Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on what we can expect from NATO this autumn and how the EU will deal with the excess of Ukrainian agricultural products in the bloc.

Brief #1: What Is NATO Up To This Autumn?

What You Need To Know: After an eventful summit in Vilnius in July, NATO will return in the next few months to "bread and butter" issues. That means various military exercises, at least two ministerial meetings in Brussels before the end of the year (one for the bloc's defense ministers, the other for its foreign ministers) and possibly welcoming a new member, Sweden.

There was an agreement between Stockholm and Ankara at the Vilnius summit that appeared to pave the way for Swedish membership. But the ratification process still hasn't begun in either Turkey or Hungary, which has pledged to align its policy with Ankara's. NATO officials I've spoken to on condition of anonymity still believe Sweden will become a member this autumn, most likely in October, despite recent comments by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hinting that Sweden must first look into the Koran burnings there over the summer to avoid further slowing the ratification process.

Deep Background: While NATO waits to welcome member No. 32, its autumn will essentially consist of implementing some of the things decided on in Vilnius. For example, are the updated defense plans outlining how NATO should respond if any member's territory is attacked truly sufficient?

According to NATO sources I spoke to: "This autumn it is about checking the executability of our plans," or "putting flesh to the bones." In other words, are there enough combat-ready troops and military equipment to quickly come to the defense of potential frontline member states in the east?

NATO will need the answers by the end of the year. Then there's the issue of turning the multinational battalions in the three Baltic states and Poland into brigades, going from roughly 1,000 troops to something closer to 3,000-5,000. This takes longer, as it requires facilities like housing and bigger training ranges for the new arrivals. Preparations can seemingly be completed in Lithuania, where Germany is the lead nation, by early 2024, and a bit later in the year in the other places.

Drilling Down:

• We are also likely to see the first-ever NATO-Ukraine Council at the ministerial level (the council met on the ambassadorial level over the summer) when NATO defense ministers meet in Brussels on October 12-13 for their regular autumn ministerial session. The council was created in Vilnius and is meant to upgrade Kyiv's relations with the alliance.
• The idea now is to ensure the NATO-Ukraine Council is a more useful forum for Ukraine to approach NATO membership than its "predecessor," the NATO-Ukraine Commission. In the council, Ukraine will be sitting as a sort of coequal, with the right to call meetings with the military alliance whenever it sees fit.
• The big question is whether that's enough. NATO will work on two documents in the autumn to define its relationship with Kyiv: an annual national program for Ukraine and a proper work program for the NATO-Ukraine Council. This is very much a bureaucratic exercise. But for Ukraine's biggest supporters inside the bloc, known as the Bucharest Eight, the most important thing is that these papers avoid any new milestones or additional conditions for Ukraine to finally become a member.
• For the Bucharest Eight -- Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia -- the aim is clear: Ukraine is already interoperable with the alliance and a political decision is all that remains, i.e. should Ukraine become a NATO member soon or not?
• What is less clear is whether this decision will come at the next NATO summit in Washington, D.C. in July 2024. Of course, with so much dependent on the course of the war in Ukraine, it is far too early to make predictions. But it is worth noting that the summit will fall in the middle of the U.S. presidential campaign season; and given that the United States and Germany were among the most vocal skeptics in Vilnius of offering Ukraine a clear pathway to membership, chances are slim that the American position will shift much next year. It is entirely possible that the Washington summit becomes a one-day celebration of NATO turning 75, with few real political decisions taken.
• In the meantime, NATO will keep a keen eye on the Ukrainian counteroffensive. A few officials I have spoken to acknowledge that the counteroffensive may not have been as impressive as some perhaps were hoping for initially, but they are quick to caution that it is easy to sit far away in safety and make such remarks.
• Another description you hear a lot from NATO HQ when describing Kyiv's push to recover more territory is "steady and incremental" along with appreciative comments that Kyiv is managing this without air support. While the training of Ukrainian pilots on F-16s is slowly starting now in places like Denmark, the Netherlands, and Romania, the jets won't be used in Ukrainian skies until next year.
• Aside from the war, speculation will intensify over top positions at NATO. Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently agreed to stay on for another year, but he will step down at the Washington summit after a decade in the job. There is some clamoring for the military alliance's first female head, but don't rule out the outgoing Dutch Premier Mark Rutte or Pedro Sanchez if he fails to cobble together a new Spanish government.
• The chair of the NATO military committee, one of the foremost military leaders in the organization, will also be up for grabs, with incumbent Dutchman Rob Bauer set to leave in 2024 and the current chief of the Italian Defense Staff, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, a favorite to replace him.
• Cybersecurity is also increasingly important for the alliance. Watch for its first-ever cyberdefense conference, in Berlin in November, bringing together high-level political leaders, military experts, and potentially even private-sector players.

