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A demonstrator holds an EU and a Georgian national flag at an opposition protest against the results of the parliamentary election in Tbilisi on October 28.
A demonstrator holds an EU and a Georgian national flag at an opposition protest against the results of the parliamentary election in Tbilisi on October 28.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: what the EU can do about Georgia and the potential changes 2025 will bring for people entering the EU.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.

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Briefing #1: The EU's Dwindling Options On Georgia

What You Need To Know: More than three weeks after the Georgian parliamentary elections, which saw the ruling Georgian Dream party winning with 54 percent of the vote but has also led to opposition protests and a boycott of parliament, the European Union remains unsure of how to react.

Generally speaking, this is connected to three things: a paucity of options going forward, divisions within the EU, and a lack of clarity over what actually took place on election day and during the run-up to the parliamentary vote.

The EU was cautious in its first statement after the vote, quoting the OSCE/ODIHR preliminary findings and noting that "irregularities" had occurred. Three days later, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell ramped up the pressure somewhat with another statement asking for a transparent inquiry and noting that international observers "have also not declared the elections to be free and fair."

Then, at a debate on the Georgian elections in the European Parliament on November 13, came the strongest rebuke so far of the ruling authorities in Tbilisi when European Commission Vice President Margaritis Schinas said that "these elections were marked by serious irregularities, with violations reported both during the election campaign and the election day itself. These elections fall short of the standards expected of a country holding EU candidate status."

Deep Background: Yet, the EU already seems to be forgetting about Georgia. You could see it at the summits in Budapest in early November. Attending the European Political Community (EPC) summit in the Hungarian capital, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze took the floor after warm congratulations from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who had raced to Tbilisi directly after the elections to celebrate Georgian Dream's success and thus publicly breaking the EU's unity.

In Budapest, Kobakhidze reportedly criticized "some Europeans" for expressing their disappointment at the election result, called for Georgia to be treated fairly by the EU, and said that the opposition didn't enjoy the support of the Georgian people. The Georgian leader spoke at the end of the meeting, and, with Orban only giving the floor to non-EU country leaders, there were no direct reactions to his speech.

EU leaders were supposed to discuss Georgia in depth on the second day of the EPC summit, but the reelection of Donald Trump as U.S. president and a presentation by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi on the bloc's competitiveness dominated the proceedings. That day, only the Estonian and Lithuanian leaders mentioned Georgia at all.

Diplomats I spoke to were a little peeved that European Council President Charles Michel had a bilateral meeting with Kobakhidze but didn't mention anything about that meeting or about Georgia at the final press conference. That meeting was described by a senior EU official who wasn't authorized to speak on the record as lasting "less than 10 minutes" and Michel, according to the diplomat, expressed "deep concerns" about alleged electoral violations and called for an investigation.

Drilling Down:

  • There were other signs the issue is already on the back burner. During the hearing in the European Parliament of the incoming new EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, Georgia was not mentioned at all during the three-hour grilling. The incoming new EU enlargement commissioner, Marta Kos, also didn't mention Georgia in the introductory speech to her hearing, but was asked about the issue by a member of the European Parliament. She did say that the process of Georgia applying to join the EU, which has been put on hold, could resume if the government nixed the recently adopted and controversial "foreign-agent" law and "anti-LGBT law."
  • Ultimately, the EU will (perhaps reluctantly) have to engage with the Georgian Dream government. According to the EU officials I've spoken to, there is definitely a sense that they are the only ones on the dance floor, so the EU doesn't really have much choice.
  • Part of the problem for EU officials is that there isn't really a smoking gun when it comes to accusations of widespread fraud. There is skepticism that the ruling party got 54 percent suppport in the elections, but it's hardly an outlandish claim. (Something more realistic would perhaps have been support of somewhere between 40 and 50 percent.)
  • Given that the OSCE election-monitoring report can take around three months to appear, there isn't much that can be done now except wait.
  • Meeting on November 18, EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss Georgia. But they are likely to discuss the same options paper on how Brussels could reorient its policy toward Georgia that they discussed in June. And can anything new be decided? Georgia's EU accession has already stalled, and political contacts between the bloc and Tbilisi have been downgraded. Thirty million euros ($31.7 million) in military aid and 120 million euros in direct assistance to the government remain frozen.
  • Sanctions would require a consensus that doesn't exist. It is not only Hungary and Slovakia who would oppose but also Bulgaria and Italy, to name just two. Visa-liberalization suspension has been mooted, but many, including Germany, aren't keen to target the general population.
  • Potentially, one measure that only requires a qualified majority (55 percent of member states, representing 65 percent of the total EU population) would be to introduce visa requirements for Georgian officials traveling into the bloc.
  • Some member states, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, will likely push for some sort of international investigation into the possible election violations. But this has its pitfalls as well. Firstly, would the Georgian government accept it? And would an EU-backed investigation come up with something radically different to what the OSCE is already working on? And, as one diplomat told me: Is now really the time to start questioning the findings of OSCE/ODIHR electoral missions in general? There has been an agreement to send a so-called "technical mission" of diplomats from the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's diplomatic service. They will speak to all stakeholders in the country and report back to Brussels.
  • At the end of November, the European Parliament is likely to pass a nonbinding resolution on Georgia. That could look similar to the resolution the parliament adopted in February following the December 2023 Serbian parliamentary elections, which were marred by irregularities. That document both called for "an independent international investigation by respected international legal experts and institutions" and urged the European Commission "to launch an initiative to send an expert mission to Serbia to assess the situation as regards the recent elections and postelection developments." It's worth noting that, in the case of Serbia, neither the investigation nor the expert mission has materialized yet. Relations with Belgrade remain frosty but intact. With the ongoing war in Ukraine and a new U.S. administration coming in January, the bloc will most likely be focused elsewhere.

Briefing #2: Will 2025 Be A 'Big Bang' Moment For Travelers To The EU?

What You Need To Know: The weekend before last could have been the big unveiling of the EU's new Entry/Exit System (EES). This new system will mean that when a non-EU citizen crosses any border or enters any airport or harbor in 25 EU countries (all the member states apart from Cyprus and Ireland) and four non-EU countries (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein), they would have to register their full name, nationality, and have their fingerprints and photo taken, possibly in a newly installed self-service kiosk.

The EES has been in the works ever since it was approved by the EU in late 2017 and will do away with the manual stamping of non-EU passports, replacing the old system with a large electronic database. According to the European Commission, the EES will help prevent irregular migration, help third-country nationals travel more easily, plus identify attempts at overstaying or identity fraud. Yet the grand unveiling never happened, not on November 10 as planned, nor on the back-up date, November 17.

Deep Background: To be fair, the dates were never actually set in stone. There was also vaguer talk of it happening sometime in the final quarter of this year. And it also wasn't the first time it was delayed. In 2020, it was the coronavirus pandemic that prevented it. Then, in 2022 and 2023, the new system still wasn't ready.

So why the constant delays? A generous answer is that this is a massive IT undertaking and the technology is untested at this scale. When, back in October, interior ministers agreed that a November rollout wasn't possible, it was France, Germany, and the Netherlands -- three member states with multiple entry points -- that were putting on the brakes.

The German Interior Ministry noted then that the central computer system underpinning the EES, which is overseen by the EU agency eu-LISA, lacked "the necessary stability and functionality."

An EU diplomat familiar with the issue was more brutal, telling me that the entire system was "shoddy" and complaining about a lack of testing before the official launch. While eu-LISA has said that all EU member states were technically ready, there were widespread fears that the new system would create chaos at the continent's key hubs, hitting crucial business and tourism with massive border queues.

There is a fear among EU officials that the teething issues with a system of such magnitude run the risk of causing massive reputational damage, potentially jeopardizing years of planning.

