Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: NATO's biggest exercise in decades; and more EU sanctions on Russia.

Brief #1: NATO's 'Biggest Exercise Since The Cold War'

What You Need To Know: In late January, NATO began what it has called its “largest military exercise since the Cold War.”

Steadfast Defender 24 involves 90,000 troops from all 31 alliance members as well as NATO invitee Sweden for four months of maneuvers by land, sea, and air.

You have to go all the way back to 1988 for the last NATO exercise that involved more troops: Reforger with 125,000. In between, the Trident Juncture exercise in 2018 included 50,000 personnel.

While official NATO documents don’t say outright that they’re training against a potential Russian offensive on allied territory, it’s clear that’s what is on their minds.

The alliance says it is testing responses “during a simulated emerging conflict scenario with a near-peer adversary.”

Exercise maps will show an adversary with a fictitious name, but privately my NATO sources acknowledge without hesitation that “of course this means Russia.”

Deep Background: Take a look at the geography and what the alliance will practice, and it becomes even more evident.

Roughly speaking, Steadfast Defender 24 includes two phases. The first, which kicked off slowly at the end of January, involves the transatlantic reinforcement of forces. This is in fact the key to see if the United States can effectively deploy a large number of troops and equipment to continental Europe to mount a defense.

Don’t underestimate the symbolism, as the United States nears a presidential election that culminates on November 5. The image of U.S. troops training alongside other nations in mock amphibious assaults in the Atlantic in the next two months, involving more than 50 naval vessels including aircraft carriers, frigates, and destroyers, could help assuage European fears of a less committed United States down the road.

The second phase of the exercise is equally crucial and is likely to show whether NATO is capable of defending its vulnerable eastern flank -- “every inch of allied territory,” as NATO officials like to put it.

Starting in mid-February and running till the end of May, many of the elements will take place on land and in the sky, involving up to 80 air platforms including F-35 fighter jets, helicopters, and drones, as well as more than 1,000 combat vehicles, including 166 tanks.

The epicenter is Poland, where a major river crossing will be attempted in March, but also in the Baltic states, with Germany acting as a major hub for reinforcement and coordination.

There will also be exercises throughout the Nordic region, as well as the Czech Republic, Hungary, North Macedonia, and Romania.

Drilling Down

• This will also represent the first proper chance for NATO to test aspects of its new defense plans agreed at the Vilnius NATO summit in July, a 4,000-page document in which every ally should know exactly which part of alliance territory it should defend if NATO is attacked.
• Another big test is seeing how well the alliance’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which was created as a direct response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, functions. It will be one of the bloc’s key components to defend any potential attack, with some 6,000 troops that should be deployable within days to any corner of the alliance.
• One of the aims of Steadfast Defender is ensuring this reaction force can be deployed together with various national forces once each year, starting from 2025. So this year is very much a test run.
• While the exercise has been planned for years, it comes at a pivotal time. Two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it should act as assurance that the alliance is ready in case the war creeps closer or even spreads across NATO members’ borders.
• While no Ukrainian troops are participating, the specter of the war in that country looms large in planners’ minds. Speaking to media in early February, NATO Brigadier General Gunnar Bruegner said “there is this unified sense that we need to go bigger, we need to train harder” when asked about the impact of the war on the alliance.
• The real question, however, is whether it will truly allay fears in Europe. Firstly, weapons deliveries to Ukraine have dropped alarmingly in recent months. The chairman of NATO’s military committee, Rob Bauer, said last fall that Western arms industries need to ramp up, as "the bottom of the barrel is now visible.”
• Then there have been plenty of recent official warnings that European allies must step up and prepare for the war potentially escaping containment to spread beyond Ukraine. And it’s not just Ukraine’s neighbors.
• The Belgian Army chief Michel Hofman suggested that Putin opening a second front in Moldova or the Baltics is not out of the question. And Hofman’s Swedish counterpart, Micael Byden, warned in late January that his countrymen “mentally must prepare for war,” triggering a slight panic as the public rushed out to buy extra fuel and survival kits.

Brief #2: The Puny New EU Sanctions Package Targeting Russia

What You Need To Know: The EU is aiming to adopt another sanctions package to deal a blow to Russia coincident with the second anniversary of the launch of the Ukrainian invasion on February 24, 2022.

The package would be the 13th imposed on Moscow since then. But early indications from EU diplomats speaking on condition of anonymity are that this round will be the weakest of the lot. It will mostly entail listings, meaning names of individuals and companies whose assets will be frozen inside the bloc and who will be slapped with visa bans -- not sector-wide sanctions targeting the Russian economy.

Nearly 2,000 people and companies have been blacklisted by the club so far, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and many in his inner circle. However, the sectoral sanctions tend to be more hard-hitting. They have so far targeted Russian coal, steel, wood, and oil exports into the union or the flow of EU goods to Russia including, for example, semiconductors and luxury goods.

