Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm looking at EU talks in Spain on how to boost Ukraine's military and unpacking the eventful "EU enlargement" summit in Athens.

Brief #1: Brussels Considers More Military Assistance To Ukraine Amid Fears Of Niger Coup Fallout

What You Need To Know: On August 29-31, first the EU's defense ministers and then the bloc's foreign ministers will meet in the Spanish city of Toledo for informal talks.

These types of gatherings -- referred to in EU parlance as "Gymnich" after a German castle where the first such meeting took place -- happen twice a year, typically in January and after the summer break at the end of August.

They aren't formal council meetings, like the monthly EU foreign affairs councils in Brussels where policy decisions are taken. Rather, they are supposed to be more like fireside chats among ministers, who often rock up without their customary suits and ties so they can kick back to discuss the more long-term goals and strategies of the European Union. These informal meetings are often considered the start of the fall political season and a warm-up ahead of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in early September.

Two items will dominate the agenda in Toledo: how to further help Ukraine militarily and the Niger coup and its consequences on the bloc.

Deep Background: Regarding Ukraine, much of the discussion will center on increasing EU arms deliveries to sustain Kyiv's war effort. There have already been seven tranches of EU military aid through the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget funding mechanism where member states contribute according to their gross national income. So far, those contributions have amounted to 5.6 billion euros ($6.1 billion). An eighth tranche -- another 500 million euros ($540 million) -- is waiting to be approved, and it's possible it could get a sign-off in Toledo.

For that to happen, though, Hungary would need to lift its veto that has been in place since early summer. The Hungarian red light stems from an unrelated dispute around a blacklist produced by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention. On that list, the Hungarian bank, OTP, is labeled an "international sponsor of war" as it continues to do business in Russia, a designation that has angered both the bank and the Hungarian government. Typically, Budapest has made its support for the next chunk of EU cash conditional on Ukraine delisting the bank.

There will also be more talks in Toledo on the possibility of a longer-term EU fund for military assistance to Ukraine. The EU's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), circulated a discussion paper to EU capitals before the August summer break about the need to provide Kyiv with 5 billion euros a year for the next four years. That plan could face some hurdles, though. Hungary has already questioned the wisdom of spending more on military aid to Ukraine. And Germany -- the bloc's single largest financial contributor -- has raised issues, such as the need to discuss the military funding within broader negotiations over the EU's budget.

Drilling Down

• The EEAS discussion paper, seen by RFE/RL, and titled A Proposal For A Dedicated Ukraine Envelope Under The European Peace Facility (Ukraine Defense Fund) notes that European Union leaders have already confirmed "the EU's readiness to provide sustainable military support to Ukraine for as long as it takes."
• It also states that "having a dedicated envelope for Ukraine under the EPF would allow for continued political unity and financial solidarity," adding that it "would ensure the necessary predictability required in financial planning by member states at [a] national level."
• The EEAS text also explains the need for supporting Kyiv militarily to the tune of 5 billion euros annually, noting that while the EU will provide an estimated 4 billion euros in 2023, more is needed. According to the paper, that is because there will be "a shift in focus from destocking to procurement, the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment, as well as evolving needs by the EU military training mission for Ukraine, EUMAM."
• EUMAM, which was set up in the fall of 2022 and largely operates from Poland, has a budget of approximately 100 million euros a year. It has so far trained 25,000 troops, with plans to increase that number, double its budget, and possibly even allow for some training inside Ukraine if conditions allow.
• Separately but very much related to the issue of military aid, the EEAS also issued another discussion paper on what other security guarantees the bloc can offer. This comes as Ukraine is currently negotiating bilateral security arrangements with the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized nations and other Western allies.
• This paper, also seen by RFE/RL, states that "Ukraine will continue to need [the] EU's long-term commitment and support to secure its free and democratic European future, notably in a scenario where Russia is unlikely to abandon its goal to subjugate Ukraine and Ukraine cannot stop defending itself. Ukraine's EU membership would be in itself a security commitment."
• It also outlines 11 other suggestions of security support for Ukraine, such as the maintenance and repair of donated equipment, enhanced cooperation between the European and Ukrainian defense industries, continuous sharing of intelligence, more demining support, and assistance in bolstering Ukraine's cybersecurity and tools to fight against disinformation.
• Not all the focus in Toledo will be on Ukraine. The recent military coup in Niger is likely to take up a significant amount of the ministers' conversation. The issue is complicated as the Economic Community of West African States, which is a partner of the EU, has indicated that it is pondering a military intervention in Niger, something it has never done before. There are, however, divisions among the various West African states. What is clear from conversations with EU officials is that they fear a widening of the conflict and, as a result, a new wave of refugees coming to Europe.
• The issue of the Russian mercenary group Wagner's presence in Niger will also be debated by EU foreign ministers. It's not clear how the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in an August 23 plane crash will affect the group; the current EU line is that there is no conclusive evidence that Wagner fighters are active in Niger. One European diplomat who wasn't authorized to speak on the record told me that images of the local population waving Russian flags indicated that "Moscow, one way or another, is very present there."

