Wider Europe

MUNICH -- If the Munich Security Conference last year felt optimistic, with Ukraine not only capable of resisting Russia's full-scale invasion of the country but also pushing back, with budding hopes that the summer offensive of 2023 would be a roaring success, this year's event in the Bavarian capital felt like the polar opposite.

Taking place over the weekend of February 16-18, the conference -- often billed as the world's leading forum for debating international security policy -- was supposed to bask in the glory of its 60th edition. Instead, it seemed as if the bad news never stopped.

All the talk leading up to the event was about a recent comment by Donald Trump, the front-runner for the U.S. Republican presidential nomination, who questioned defending NATO allies who failed to spend enough on defense from a potential Russian invasion.

This, combined with the inability of the U.S. House of Representatives to pass a $60 billion Ukraine aid package and instead go into recess until the end of the month, made people at the conference loudly question whether Washington was still committed to both Ukraine and transatlantic relations in general.

But this was just the start.

More And More Bad News

During the same weekend, Ukraine announced the strategic withdrawal of its troops from Avdiyivka, a city it had defended from Russian attacks for months. And then, on the first day of the gathering, news emerged that Russia's foremost opposition politician, Aleksei Navalny, had died in a Siberian prison.

The Kremlin opponent's wife, Yulia Navalnaya, was present in Munich. Just hours after the news broke, she took the main stage at the conference and, in the most poignant moment of the entire weekend, laid the blame on the Russian president.

"I want [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and everyone around him, his friends and the government, to know that they will be held accountable for what they did to our country, to my family, and my husband," she said, before adding, "That day will come soon."

From then on, it felt that most of the panel discussions, roundtables, and chit-chat in the corridors of the venue really circled around the two persons who weren't present: Putin and Trump.

SEE ALSO:

Aleksei Navalny, Dogged Anti-Corruption Crusader And Outspoken Kremlin Foe, Dies In Prison

So it was left to the people actually present in Germany to put on a brave face, starting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who noted dryly with a not-so-subtle hint at the U.S. Congress that "dictators don't go on vacation."

Possibly aiming at those who want Kyiv to negotiate with Moscow, he added, "Don't ask Ukraine when the war is over; ask yourselves why Putin can continue."

He then outlined a number of things that the West could do to help Ukraine -- most of which won't be delivered any time soon. Take, for example, Western sanctions on the Russian nuclear industry, which Zelenskiy said he hoped for. While the EU is poised to impose more sanctions on the Kremlin in the coming days, it will be a rather symbolic package without hitting Russian economic sectors.

Or take the confiscation of frozen Russian assets in the West, which he also alluded to. While work is under way in the EU to use some of the proceeds of those frozen funds to help Ukraine, it is unlikely to move much beyond that.

Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, whose country holds the majority of Russian assets in the bloc, told the Munich crowd that his country cannot "do it on its own" and that a G7 framework was necessary. An EU official told me afterwards that there wasn't much appetite in the group of leading industrial nations for this now.

Zelenskiy was asked about Ukrainian NATO membership, with the military alliance holding a key summit in July in Washington, but even he admitted that not all members were ready to extend such an invitation -- something that Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in a separate discussion hammered home matter-of-factly: "As long as war is raging, Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO. We cannot overpromise."

SEE ALSO:

Dutch PM 'Cautiously Optimistic' Military Aid For Ukraine Coming 'Soon'

Instead, Kyiv will focus on signing so-called "security pacts" with key Western allies, which essentially means assurances of a steady stream of arms in the future. Zelenskiy came to Munich directly after inking such deals in both Berlin and Paris. A Ukrainian official told me that pacts with France and Germany were worth billions, but they will be "staggered," meaning that they won't cover the immediate military aid Kyiv is craving right now.

When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was asked if Germany was ready to provide Ukraine with the long-range Taurus cruise missile, he was simply noncommittal, saying that the "right moment was needed."

Eyes Across the Atlantic

So what about the specter of a Trump presidency next year?

Zelenskiy simply responded that he would take him to the front lines and show that the war was real. Rutte berated the crowd, arguing that "we should stop moaning and whining about Trump" and that "we have to work with whoever is on the dance floor," while EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell simply noted that, "I am happy underneath the American [security] umbrella, but the umbrella might not be open all the time."

The crowd of U.S. politicians in Bavaria, especially Democrats, were understandably less enthusiastic about a return of Trump. Hillary Clinton, who was defeated by Trump in the 2016 presidential race, warned at a side event organized by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation to take Trump "literally and seriously" and continued, "He will be an absolute authoritarian leader if given the chance to be so."

