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Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban delivers a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, eastern France, on October 9.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban delivers a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, eastern France, on October 9.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: The upcoming summits in Budapest and last week's EU enlargement report.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve. Happy listening!

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Briefing #1: Will Orban Unveil A Big Surprise?

What You Need To Know: Hungary's turn as the rotating president of the Council of the European Union in the second half of this year was always bound to be interesting, given that Budapest has a habit of clashing with Brussels on a number of things -- not least on Russia and Ukraine.

And it is fair to say that one of the highlights of this controversial presidency will come on November 7 as the Hungarian capital is hosting the summit of the European Political Community (EPC) -- a political forum bringing together the leaders of almost all European states (bar Belarus, Russia, and the Vatican). That evening and the next day, there will be a meeting of the 27 EU heads of government to mainly discuss how to make the bloc more competitive.

There is, however, a risk that both meetings will be overshadowed by other events -- most likely the U.S. elections taking place on November 5. As the presidential race is expected to be a tight affair, it's possible the winner may still not be known by the time the leaders gather on the morning of November 7.

There are also persistent rumors in Brussels that Orban has a "big surprise" in store for his guests, so stay tuned.

Deep Background: Another issue to be discussed at the EPC, and particularly the informal EU summit, will be the October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections. They were won by the ruling Georgian Dream party and marred by irregularities. The EU is divided on how to respond (see next briefing) and whether or not the vote was free and fair.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell last week summed up the confusion himself by noting that even OSCE/ODIHR election observers hadn't pronounced whether or not the elections were free and fair.

It will also be interesting to see who will represent Tbilisi at the EPC summit. At the last one, at Blenheim Palace in the United Kingdom in July, it was Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, whose government has been accused of becoming increasingly authoritarian.

As it is Budapest that handles the invitations, don't be surprised if Orban wants his ally from Georgian Dream present, which could lead to plenty of uncomfortable encounters with other European leaders.

Drilling Down:

  • And then there is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is poised to make his first visit to Hungary since the full-scale Russian invasion of his country in early 2022. Zelenskiy and Orban have sparred on numerous occasions, notably on Hungary's reluctance to channel more EU funds to Kyiv and skepticism toward Ukraine's EU and NATO membership. So it could be a very tense affair indeed.
  • The formal part of the EPC will last just a few hours, with a short plenary dealing with security challenges. That will be followed by breakout sessions focusing on migration and economic security before concluding with a second plenary.
  • What really matters at the summit is the chance for some diplomatic speed dating in an informal setting -- something the leaders reportedly love about the EPC format. Will, for example, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet, either with or without outgoing European Council President Charles Michel?
  • The migration debate could also be interesting, as the EU is becoming much more restrictive in this area. A discussion paper on migration ahead of the EPC meeting, seen by RFE/RL, notes that the priority in this area will mainly be the fight against human smuggling and trafficking. The paper also notes that "we need to be extremely vigilant not to allow people in conflict areas to become tools in the hands of hostile regimes in a hybrid war. We must be equally determined to counter the phenomenon where nonstate actors willingly or not willingly become collaborators of criminal organizations." And the controversial idea of sending people who didn't get asylum in the EU to so-called "return hubs" outside the EU will be discussed, with the document underlining that "we should ensure solid mechanisms for effective returns, especially for the removal of those who pose a serious threat to public order or internal security. We should also continue to explore innovative solutions as possible ways forward, including the idea of developing return hubs outside Europe."
  • The issue that is proving to be the most controversial ahead of the summit, however, has been a document, devised by Michel, called the Budapest Declaration On The New European Competitiveness Deal. The draft, seen by RFE/RL and which Michel is hoping the leaders will endorse, notes that the EU's share of world gross domestic product (GDP) has halved over the last two decades, that retail prices for industrial electricity in the EU are three times higher than for the other major world economies, and that "as a share of GDP, the EU spends one-third less on research and development than other major economies in the OECD." It's controversial, as some EU member states think the 10-page document is too long; some are furious that it mentions the next long-term EU budget (always a fraught discussion, as it concerns who pays how much); and others are peeved that it mentions convergence on taxation, another sensitive topic. Others are not happy about what the document has left out: for example, support for nuclear energy or more European defense spending.
  • There is a long list of complaints and it neatly illustrates the age-old Brussels problem: agreeing on a way forward on anything. As one diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, told me, "We are in a hostile, global environment in which we rightly have identified that we need to become more competitive on every level, yet we get stuck arguing about commas and bullet points in a document few [people] will read."

