Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: the EU's new Russian sanctions package and military aid to Armenia and Georgia.

Brief#1: The EU Could Further Sanction Russian Energy

What You Need to Know: On May 8, the European Commission presented a new round of sanctions on Russia and Belarus to the ambassadors of the European Union member states. The proposal, seen by RFE/RL, is actually surprisingly ambitious, given that the bloc has adopted numerous rather weak packages in the past. The big question is whether the measures, if adopted, will retain their clout. As they have to be adopted unanimously, there is a risk of them being watered down.

Surprisingly, the proposed measures touch on Russian energy, something that has been a "no-go" ever since the EU managed to impose a near-ban on Russian oil imports in 2022 after months of diplomatic bickering. This time, the European Commission is proposing to hit Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG).

However, the sanctions proposal does not suggest banning direct imports to the EU, which make up some 5 percent of the bloc's energy consumption and can be replaced immediately, according to European Commission estimates. Instead, a gradual approach is being suggested by forbidding transshipment, meaning that EU countries would be prevented from reexporting Russian LNG and therefore forcing Russian ships to make longer journeys to reach their final destination.

There is also a ban on investing or providing services for huge Russian LNG-infrastructure projects under construction -- Arctic LNG and Murmansk LNG. Big countries such as Germany, France, and Italy have already asked for an impact assessment of how these LNG-related measures will work, suggesting that member states are nervous about this move.

Deep Background: Another issue that might be tricky for EU member states to green-light is a proposed import ban on helium. So far, EU helium imports from Russia only amount to about $1 billion a year, but Russia has the ambition of becoming one of the world's biggest helium suppliers in the future.

In the proposal, there is also a push to expand the liability of sanctions violations to EU subsidiaries abroad, which could be a step too far for EU member states as they would argue that it is too complicated to keep track of everything that has been decided in Brussels and too much of a regulatory burden for companies.

What else is in the proposal? There is a prohibition on using the System For Transfer Of Financial Messages (SPFS), a sort of Moscow-based SWIFT, which should pass even though Hungary has expressed reservations.

Then there are things that appear straightforward but which potentially may not cut it with member states. One is the restriction on the use and transfer in Russia of plant-variety rights, which give farmers the exclusive control over the planting, harvesting, selling, exporting, and importing of certain species. France and Portugal have voiced concerns here, arguing that such a move could lead to global food scarcity.

It will also be interesting to see if a proposed ban on Russian state financing for EU-based political parties, foundations, think tanks, NGOs, and media service providers in the union won't be watered down. Some countries, notably Hungary and Slovakia, enjoy warm relations with the Kremlin and might lack the political will; others, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, have constitutional restrictions on the state interfering in media and civil society funding.

The proposed ban on acquiring Ukrainian cultural goods if there are suspicions that these items have been illegally removed from Ukraine should, however, fly. As will a bid to block the operation in the EU of transport companies that are at least 25 percent owned by Russians -- a more stringent measure than the status quo, where companies can only be blocked if Russians hold a majority stake. Measures hitting Russia's so-called shadow fleet, vessels with unclear ownership that Moscow is using to circumvent the bloc's oil transport ban, are also expected to pass.