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, with Trump's recent NATO comments clearly in mind, noted: "Imagine we went easy on Putin, let alone encouraged him. History offers a clue: If we stand by, they will keep going. And in the case of Putin, that means all of Europe will be threatened."

The problem appeared to be that while everyone seemed to agree that Russia might continue to attack other European countries in the near future if successful in Ukraine, concrete action on the ground tells a different story. Part of it seems to be that the general public in the West doesn't appear to take the threat from Moscow seriously.

The Munich Security Report (perhaps aptly this year titled Lose-Lose?), published in the days before the conference, notes that the perceived threat from Russia has abated compared to last year, when respondents in 5 out of 7 G7 countries saw the Kremlin as the No. 1 threat. This year it was only No. 2. Interestingly, German citizens now only see Russia as the seventh-greatest concern, and Italians see it as the 12th.

The trick then by politicians, especially in Europe, is how to try to "sell" the need to help Ukraine to what appears to be an increasingly skeptical audience.

It's Just Business

And here, a new strategy may be emerging: Use the war in Ukraine as a pure business opportunity. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg spoke about the need to "expand the transatlantic industrial base" to refill arms stocks in the alliance and to send stuff to Ukraine, saying this would mean highly skilled jobs. Being in Munich, after all, he pointed to the building of a new high-tech production line in Bavaria to produce Patriot missiles as an obvious example.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was even more open in her sales pitch, saying that she, in early March, would propose a new military-industrial strategy for the bloc in which more money would be invested and joint procurement between European countries would be encouraged by offering "off-take agreements," meaning that there will be an advanced commitment to buy even if the product isn't ready yet.

SEE ALSO:

Navalny's Death May Not Hasten Approval Of U.S. Aid For Ukraine

More importantly, she pointed out that "we want a return on our taxes" -- essentially saying that the good jobs must be in Europe, even though not necessarily provided by EU companies. She added that the move is fully aligned with NATO and that Ukraine will be integrated into the bloc's defense program.

When I later asked an EU official why this is happening only now, two years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I got the sad but telling reply: "The truth is that Europeans didn't expect the war to last so long, maybe just a few weeks, so why build a factory? But now there is a sense that this is an opportunity."

This also goes quite some way in explaining why Europe is struggling to provide Ukraine with ammunition now. The EU optimistically pledged in March last year to deliver 1 million 155 mm artillery shells to the country in a year. Nearly 12 months later, the bloc has provided 524,000 rounds and now promises to reach 1.1 million by the end of this year instead.

But there is more "EU spin" on the story. One senior EU official who wasn't authorized to speak on the record briefed journalists on background, saying that there is a difference between donating and selling and that the abovementioned figure is just donating. The official also admitted that nobody knows how much ammunition the bloc has sold to Kyiv, as it is an "opaque system" with a lot of confidential information.

That in itself is, however, not the end of the process, as various European countries have tinkered with standards in recent decades so that there isn't any uniform 155 mm shell that fits the artillery -- perhaps most amusingly summed up by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, who said that "politicians tick the box and get credit when there is agreement to send something to Ukraine, but on the ground it becomes a massive technical problem to send the right ammo to the right cannon."

And outside the merry diplomatic speed-dating at the Munich Security Conference, a Ukrainian official described the situation on the front line as absolutely dire, with the army shooting "with nothing," meaning less than 2,000 rounds per day compared to Russia's 10,000. The predicted result of this is losing more Ukrainian soldiers and eventually more territory. It was quite telling that Zelenskiy, when asked by the audience at the conference about the possibility of lowering the draft age from the current 27, elegantly dodged the question.

And this was, in many ways, how the Munich Security Conference this year shaped up: high in rhetoric but lacking in concrete news and outcomes.

While everyone spoke affectionately and emotionally about the loss of Navalny, pointing the finger solidly at the Kremlin, quite a few leaders quickly dismissed the need to punish Russia with new sanctions over the event. At least some believed that his tragic fate would spur U.S. lawmakers into passing the Ukraine supplement -- with some optimistically suggesting a vote will soon reach the floor -- but only in March, after the recess, naturally.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: NATO's biggest exercise in decades; and more EU sanctions on Russia.

Brief #1: NATO's 'Biggest Exercise Since The Cold War'

What You Need To Know: In late January, NATO began what it has called its “largest military exercise since the Cold War.”