Briefing #2: Georgia Is The Big Loser In The Latest EU Enlargement Report

What You Need To Know: The European Commission presented its annual enlargement report on October 30, with a distinctly different tone from last year's release. Then, the EU executive made historic recommendations: It proposed opening accession talks with Moldova, Ukraine, and conditionally for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and proposed granting candidate status for Georgia.

This year, the report did not contain any such big news or significant recommendations.

The very fact that it was issued on a school holiday week in Brussels, with many EU officials far away from the office, and that the European Commission prioritized a report on improving civilian and defense preparedness tells you quite a lot about how much importance the bloc gives to further enlargement at this point.

Deep Background: In fact, the most interesting aspect of the entire package was how hard the European Commission would be on Georgia, just fresh out of parliamentary elections with reported irregularities that gave the ruling Georgian Dream party an improbable majority.

And it was damning on Georgia, by EU standards.

Citing the recent adoption of the controversial "foreign influence" law, similar to Russia's "foreign agent" law, and anti-LGBT laws, as well as "strong anti-EU narratives from Georgian officials," the document concluded that "unless Georgia reverts the current course of action, which jeopardizes its EU path, and demonstrates tangible efforts to address outstanding concerns and key reforms, the [European] Commission will not be in a position to consider recommending opening negotiations with Georgia."

Last time around, the European Commission gave Tbilisi nine conditions in various policy fields to complete in order to start accession talks. Here, Brussels simply concluded that the South Caucasus republic had made "insignificant progress" and noted a lack of "sufficient political commitment of the authorities" to undergo necessary reforms.

Yet, apart from halting Georgia's EU accession, something that de facto was concluded by EU leaders already in June, there's not much else happening now. The truth is that the bloc is unsure of how to read the Georgian elections on October 26.

The report refers to the OSCE's preliminary findings issued after the vote, noting "several shortcomings that occurred in a tense and highly polarized environment," such as intimidation and compromises on vote secrecy. It talks of "comprehensive electoral reform" and "constructive and inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum."

But the truth is that the EU is divided on this. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban raced down to Tbilisi to congratulate his political allies, while Europe ministers from 15 EU member states issued a statement at least questioning the fairness of the vote and underlining that Orban wasn't speaking on behalf of the bloc.

Drilling Down:

  • These divisions will make potential future sanctions on Georgia's current leadership hard to agree on. Hungary, and probably also Slovakia, will be vetoing them. And then there is the issue of actually finding some offense that is sanctionable, pinpointing it on high-enough officials, and then backing it up with evidence. Right now, that seems like a tall order for Brussels.
  • What is left, apart from cutting more funds to Tbilisi, is to suspend visa liberalization, which only requires a qualified majority of member states to back. But is there really an appetite to punish the entire population? The EU will be discussing this at the informal EU summit in Budapest next week and when EU foreign ministers meet in Brussels later in November.
  • So, what about the more positive aspects of the reports? The European Commission hopes that both Moldova and Ukraine will open EU accession chapters "as soon as possible in 2025." Brussels will look to Chisinau to further step up anti-corruption and "de-oligarchization" to proceed further on its membership path, whereas Kyiv needs to keep on fighting organized crime and continue to improve legislation for national minorities.
  • The thing to look out for here is a potential link to Serbia -- and the politicking that can ensue. For the third year running, the European Commission recommends that Belgrade should be allowed to open more EU accession chapters. This is something that Hungary, which currently holds the rotating EU Presidency, is keen on as well.
  • Many other EU member states, however, are not impressed with Belgrade’s close links with Moscow. Don't rule out that Budapest might want to trade a green light for Serbia moving ahead in late 2024 with giving its OK to Ukraine sometime in 2025.
  • There was also happy reading for Albania and Montenegro. Earlier in October, Tirana opened its first cluster of accession chapters, and in December the European Commission hopes that member states will open yet another batch. It also endorses the country's highly ambitious goal to close accession negotiations by the end of 2027.
  • This is really in the hands of member states, but right now Albania is the "feel-good story" of the otherwise rather sorry tale of Western Balkan EU enlargement.
  • For Montenegro, which has already opened all 30+ chapters, the European Commission hopes that some chapters actually can be closed by the end of the year, which should be feasible, and that talks conclude at the end of 2026, as is Podgorica's goal, which may just be a bridge too far. But if any country ends up joining the club this decade, the smart money is on Montenegro.
  • Then there are the seemingly hopeless cases of Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pristina's EU application is languishing in the European Council, where member states still aren't too keen to send it over to the European Commission for an opinion on membership feasibility -- at least not before the February parliamentary elections in the country.
  • North Macedonia remains stuck as long as it doesn't change its constitution according to Bulgaria's wishes, something that doesn't look likely to happen anytime soon.
  • And then there is Bosnia, which could potentially start accession talks in the foreseeable future but that so far has failed with basic conditions such as appointing a chief negotiator to the EU talks, a team to do the heavy lifting during those talks, and a national plan to transpose EU laws to the national legislation -- again reflecting Sarajevo's dysfunctional internal politics in which the country's entities can rarely agree on any way forward.

Looking Ahead

The U.S. election isn't the only interesting news this week. There are also the hearings in the European Parliament for the proposed new European commissioners.

The hearing of the enlargement commissioner-designate, Marta Kos, is taking place on November 7, presumptive defense commissioner Andrius Kubilius a day earlier, and the proposed foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, the week after -- on November 12.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

 Former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas is expected to become the EU's new foreign policy chief.
Former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas is expected to become the EU's new foreign policy chief.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am previewing the upcoming hearings in the European Parliament, where the commissioner candidates have to prove their worth.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve. Happy listening!

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Briefing #1: Will Kaja Kallas Tone It Down?

What You Need To Know: While most of the world will likely be focusing on the U.S. presidential election and its aftermath, EU-types will be glued to something completely different: the hearings of the 26 commissioners-designate from November 4 to November 12.

Each candidate will face three hours of grilling from members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in a committee relevant to their assigned portfolio. Last time around, in 2019, three candidates were culled, so expect that this could happen again, leading to extra hearings later in the month.

One commissioner-designate who is expected to sail through, however, is the prospective EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. The former Estonian prime minister is considered one of the "stars" of European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen's new team.

What will be interesting at her November 12 hearing is to see how much (if at all) she tones down her hawkish rhetoric on China and Russia in order to fit the new post, where diplomacy and finding consensus on foreign policy issues is of paramount importance.

Deep Background: Judging from von der Leyen's mission letter to Kallas, the focus of much of the questioning will be on Ukraine. The mission letter, which is a public document outlining what the president expects from a commissioner over the next five years, essentially makes it clear from the very start: "We will work closely together to ensure that Europe stands with Ukraine for as long as it takes -- economically, politically, and militarily -- and supports its territorial integrity."

Can Kallas offer something new here? Kyiv is already expected to open EU accession chapters next year and EU financial support for the country for 2025 is already secured. So far, the EU has imposed 14 rounds of sanctions on Russia, but, from speaking to diplomats around Brussels, it is becoming increasingly hard to persuade EU member states to adopt more hard-hitting measures on Moscow with Europe's economic climate and outlook far from rosy.