Drilling Down

• A proposed broadcasting ban on the pro-Russian propaganda network Voice of Europe, the state-owned RIA Novosti news agency, and the Russian newspapers Izvestia and Rossiiskaya gazeta is also expected. Under such a measure, the four companies would be added to the same EU blacklist as Russia’s state-owned RT and Sputnik. That means EU citizens can't access their media products in the bloc, but correspondents from these companies still have the right to report from member states. I understand that the decision on this issue could be taken separately and be rubber-stamped by EU ambassadors when they assemble again in Brussels on May 15.
• There are also suggested asset freezes and visa bans on two people associated with Voice of Europe: Artem Marchevskiy and Viktor Medvedchuk, with the proposal stating that "Marchevskiy has used Voice of Europe as a vehicle for funneling financial resources designated for remuneration of propagandists, and for building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe."
• As always, some interesting derogations are being proposed. A flight ban on Russian aircraft over EU territory was introduced shortly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, Russian travelers have been using creative ways of getting around this by using quick stopovers in places like Armenia, Georgia, or Turkey, or by masking which companies are running the flight. The European Commission is proposing to tighten this by adding the requirement for flight operators to disclose the owner of the actual aircraft, as well as the nationalities of the passengers. There is, however, an exemption from this requirement for aircraft with no more than four seats and with a maximum take-off mass of 2,000 kilograms. Sounds ideal for small private jets used by rich Russians.
• And then you have Belarus, where the European Commission is suggesting measures for Minsk that have already been adopted for Russia. This includes, among other things, import bans on maritime navigation components, diamonds, gold, and coal, and a prohibition on providing Belarus with various IT services.
• An important derogation has also been suggested: the possibility of allowing Belarusian potash, used in agricultural fertilizers, to be shipped via the EU to third countries where there is food scarcity. So far, Belarusian potash has been banned and it will continue to be prohibited, but there is now a suggestion that an empty annex to the document could be adopted in which the names of at-risk third countries can be added in the future in case there is a potash shortage. The Baltic states are against this move as they believe it would reward the regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and force them to allow Belarusian potash to transit their countries. Others like Italy, Portugal, and Spain have countered that the EU must be seen to do more to avoid accusations of causing food shortages globally and that the empty annex is a last resort that very well may remain empty.

Brief#2: EU Military Aid For Armenia And Georgia

What You Need To Know: One of the more successful, if perhaps underreported, European Union initiatives in recent years is the European Peace Facility (EPF), created back in 2021, to finance actions such as training missions and military equipment in third countries. The facility is outside the regular EU budget, meaning that the 27 member states of the bloc contribute as they see fit.

At the start, it was largely meant to finance projects and missions in Africa with a budget ceiling of 5.6 billion euros ($6 billion), but with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year later, the ceiling has now been elevated to 17 billion euros. The EPF has also allowed the EU as an organization for the first time ever to send lethal military aid, with assistance worth nearly $3.9 billion going to Ukraine.

Other countries in the EU's eastern neighborhood have also benefited from contributions from the fund. Last month, Moldova received some $44 million over a period of 40 months for nonlethal equipment in areas such as air surveillance, electronic warfare, and logistics. Georgia received more than $32 million last year to boost its army in the fields of military engineering, command and control, medical equipment, logistics, and cyberdefense -- a sum that came on top of previous contributions from the EU, worth $34.5 million, for similar purposes.

Deep Background: Now, once again, Georgia is in line for more cash from the EPF -- as is Armenia. For Armenia, it would be the first time ever it had received such funding and would signify a small but symbolic step for Yerevan in its relationship with the European Union. (There are even rumors in Brussels that Armenia might soon even apply to join the bloc.)

The draft EPF proposal, seen by RFE/RL, also hints at Armenia's closer cooperation with the bloc: "the assistance measure aims to allow the armed forces to enhance operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with (European) Union standards and interoperability, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies. It will also strengthen Armenia's capacities in regard to its future participation in EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operations and missions."

Interestingly, the proposal for Georgia contains the same wording. For both countries, the proposal states that the "objective of the assistance measure is to contribute to the strengthening of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia/Georgia's capacities to enhance national security, stability, and resilience in the defense sector."