Steadfast Defender 24 involves 90,000 troops from all 31 alliance members as well as NATO invitee Sweden for four months of maneuvers by land, sea, and air.

You have to go all the way back to 1988 for the last NATO exercise that involved more troops: Reforger with 125,000. In between, the Trident Juncture exercise in 2018 included 50,000 personnel.

While official NATO documents don’t say outright that they’re training against a potential Russian offensive on allied territory, it’s clear that’s what is on their minds.

The alliance says it is testing responses “during a simulated emerging conflict scenario with a near-peer adversary.”

Exercise maps will show an adversary with a fictitious name, but privately my NATO sources acknowledge without hesitation that “of course this means Russia.”

Deep Background: Take a look at the geography and what the alliance will practice, and it becomes even more evident.

Roughly speaking, Steadfast Defender 24 includes two phases. The first, which kicked off slowly at the end of January, involves the transatlantic reinforcement of forces. This is in fact the key to see if the United States can effectively deploy a large number of troops and equipment to continental Europe to mount a defense.

Don’t underestimate the symbolism, as the United States nears a presidential election that culminates on November 5. The image of U.S. troops training alongside other nations in mock amphibious assaults in the Atlantic in the next two months, involving more than 50 naval vessels including aircraft carriers, frigates, and destroyers, could help assuage European fears of a less committed United States down the road.

The second phase of the exercise is equally crucial and is likely to show whether NATO is capable of defending its vulnerable eastern flank -- “every inch of allied territory,” as NATO officials like to put it.

Starting in mid-February and running till the end of May, many of the elements will take place on land and in the sky, involving up to 80 air platforms including F-35 fighter jets, helicopters, and drones, as well as more than 1,000 combat vehicles, including 166 tanks.

The epicenter is Poland, where a major river crossing will be attempted in March, but also in the Baltic states, with Germany acting as a major hub for reinforcement and coordination.

There will also be exercises throughout the Nordic region, as well as the Czech Republic, Hungary, North Macedonia, and Romania.

Drilling Down

• This will also represent the first proper chance for NATO to test aspects of its new defense plans agreed at the Vilnius NATO summit in July, a 4,000-page document in which every ally should know exactly which part of alliance territory it should defend if NATO is attacked.
• Another big test is seeing how well the alliance’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which was created as a direct response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, functions. It will be one of the bloc’s key components to defend any potential attack, with some 6,000 troops that should be deployable within days to any corner of the alliance.
• One of the aims of Steadfast Defender is ensuring this reaction force can be deployed together with various national forces once each year, starting from 2025. So this year is very much a test run.
• While the exercise has been planned for years, it comes at a pivotal time. Two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it should act as assurance that the alliance is ready in case the war creeps closer or even spreads across NATO members’ borders.
• While no Ukrainian troops are participating, the specter of the war in that country looms large in planners’ minds. Speaking to media in early February, NATO Brigadier General Gunnar Bruegner said “there is this unified sense that we need to go bigger, we need to train harder” when asked about the impact of the war on the alliance.
• The real question, however, is whether it will truly allay fears in Europe. Firstly, weapons deliveries to Ukraine have dropped alarmingly in recent months. The chairman of NATO’s military committee, Rob Bauer, said last fall that Western arms industries need to ramp up, as "the bottom of the barrel is now visible.”
• Then there have been plenty of recent official warnings that European allies must step up and prepare for the war potentially escaping containment to spread beyond Ukraine. And it’s not just Ukraine’s neighbors.
• The Belgian Army chief Michel Hofman suggested that Putin opening a second front in Moldova or the Baltics is not out of the question. And Hofman’s Swedish counterpart, Micael Byden, warned in late January that his countrymen “mentally must prepare for war,” triggering a slight panic as the public rushed out to buy extra fuel and survival kits.

Brief #2: The Puny New EU Sanctions Package Targeting Russia

What You Need To Know: The EU is aiming to adopt another sanctions package to deal a blow to Russia coincident with the second anniversary of the launch of the Ukrainian invasion on February 24, 2022.

The package would be the 13th imposed on Moscow since then. But early indications from EU diplomats speaking on condition of anonymity are that this round will be the weakest of the lot. It will mostly entail listings, meaning names of individuals and companies whose assets will be frozen inside the bloc and who will be slapped with visa bans -- not sector-wide sanctions targeting the Russian economy.