Brief #2: A Meeting In Athens Gives Some Clues About The Future Of EU Enlargement

What You Need To Know: Last week, on August 21-22, there was a rather unusual meeting in Athens, which brought together both the European Council President Charles Michel and the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, along with a number of leaders from countries from the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe who are hoping to join the EU.

Also invited to the Greek capital were leaders from countries in the region that are already members of the EU: Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. The meeting provided some clues as to how the enlargement of the bloc might shape up in the coming years, as well as revealing the fissures that could scupper the whole thing.

This gathering has been a regular event for several years now, usually involving the six EU candidates and potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

The meeting is a chance for Greece to demonstrate leadership in its neighborhood, where it already plays a critical political and diplomatic role. This year's meeting also marked the 20th anniversary of the historic decision in Thessaloniki, Greece's second city, which for the first time proclaimed that all of the states of the Western Balkans would one day join the EU.

Deep Background: This year, there were also some new attendees: Moldova and Ukraine. That slightly shifted the focus from the usual regional cooperation to discussions about EU enlargement, as both Kyiv and Chisinau are newly minted EU candidate countries and hope to start accession talks by the end of the year. Yet the addition to the group also raised questions, most notably: Why weren't the other EU hopefuls, Turkey and Georgia, also in attendance?

EU diplomats I spoke to on the condition of anonymity as they weren't authorized to speak on the record were quick to point out that Greece extended the invitation to Moldova and Ukraine but also acknowledged that this arrangement was "debatable" and "ad hoc" and that this format wasn't intended to be permanent.

When asked why Turkey and Georgia weren't present, one diplomat explained: "The countries invited appear to be the most advanced on their path [toward EU membership]."

This assertion may seem accurate at first. Georgia is, after all, one step behind Moldova and Ukraine, as it isn't yet an EU candidate country. And Turkey's EU accession talks have been frozen for years due to disagreements between Ankara and the EU on a number of issues.

Technically, however, Turkey remains further advanced along the path to joining the EU than most other prospective members, having started accession talks back in 2006, which at least nominally places it in the same front-runner category as Montenegro and Serbia.

It's also worth noting that Kosovo, invited for the Athens powwow, is not even recognized as an independent state by the EU.

Drilling Down

• Something else could be at play here. One of the political themes likely to dominate EU discussions this fall will be "absorption capacity": how the EU could bear the burden and how it could function if it underwent further enlargement.
• France and Germany have established a joint working group on this issue, which will present its initial thoughts to other member states in September. When the European Political Community, which brings together all European countries apart from Belarus and Russia, convenes in the Spanish city of Granada in early October, "absorption capacity" will certainly be discussed. If there are any political and institutional decisions to be made on this issue, that could happen at the EU summit in Brussels in December.
• When EU officials discuss "absorption capacity," they often contemplate how an "EU of 35" would function -- adding eight new states to the existing 27. The issue here is that there are in fact 10 countries -- not just eight -- seeking to join the bloc: the six Western Balkan states, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, and Ukraine. So, which two are not being considered? While diplomats I speak to insist that the term "EU of 35" isn't linked to specific countries, the absences from the Athens meeting might be an indication to the contrary.
• According to diplomats involved that I spoke to on background, the meeting was deemed a success, as they said it brought Western Balkan countries closer to their Ukrainian and Moldovan counterparts. EU officials I've spoken to previously have said there are lingering fears among the six Western Balkan nations that Kyiv and Chisinau might "jump the queue" and join the EU ahead of them.
• The summit also resulted in a joint declaration, with all participants pledging to support Ukraine's territorial integrity. Serbian President Alexander Vucic did later boast that he had managed to remove references to Russia sanctions in the document, but several Brussels insiders I spoke to on the condition of anonymity said that the draft texts they had seen never contained any language about sanctions. Vucic was most likely just playing to his domestic audience, many of whom have positive political views of Russia.
• More significantly, though, was the first face-to-face meeting between Vucic -- who has so far refused to align with EU sanctions on the Kremlin -- and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. While Belgrade won't be exporting arms to Ukraine any time soon, there were pledges of continued humanitarian and medical assistance to the war-torn country.
• The main news story from the Athens meeting was that Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama wasn't invited. The reason for this was the arrest of Fredi Beleri, a man running for mayor in the southern Albanian town of Himare under the banner of a Greek minority party aligned with an opposition coalition. Beleri was arrested in mid-May on suspicion of vote-buying. Despite winning the mayoral election, he remains in custody, triggering loud protests from Greece and counteraccusations from Tirana of political meddling.
• There's now a real possibility that Greece will block Albania from officially opening EU accession chapters later this year, showing once again how beholden the bloc's enlargement process is to the whims of national or even local politics.

