Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'll be focusing on Estonia, in particular its outsized role in assisting Ukraine, following a few days in Tallinn at this year's Lennart Meri Conference.

Briefing: Bold But Also Vulnerable -- Estonia's Leading Role On Ukraine

What You Need To Know: The mood at this year's Lennart Meri Conference, which brings together policymakers, analysts, and military officials to discuss foreign and security policy, shouldn't have been the best. Things are not going well in Ukraine, with Russia pounding the Kharkiv region, sensing a window of opportunity as the bulk of the U.S. aid agreed a few weeks ago has still not arrived.

And as the three-day event in Estonia's capital Tallinn kicked off on May 16, news filtered through from Beijing that China and Russia had agreed to deepen their "no-limits partnership." That partnership was agreed in 2022 during a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, and the two countries deepening ties further will result in sustained Chinese political, economic, and even military support for the Kremlin.

Yet, the mood at the conference wasn't as gloomy as the Munich Security Conference in February. The more upbeat tone began with the opening remarks from Indrek Kannik, the director of the Tallinn-based International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS), which organized the event. He noted that "the situation is shit, but that is the fertilizer of our future." The expression was one coined by Lennart Meri, the first post-Soviet president of the country, who dragged Estonia back to the Western world. In front of an audience of foreign diplomats and political commentators, the joke nearly brought down the house.

That set the tone for the conference, with this year's theme being "Let us not despair, but act." And acting, especially when it comes to supporting Ukraine, is something that Tallinn has done.

Deep Background: Estonia has put huge amounts of effort into gathering evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine and bringing perpetrators to justice. It came up with the idea of actually seizing frozen Russian assets in the European Union to pay for both Kyiv's war effort and the eventual reconstruction.

Earlier in May, EU ambassadors finally agreed to seize the annual profits of Russian central bank assets held in the EU, which could generate some 3 billion euros ($3.27 billion) for Ukraine every year. Estonia, however, has gone one step further. Last week, its parliament voted in favor of a law that would allow the confiscation of assets in the country belonging to private Russian citizens if there is a proven link to the Russian war machine.

This is unlikely to be replicated at the EU level, but it could get the ball rolling on eventually seizing the frozen Russian state assets -- rather than just their annual profits -- which are estimated to be worth more than 300 billion euros ($326 billion).

And it doesn't stop there. Tallinn has given Ukraine roughly $640 million worth of military, humanitarian, and financial aid. While perhaps that contribution isn't too much in absolute terms, it constitutes 1.6 percent of Estonia's total gross domestic product (GDP), more than any other country that has supplied Ukraine with aid.

The challenge now is how to sustain all the different contributions to the ailing country -- and here Tallinn is pushing for various options. One of Estonia's ideas, much touted at the conference, is for all Western allies to commit 0.25 percent of their GDP in military aid to Ukraine. So far, the idea has not gained much traction.

Another option is the issuing of joint EU bonds (Eurobonds) to boost defense production on the continent. This is something that the French have firmly backed, and with which Estonia is fully on board. While the practice of joint EU borrowing was agreed upon for the first time ever to finance the post-coronavirus pandemic reconstruction in 2020, the idea is unlikely to fly.

Accruing debt is anathema both for the German liberals who hold up the current government coalition in Berlin and for the new, financially hawkish Dutch government soon to be sworn in. Speaking at one panel, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was, however, still defiant on the Eurobonds option, noting that it was "not dismissed completely [in Brussels], so then it is not dead yet."

But what about the much more sensitive issue of having Western soldiers on the ground in Ukraine? French President Emmanuel Macron famously didn't rule it out when the topic was broached earlier this spring and has since refused to walk it back. Charles Brown, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted last week that a NATO deployment of trainers in the country is likely to happen over time.

This is also something I heard from Estonian officials in Tallinn this weekend. For quite some time, the Baltic nation has assessed the possibility of sending Estonian soldiers -- preferably under a NATO umbrella -- but only in support roles a long way from the front line.