Nearly 2,000 people and companies have been blacklisted by the club so far, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and many in his inner circle. However, the sectoral sanctions tend to be more hard-hitting. They have so far targeted Russian coal, steel, wood, and oil exports into the union or the flow of EU goods to Russia including, for example, semiconductors and luxury goods.

Deep Background: The listings consist of up to 250 individuals or companies being presented by the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, to EU member states in two batches. One came last week and includes 118 names; the other is expected this week.

The reason for the division is that the European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic corps, still needs time to go through the evidence packages with an eye to why the proposed targets should be listed. These evidence packages are frequently prepared by individual EU member states’ foreign ministries, often with help from their embassies in Moscow and/or Kyiv.

For this round, as I understand it, eight or so member states sent listing proposals to Brussels. In the first batch, seen by RFE/RL, most of the names come from the military sector, including companies that are producing ammunition and drones for Russia’s army; there are also individuals active in politics on behalf of Moscow in Ukrainian territories currently occupied by Russia.

The second batch will reportedly include Belarusian officials, judges, and media personalities whom Brussels deems to be “propagandists” supporting Russia’s war efforts.

There is still another type of sanction that the European Commission might propose: adding companies to “Annex Four.”

This is a list of over 600 companies, mainly Russian, with whom EU firms are banned from trading with because Brussels suspects them of contributing to Russia's war machine, largely via so-called dual-use items that might otherwise be found among standard household appliances -- let’s say computer chips for washing machines -- but are instead acquired for use in military equipment like drones.

The proposal is for the inclusion of around 25 new companies, the majority from Russia. But as I understand it, some might be from China, India, Turkey, Serbia, and Kazakhstan.

The question is whether they all remain on the list once ambassadors from the 27 member states debate the package.

Beijing has previously lobbied successfully to remove proposed listings under Annex Four, and it is likely to try again. Turkey and Serbia, who enjoy close political and economic ties with many EU member states, may also attempt to get companies from their national jurisdiction delisted.

Drilling Down

• The point for broader discussion, though, is why the European Commission opted mainly for listings. I understand from diplomats familiar with the file that the commission wanted something that could be agreed quickly in time for the February anniversary.
• The truth is that agreement on the EU sanctions packages has become more complicated, particularly in the last few rounds as member states have spent weeks or even months hashing out details such as economic sanctions.
• To adopt only listings of individuals makes sense, then, as it should only take EU member states a few meetings to sign off on them ahead of February 24. commission officials I’ve spoken with off the record have also pointed out that the package was coordinated with the Group of Seven leading industrial nations and that there was agreement that listings are easier to green-light.
• Still, I understand that some EU member states are unhappy and underwhelmed with the package. The critics point out that something hard-hitting against Moscow would be more apt in marking such a significant date, especially as Russia continues its missile barrages against Ukrainian cities.
• Some member states -- notably Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland -- sent a discussion paper seen by RFE/RL to the commission in January with proposed items to sanction including in the Russian nuclear sector, liquefied natural gas (LNG), aluminum in addition to a prohibition on EU companies providing any IT or cloud services to Russia.
• None of the proposals appears to have been taken on board. Neither has a Czech idea to ban the movement inside the bloc of Russian diplomats still posted to EU countries. Prague’s proposal was deemed impractical by EU officials, as travel inside the passport-free Schengen zone is difficult to control.
• In a letter seen by RFE/RL and addressed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and signed by the foreign ministers of the Baltic states plus Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, there is a request for the commission “to present a proposal of sectoral sanctions as soon as possible.” The signatories add that “our focus should be on further cutting Russian revenues to finance the war, cutting its access to sensitive goods and technology empowering its military machine.”
• My understanding is that the commission has promised member states to return to the issue of sectoral sanctions directly after passage of the 13th package is ensured. There is, however, a risk that new measures will be harder to accept as June’s European Parliament elections grow nearer and that efforts will instead focus on the autumn.

Looking Ahead

NATO defense ministers convene in Brussels for their first official meeting of the year on February 15. They will examine issues including a review of the alliance’s air- and missile-defense posture on its eastern flank, defense spending among the 31 members, and how to encourage more joint procurement of ammunition and arms.

Keep an eye out for the Munich Security Conference on February 16-18. It’s widely regarded as the most important annual security forum, bringing together decision-makers from around the globe. Expect plenty of debate on the war in Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy among this year’s scheduled speakers. Read my takeaways from Bavaria in the next edition of this newsletter.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or by e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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