Looking Ahead

It is not only the EU foreign and defense ministers that will discuss how to better help Ukraine. The European Parliament also starts its work this week, and its foreign affairs committee will meet on August 30 in Brussels to discuss how to improve the bloc's military assistance to Kyiv. Expect the issue to come up again when all 705 members of the European Parliament meet for its first plenary session later in September.

Otherwise, Brussels is still in its summer slumber and not too much is expected from its institutions this week.

There is, however, plenty of activity on the think-tank conference circuit.

A number of European officials and politicians will head to the Tyrolean town of Alpbach on August 27-30 for the European Forum Alpbach.

Then there is the annual strategic forum run by the Slovenian Foreign Ministry and the Center for European Perspective on August 28-29 in the picturesque Slovenian resort town of Bled.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm looking at sanctions: specifically, the horse-trading behind the EU's latest restrictions on Belarus, and how Hungary is trying to get Russian oligarchs delisted.

Brief #1: The Complex Politics Behind The EU's Latest Sanctions On Belarus

What You Need To Know: When the European Union officially imposed another round of restrictive measures on Belarus on August 3, it put an end to one of the longest-running sanctions sagas in the bloc in recent years.

The new measures were the first targeting the regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka since the summer of 2022. While early sanctions on Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 were to a large degree imposed on Belarus as well, further EU sanctions on Moscow were not applied to Minsk. That was largely due to the belief in Brussels that Belarus's role in the Ukraine war couldn't be compared to Russia's.

Then a new problem appeared: Many of the sanctioned components that Russia requires for its war effort -- in particular, dual-use goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes -- were being rerouted via Belarus. The latest round of sanctions on Belarus is partly meant to address this problem.

The original proposal from the European Commission, seen by RFE/RL, suggested measures such as a ban on EU companies providing IT, consulting, and polling services to Belarus; a ban on the export of luxury goods to the country; and a prohibition on the import of Belarusian gold and steel.

The final agreed-upon package, though, was a good deal watered down, with EU export bans on firearms, ammunition, and materials used in the aviation and space industries, along with restrictions on potential dual-use items, such as drones, semiconductors, and computer hardware. The rest from the original proposal was left out.

To understand why the final sanctions were weaker than originally envisioned, and why they took so long to come to fruition, it is helpful to understand two considerable drivers of EU policy. The first is the importance of the so-called Global South -- countries with growing political and economic clout in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The second is classic Brussels horse-trading on political issues that are, at best, only tangentially linked.

Deep Background: The main reason for the delay in agreeing a new round of sanctions on Belarus -- apart from all the loopholes that needed to be closed -- was a proposed derogation, or exception, that would allow for the import of Belarusian potash, a key ingredient in fertilizers that the EU had already sanctioned as it is one of Minsk's main sources of income. A derogation on Russian potash exports had been agreed by the EU in December 2022, but a similar exception for Belarus was seen as being a little trickier.

Allowing the import of Belarusian potash would mean unfreezing the assets of the Belarusian tycoon Ivan Halavaty -- the CEO of Belaruskali, one of the biggest fertilizer producers in the world -- and those of Russian billionaire Mikhail Gutseriyev, who is building a potassium-chloride mining and processing plant in Belarus.