Brief #2: What To Do With The Glut Of Ukrainian Food In The EU?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission is facing tricky decisions in the coming weeks over the influx of Ukrainian agricultural products into the European Union. September 15 marks the end of the so-called temporary preventive measures that have allowed wheat, maize, rapeseed, and sunflower seed from Ukraine to transit through Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. All four of those commodities must remain "unsealed" until they reach other EU member states -- ideally to EU ports to be shipped on to developing nations around the world. These measures came about in early May after Poland, then Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria unilaterally shut their borders to all Ukrainian exports a month earlier, complaining that a glut of Ukrainian agricultural goods was filling up local storage and depressing prices for local farmers.

The European Commission scrambled for a solution that would satisfy the five frontline states (the above-mentioned four plus Romania) while being acceptable for Kyiv. There was also a need to ensure that Ukrainian agriproducts reached third countries, notably in Africa and Asia, that have reported food shortages.

Moreover, there was evident interest in safeguarding against major distortions on the EU's internal market -- something that the European Commission is officially in charge of. That's a lot of circles to square, and Brussels' solution in early May was to agree to preventive measures regarding the four products for the five frontline countries for one month, plus financial compensation for their farmers.

In June, the measures were prolonged with the understanding that they would be phased out on September 15 and, in a separate decision, the EU approved the extension by another year of a tariff-free regime with Ukraine covering all Ukrainian products entering the bloc.

Deep Background: Now the five frontline EU member states are pushing for an extension until the end of the year. You have crucial parliamentary elections in Slovakia on September 30 and in Poland on October 15, and farmers are an important and influential constituency in both countries.

The European Commission does have some understanding for the five, and numbers back up their worries. Before 2022, EU agricultural imports from Ukraine totaled 7 billion euros, and 90 percent came via the Black Sea route. By 2022, that figure had risen to 13 billion euros and 5 billion of the additional 6 billion euros of goods ended up on the markets of the frontline EU states.

The big culprit here is, of course, Russia, which has severely hampered Ukraine's lucrative Black Sea trade. Since the outbreak of the war, 40 percent of Ukrainian grain has been exported via the Black Sea Grain Initiative that expired in July after Russia opted not to renew it.

Turkey, which was key to the 2022 initiative that was struck to alleviate the global food shortage by opening trade from a handful of Ukrainian ports, has been working hard to resuscitate the deal. President Erdogan was expected to push for its renewal during a planned meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on September 4.

There's a question, however, as to whether Russia is interested in a renewal. By strangling the Ukrainian Black Sea option, which normally allows for larger and cheaper worldwide exports with huge cargo ships compared to transporting overland in the EU, Russia has seemingly outmaneuvered an important trade competitor and made its own grain cheaper and more lucrative worldwide.

Drilling Down:

• Ukraine obviously wants the temporary measures removed on September 15 but finds itself in a difficult situation when it comes to its agricultural products. Only 3 percent of the products that are currently transported via the EU's solidarity lanes instead of the Black Sea route are being shipped from the EU to third countries. There simply aren't many global buyers for such expensive goods. Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain have instead increased Ukrainian imports, especially of maize, which is vital to feeding livestock and boosting meat production.
• The EU is also investing to the tune of 1 billion euros to improve the Solidarity lanes -- and to reduce the costs for Ukrainian traders. The most obvious remedies include removing bottlenecks on various EU-Ukrainian border crossings by streamlining customs services, improving roads leading to the crossing, and increasing personnel there. But such measures take time to implement.
• The Baltic states have suggested easing the administrative burden on the EU-Ukrainian borders by shifting customs, veterinary, and phytosanitary controls to five Baltic ports (Tallinn, Riga, Ventspils, Liepaja, and Klaipeda), which have a combined annual capacity of 25 million tons. Croatia has also suggested using its Adriatic ports in a similar way.
• Currently, the most likely scenario is a prolongation of the preventive measures, judging by indications I've gotten from EU officials. And not only that. The frontline five want more products, including eggs and poultry, added to the four types of goods already listed.
• The European Commission has so far indicated there is no great influx from Ukraine of eggs or poultry. Raspberries, however, might be added after what one European Commission official described to me as a "drastic increase" in the EU market.
• The European Commissioner for agriculture, Janusz Wojciechowski, recently floated the idea of compensating Kyiv along with any extension. Noting that EU transit costs around 30 euros per ton and Ukraine needs to export around 20 million tons of food produce in the coming months, the European Commission would offer 600 million euros to Kyiv.
• This would act as a sort of economic subsidy to Ukrainian traders to enable the transport of grain all the way to EU ports. Ukraine would reportedly consider such an option, but it's unclear whether the entire European Commission would agree to the compensation.
• Expect that some sort of solution will be forthcoming as early as this week, especially given that a working platform set up in May to tackle the issue comprising relevant officials from the five frontline states, Ukraine, and the European Commission will discuss the issue in Brussels on September 5 as the bloc's agricultural ministers are meeting in the Spanish city of Cordoba on September 4-5.

Looking Ahead

Most eyes this week will turn to New Delhi and the G20 summit there on September 9-10. EU institutions will be represented by both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel.

The leaders of France, Germany, and Italy are also expected to come, as are the premiers of the Netherlands and Spain, both of whom are invited as G20 guests.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced that his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, will replace him in India him due to Putin's "busy schedule."

India is not a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has issued an arrest warrant for the Russian leader, so they are not obliged act on that warrant.

Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani will be in Brussels on September 7. Among other things, she will visit NATO HQ in order to share information on the latest security developments in Kosovo.

NATO boosted its presence there in May after its KFOR peacekeeping troops were attacked by ethnic Serbs following the forcible seating of ethnic Albanian mayors after boycotted elections in the Serb-dominated north.

A week later, on September 14, Brussels will host the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo for another round of the EU-mediated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the first such meeting since that violent episode.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm looking at EU talks in Spain on how to boost Ukraine's military and unpacking the eventful "EU enlargement" summit in Athens.

Brief #1: Brussels Considers More Military Assistance To Ukraine Amid Fears Of Niger Coup Fallout

What You Need To Know: On August 29-31, first the EU's defense ministers and then the bloc's foreign ministers will meet in the Spanish city of Toledo for informal talks.

These types of gatherings -- referred to in EU parlance as "Gymnich" after a German castle where the first such meeting took place -- happen twice a year, typically in January and after the summer break at the end of August.

They aren't formal council meetings, like the monthly EU foreign affairs councils in Brussels where policy decisions are taken. Rather, they are supposed to be more like fireside chats among ministers, who often rock up without their customary suits and ties so they can kick back to discuss the more long-term goals and strategies of the European Union. These informal meetings are often considered the start of the fall political season and a warm-up ahead of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in early September.

Two items will dominate the agenda in Toledo: how to further help Ukraine militarily and the Niger coup and its consequences on the bloc.

Deep Background: Regarding Ukraine, much of the discussion will center on increasing EU arms deliveries to sustain Kyiv's war effort. There have already been seven tranches of EU military aid through the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget funding mechanism where member states contribute according to their gross national income. So far, those contributions have amounted to 5.6 billion euros ($6.1 billion). An eighth tranche -- another 500 million euros ($540 million) -- is waiting to be approved, and it's possible it could get a sign-off in Toledo.

For that to happen, though, Hungary would need to lift its veto that has been in place since early summer. The Hungarian red light stems from an unrelated dispute around a blacklist produced by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention. On that list, the Hungarian bank, OTP, is labeled an "international sponsor of war" as it continues to do business in Russia, a designation that has angered both the bank and the Hungarian government. Typically, Budapest has made its support for the next chunk of EU cash conditional on Ukraine delisting the bank.