So it will be interesting to see if Kallas takes a harder line, for example by preventing the circumvention of sanctions by adding third-country companies or even third countries on the bloc's blacklist. While the EU already has mechanisms in place to do this, so far the lists have remained empty.

If approved (and really it is a case of when rather than if), the former Estonian prime minister is likely to present a new sanctions regime targeting hybrid threats to the EU. A new regime dealing with Russian subversive actions toward the bloc was recently enacted, but Kallas is expected to push for a global mechanism.

Many MEPs will certainly push Kallas to include corruption as a sanctionable offense in the EU's "Magnitsky Act," which sets out sanctions for human rights violators in Russia. That's something that has eluded previous EU foreign policy chiefs, and those pushing such a measure hope it would mean leveraging Russian frozen assets in the EU to pay for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Both moves require unanimity, and it will be Kallas's job to get that done.

Drilling Down:

  • Both von der Leyen and the European Parliament will want Kallas to try to get more EU foreign policy decisions to be taken via qualified majority voting (55 percent of EU member states covering 65 percent of the total EU population voting in favor) to circumvent national vetoes. For a long time, this has been top of the EU's wish list, as it would allow the bloc to be nimbler in world affairs. Quite a few national capitals, however, are reluctant to give up their foreign policy prerogatives, and you need unanimity to get rid of the unanimity.
  • Perhaps the most curious aspect of von der Leyen's mission letter is that it doesn't mention the Western Balkans or China. Still, the MEPs will surely question her on both.
  • I have a hunch that she might announce at the hearing that her first trip as commissioner would be a visit to the Western Balkans. On this, she will certainly be quizzed on how she intends to resuscitate the EU-mediated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.
  • Her predecessors, Federica Mogherini and Josep Borrell, didn't accomplish much in Serbia-Kosovo relations over the last 10 years. Will she have a more hands-on approach with regular meetings with the two countries' leaders, or will she delegate the talks to a special representative, as Borrell did?
  • The EU recently announced tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and Kallas will likely be asked if she has more sectors in her crosshairs. She will also be pressed on whether she will go after China if Beijing continues to help the Kremlin's war efforts in Ukraine.
  • With the hearing coming a week after the U.S. election, there will also be questions about future relations with Washington, especially if the more isolationist Donald Trump returns to the White House.
  • Kallas, according to people who know her, is an ardent transatlanticist, but she will be asked about the need for the EU to develop some sort of "strategic autonomy" -- a concept that many in the eastern part of the bloc have seen as a French plan to diminish U.S. influence and elevate its own.
  • One of her key tasks, together with the newly created portfolio of defense (given to the former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius), will be to compose a white paper on the future of European defense in the first 100 days of her mandate.
  • As always, the million-dollar question will be how much money should be given to build up a European defense industry -- plus, whether the EU will work with non-EU defense contractors.
  • And then there is, of course, the crisis in the Middle East. With member states divided on Israel, it's clear that the EU doesn't have much desire to shape the situation right now. But once the dust settles, there are calls for a robust plan. As her mission letter states: "You will take forward a comprehensive EU Middle East Strategy with a view to the day after the war in Gaza, focusing on promoting all the steps needed for the two-state solution and strengthening partnerships with key regional stakeholders."

Briefing #2: Marta Kos's Turn In The Hot Seat

What You Need To Know: While Kallas is expected to breeze through the questioning, the Slovenian commissioner-designate for enlargement, Marta Kos, is likely to face a stormier hearing on November 7. From speaking to sources in the European Parliament, it's thought that she is one of the candidates who could be voted down.

For starters, she is left-leaning in a chamber that is increasingly tilting right. Then there's the comments she made a month after Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when she noted that doors must not be closed toward Russia. There are also allegations of links to the former Yugoslav secret police, which she has denied, and complaints from former employees about her management when she served as Slovenia's ambassador to Germany.