Drilling Down:

  • One of the problems is that the EU wanted to launch it everywhere all at once. A "big bang" of sorts. The thinking now in Brussels, however, is a more phased-in approach, which means that the already agreed upon operating regulations will have to be amended. This can be done if there is political will (which seems to exist) but it is now up to the European Commission to define what exactly this phased-in approach means.
  • Does it mean that it will be gradually rolled out geographically, for example, in just a few countries or some specific airports? Or does it mean that only some biometric details will be registered but not all -- for example, skipping the taking of fingerprints? The new European Commission, which is likely to be sworn in in December, will have to tackle this as a matter of urgency.
  • In the meantime, many hubs and border crossings will continue to prepare for an eventual launch in 2025 by adding more automatic barriers, self-service kiosks, tweaking the preregistration app, and training staff and border guards.
  • There is another thing for non-EU citizens traveling into the visa-free Schengen zone to consider. The plan is that once the EES is operational, the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) will follow some six months later. ETIAS is something like an EU equivalent to the already functioning U.S. Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) and the recently established U.K. Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA). This will cover all visa-exempt travelers to the EU, with an estimated 1.4 billion people needing to apply. This includes, for example, U.S. and British citizens but also Ukrainians, Georgians, and Moldovans, as well as citizens of the non-EU Western Balkan states.
  • It is worth pointing out that getting ETIAS approval is not a visa, nor does it guarantee entry. The authorization, valid for three years, will cost seven euros and will have to be completed by everyone between the ages of 18 to 70. Some people will be able to get exemptions. Among them are individuals with visas and residence permits, refugees, diplomatic passport holders, and airport transit passengers.
  • ETIAS was agreed by the EU in 2018 and, like the EES, is part of the push to make the Schengen zone more robust by having greater control of who is entering. With immigration once again top of the political agenda across the bloc, there is likely to be a firm push by several member states, as well as the European Commission, to have both systems up and running in 2025.

Looking Ahead

On November 22, the interior ministers of Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, and Romania will assemble to try to iron out the final details of the latter two countries' full entry into the Schengen zone. Since the start of this year, both countries are part of Schengen when it comes to air and maritime travel but not land crossings, with Vienna blocking it due to migration concerns. There are indications, though, that a deal can be struck, which would mean EU ministers could finally give an official green light when they meet in Brussels on December 12.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Ukrainian soldiers receive training at a German Army base in Klietz, eastern Germany, in May 2023.
Ukrainian soldiers receive training at a German Army base in Klietz, eastern Germany, in May 2023.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the EU's training mission for Ukrainian soldiers and the main takeaways from the hearing on the EU's new enlargement commissioner.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.

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Briefing #1: EU Training Mission To Ukraine To Continue -- But No Boots On The Ground

What You Need To Know: As European Union ambassadors on November 6 woke up to the news that Donald Trump will return to the White House early next year, they took the little-heralded but rather symbolic decision to prolong by two years the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine -- EUMAM Ukraine, for short.

This mission was first approved by the bloc's member states in the fall of 2022. According to a concept note from the time, it was set up "with the strategic objective to contribute to enhancing the military capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces in order to support Ukraine in its struggle against Russia's war of aggression."

By late November of that same year, EUMAM Ukraine was welcoming the first Ukrainian soldiers for training on EU soil. And by the end of this year, close to 75,000 Ukrainians will have received training from EU countries. Given that the initial plan was to train around 15,000 soldiers, it can certainly be said that the mission has delivered.

Under a Trump presidency, there are fears in Brussels that the EU will have to shoulder more of the burden of financial and military support for Ukraine. Western funding to the tune of $50 billion, covering the entirety of 2025, was agreed by the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized nations in late October. By comparison, EUMAM Ukraine cost just 362 million euro ($388 million) over the last year.

It is precisely these sorts of initiatives, considered cost-efficient by diplomats, that the Europeans might increasingly have to turn to. As a result, the annual budget for EUMAM Ukraine is expected to increase to 408 million euros over the next couple of years and will be financed by the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget vehicle in which EU member states pay in a share based on their gross national income (GNI).