There will also be more talks in Toledo on the possibility of a longer-term EU fund for military assistance to Ukraine. The EU's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), circulated a discussion paper to EU capitals before the August summer break about the need to provide Kyiv with 5 billion euros a year for the next four years. That plan could face some hurdles, though. Hungary has already questioned the wisdom of spending more on military aid to Ukraine. And Germany -- the bloc's single largest financial contributor -- has raised issues, such as the need to discuss the military funding within broader negotiations over the EU's budget.

Drilling Down

• The EEAS discussion paper, seen by RFE/RL, and titled A Proposal For A Dedicated Ukraine Envelope Under The European Peace Facility (Ukraine Defense Fund) notes that European Union leaders have already confirmed "the EU's readiness to provide sustainable military support to Ukraine for as long as it takes."
• It also states that "having a dedicated envelope for Ukraine under the EPF would allow for continued political unity and financial solidarity," adding that it "would ensure the necessary predictability required in financial planning by member states at [a] national level."
• The EEAS text also explains the need for supporting Kyiv militarily to the tune of 5 billion euros annually, noting that while the EU will provide an estimated 4 billion euros in 2023, more is needed. According to the paper, that is because there will be "a shift in focus from destocking to procurement, the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment, as well as evolving needs by the EU military training mission for Ukraine, EUMAM."
• EUMAM, which was set up in the fall of 2022 and largely operates from Poland, has a budget of approximately 100 million euros a year. It has so far trained 25,000 troops, with plans to increase that number, double its budget, and possibly even allow for some training inside Ukraine if conditions allow.
• Separately but very much related to the issue of military aid, the EEAS also issued another discussion paper on what other security guarantees the bloc can offer. This comes as Ukraine is currently negotiating bilateral security arrangements with the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized nations and other Western allies.
• This paper, also seen by RFE/RL, states that "Ukraine will continue to need [the] EU's long-term commitment and support to secure its free and democratic European future, notably in a scenario where Russia is unlikely to abandon its goal to subjugate Ukraine and Ukraine cannot stop defending itself. Ukraine's EU membership would be in itself a security commitment."
• It also outlines 11 other suggestions of security support for Ukraine, such as the maintenance and repair of donated equipment, enhanced cooperation between the European and Ukrainian defense industries, continuous sharing of intelligence, more demining support, and assistance in bolstering Ukraine's cybersecurity and tools to fight against disinformation.
• Not all the focus in Toledo will be on Ukraine. The recent military coup in Niger is likely to take up a significant amount of the ministers' conversation. The issue is complicated as the Economic Community of West African States, which is a partner of the EU, has indicated that it is pondering a military intervention in Niger, something it has never done before. There are, however, divisions among the various West African states. What is clear from conversations with EU officials is that they fear a widening of the conflict and, as a result, a new wave of refugees coming to Europe.
• The issue of the Russian mercenary group Wagner's presence in Niger will also be debated by EU foreign ministers. It's not clear how the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in an August 23 plane crash will affect the group; the current EU line is that there is no conclusive evidence that Wagner fighters are active in Niger. One European diplomat who wasn't authorized to speak on the record told me that images of the local population waving Russian flags indicated that "Moscow, one way or another, is very present there."

Brief #2: A Meeting In Athens Gives Some Clues About The Future Of EU Enlargement

What You Need To Know: Last week, on August 21-22, there was a rather unusual meeting in Athens, which brought together both the European Council President Charles Michel and the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, along with a number of leaders from countries from the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe who are hoping to join the EU.

Also invited to the Greek capital were leaders from countries in the region that are already members of the EU: Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. The meeting provided some clues as to how the enlargement of the bloc might shape up in the coming years, as well as revealing the fissures that could scupper the whole thing.

This gathering has been a regular event for several years now, usually involving the six EU candidates and potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

The meeting is a chance for Greece to demonstrate leadership in its neighborhood, where it already plays a critical political and diplomatic role. This year's meeting also marked the 20th anniversary of the historic decision in Thessaloniki, Greece's second city, which for the first time proclaimed that all of the states of the Western Balkans would one day join the EU.

Deep Background: This year, there were also some new attendees: Moldova and Ukraine. That slightly shifted the focus from the usual regional cooperation to discussions about EU enlargement, as both Kyiv and Chisinau are newly minted EU candidate countries and hope to start accession talks by the end of the year. Yet the addition to the group also raised questions, most notably: Why weren't the other EU hopefuls, Turkey and Georgia, also in attendance?

