in 2021 were worth $4.5 billion and amounted to 1 percent of all Russia's total exports. Belgium, home to the European "diamond capital," Antwerp, has long been opposed to clamping down on Russia's diamond business, arguing that it would hurt itself more than Russia. EU action also hinges on whether the Group of Seven (G7) leading economies can find a global solution to the issue.
• Even if such measures were implicated, there still might be too many loopholes, as Russian diamonds could be rerouted from Antwerp directly to Dubai and the Indian city of Surat. Governments in the United Arab Emirates and India would be unlikely to align with such sanctions.
• Poland remains the main EU importer of LPG from Russia, followed by the Netherlands. So even if Warsaw has indicated that it is ready to cease LPG imports, the question remains as to whether other countries will be willing. As winter is approaching and energy prices remain high, there doesn't seem to be much appetite within the EU to target LPG and LNG. Russian imports of the latter into the bloc even increased this year compared to 2022, with Belgian, French, and Spanish ports reportedly seeing more trade.
• Lithuania is pushing for harsher EU measures against the Russian nuclear sector, which would prohibit EU companies from signing contracts with Russian nuclear giant Rosatom, investing in the Russian civil nuclear energy sector, and from importing enriched uranium from Russia. While some member states might be persuaded on halting business with Rosatom or staying out of the Russian nuclear business, stopping uranium imports from Russia would likely be a bridge too far. In the first four months of 2023, the bloc's two biggest member states, France and Germany, imported Russian-enriched uranium worth 134.5 million euros and 12.3 million euros, respectively.
• And what about steel products? Sanctions were introduced in October 2022, but both Belgium and Italy pushed for wind-down periods lasting two years, something that is unlikely to change. There is some wiggle room, with the possibility that different types of iron products could be added to the sanctions list to tighten existing loopholes, such as with steel sheets and pig iron.
• So, what might fly? There could be some new sanctions against the Russian laser industry and a widening of the EU ban to provide Russia with IT consultancy services, which for now largely concerns the installation of computer hardware and software. The sale to Russia of European cloud-computing technologies, for example, is not covered by any sanctions.
• Then there is a whole list of components made in the EU that can be used in Russian military hardware. These parts -- for example, small drones, electric motors, generators, and sensors -- might not often make the headlines, but experts say blocking their export could make it harder for the Russian military to function.

Looking Ahead

On October 20, European Commission President von der Leyen and European Council President Michel will travel to Washington to meet U.S. President Joe Biden for the first EU-U.S. summit in nearly two years. The wars in Ukraine and Israel will feature prominently on the agenda, although China is likely to grab the headlines, as Brussels is set to announce anti-subsidy investigations against Chinese steelmakers.

Also, look out for the Berlin Process summit in Albania's capital, Tirana, on October 16. The Berlin Process was an initiative of yearly summits first launched in 2014 to improve cooperation between various EU member states and the six Western Balkans EU hopefuls (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). This is, however, the first time the summit is being held in one of the six Western Balkan countries. No big announcements are likely, but there could be an increased push from countries such as Albania and North Macedonia to speed up their EU accession paths.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: The upcoming Polish elections and what they mean for Europe, and the meeting of NATO defense ministers amid concerns about dwindling support for Ukraine.

Brief #1: The Lowdown On Poland's Crucial Elections

What You Need To Know: On October 15, Poland holds parliamentary elections in what might be the most closely watched European vote this fall. Opinion polls point to a nail-biter. Will the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, which has dominated Polish politics since its election victory back in 2015, secure an unprecedented third term? A third term that could spell more sparring with Brussels and Berlin and a continued socially conservative domestic agenda. Or will a clutch of opposition parties seize power, attempt to mend relations with various European capitals, and push to roll back some of the previous controversial reforms, such as the politicization of the judiciary?

Like so many other times in recent political history in Poland, the two biggest parties fighting it out are the conservative PiS and the center-right Civic Coalition (KO). Polls show that PiS is likely to finish first with roughly 35 percent of the vote and KO a bit behind with close to 30 percent.

Both will be looking for potential coalition partners among three political groupings that are all polling around 10 percent of the vote: The Left political alliance; the Third Way, a political coalition between the agrarian Polish People's party and a new centrist force called Poland 2050; and the far-right Confederation party.