Crucially, allowing Belarusian exports of potash would mean the shipments being transported via Lithuanian ports, something which is deeply unpalatable to most Lithuanian politicians who tend to be the fiercest critics of the Lukashenka regime.

While Vilnius's refusal to agree on any potash derogations was backed by Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, there was a bigger group within the EU -- led by Portugal and other European countries with large ports -- that was pushing for the potash derogations.

This wasn't just a case of countries looking to secure vital income streams but also concerned issues of food security and allegations -- often stoked by the Kremlin -- that EU sanctions have led to food shortages in the developing world.

Drilling Down

• The EU has not sanctioned food exports, neither from Russia nor Belarus. However, those in favor of the potash derogation have argued that some countries, notably Brazil, a former Portuguese colony, have suffered because they have had to import alternative fertilizers for their agricultural sectors.
• Diplomats with knowledge of the matter but who are not authorized to speak on the record told me that Lisbon drove a hard bargain on the derogation issue because UN Secretary-General and former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres is particularly sensitive to the concerns of the Global South.
• Recent developments in Belarus have given new urgency to the sanctions issue. First, there was the signing of an agreement in May to allow the deployment of Russian nuclear warheads on Belarusian territory; and then, making the situation even more acute, Wagner troops moved to Belarus from Russia under a deal to end the mercenary group's June rebellion led by its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.
• The deal started to come together at a summit of the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in Brussels at the end of July. With Spain now holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, where ministers from EU countries convene to coordinate policies and adopt laws, Madrid was keen to show its partners -- including many of its former colonies in South America -- more than just goodwill.
• To show it meant business, Spain pushed for the EU to green-light the Post-Cotonou Agreement -- a pact between the EU and 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries that had been only provisionally agreed upon. The first Cotonou Agreement -- signed in 2000 in the largest city in the west African country of Benin -- created the foundation for Brussels to strike deals with these countries, covering areas such as trade and migration, and was hailed as a groundbreaking development in the EU's relations with the Global South.
• The updated agreement, which would set the framework for EU relations with these countries for the next two decades, had been blocked by Hungary for the last three years. Hungary's reluctance to sign off was likely less to do with any objections to the pact but more about its tendency to bargain with the EU. Budapest made its support for the Post-Cotonou Agreement conditional on getting money from the EU budget that was still being withheld by the European Commission due to concerns about the rule of law in the country.
• While Budapest eventually came on board, Poland introduced its own veto. Warsaw also used the Post-Cotonou Agreement as a bargaining chip, noting the desperate situation of its own farmers in an attempt to get the 100 million euros ($110 million) promised to Warsaw by the European Commission to compensate for financial losses incurred due to Ukrainian agricultural imports. The commission, in turn, said it would not release the compensation until Poland implemented a Brussels-brokered deal that would allow Ukrainian agricultural products to pass through EU territory once again.
• While Poland received the money earlier this summer, Warsaw still blocked the Post-Cotonou Agreement, using its support as leverage to get the Belarus sanctions over the line before the EU's August break.
• After some intense horse-trading, the Post-Cotonou Agreement finally got the thumbs up on July 20, and the new Belarus sanctions were agreed without any exceptions for potash. The sanctions, however, were more limited in scope than the original European Commission proposal and came with a commitment to look into their possible impact on food security in the fall. The commission also made a pledge to explore further sanctions on Belarus going forward.

Brief #2: How Hungary Is Trying To Soften Sanctions On Russia

What You Need To Know: Before heading off on their summer break, the ambassadors of the 27 EU member states agreed to review some of the individual sanctions on the mainly Russian people and companies that the bloc deems to have undermined Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the bloc has slapped asset freezes and visa bans on more than 1,800 individuals and entities, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and many oligarchs and businessmen close to the Kremlin. The rollover of these sanctions usually takes place in March and September each year, offering individual member states a chance to make changes as the six-month extensions require unanimity.

Although no individual sanctions have so far been removed, the discussions have given Hungary plenty of opportunities to voice its displeasure about the EU's general sanctions policy on Russia. While Budapest has eventually agreed to all the EU's restrictive measures to date, it has used its veto power to water down some sanctions -- for example, by not agreeing that the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, should be targeted by the bloc; and by securing opt-outs for itself when it comes to the EU's embargo on Russian oil.