Drilling Down

• There are key differences between the military proposals for the two countries. Armenia's is a rather modest one – worth nearly $11 million for the upcoming 30 months. The document makes it clear that it will finance the "types of equipment not designed to deliver lethal force" and spells out that it will contribute mobile field-camp capability for a battalion-sized unit and a medical treatment facility. For Georgia, the proposal is to the tune of more than $32 million for 40 months. As with Armenia, there is support for logistics equipment, but then additionally there is also money available for artillery command-and-control equipment, engineering equipment, and cyberdefense equipment.
• For both countries, there are also safeguards in case things don't go to plan. The funding can be suspended or terminated altogether if Yerevan or Tbilisi are not following international human rights law, if the cash is not used for the purpose it was provided for, or if any equipment is transferred without Brussels' consent.
• To make sure the money isn't frittered away, the EU has also insisted on delivery certifications and onsite visits upon request by the EU foreign policy chief or EU auditors, as well as reports on how the various projects are doing every six months.
• These sorts of requests are standard in Brussels, but they also reflect potential unease as these decisions ultimately are political. All 27 EU member states must sign off on them.
• In the case of Georgia, EU ambassadors already did so on May 8. Despite growing worries about the potential of Georgia adopting a "foreign agent" law --- which requires media outlets, NGOs, and other nonprofits to register as "pursuing the interests of a foreign power" if more than 20 percent of their funding comes from abroad -- the member states decided not to touch the EPF money for Tbilisi. One argument not to cut Tbilisi off was that the continued funding would lead to more transparency and the EU would have some oversight of the Georgian armed forces.
• Instead, the EU is looking into other ways to respond in case the law is adopted, including halting Georgia's EU accession process, freezing some other EU funds meant for Georgia, or even looking into ways to suspend visa liberalization with the country.
• It is actually Armenia's EPF proposal that is more problematic. So far, it hasn't reached the EU ambassadors' desks as it remains stuck in lower-level working groups partly as a result of Hungary blocking it. Hungary, which enjoys close ties with Azerbaijan, has conditioned its green light for Armenia on Baku getting its own EPF program as well. While other EU member states would be open to Azerbaijan also benefiting from the fund, there is one problem: the EPF functions in such a way that a third country must ask if they can be part of it and, so far, Baku has not shown any interest.

Looking Ahead

Watch out for the annual meeting of the foreign ministers of the Council of Europe, which focuses on promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law on the continent, in Strasbourg on May 16-17. There had been hopes that, after this session, Kosovo would be approved to join the organization. But as Pristina hasn't submitted a draft law on the establishment of an association of Serbian-majority municipalities -- a key sticking point between Kosovo and Serbia -- chances now appear slim that this will happen.

NATO countries' chiefs of defense will assemble in Brussels on May 16 to discuss weapon deliveries to Ukraine, a potential NATO mission to coordinate these deliveries and train troops, and how to ramp up military production in the alliance.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: Moldova’s and Ukraine’s next EU steps; and a deeper dive into the political views of Central and Eastern Europeans.

Brief #1: Moldova And Ukraine To Start EU Accession Talks. Or Are They?

What You Need To Know: Both Ukraine and Moldova are expected to formally open EU accession talks in the final week of June. Several diplomats that RFE/RL spoke to on condition of anonymity are confident that a “ceremonial intergovernmental conference” (IGC) will be held in Brussels with the pair just before Hungary takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the EU on July 1.

They also said they expected the negotiation frameworks with both countries to be adopted by EU member states at the same time. You would be forgiven for thinking that talks with Ukraine and Moldova had already started, recalling that EU leaders in December 2023 green-lighted the kickoff of negotiations. That, however, was just a political opening shot in a long and arduous process of accepting new members to the club in which unanimity by the 27 current member states will be required at many stages. And it is a process that both politicians and the media are rather confused about.

Deep Background: Just take the question of what actually constitutes the start of EU accession talks with an EU candidate country. It’s complicated, as the answer might differ depending on who you ask. There are, in fact, three correct replies to that query. Some say it is when EU leaders say they give a green light; in other words, what happened for Ukraine and Moldova at the end of last year. Others in Brussels would argue it is when the first IGC takes place, which is what Kyiv and Chisinau are expecting at the end of next month.

But there are also officials in the EU capital who claim that the negotiations only start in earnest once the first of around 33 accession chapters (covering EU rules in everything from agriculture to foreign policy that candidates need to adopt) is officially opened. And this is not expected to happen for either Ukraine or Moldova in June, as the IGC is expected to be a “ceremonial” one and not what Brussels types refer to as “political IGCs,” in which chapters are opened or closed.

At best, this could happen sometime in 2025. And, as always, all EU member states must agree to such a move, which isn’t always a cakewalk. To illustrate this, take the examples of North Macedonia and Albania. In March 2020, EU leaders decided to open talks with that Western Balkans pair, and in July 2022 they had their respective ceremonial IGCs. But they haven’t actually opened and/or closed any chapters yet.