EU diplomats I spoke to on the condition of anonymity as they weren't authorized to speak on the record were quick to point out that Greece extended the invitation to Moldova and Ukraine but also acknowledged that this arrangement was "debatable" and "ad hoc" and that this format wasn't intended to be permanent.

When asked why Turkey and Georgia weren't present, one diplomat explained: "The countries invited appear to be the most advanced on their path [toward EU membership]."

This assertion may seem accurate at first. Georgia is, after all, one step behind Moldova and Ukraine, as it isn't yet an EU candidate country. And Turkey's EU accession talks have been frozen for years due to disagreements between Ankara and the EU on a number of issues.

Technically, however, Turkey remains further advanced along the path to joining the EU than most other prospective members, having started accession talks back in 2006, which at least nominally places it in the same front-runner category as Montenegro and Serbia.

It's also worth noting that Kosovo, invited for the Athens powwow, is not even recognized as an independent state by the EU.

Drilling Down

• Something else could be at play here. One of the political themes likely to dominate EU discussions this fall will be "absorption capacity": how the EU could bear the burden and how it could function if it underwent further enlargement.
• France and Germany have established a joint working group on this issue, which will present its initial thoughts to other member states in September. When the European Political Community, which brings together all European countries apart from Belarus and Russia, convenes in the Spanish city of Granada in early October, "absorption capacity" will certainly be discussed. If there are any political and institutional decisions to be made on this issue, that could happen at the EU summit in Brussels in December.
• When EU officials discuss "absorption capacity," they often contemplate how an "EU of 35" would function -- adding eight new states to the existing 27. The issue here is that there are in fact 10 countries -- not just eight -- seeking to join the bloc: the six Western Balkan states, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, and Ukraine. So, which two are not being considered? While diplomats I speak to insist that the term "EU of 35" isn't linked to specific countries, the absences from the Athens meeting might be an indication to the contrary.
• According to diplomats involved that I spoke to on background, the meeting was deemed a success, as they said it brought Western Balkan countries closer to their Ukrainian and Moldovan counterparts. EU officials I've spoken to previously have said there are lingering fears among the six Western Balkan nations that Kyiv and Chisinau might "jump the queue" and join the EU ahead of them.
• The summit also resulted in a joint declaration, with all participants pledging to support Ukraine's territorial integrity. Serbian President Alexander Vucic did later boast that he had managed to remove references to Russia sanctions in the document, but several Brussels insiders I spoke to on the condition of anonymity said that the draft texts they had seen never contained any language about sanctions. Vucic was most likely just playing to his domestic audience, many of whom have positive political views of Russia.
• More significantly, though, was the first face-to-face meeting between Vucic -- who has so far refused to align with EU sanctions on the Kremlin -- and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. While Belgrade won't be exporting arms to Ukraine any time soon, there were pledges of continued humanitarian and medical assistance to the war-torn country.
• The main news story from the Athens meeting was that Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama wasn't invited. The reason for this was the arrest of Fredi Beleri, a man running for mayor in the southern Albanian town of Himare under the banner of a Greek minority party aligned with an opposition coalition. Beleri was arrested in mid-May on suspicion of vote-buying. Despite winning the mayoral election, he remains in custody, triggering loud protests from Greece and counteraccusations from Tirana of political meddling.
• There's now a real possibility that Greece will block Albania from officially opening EU accession chapters later this year, showing once again how beholden the bloc's enlargement process is to the whims of national or even local politics.

Looking Ahead

It is not only the EU foreign and defense ministers that will discuss how to better help Ukraine. The European Parliament also starts its work this week, and its foreign affairs committee will meet on August 30 in Brussels to discuss how to improve the bloc's military assistance to Kyiv. Expect the issue to come up again when all 705 members of the European Parliament meet for its first plenary session later in September.

Otherwise, Brussels is still in its summer slumber and not too much is expected from its institutions this week.

There is, however, plenty of activity on the think-tank conference circuit.

A number of European officials and politicians will head to the Tyrolean town of Alpbach on August 27-30 for the European Forum Alpbach.

Then there is the annual strategic forum run by the Slovenian Foreign Ministry and the Center for European Perspective on August 28-29 in the picturesque Slovenian resort town of Bled.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.