The first two look primed to join forces with the Civic Platform, so the party to watch here is Confederation. At first it appears that it would be a natural partner for PiS with its hard-line stance on migration, the EU, and social issues. But there are clear hurdles to overcome. Confederation likes to portray itself as a "political outsider," keen to revamp the entire system rather than just joining government as a junior partner. Its "pro-business" agenda with lower taxes and social-spending cuts also runs counter to PiS's lavish benefits payouts in recent years. That could mean a hung parliament, which has spawned predictions that, in case of a stalemate, snap elections might be called in early 2024.

Deep Background: As well as being a fight between old rivals PiS and KO, these elections are yet another round in the ongoing battle between the two men that have dominated Polish politics this century: Law and Justice's Jaroslaw Kaczynski and the Civic Platform's Donald Tusk.

Both sprang from the Solidarity movement that ousted the country's communist regime and ushered in democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and both have enjoyed stints in power and remain their parties' leaders and biggest stars. Kaczynski served as prime minister in 2006 and 2007, but, since PiS returned to power in 2015, he has avoided running for premier, preferring to remain deeply influential behind the scenes.

Tusk, on the other hand, was prime minister from 2007 to 2014 before becoming president of the European Council, which sets the direction and priorities for the European Union, and heading the center-right European People's Party (EPP), the biggest political grouping in the European Parliament. In 2022, Tusk returned to Poland to head the Civic Coalition again as, without him, the party had taken one electoral beating after another.

The fact that there is no love lost between the two men only spices up the rivalry. The two men's issues with each other go back to the Smolensk air crash in 2010, where the president at the time, Jaroslaw's twin brother Lech Kaczynski, was killed along with many senior Polish politicians and officials. Kaczynski continues to blame the death of his brother on Tusk, who was prime minister at the time. He has often pushed the widely discredited conspiracy theory that it was Tusk, working with the Kremlin, who was behind the plane crash, which claimed 96 lives.