Drilling Down:

• In the meantime, the most pressing need concerns weapons deliveries to Ukraine, where Tallinn has also been leading the way. However, there are some harsh realities here as well. The "Estonian proposal," which swiftly became an EU-wide objective, to supply 1 million 155 mm shells to Ukraine by March 2024 only succeeded in delivering half of that. The current goal is to deliver the remaining amount by the end of the year.
• Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur recently said that his ministry had managed to find another 1 million shells worldwide, but it may very well be that the Estonians have the same issues as the Czechs who, earlier this year, announced with much fanfare that they had "identified" 800,000 shells globally. The problems, as the Czechs discovered, is that identifying the shells in various third countries is not the same as actually having them and getting them to the Ukrainian front lines. As Czech diplomats admitted to me, it is a seller's market, after all, with demand exceeding supply. Russia is trying not only to outbid and buy them all up but also use other underhand means, including political pressure and sabotage, to prevent deliveries to Kyiv.
• So far, nothing from the Czech initiative (which Estonia also backs financially) has been delivered, even though it is expected that a first batch of 180,000 shells will arrive at the beginning of June and another 400,000 later in the summer.
• With all the busy Estonian diplomatic activity, it is no surprise that the country's politicians are being touted for top jobs in the EU and NATO. Prime Minister Kallas is a favorite to secure something when the positions are dished out in June after the European Parliament elections. And the Lennart Meri Conference felt very much like an audition for her, as she appeared on stage consecutive days and hobnobbed generously with the foreign journalists.
• She seemed more mellow and less combative than usual, perhaps a play to win over Western doubters, some of whom have half-jokingly noted that she "eats Russians for breakfast." In perhaps a similar vein, an Estonian diplomat mentioned a recent vote at the United Nations where Estonia backed a UN resolution calling for full membership for Palestine. This was a complete U-turn from Tallinn, as it usually tends to be very pro-Israeli. With that vote, was the prime minister trying to be more "palatable" to Western Europeans?
• It's still not clear if Kallas wants the job as the EU foreign policy chief, which many in Brussels think is hers already. She was rather red-faced when directly asked on stage about the position, saying that she had "no idea how it works, as she was not around in 2019," when the top EU jobs were handed out the last time. She did add that she was "honored" that her name was circulating but was quick to add that she was also frequently mentioned as a possible candidate for the NATO secretary-general position, which more or less appears to be going to Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte.
• There are two main obstacles for Kallas getting the EU job. The first is the arcane, behind-closed-doors negotiations by which the 27 EU heads of state and government choose the presidents of the European Commission, the European Council, and the EU foreign policy leader when they convene in Brussels. The three top jobs are chosen to reflect a geographic, gender, and political party balance. With the center-right European People's Party (EPP) expected to come out on top in June's European Parliament elections, it is likely that the new European Commission president will come from their ranks. They would likely (although not certainly) push for the German incumbent, Ursula von der Leyen, to be reselected for another five years. The center-left group, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), which looks set to finish runners-up, will likely claim the presidency of the European Council, an institution that sets the general political direction and priorities of the EU. Whereas Kallas's liberal Renew Europe group will fight out with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) for third place and the the role of EU foreign policy chief. In terms of geographic parity, the idea is that someone from Central or Eastern Europe should get one of the three key roles, having been overlooked in 2019 and with Kallas probably not destined for the unrelated but somewhat linked NATO top job. Most front-runners for the three top jobs from the east are in the EPP and there are hardly any coming from the S&D, ECR, or Renew Europe. So Kallas, as a member of Renew Europe, does have a decent chance, but then the liberals must do well in the June elections, which is far from certain.
• And then there is the second obstacle. The so-called "easterners" are far from a coherent bunch, stretching from Estonia in the north to Bulgaria in the south. And they are seemingly not very good at lobbying for each other to get what they want in Brussels. Take the decision among EU member states last week to elect Irish General Sean Clancy as chair of the European Union Military Committee, an obscure but increasingly significant body given the Ukraine war. The very fact that a neutral member state with limited military capabilities got that position ahead of a Polish general, with Warsaw being NATO's biggest defense spender per capita, raised a few eyebrows.
• My biggest takeaway from the conference was, despite all the tough talk, the pervasive sense of Estonian vulnerability. Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur noted that in the last 25 years, NATO has seen a 61 percent increase in defense spending; in the same period, Russia's has grown by 600 percent. Worryingly, Pevkur then noted that the NATO defense plans that were agreed upon at the NATO Vilnius summit last year to protect every inch of the alliance's territory aren't fully executable yet, as there just aren't enough military capabilities. And while Russia is currently tied down in Ukraine and doesn't have enough firepower in the Baltic region, Pevkur cautioned that this could change and Russia could still test NATO with hybrid threats such as cyberattacks and sabotage. This point was also hammered home by Estonia's ambassador to NATO, Juri Luik, who said that in international waters such as the Baltic Sea, Russia has options. He said that underwater infrastructure would be a prime target, as the three Baltic states, together with Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, all share the same submarine power cables -- and the same vulnerabilities. Luik also noted that while Swedish and Finnish NATO membership has increased deterrence in the region, the balance of power has not changed when it comes to protecting the Baltic states. And this vulnerability is paradoxically increasing, he said, as Russia declines as a global power.