The main reason for this is bilateral issues with EU member states. North Macedonia needs to change its constitution to include language on Bulgarians as a founding people. Albania’s path remains blocked by Greece over a nearly yearlong spat over the imprisonment of an ethnic Greek mayor in the southern Albanian town of Himare.

So, Ukraine and Moldova would essentially move into the same “category” as Tirana and Skopje at the end of June: EU leaders have green-lighted the start of talks and ceremonial IGCs will have taken place, but the nitty-gritty matters of actually negotiating stuff in various policy fields are yet to take place.

Drilling Down

• Why does the EU conduct these “ceremonial IGCs,” then? In a sense, to encourage EU hopefuls. Montenegro, for example, had one in January. This despite the fact that it had previously both opened and closed chapters and is the most advanced of all EU candidate countries in this exercise. Brussels essentially wanted to give Podgorica “a tap on the shoulder,” indicating that the country is slowly heading in the right direction again after a few politically turbulent years.
• But the real reason is also to avoid vetoes. Hungary has made clear that it opposes Ukrainian EU membership for the moment. Budapest will reportedly be OK with lifting its veto in June for Ukraine (and by extension Moldova, as it is paired with Kyiv) because it knows full well that it doesn’t mean that negotiations chapters will be opened.
• It also means that Hungary doesn’t have to give Ukraine any “carrots” during its presidency in the second half of this year. I have also heard from sources in Brussels that Ukraine is being encouraged not to make too much of a fuss over the potential IGC in June -- mainly to avoid needlessly provoking Hungary.
• Budapest has on numerous occasions voiced worries about the rights of the Hungarian-speaking minority in Ukraine, and that’s still an open question. When the European Commission presented so-called “oral updates” to EU member states on the progress made by Ukraine and Moldova so far on necessary reforms, the European Commission found that Kyiv still had not completed all necessary legislative changes pertaining to laws related to national minorities.
• Several EU member states, however, believe that Ukraine has done its homework and that the European Commission’s assessment is colored by Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi, a Hungarian with close ties to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
• This discrepancy in interpretation has meant that there won’t be another European Commission assessment on Ukrainian progress (or lack thereof) in June, as it would provide Hungary with another opportunity to block. But it also means that Budapest can, of course, and probably will, use its veto further down the road if it isn’t satisfied with Kyiv’s reforms.
• And in June, Hungary will most likely also use its threat of a veto to “leverage” progress for some of its friends among candidate countries in the Western Balkans: Montenegro, and possibly Serbia.
• The former is set to close a few accession chapters in June, and it could be that Belgrade is likely to open some. Serbia has essentially stood still on its EU path for the last few years, as several EU member states have questioned its refusal to align with EU sanctions against Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• It could well be that the Russia hawks such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have to lift their vetoes for Belgrade in order to secure an IGC for Ukraine. The Brussels horse-trading over enlargement decisions could, in other words, still be in full swing.

Brief #2: What Central And Eastern Europeans Think About NATO And The EU

What You Need To Know: On May 2, perhaps the foremost think tank in Central Europe, GlobSec, published its annual survey of political attitudes among seven Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU 20 years ago -- the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia -- as well as Bulgaria and Romania, which became members of the club in 2007. In other words, a club of nine former Warsaw Pact members or Soviet republics that now are anchored in Western institutions and organizations and playing an increasingly prominent role in them.

Titled Globsec Trends 2024 – A Brave New Region, the survey quizzed respondents in February/March about their attitudes to EU and NATO memberships of their home countries, the war in Ukraine, and relations with big powers, among other things.

Deep Background: Support for EU and NATO membership remains strong across the nine countries polled. On average, 78 percent of the respondents want their country to remain in the EU, a number similar to previous years; for NATO membership, the regional average is 81 percent -- a surge from 73 percent in 2021, likely triggered by the Russian invasion in nearby Ukraine and the appreciation of being part of a bigger military alliance.