Deep Background: Since last year, Hungary has blocked several tranches of EPF money going to EU member states. (The idea is that those member states send arms to Ukraine and then get compensated through the EPF.)

EUMAM Ukraine has, however, been green-lighted by Budapest, even though it wasn't entirely frictionless. There was an idea that the bloc would expand the mission to include EU training of Ukrainian soldiers inside Ukraine. However, this was vetoed by Hungary, plus many other member states are strictly against any "EU boots on the ground" -- something that France has been pushing for.

Those in favor of expanding the mission argued that it wasn't military personnel being sent to Ukraine but something more akin to administrators overseeing training exercises.

In the end, the decision was recently taken to prolong the mission but with no expanded mandate and just a slightly increased budget. There will also be a strategic assessment of EUMAM Ukraine conducted in early 2025 to see if new things are needed.

Drilling Down

  • In the final agreement on EUMAM Ukraine, seen by RFE/RL, there is another interesting element: "the necessary exchange of classified information should be authorized between EUMAM Ukraine and NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)." NSATU is essentially the NATO equivalent of EUMAM Ukraine with a 700-person headquarters opening in Germany this fall. It is a small political breakthrough that the two Brussels-based organizations will actually cooperate, something that historically has not proved easy.
  • This only leads to inevitable questions in Brussels: Why are both NATO and the EU running training missions for Ukrainian soldiers? And wouldn't it be more efficient if only one Western organization did so to avoid duplication? The answer from both NATO and EU officials is usually that all efforts are welcomed by Kyiv -- and it is good that the EU is engaged in hard security measures, especially if a new U.S. administration withdraws support for NATO training in the future.
  • All that aside, EUMAM Ukraine is just a drop in the ocean. A high-ranking Ukrainian official, who wasn't authorized to speak on the record, told me recently that EUMAM Ukraine "covers just a fraction of our needs." And while it offers solid and up-to-date training, for example, in areas such as demining and cyberwarfare, it does not give Ukraine what it wants most of all: heavy artillery (along with the permission to use it deep inside Russian territory) and ammunition.
  • An EU official, also speaking anonymously, put it to me even more bluntly: "It's good that it is there, and they are doing useful things, but it is not the things that Kyiv most desperately needs now. It's a typical European solution -- let's do something, anything, that we then can communicate as a major win."
  • And while there isn't any issue with money in the upcoming year, funds will be an issue in the future. The EU's European External Action Service (EEAS) has proposed that EPF should be topped up via "voluntary contributions" rather than EU members paying in a mandatory share based on GNI. While this method would circumvent potential future vetoes, by stripping nonpaying countries of a chance to block, some member states are afraid that a voluntary scheme would allow some countries a free ride.
  • In this context, I understand that the bloc's lawyers are currently looking at the EU treaties to check whether the common EU budget, which currently stands at over a trillion euros, can be used for defense spending as well. Traditionally, that hasn't been the case, but with the ongoing war in Ukraine, that could well change in the years to come.

Briefing #2: What We Might Expect From The EU's New Enlargement Commissioner

What You Need To Know: Prospective EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos got the thumbs-up from the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels on November 7. The Slovenian, a former journalist, businesswoman, and diplomat, could now be sworn in with the rest of the new European Commission before the end of this year.

During her three-hour hearing, Kos repeated the talking points of so many of her predecessors: that EU enlargement is "a marathon not a sprint;" that the accession process for new members is "merit-based with no shortcuts;" and that enlargement offers "a historical opportunity to achieve peace, freedom, and prosperity on the whole continent."

Kos added, however, that the EU must reform before welcoming new countries and that she would push for a doubling of financial support for civil society and media in vulnerable EU neighborhood countries.

Deep Background: The most interesting thing to look out for when a prospective EU enlargement commissioner is being grilled is if the person mentions any time frames as to when the club might expand. With her mandate running till 2029, could she oversee the first new addition(s) to the EU since Croatia joined in 2013?