In September 2022, when the cases of sanctioned individuals were up for review, Budapest asked for the removal of three Russian oligarchs. It backed down, according to diplomats familiar with the file, after Hungarian officials were promised that the sanctions reviews would take place every six months and not every 12 as most other member states wanted, giving Budapest more opportunities to challenge the listings.

Hungary did just that. Ahead of the extension in March of this year, Budapest wanted nine people removed from the sanctions list. Once again, Hungary backed down but only after getting a commitment from the legal service of the Council of the EU to thoroughly examine the legitimacy of some of the listings.

Deep Background: When discussing the legal review ahead of the upcoming September rollover, I was told by diplomats familiar with the issue but who prefer to remain anonymous as they aren't authorized to speak on the record that Hungary has once again pushed for nine removals. (It's not clear if these are the same people Budapest wanted taken off the sanctions lists in March.) In the talks that took place throughout July, it was clear that there would be some delistings, though not necessarily the ones Hungary was pushing for.

The Council of the EU's legal service has identified so-called "weak cases," ones that EU lawyers fear they would likely lose in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), if challenged. So far, over 70 individuals and firms -- often wealthy oligarchs using expensive European lawyers -- have lodged appeals against their listings in the ECJ. Many hearings have already taken place, and some rulings are expected to come this fall.

Brussels would very much like to avoid the humiliation of losing such cases as it could open legal grounds for even more delistings. The EU has already lost one case, on March 8, after Prigozhin's mother, Violetta Prigozhina, challenged her inclusion on the list.

She had been sanctioned by the bloc due to supposed business ties with her son, but the ECJ reasoned that these links were tenuous at best. She remains listed because the ruling only concerned the decision to sanction her in February 2022 and not the subsequent renewals of the restrictive measures in September 2022 and in March of this year when the scope of EU sanctions was widened to make it easier to target family members of oligarchs. A warning shot, however, had been fired.

Drilling Down

• According to several officials who are familiar with the talks but who are not authorized to speak on the record, the EU is set to delist three individuals ahead of the September renewal: Aleksandr Shulgin, Farkhad Akhmedov, and Grigory Berezkin. Blacklisted in April 2022, all of them have taken their cases to the ECJ, and EU lawyers have indicated they are likely to win in court.
• Shulgin was presented in the EU's official journal, where the bloc's reasons for blacklisting are stated, as the "CEO of Ozon, Russia's leading multi-category e-commerce platform." The journal also noted that "he attended a meeting of oligarchs at the Kremlin with President Vladimir Putin to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions." According to EU sources familiar with his file but not permitted to speak on the record, Shulgin has submitted documents that state that he no longer has a connection to the company and no new evidence to the contrary has emerged.
• Akhmedov, who according to the EU's official journal, is "close to the Kremlin and is a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation," notably by owning gas companies. According to EU sources familiar with his case, he is set to be delisted because he was sanctioned based on old information.
• Berezkin is described as "a leading Russian businessperson and considered to be the 'henchman' of President Vladimir Putin." As the chairman of the board of the Russian private equity firm ESN, the EU journal notes that he has invested in industries that have provided "a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation." According to sources familiar with his case, even some members of the Russian opposition support his removal from the list because he isn't thought to be closely linked to the Kremlin.
• Three removals were not enough for Hungary, however, with Budapest lobbying for a fourth person to be delisted. That was Nikita Mazepin, the racing-driving son of oligarch Dmitry Mazepin. Hungary might not get what it wants, though, as sources within the EU legal service have suggested that there is likely enough evidence to show that Mazepin junior has financial ties with his sanctioned father.
• There is still one key name missing from the sanctions list: Belarusian oligarch Alyaksandr Moshensky. Nicknamed "the fish king" due to his ownership of Belarusian seafood giant Santa Bremor, Moshensky is believed to enjoy close links to the Lukashenka regime. Various EU member states have tried to get him blacklisted several times, only to come up against Hungarian opposition, with Budapest citing "food security" as the reason. It's worth noting that Syarhey Niadbaylau, Moshensky's aide and the managing director of Santa Bremor, is also the honorary Hungarian consul in Belarus.

That's all for now. I am traveling this week, so please look out for the next newsletter on August 28.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.