Digging deeper into the numbers, some interesting things pop up. Only 71 percent of Czechs want to stay in the EU -- the lowest figure among the nine countries. No explanations are offered, but it might stem from Brussels-bashing ex-presidents like Vaclav Klaus and Milos Zeman or the enduring legacy of the right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS), for decades arguably the most influential party in the Czech Republic and a staunch member of the mildly Euroskeptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) political grouping in the European Parliament.

Interestingly, the highest level of support for EU membership is in Hungary with 86 percent (tied for first with Lithuania). An enigma perhaps, considering that Hungarians for over a decade have opted electorally for Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party, which are in a seemingly perpetual struggle against Brussels in many areas.

You also have Slovakia, in which 72 percent of people want to stay in the EU. That figure is still quite high, but when you consider that it was 93 percent when the country joined the bloc 20 years ago, that’s quite an alarming slide and possibly something that the recently returned left-wing populist Prime Minister Robert Fico has tapped into.

Or take Bulgaria, which is the only country of the nine in which respondents don’t believe that their country has a greater influence in global affairs thanks to its EU membership; on the contrary, a whopping 73 percent of Bulgarian respondents thinks Brussels dictates what to do without Sofia having the power to influence it.

Drilling Down

• Wading more deeply into the numbers, you’ll quickly notice that there is substantial evidence that Bulgaria and Slovakia, and to a certain extent Hungary, are proper outliers compared to the other six countries.
• Twenty-seven percent of Bulgarians and 24 percent of Slovaks still express a desire for their countries to leave NATO -- much higher than in the other countries -- potentially reflecting decades of anti-Western and even Russia-friendly sentiments.
• Forty-one percent of Slovaks see the United States as a threat, as do 33 percent of Bulgarians; some 44 of Slovaks and 32 percent of Bulgarians see “Western society and their way of living” as a threat.
• What about the Russia of today, then? Again, the opinion of the trio sticks out. Twenty-seven percent of Slovaks see Russia as a strategic partner, as do 23 percent of Bulgarians and 22 percent of Hungarians; however, the numbers in all three countries have decreased considerably compared to 2021, when it was close to half. By contrast, only 3 percent of Poles and 2 percent of Lithuanians see Russia in a similarly positive light.
• Thirty-four percent of Hungarians see China as a strategic partner, with Slovakia a distant second at 16 percent -- surely reflecting Budapest’s open courtship of Beijing in recent years. (Chinese President Xi is making Hungary one of his three stops this week on his first European trip in five years.)
• In seven out of the nine countries polled, Germany was seen as the most important strategic partner, probably reflecting the economic clout of Berlin in the region. Only in Poland and Romania was the United States considered a bigger partner -- which comes as no surprise considering general pro-American sentiments and considerable U.S. military presences in the two countries.
• Relations with Ukraine and opinions on the war there also reflect Bulgaria’s, Slovakia’s, and to a lesser extent Hungary’s alternative views. In the former two, fewer than half of the respondents viewed Russia as the main perpetrator of war. Thirty-four percent of Bulgarians instead thought that the West provoked Russia into conflict, and 31 percent of Slovaks were of the same opinion.
• Interestingly, in the entire region there is no country where the absolute majority of respondents envision Ukraine as a member of both the EU and NATO -- the stated geopolitical goal of Kyiv and something that is backed by most Ukrainians.
• Forty-nine percent of Latvians and Lithuanians think Ukraine should be members of both organizations. In Estonia, 48 percent backed this, as did 40 percent of Poles and Romanians.
• More worryingly for Ukraine, a full 57 percent of Hungarians think theirs should be a neutral country, as do 49 percent of Slovaks. Surprisingly, 36 percent of Czechs held the same view, with only 35 percent wanting it to be a member of both main Western alliances.
• Considering that the decisions to accept members to both the EU and NATO require unanimity, the relatively low support for Ukraine among some of its neighbors can spell problems for the country’s political future.

Looking Ahead

It’s a short week in Brussels, as institutions are closed on May 9-10 due to the Ascension holidays. But look out for the meeting of EU ambassadors in Brussels on May 8. They are expected to finally agree on sending the profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine and, for the first time, discuss another round of sanctions on Russia and Belarus.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X, formerly, Twitter, @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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