Kos didn't commit to any dates regarding when the bloc could admit new members, adding that "today, for the first time after 10 years, there is a real chance that we will bring one or two countries to the end of the negotiating process."

She then pointed out the ambitious goals of Montenegro wanting to complete its talks with Brussels at the end of 2026 and Albania in 2027. She also said that Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic had recently underlined that he was willing to do everything to align his country's legislation with that of the EU.

It was perhaps telling that she didn't mention North Macedonia at all. Kos was repeatedly quizzed by Bulgarian EU parliamentarians on the contentious issue in North Macedonia of amending the constitution to include Bulgarians as a founding people, something Skopje has repeatedly failed to do and which has slowed down the country's accession bid.

Predictably, Kos came down on Sofia's side, indicating that the interests of EU member states "of course come first" and that the bloc "cannot import bilateral issues." North Macedonia now appears to be further back in line compared to Albania, Montenegro, and even Serbia.

Drilling Down

  • So, what about Ukraine? Nothing much concrete apart from Kos saying in her introductory remarks that "enlargement negotiations are the European guiding star for this brave nation," adding that the same was true for Moldova. She also confirmed that Ukraine likely would be her first destination as enlargement commissioner and that, while the EU had already started the reconstruction process, investment from the private sector will be needed going forward as well.
  • There was one big omission. While mentioning both Ukraine and Moldova in her introduction, together with the Western Balkans, Turkey, and even the possibility of "fostering peace with Armenia and Azerbaijan," she skipped Georgia completely.
  • In fact, when asked by a parliamentarian about her view of the South Caucasus republic, where contested parliamentary elections in late October have left the EU struggling with a response, she said that she had a message to the people of Georgia: "Don't give up hope."
  • She said that she would be ready to resume the enlargement process with Georgia but only after the sitting government, which in recent years has taken an increasingly authoritarian approach, abolishes the recently adopted "foreign-agent law" and "anti-LGBT law."
  • There was not a word on the elections, but there was an indication that Brussels is still prepared to work with the ruling Georgian Dream party. The pro-EU opposition in Georgia will likely not be thrilled with that almost "business-as-usual" approach.
  • Away from the classical enlargement beat, Kos did hint that she aims to play a bigger role in the EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which the new EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, will oversee and could be approached differently this time around. She offered few hints but did make one thing crystal-clear: there will be no land-swaps in the Western Balkans. "It is out of the question. We will not follow these tendencies," she said.
  • Otherwise, she managed to swerve some of the more politically loaded questions. When pressed on Serbia's failure to align with EU sanctions on Russia, she appeared contradictory, first saying it was not a condition during the enlargement process but then admitting that a 100 percent alignment is necessary before becoming a member.
  • Kos also ducked multiple questions on possible sanctions on Serbia over the Banjska attack in September 2023, when dozens of ethnic Serb gunmen attacked a police unit in northern Kosovo. Similarly, she failed to answer whether the bloc's restrictive measures on Kosovo, in place since last year over tension in the Serb-majority northern part of the country, should be lifted and nor did she give details about how she would handle the separatist tendencies of Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  • Many of the same questions are expected when the prospective EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas faces the EU parliamentarians later on November 12. The former Estonian prime minister is expected to be one of the key players in Brussels in the years ahead, especially if she can shape a coherent EU foreign policy on everything from Ukraine to the Middle East.

Looking Ahead

There is a curious case in the General Court, one of the courts making up the Court of Justice of the European Union, on November 13. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine has asked the judges to annul a 2023 decision by the Office of the European Union for Intellectual Property (EUIPO) to refuse to register the famous utterance, "Russian warship, go f*** yourself," as a trademark in the EU.

The phrase became famous in the early stages of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when a border guard used it in a standoff with an approaching Russian warship.

The Ukrainian border guard service had originally tried to register the slogan, as it was being used on clothes and other products, but the request was struck down by the court on the grounds that it was a "political slogan devoid of distinctive character for the goods and services in question." Let's see what happens this time around.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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