Drilling Down

• Foreign observers often warn about political backsliding in Poland under the Law and Justice party, pointing to severely restricted abortion rights, the emergence of "LGBT-free" local municipalities, and, crucially, the politicization of the judiciary. That has led to EU funds being withheld, numerous cases in the European Court, and the possibility of Warsaw losing voting rights in the Council of the European Union, which can amend or veto European Commission proposals. But despite all that, PiS remains popular in Poland.
• The party's popularity can be explained by much of the electorate identifying with the party's socially conservative agenda, which plays up the country's nationalist and Catholic character and regularly airs historical grievances, especially toward Germany. But the party has also overseen healthy economic growth, helped by a steady stream of EU funds (Poland is the biggest net recipient of Brussels cash), and increased social spending.
• One of the biggest criticisms of the Civic Coalition's time in power, between 2007 and 2015, was that it only catered for cosmopolitan city folk and neglected the countryside and the less well-off. Law and Justice has taken note. Its flagship child benefits program -- named 500+ after the 500 zlotys ($115) per month per child it offered parents -- has proved popular, with the allowance now increased to 800 zlotys. While in power, the PiS has promised not to increase the pension age and has banned the selling of state companies to foreign concerns -- both of which have been well received.
• But don't expect a sudden rollback of many of these reforms if the more liberal opposition wins. The current president, Andrzej Duda, is largely seen as loyal to PiS and wields a veto that can only be overturned by a three-fifths parliamentary supermajority, which is unlikely to be reached by KO and any potential partners. And then there is a constitutional tribunal, which tests the legality of laws passed in parliament, and whose appointees are thought to be supportive of PiS; plus a potentially hostile prosecutor-general and other levers of political power that have been put in place by PiS over the last eight years.
• Then there is the issue of Poland's war-torn neighbor Ukraine. In the aftermath of Russia's full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022, Poland was perhaps Ukraine's biggest supporter. It hosts the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, has pushed in Brussels for strong EU sanctions against Russia and generous aid packages for Kyiv, lobbied hard for Ukraine's EU and NATO memberships, and Poland remains the main conduit for arm deliveries to the front.
• But the run-up to these elections has also seen a radical change from Warsaw. It started with Poland (and other eastern EU member states) in May blocking the passage of certain Ukrainian agriproducts entering the EU, complaining that a glut of food jeopardized the livelihoods of its own farmers. Despite mediation by Brussels, to this day Warsaw is only allowing the transit of a few Ukrainian products. Most EU diplomats I have spoken to see the whole affair as Law and Justice's cynical attempt to win rural votes, a crucial segment of the Polish electorate.
• It doesn't stop there. Recently Poland wanted to postpone an EU decision to allow Ukrainian refugees in the bloc to continue to have access to local labor markets, housing, and health care. Polish officials on various political levels have been reluctant of late to meet their Ukrainian counterparts and Warsaw has hinted that no new Polish arms deliveries to Kyiv are forthcoming.
• With the dialing down of rhetoric and vote-seeking populism, Polish-Ukrainian relations are likely to improve after the elections, regardless of who gets into power. But will it return to the peak of good relations seen in the immediate aftermath of the Russia invasion?
• One thing is certain: The closer Ukraine gets to EU membership, the more Poland and Ukraine will become political rivals. Yes, trade between the pair will likely soar, but they will also compete for the same EU funds designated for farmers and poorer regions. And Warsaw will wield its EU veto powers in Ukraine's EU accession process if it feels its economic or political interests are threatened.
• On the same day as the parliamentary elections, there is also a referendum asking four questions about the potential privatization of state-owned enterprises; increases to the retirement age; the admission of migrants under the EU relocation mechanism; and the removal of the barrier on Poland's border with Belarus, which was put up to stop migrants, usually from non-European countries, that Warsaw says Minsk is pushing into the country.
• The referendum questions have been heavily criticized for being leading, aimed at exploiting the opposition, and designed to increase voter turnout for Law and Justice. It has also been compared to similar referendums held under the ruling right-wing Fidesz party in Hungary in recent years, which critics also said were designed to drum up support for the government. More than 50 percent of all registered voters have to participate for the result to be valid and, with the opposition urging a boycott, it will be interesting to see if that number is reached and how this referendum will be used politically in the future.

Brief #2: With Support For Ukraine Flagging, NATO Defense Ministers To Take Stock

What You Need To Know: The NATO defense ministers' meeting in Brussels on October 11-12 will focus mainly on two things: further support for Ukraine and how well NATO is prepared to defend itself. This is the first NATO ministerial since the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July and it is very much a stocktaking exercise, looking at the state of the military alliance ahead of its 75th anniversary summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024.

The big elephant in the room, however, will be the question of whether the member states are as committed to Kyiv as before, notably with the United States not approving further funding for Ukraine to avert a government shutdown and European countries focusing more and more on other issues, such as increased migration into the bloc.

The first test will come just before the actual ministerial starts with another meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group, commonly known as the "Ramstein format" after the German military base where more than 50 nations committed to arming Ukraine usually convene. Expect some announcements about more demining equipment, ammunition, armored vehicles, military spare parts, and longer-range rockets for air defense systems.

Other business will be Ukrainian pleas to get more longer-range offensive missiles, such as the U.S.-made ATACMS and German-made Taurus, but a NATO official speaking on background told me that these would be "big ticket items" that likely won't be announced this week. Germany has already ruled out supplying its Taurus missiles for now and, even though there have been media reports for weeks that White House officials expect a positive announcement regarding the ATACMS soon, nothing so far has materialized.

Deep Background: There will also be a new face in the crowd as the recently installed Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will come to Brussels for the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), which is also being held this week. No major decisions are expected at the NUC and Umerov will likely be quizzed on the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the chances of breaking through Russian defensive lines in the eastern and southern parts of the country.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently assessed the offensive by saying it was "gradually gaining ground," but a NATO official I spoke to on condition of anonymity as they are not authorized to speak on the record said the mood in the military alliance is gloomy about the prospects of a substantial breakthrough before the winter sets in. "Russia has really deep defensive lines, so I can't say I am very optimistic at the moment," the NATO official said.