Looking Ahead

On May 23, the final debate is taking place ahead of European Parliament elections across the bloc on June 6-9. The debaters are the so-called "lead candidates" of the respective political groups in the European Parliament, with the idea that the party that gets the biggest vote share will end up putting forward their lead candidates for the European Commission presidency. Normally, the leaders of the 27 EU member states ignore this "electoral advice" and a new president is chosen in various backroom deals. But this time around, they might actually heed the advice, as the lead candidate for the center-right coalition set to finish first is the sitting commission president, von der Leyen.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: the EU's new Russian sanctions package and military aid to Armenia and Georgia.

Brief#1: The EU Could Further Sanction Russian Energy

What You Need to Know: On May 8, the European Commission presented a new round of sanctions on Russia and Belarus to the ambassadors of the European Union member states. The proposal, seen by RFE/RL, is actually surprisingly ambitious, given that the bloc has adopted numerous rather weak packages in the past. The big question is whether the measures, if adopted, will retain their clout. As they have to be adopted unanimously, there is a risk of them being watered down.

Surprisingly, the proposed measures touch on Russian energy, something that has been a "no-go" ever since the EU managed to impose a near-ban on Russian oil imports in 2022 after months of diplomatic bickering. This time, the European Commission is proposing to hit Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG).

However, the sanctions proposal does not suggest banning direct imports to the EU, which make up some 5 percent of the bloc's energy consumption and can be replaced immediately, according to European Commission estimates. Instead, a gradual approach is being suggested by forbidding transshipment, meaning that EU countries would be prevented from reexporting Russian LNG and therefore forcing Russian ships to make longer journeys to reach their final destination.

There is also a ban on investing or providing services for huge Russian LNG-infrastructure projects under construction -- Arctic LNG and Murmansk LNG. Big countries such as Germany, France, and Italy have already asked for an impact assessment of how these LNG-related measures will work, suggesting that member states are nervous about this move.

Deep Background: Another issue that might be tricky for EU member states to green-light is a proposed import ban on helium. So far, EU helium imports from Russia only amount to about $1 billion a year, but Russia has the ambition of becoming one of the world's biggest helium suppliers in the future.

In the proposal, there is also a push to expand the liability of sanctions violations to EU subsidiaries abroad, which could be a step too far for EU member states as they would argue that it is too complicated to keep track of everything that has been decided in Brussels and too much of a regulatory burden for companies.

What else is in the proposal? There is a prohibition on using the System For Transfer Of Financial Messages (SPFS), a sort of Moscow-based SWIFT, which should pass even though Hungary has expressed reservations.

Then there are things that appear straightforward but which potentially may not cut it with member states. One is the restriction on the use and transfer in Russia of plant-variety rights, which give farmers the exclusive control over the planting, harvesting, selling, exporting, and importing of certain species. France and Portugal have voiced concerns here, arguing that such a move could lead to global food scarcity.

