Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: the battle over the EU's top jobs and what the bloc plans to do about Georgia

(In case you missed my note last week, the newsletter will now be coming out every Tuesday morning.)

Briefing #1: Jockeying Well Under Way For The Top EU Positions

What You Need To Know: Leaders of the 27 EU member states are meeting in Brussels on June 27-28, where they are expected to decide who will take the top jobs across the bloc's various institutions. The key roles are the three presidents -- of the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament -- and the bloc's foreign policy chief.

In all likelihood, the German center-right candidate from the European People's Party (EPP) group, Ursula von der Leyen, will get another five years as president of the European Commission, the EU's executive arm, as will her fellow EPP member and Maltese politician Roberta Metsola, who is expected to retain the presidency of the European Parliament for another two and a half years. Metsola would then hand over the role to a candidate from the second-biggest group in the chamber, the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialist and Democrats (S&D) in a classic European Parliament power-sharing deal.

The general consensus is that former Portuguese left-wing Prime Minister Antonio Costa will replace Charles Michel as the president of the European Council, and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas from the liberal Renew group will succeed Spaniard Josep Borrell as the EU foreign policy chief.

Deep Background: There were high hopes that this process could have already been wound up last week, on June 17, at an informal EU leaders' meeting in Brussels. But according to several sources I have spoken to who are familiar with the discussion, two things prevented a deal.

Firstly, the EPP, which emerged as the winner of the recent European Parliament elections, is asking for more. According to my sources, in addition to the presidencies of the European Commission and European Parliament, the EPP also wants to get half of the European Council president's job.

But how would this work? While the European Council president serves a term lasting five years, after two and a half years, the 27 EU heads of state and government evaluate the job done by the office holder and -- at least so far -- renew the term for another two and a half years. The vote has to be carried by qualified majority voting, which means 55 percent of the EU member states, representing 65 percent of the bloc's total population.

Normally, the largest political group in parliament gets to put forward its candidate for the European Commission president's post, whereas the second and third groups get dibs on the European Council president and the foreign policy chief jobs.

The EPP suggested Costa, the main candidate for the post, just serve half a term and then be replaced by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, an EPP stalwart. Needless to say the EPP's suggestion didn't go down very well.

Why is the EPP feeling so confident? It certainly had a good result in the European Parliament elections as the only major group to gain ground, finishing first by some distance with 190 seats.

It's more, however, to do with the composition of the European Council, which comprises the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member states. Thirteen leaders on the council belong to the EPP, although they are mainly smaller countries, with the biggest being Poland. The EPP is banking on more, calculating that within two years there will be future EPP-affiliated leaders coming from heavyweights such as Germany and Spain. If that bears out, the EPP would have more than a qualified majority in the room.

The second factor that prevented a deal last week was the process itself. Apparently, the chief negotiators from the three main parliamentary groups -- Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for the EPP, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez for the S&D, and Renew's French President Emmanuel Macron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte -- hammered it out for over three hours, leaving the other leaders waiting around.

Right-wing Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, was, according to my sources with knowledge of the meeting, furious about being excluded from the talks. Her Brothers Of Italy party is the strongest component of the ECR, which finished in a respectable fourth place in the European elections. And since the June 17 summit, the ECR has managed to mop up a few unattached members of parliament, leapfrogging Renew into becoming the third biggest group in the chamber.

Drilling Down

• It's not exactly clear what Meloni wants to get out of taking this stance. It's not thought she's interested in securing one of the four top EU positions but is instead keen on pushing for an Italian portfolio in the European Commission. (That could mean, for instance, a vice president with a mandate on the economy or migration.) A reminder once again that, more important than the four names, it's the jockeying behind the scenes that really matters.
• If the EU leaders eventually agree on the top jobs, the real test will come from the European Parliament. EU leaders don't actually have a vote when it comes to the parliament's president. That's the sole responsibility for the parliament itself, which is set to elect Metsola with a simply majority in Strasbourg on July 16. On the other hand, the parliament doesn't have a say when it comes to the president of the European Council. That position just needs a qualified majority of member states' leaders to sign off.
• For the European Commission president and the foreign policy chief, the situation is more complex. Those positions need a qualified majority of leaders, but then, on top of that, they also need to pass the European Parliament with a simple majority. In short, all the positions are up for negotiation.
• In 2019, the commission's current president, Von der Leyen, scraped through parliament with just nine votes. A July vote might even be tighter this time around, as there are fewer MEPs from the four major groups (EPP, S&D, Renew, and the Greens) than last time, and Von der Leyen probably can't count on votes from anywhere else. If the European Parliament flexes its muscles and rejects her, the leaders will have to go back to the drawing board and find an alternative candidate that could muster the 361 votes needed in parliament.