The NUC will also focus on Ukraine's defense reforms. Kyiv will be expected to draw up a so-called adapted Annual National Program by the end of the year that will detail what the country needs to do to get closer to the miliary alliance. This largely concerns reforms in four areas: interoperability with NATO; procurement in the military sphere; civilian oversight of the armed forces; and credible anti-corruption measures in the defense sector. At the same time, there is also a push from Kyiv and its supporters within NATO to increase the alliance's presence in Ukraine. The alliance's liaison office in Kyiv is currently staffed by only two people.

Drilling Down

• In terms of Ukraine's path to NATO membership, the communique from July's NATO Summit in Vilnius was rather vague about the next steps: "NATO foreign ministers will regularly assess progress through the adapted Annual National Program. The alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path toward future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when allies agree and conditions are met."
• That means that most of the talk about Ukraine's potential membership will be deferred to when the alliance's foreign ministers meet in Brussels at the end of November and then every time they meet. My understanding is that defense ministers this week aren't keen to devote too much time to the question of membership.
• And is there really any appetite to bring Ukraine closer to NATO anytime soon? NATO sources I have spoken to on the condition of anonymity have told me that there hasn't been any shift in positions since Vilnius, when the United States and Germany were reluctant to move further on the question of accession, especially given that Ukraine is a country still at war.
• The NATO Summit in Washington next July comes just four months before the U.S. presidential election. NATO officials I have spoken to on condition of anonymity predict that the meeting in the U.S. capital will hardly be "an open-door summit." They point to a general skepticism within parts of the Republican Party about aiding Ukraine militarily and politically, sentiments that will likely prevent the United States from giving a green light for Ukrainian membership anytime soon. Several NATO ambassadors were recently in Washington and, while they got a commitment from both Democrats and Republican lawmakers that support for Ukraine will remain high and money will still flow to Kyiv, there is concern among NATO members that the United States will lose interest and reduce its military and political support.
• It is not only across the Atlantic that support for Ukraine might be weaker than before. A group of Central and Eastern European member states, referring to themselves as the Bucharest Eight (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), have been the most vocal supporters of Ukrainian membership so far. That could change, though, with Ukraine fatigue increasing across the continent. For example, after the recent parliamentary elections in Slovakia, it's now a question of how committed to Ukraine Bratislava will be. It looks likely that the next Slovak government will be led by the Smer party, which indicated on the campaign trail that it is against more arms deliveries to Ukraine and has struck a more conciliatory tone toward Moscow.
• It's not all bad, though. While Poland has seemed to have become tougher on several issues pertaining to Ukraine in the run-up to its parliamentary elections (see other briefing), Warsaw is still expected to support Kyiv's NATO aspirations going forward, even if Polish-Ukrainian relations aren't as warm as before.
• A large section of the meeting will also go to NATO's "deterrence and defense" -- meaning its own defense plans. Agreed in Vilnius, these top-secret documents spell out how every part of NATO territory will be defended in case of an attack. While the plans on paper have been described to me by one NATO official as "top quality," there are questions the alliance will have to answer this fall: Are the plans realistic? And are they executable? Or in simpler terms: Are there enough soldiers and equipment available for the "NATO pot" that the alliance is demanding each ally contribute to? It might not hog the headlines, but these are the types of issues that will be keeping the military alliance's officials busy.
• Recent events in northern Kosovo will also be discussed. The military alliance already announced last week that it will boost its KFOR peacekeeping force from 4,500 troops to about 5,000, mostly utilizing British forces. That is a response to an armed attack at a monastery in northern Kosovo on September 24 that killed a Kosovar police officer and three attackers.

Looking Ahead

On October 12, the members of the European Parliament's development and foreign affairs committees will vote on the three finalists for this year's Sakharov Prize. Over the last three years, the prestigious human rights prize has been awarded to the Belarusian democratic opposition, the jailed Russian opposition activist Aleksei Navalny, and the people of Ukraine. This year it is likely to go posthumously to Mahsa Amini, a young Iranian woman who died in police custody in September 2022 after an alleged hijab infraction. Her nomination is supported by the three biggest political groups in the chamber. The winner will be announced on October 19 after a closed-door decision by the European Parliament president and the leaders of all political groups in the house.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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