It will also be interesting to see if a proposed ban on Russian state financing for EU-based political parties, foundations, think tanks, NGOs, and media service providers in the union won't be watered down. Some countries, notably Hungary and Slovakia, enjoy warm relations with the Kremlin and might lack the political will; others, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, have constitutional restrictions on the state interfering in media and civil society funding.

The proposed ban on acquiring Ukrainian cultural goods if there are suspicions that these items have been illegally removed from Ukraine should, however, fly. As will a bid to block the operation in the EU of transport companies that are at least 25 percent owned by Russians -- a more stringent measure than the status quo, where companies can only be blocked if Russians hold a majority stake. Measures hitting Russia's so-called shadow fleet, vessels with unclear ownership that Moscow is using to circumvent the bloc's oil transport ban, are also expected to pass.

Drilling Down

• A proposed broadcasting ban on the pro-Russian propaganda network Voice of Europe, the state-owned RIA Novosti news agency, and the Russian newspapers Izvestia and Rossiiskaya gazeta is also expected. Under such a measure, the four companies would be added to the same EU blacklist as Russia’s state-owned RT and Sputnik. That means EU citizens can't access their media products in the bloc, but correspondents from these companies still have the right to report from member states. I understand that the decision on this issue could be taken separately and be rubber-stamped by EU ambassadors when they assemble again in Brussels on May 15.
• There are also suggested asset freezes and visa bans on two people associated with Voice of Europe: Artem Marchevskiy and Viktor Medvedchuk, with the proposal stating that "Marchevskiy has used Voice of Europe as a vehicle for funneling financial resources designated for remuneration of propagandists, and for building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe."
• As always, some interesting derogations are being proposed. A flight ban on Russian aircraft over EU territory was introduced shortly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, Russian travelers have been using creative ways of getting around this by using quick stopovers in places like Armenia, Georgia, or Turkey, or by masking which companies are running the flight. The European Commission is proposing to tighten this by adding the requirement for flight operators to disclose the owner of the actual aircraft, as well as the nationalities of the passengers. There is, however, an exemption from this requirement for aircraft with no more than four seats and with a maximum take-off mass of 2,000 kilograms. Sounds ideal for small private jets used by rich Russians.
• And then you have Belarus, where the European Commission is suggesting measures for Minsk that have already been adopted for Russia. This includes, among other things, import bans on maritime navigation components, diamonds, gold, and coal, and a prohibition on providing Belarus with various IT services.
• An important derogation has also been suggested: the possibility of allowing Belarusian potash, used in agricultural fertilizers, to be shipped via the EU to third countries where there is food scarcity. So far, Belarusian potash has been banned and it will continue to be prohibited, but there is now a suggestion that an empty annex to the document could be adopted in which the names of at-risk third countries can be added in the future in case there is a potash shortage. The Baltic states are against this move as they believe it would reward the regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and force them to allow Belarusian potash to transit their countries. Others like Italy, Portugal, and Spain have countered that the EU must be seen to do more to avoid accusations of causing food shortages globally and that the empty annex is a last resort that very well may remain empty.

Brief#2: EU Military Aid For Armenia And Georgia

What You Need To Know: One of the more successful, if perhaps underreported, European Union initiatives in recent years is the European Peace Facility (EPF), created back in 2021, to finance actions such as training missions and military equipment in third countries. The facility is outside the regular EU budget, meaning that the 27 member states of the bloc contribute as they see fit.

At the start, it was largely meant to finance projects and missions in Africa with a budget ceiling of 5.6 billion euros ($6 billion), but with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year later, the ceiling has now been elevated to 17 billion euros. The EPF has also allowed the EU as an organization for the first time ever to send lethal military aid, with assistance worth nearly $3.9 billion going to Ukraine.