While most of the questions will likely focus on how she ensures that EU hopefuls in both the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) and in the east (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) move toward membership, there are plenty of other things for MEPs to sink their teeth into.

Deep Background: A key question is whether Kos will commit to any dates for future enlargement during her term, which ends in 2029. For example, Montenegro wants to be a member by 2028, but does she think that is feasible? Moldova and Ukraine aim to be part of the bloc by 2030, but does she think that's reasonable?

To be sure, enlargement timelines are complicated and not solely her call. She is a guide not a decision-maker. And the fact remains that no country has joined the EU since Croatia back in 2013, and every current member state can veto any opening and closing of EU accession chapters.

Moreover, von der Leyen's mission letter to Kos also doesn't commit. The letter just states that "you will work on gradual integration of candidate countries as they work to join the [European] Union."

Drilling Down:

  • Even though, if approved, she may not see any new countries joining under her watch, Kos is likely to see quite a few of them advancing. Already in the first half of 2025, Moldova and Ukraine are expected to open the first EU accession chapters, de facto starting the negotiation process.
  • While so far there seems to be little resistance in the bloc to Moldova joining, it will be interesting to see how Kos will deal with the member states, notably Hungary and possibly also Slovakia, that have expressed reservations about Ukraine's potential membership. Will she, for example, be in favor of decoupling Ukraine's and Moldova's candidacies?
  • While Bosnia-Herzegovina is hoping to start opening chapters, conditions need to be met by Sarajevo, including stepping up the fight against organized crime and corruption.
  • It might be that Kos would be the one to drag Montenegro over the finish line or at least get the country most of the way. Podgorica has opened negotiations on all 33 policy accession chapters but has only managed to conclude talks on three of them. At this point, Montenegro is closest to become EU member 28 and there is a feeling among pro-enlargement diplomats and politicians in Brussels that the bloc must show to other prospective members that enlargement is indeed possible.
  • It won't be smooth sailing. While Albania just recently opened chapters and is making good progress, Serbia's accession could continue to be thwarted by Russia hawks in the EU's eastern members objecting to Belgrade's close links to Moscow.
  • North Macedonia's newish center-right government is unlikely to meet Bulgarian demands that it change the country's constitution in order to open up the path for Skopje to start talks. North Macedonia's government has also referred to the country as just "Macedonia," irritating its southern neighbor Greece, which for decades was embroiled in fights with Skopje over the name issue. Finding ways for North Macedonia to have better neighborly relations with both Bulgaria and Greece will be an issue Kos will certainly be grilled on by MEPs. If she does get the job, she will spend a lot of time dealing with these delicate matters.
  • Kosovo's EU membership application is stuck in the European Council, where EU members sit, as nonrecognizers of Pristina such as Spain aren't keen to send the application for an assessment across the street to the European Commission. Most likely, Kos will say that she is ready to sign off on the assessment but that it's ultimately out of her hands.
  • And then there is Georgia, which has had its EU aspirations come to a halt over several controversial laws adopted by the current government. Kos's hearing will take place after key parliamentary elections in Georgia on October 26, so definitely expect some questions there. Georgia is actually not mentioned by name in the mission letter, which just says that "you should also develop a coordinated approach to supporting the countries of the Southern Caucasus, including on regional connectivity." Perhaps I'm reading too much into it, but to lump Georgia in with Azerbaijan, an undemocratic state with no interest in joining the EU, and Armenia, which might be interested in joining but is reluctant to apply for fear of upsetting Moscow, seems to be already something of a snub.

Looking Ahead

There is another plenary of the European Parliament in Strasbourg this week. Look out for the debate and vote today (October 22) on the EU's next round of financial aid for Ukraine. The lawmakers are set to approve the 35 billion-euro ($38 billion) package after EU member states gave their consent earlier in October.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

I will be off next week, so the new issue of the newsletter will come on November 5.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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