Deep Background: The listings consist of up to 250 individuals or companies being presented by the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, to EU member states in two batches. One came last week and includes 118 names; the other is expected this week.

The reason for the division is that the European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic corps, still needs time to go through the evidence packages with an eye to why the proposed targets should be listed. These evidence packages are frequently prepared by individual EU member states’ foreign ministries, often with help from their embassies in Moscow and/or Kyiv.

For this round, as I understand it, eight or so member states sent listing proposals to Brussels. In the first batch, seen by RFE/RL, most of the names come from the military sector, including companies that are producing ammunition and drones for Russia’s army; there are also individuals active in politics on behalf of Moscow in Ukrainian territories currently occupied by Russia.

The second batch will reportedly include Belarusian officials, judges, and media personalities whom Brussels deems to be “propagandists” supporting Russia’s war efforts.

There is still another type of sanction that the European Commission might propose: adding companies to “Annex Four.”

This is a list of over 600 companies, mainly Russian, with whom EU firms are banned from trading with because Brussels suspects them of contributing to Russia's war machine, largely via so-called dual-use items that might otherwise be found among standard household appliances -- let’s say computer chips for washing machines -- but are instead acquired for use in military equipment like drones.

The proposal is for the inclusion of around 25 new companies, the majority from Russia. But as I understand it, some might be from China, India, Turkey, Serbia, and Kazakhstan.

The question is whether they all remain on the list once ambassadors from the 27 member states debate the package.

Beijing has previously lobbied successfully to remove proposed listings under Annex Four, and it is likely to try again. Turkey and Serbia, who enjoy close political and economic ties with many EU member states, may also attempt to get companies from their national jurisdiction delisted.

Drilling Down

• The point for broader discussion, though, is why the European Commission opted mainly for listings. I understand from diplomats familiar with the file that the commission wanted something that could be agreed quickly in time for the February anniversary.
• The truth is that agreement on the EU sanctions packages has become more complicated, particularly in the last few rounds as member states have spent weeks or even months hashing out details such as economic sanctions.
• To adopt only listings of individuals makes sense, then, as it should only take EU member states a few meetings to sign off on them ahead of February 24. commission officials I’ve spoken with off the record have also pointed out that the package was coordinated with the Group of Seven leading industrial nations and that there was agreement that listings are easier to green-light.
• Still, I understand that some EU member states are unhappy and underwhelmed with the package. The critics point out that something hard-hitting against Moscow would be more apt in marking such a significant date, especially as Russia continues its missile barrages against Ukrainian cities.
• Some member states -- notably Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland -- sent a discussion paper seen by RFE/RL to the commission in January with proposed items to sanction including in the Russian nuclear sector, liquefied natural gas (LNG), aluminum in addition to a prohibition on EU companies providing any IT or cloud services to Russia.
• None of the proposals appears to have been taken on board. Neither has a Czech idea to ban the movement inside the bloc of Russian diplomats still posted to EU countries. Prague’s proposal was deemed impractical by EU officials, as travel inside the passport-free Schengen zone is difficult to control.
• In a letter seen by RFE/RL and addressed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and signed by the foreign ministers of the Baltic states plus Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, there is a request for the commission “to present a proposal of sectoral sanctions as soon as possible.” The signatories add that “our focus should be on further cutting Russian revenues to finance the war, cutting its access to sensitive goods and technology empowering its military machine.”
• My understanding is that the commission has promised member states to return to the issue of sectoral sanctions directly after passage of the 13th package is ensured. There is, however, a risk that new measures will be harder to accept as June’s European Parliament elections grow nearer and that efforts will instead focus on the autumn.

Looking Ahead

NATO defense ministers convene in Brussels for their first official meeting of the year on February 15. They will examine issues including a review of the alliance’s air- and missile-defense posture on its eastern flank, defense spending among the 31 members, and how to encourage more joint procurement of ammunition and arms.

Keep an eye out for the Munich Security Conference on February 16-18. It’s widely regarded as the most important annual security forum, bringing together decision-makers from around the globe. Expect plenty of debate on the war in Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy among this year’s scheduled speakers. Read my takeaways from Bavaria in the next edition of this newsletter.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or by e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: how the EU overcame a Hungarian veto and the heated debate over Ukrainian food.

Brief #1: The EU Finally Agrees To Fund Ukraine

What You Need To Know: The EU summit on February 1 was supposed to be a difficult one. But after an early morning start, there was clear unanimity among EU leaders well before noon: The bloc would provide Ukraine with 50 billion euros ($54 billion) of grants and loans for the next four years.

With Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban spectacularly vetoing a deal at the Brussels summit in December, it's come at just the right time for Ukraine. The U.S. Congress has so far failed to agree on more funding for the war-torn country, and Kyiv has said it's running low on funds.

On the surface, it seems that Orban lost this time around, underestimating the other 26 member states' resolve and, in the end, only managing to extract a few concessions. He will not get any vetoes over the annual disbursements of money for Ukraine between 2024 and 2027 -- something that had been talked about as a possible concession for Orban -- and he won't see any of the money meant for Budapest that the European Commission has frozen over concerns about Hungary's democratic backsliding. The EU funds will start going to Ukraine as soon as March, with a first tranche of 1.5 billion euros.

Deep Background: Orban, however, claimed "mission accomplished" in a tweet after the meeting, noting that "Hungary's funds will not end up in Ukraine" and that there would be "a control mechanism at the end of the first and second years." (To be clear, EU money meant for Hungary has never been diverted to Ukraine, and the control mechanism Orban is referring to is wide open to interpretation.)

The best way to digest all of this is to look at the EU summit conclusions that were agreed on by all leaders. There were two crucial paragraphs. The first of these says that "on the basis of the commission's annual report on the implementation of the Ukraine facility, the European Council will hold a debate each year on the implementation of the facility with a view to providing guidance. If needed, in two years, the European Council will invite the commission to make a proposal for review in the context of the new MFF (the multi-financial framework is the long-term EU budget)."

Whether this is a "control mechanism" or not, it's pretty clear that Hungary didn't get the vetoes it wanted. An annual report by the European Commission is not a veto, nor is a yearly debate among leaders in the European Council, which defines the political direction and priorities of the EU. And in order to trigger a review, all 27 EU member states must agree. That means some of Ukraine's greatest supporters, such as the three Baltic states, can now simply prevent a review if they feel it isn't necessary.

And then there is the word "review" itself. While Hungary could interpret the process as a veto, others don't, showing once again the EU's mastery of semantic gymnastics in order to achieve a compromise.

Drilling Down

• As an illustrative anecdote, diplomats pointed to the agreement the EU struck at the end of 2022 over the price cap on Russian oil. At the time, it was settled at $60, even though more hawkish EU member states such as Poland wanted a lower figure.
• The promise that the European Council would hold reviews every other month helped convince Budapest, which perhaps took it to mean proper negotiations and potential vetoes over the price. Nothing like that has ever happened, however, and the price cap remains at $60 to this day. In this case, a review has meant just regular updates and not much more.
• The second relevant paragraph is a single sentence at the end of the summit conclusions that states that "the European Council recalls its December 2020 conclusions on the application of the conditionality mechanism."
• The conditionality mechanism being referred to was the rule change, agreed for the EU budget of 2020-27, that meant money could be withheld from member states if there was a fear that it was being misused -- which is exactly what the European Commission has done with Hungary.

So, what are the takeaways here?

• After speaking on background to officials in Brussels, the deal on the Ukraine aid package can also be interpreted as the member states gently putting pressure on the commission to unfreeze at least a portion of the 10 billion euros that is being withheld from Hungary. Or at least an urging to loosen up on the conditions that Hungary has to fulfill to get the money.
• It's possible that cash will start flowing to Hungary in the spring, especially since the European Parliament -- as a body, one of Orban's fiercest critics -- will soon go from legislative mode to election mode as EU-wide polls in June are approaching.
• It's also possible that, with Hungary coming on board, Ukraine's enlargement process might be slowed down -- something that Budapest would certainly welcome. It could be that the intergovernmental conference for Ukraine, which would mark the de facto official opening of accession talks, won't happen in March as Kyiv is hoping for but after the EU elections, so in the summer or even the fall.
• Despite not getting quite what he wanted, the whole affair has been a boost for Brand Orban. Ahead and during the summit, the two most spoken words were "Viktor" and "Orban." The Hungarian leader is perhaps the best-known populist politician in the bloc at the moment, and his talking points about sending less money to Ukraine and the need for peace talks might appeal to more Europeans than just his Hungarian faithful.
• If Euroskeptic parties do well in the European Parliament elections, Orban could see his star rising even higher once again.

Brief #2: The Problem With Ukrainian Food

What You Need To Know: The European Commission last week decided to renew the suspension of import duties and quotas on Ukrainian (and Moldovan) exports into the European Union. Known as Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs), they have been crucial in supporting Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.

But while the suspension was universally welcomed by the 27 EU member states back in 2022, there are now considerable grumblings in the bloc, especially among Ukraine's immediate neighbors. They have complained that the measures have meant their domestic markets are flooded with cheap Ukrainian agricultural goods, threatening the livelihood of their own farmers.