Other countries in the EU's eastern neighborhood have also benefited from contributions from the fund. Last month, Moldova received some $44 million over a period of 40 months for nonlethal equipment in areas such as air surveillance, electronic warfare, and logistics. Georgia received more than $32 million last year to boost its army in the fields of military engineering, command and control, medical equipment, logistics, and cyberdefense -- a sum that came on top of previous contributions from the EU, worth $34.5 million, for similar purposes.

Deep Background: Now, once again, Georgia is in line for more cash from the EPF -- as is Armenia. For Armenia, it would be the first time ever it had received such funding and would signify a small but symbolic step for Yerevan in its relationship with the European Union. (There are even rumors in Brussels that Armenia might soon even apply to join the bloc.)

The draft EPF proposal, seen by RFE/RL, also hints at Armenia's closer cooperation with the bloc: "the assistance measure aims to allow the armed forces to enhance operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with (European) Union standards and interoperability, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies. It will also strengthen Armenia's capacities in regard to its future participation in EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operations and missions."

Interestingly, the proposal for Georgia contains the same wording. For both countries, the proposal states that the "objective of the assistance measure is to contribute to the strengthening of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia/Georgia's capacities to enhance national security, stability, and resilience in the defense sector."

Drilling Down

• There are key differences between the military proposals for the two countries. Armenia's is a rather modest one – worth nearly $11 million for the upcoming 30 months. The document makes it clear that it will finance the "types of equipment not designed to deliver lethal force" and spells out that it will contribute mobile field-camp capability for a battalion-sized unit and a medical treatment facility. For Georgia, the proposal is to the tune of more than $32 million for 40 months. As with Armenia, there is support for logistics equipment, but then additionally there is also money available for artillery command-and-control equipment, engineering equipment, and cyberdefense equipment.
• For both countries, there are also safeguards in case things don't go to plan. The funding can be suspended or terminated altogether if Yerevan or Tbilisi are not following international human rights law, if the cash is not used for the purpose it was provided for, or if any equipment is transferred without Brussels' consent.
• To make sure the money isn't frittered away, the EU has also insisted on delivery certifications and onsite visits upon request by the EU foreign policy chief or EU auditors, as well as reports on how the various projects are doing every six months.
• These sorts of requests are standard in Brussels, but they also reflect potential unease as these decisions ultimately are political. All 27 EU member states must sign off on them.
• In the case of Georgia, EU ambassadors already did so on May 8. Despite growing worries about the potential of Georgia adopting a "foreign agent" law --- which requires media outlets, NGOs, and other nonprofits to register as "pursuing the interests of a foreign power" if more than 20 percent of their funding comes from abroad -- the member states decided not to touch the EPF money for Tbilisi. One argument not to cut Tbilisi off was that the continued funding would lead to more transparency and the EU would have some oversight of the Georgian armed forces.
• Instead, the EU is looking into other ways to respond in case the law is adopted, including halting Georgia's EU accession process, freezing some other EU funds meant for Georgia, or even looking into ways to suspend visa liberalization with the country.
• It is actually Armenia's EPF proposal that is more problematic. So far, it hasn't reached the EU ambassadors' desks as it remains stuck in lower-level working groups partly as a result of Hungary blocking it. Hungary, which enjoys close ties with Azerbaijan, has conditioned its green light for Armenia on Baku getting its own EPF program as well. While other EU member states would be open to Azerbaijan also benefiting from the fund, there is one problem: the EPF functions in such a way that a third country must ask if they can be part of it and, so far, Baku has not shown any interest.

Looking Ahead

Watch out for the annual meeting of the foreign ministers of the Council of Europe, which focuses on promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law on the continent, in Strasbourg on May 16-17. There had been hopes that, after this session, Kosovo would be approved to join the organization. But as Pristina hasn't submitted a draft law on the establishment of an association of Serbian-majority municipalities -- a key sticking point between Kosovo and Serbia -- chances now appear slim that this will happen.

NATO countries' chiefs of defense will assemble in Brussels on May 16 to discuss weapon deliveries to Ukraine, a potential NATO mission to coordinate these deliveries and train troops, and how to ramp up military production in the alliance.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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