Despite the opposition to the continued suspension of import duties and quotas, the ATMs are expected to be green-lit by EU member states later in the year. Unanimity isn't required for this: Only a qualified majority of 55 percent of the member states, comprising 65 percent of the total EU population, is needed for adoption.

This doesn't, however, mean that Ukrainian goods will flow freely into the bloc quite yet. It is Poland -- incidentally, one of Kyiv's biggest supporters during the war -- that is putting on the brakes. Back in May 2023, Poland, followed by Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, unilaterally shut their borders to all Ukrainian goods after complaining about the glut of food produce. The European Commission then found a temporary solution, allowing wheat, maize, rapeseed, and sunflower seeds from Ukraine to transit "unsealed" through those four countries, plus Romania, to the rest of the bloc and to destinations around the world.

The increased imports of Ukrainian goods came as Russia drastically curtailed Ukraine's lucrative Black Sea trade, and then, later that summer, backed out of a Turkey-brokered deal that had allowed ships to use a limited number of Ukrainian ports for the delivery of grain. And while Ukrainian ships continue to make the journey by hugging the Romanian and Bulgarian Black Sea coasts, the majority of food is still rerouted over land via the EU.

Deep Background: This temporary solution was not extended in September 2023, resulting in Poland unilaterally banning all Ukrainian products from entering its market. While Warsaw did still allow the transit of produce, long queues on the Polish-Ukrainian border meant more bad blood between Warsaw and Kyiv and also between Poland and the EU. The move by the Polish government, led by the right-wing Law and Justice party, was seen by many at the time as a play for votes, especially among the powerful farming sector, ahead of parliamentary elections in October 2023.

However, the new, more pro-EU government, which came into power in December, has not backed away from the restrictive policy, and the unilateral ban remains in place. Poland's new agriculture minister, Czeslaw Siekierski, is a member of the Polish People's Party, a junior partner of the government and the country's main agrarian party. In early January, Siekierski wrote a letter to the European Commission opposing the continued suspension of duties and quotas. He wrote that "the immediate liberalization of imports serves not so much the overall economy of Ukraine as it contributes to the increased profits of a small group of oligarchs, often locating their capital outside Ukraine."

Drilling Down

• At the same time, Warsaw has been constructive, opening up to the possibility of allowing Ukrainian produce back on its domestic market. Warsaw is largely driven by the fear that, sooner or later, Brussels would drag Poland to court for taking unilateral trade measures that affect the bloc's common single market.
• After intense negotiations between Polish officials and the European Commission, a number of "safeguard measures" have been put into place for when the new ATM kicks in on June 6. The aim is that this should allow Warsaw to eventually drop the ban and reassure its farmers that they are "protected."
• Poland has long highlighted how much poultry, eggs, and sugar the bloc imports. And, according to the European Commission's own figures, Warsaw has a point. Take poultry as an example. In 2021, when the normal tariffs still applied, the bloc was importing 86,000 tons a year. In 2022, with the new liberalization measures in place from June, that figure increased to 138,880 tons. In 2023, it rose again, with 200,000 tons of poultry being imported. There were similar increases in the trade volumes for eggs and sugar.
• As a solution, the European Commission has suggested a mechanism for automatic tariffs. That would mean if imports of poultry, eggs, or sugar between June and December 2024 rose to a certain level, additional tariffs on Ukrainian agricultural products would be imposed within a week.
• The devil is in the details, in particular what that level should be. The European Commission first suggested that the threshold should be the amount of poultry, eggs, or sugar imported in 2023. But considering that last year was a record year for imports, Warsaw argued that the threshold was too high. A compromise was made, with the agreed threshold based on the average of 2022 and 2023 imports, which increases the likelihood of tariffs kicking in.
• The European Commission also agreed on simpler procedures for applying an emergency brake in the form of import restrictions on products other than poultry, eggs, or sugar. This essentially means that it is deemed sufficient for one EU member state to demonstrate destabilization in its own market, instead of having to prove that it is a problem for the entire EU.
• While Poland was initially alone in pushing for safeguard mechanisms, Hungary and Slovakia, which both share a border with Ukraine, have since joined. The move also coincided with farmers taking to the streets in Belgium, France, and Germany over rising production costs (not directly related to Ukraine) and the EU stepping away from a trade deal with Mercosur, a bloc made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, that would have allowed for cheap food imports from South America.

Looking Ahead

The European Union is gearing up for more sanctions against Russia. Over the weekend of February 3-4, ambassadors of EU member states were discussing a new package with European Commission officials that will coincide with the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24. The new measures would largely consist of asset freezes and visa bans against Russian officials.

The European Parliament will meet in Strasbourg this week, and on February 7, lawmakers will debate the recent mass arrests of opposition figures in Belarus. A nonbinding resolution will be voted on the following day, and the chamber is expected to call for more restrictive measures against Minsk.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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