Briefing #2: How The EU Is Expected To Respond To A Backsliding Georgia

What You Need To Know: The European Union is starting to prepare a response to Georgia in light of Tbilisi passing last month a controversial "foreign agent" law that requires NGOs and media groups receiving at least 20 percent of their funding from outside the country to register as organizations "pursuing the interests of a foreign power." The legislation has been compared to a law in Russia, first passed in 2012 and expanded since, which has been used to stifle opposition and clamp down on free media.

A recent options paper seen by RFE/RL and authored by the EU's diplomatic arm, the European External Action Service, considers how Brussels could reorient its policy toward Georgia and notes that the government in Tbilisi has also "taken other worrying steps in recent months." That's a reference to other controversial laws passed recently, for example those on so-called LGBT propaganda, amendments to the electoral code, and also "steps affecting the independence of the Georgian National Bank."

Deep Background: What does the paper actually propose? Essentially it spells out three levels of potential measures. Firstly there are the "short-term measures" that can be adopted immediately and, according to the document, be "lifted once the ['foreign agent'] law is repealed, and provided that EU concerns on democratic backsliding are sufficiently addressed and...accompanied by clear public messages."

According to the options paper, these short-term measures would consist of scaling down engagement with the Georgian authorities and halting the disbursement of EU funds to the country. That could mean high-level bilateral visits are suspended and ongoing negotiations on, for example, lowering roaming tariffs between the bloc and Georgia are paused.

Regarding the EU funds, it could simply be a matter of reallocating financial assistance to civil society and independent media organizations, instead of the Georgian government.

The paper also mentions the possibility of freezing the impending adoption of a 30 million euros ($32 million) package of nonlethal military aid.

All these measures could be taken swiftly by the European Commission, without member states having to give their approval. Yet it is customary in Brussels that the commission seeks "guidance" from the member states in order to proceed.

This is what happened at the EU's Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on June 24 when the bloc's foreign ministers had an initial discussion on the options paper. While some countries already wanted to move ahead, notably Estonia and Lithuania, other member states such as Hungary and Slovakia preferred to proceed more slowly.

The issue will certainly come up again, most likely at the EU summit in Brussels on June 27-28. Draft summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, do not include any potential punitive measures, with the leaders instead expressing their concern about recent developments in Georgia and calling on the government "to clarify their intentions by reversing the course of action, which puts into question Georgia's progress on its EU path."

Drilling Down

• What about the other two levels of measures? The second level spells out the potential action to take "in case of further deterioration," such as the use of violence against peaceful protesters and intimidation or major irregularities in the electoral process. Under such circumstances, the recommendation would be for member states to introduce a temporary Schengen visa requirement for all holders of Georgian diplomatic passports. The paper notes that "this measure could have a symbolic value to restrict the privileges of the government officials/diplomats, while not affecting the general population."
• Another possibility for the second level of measures could be visa bans and asset freezes on people and entities under the EU's Global Human Rights Regime. For example, under this sanctions instrument, the EU has targeted those it deems responsible for the imprisonment and death of the Russian opposition figure Aleksei Navalny.
• The problem with these more severe measures is that they require unanimity among the EU's 27 member states, and consensus is often hard to find. And finding concrete evidence linking serious human rights violations to the actions of officials is not always easy. Such measures likely wouldn't target high-ranking Georgian officials but rather lower-level judges and police chiefs -- which was the case with the Navalny sanctions listings.
• The final, most severe tier of measures would be applied in the case of a "significant deterioration of the situation." In this case, according to the options paper, there would be "steps related to the enlargement path." Georgia officially become an EU candidate country in December 2023 and the European Commission is due to present its annual EU enlargement report in October. Unless anything changes dramatically, the summit conclusions will be far from complimentary toward Georgia.
• In terms of the country's EU application, it's most likely Georgia won't move forward for now. That means it won't follow Ukraine and Moldova with the opening of formal EU accession talks, which is expected to happen on June 25. It could, of course, also lose its candidate status, but this has never happened before and would require all member states to be on board.
• The nuclear option would be suspending visa liberalization to the EU that Georgian citizens have enjoyed since 2017. If this did happen, it would take place in the fall when the European Commission presents its annual report on visas. For a initial suspension of nine months, it is enough if a qualified majority of EU member states are in favor.
• A suspension of this kind is unlikely, however, and is thought to be a rather blunt instrument only used once in EU history: against the South Pacific island nation of Vanuatu. The options paper acknowledges as much by stating that "while this measure could be powerful leverage for Georgia to reconsider the law at stake, its immediate negative impact would be on the Georgian population" and adds that the focus should be on "entry bans against individuals" and member states committing to not granting "visa exemptions to service or diplomatic passport holders."

Looking Ahead

The Intergovernmental Conferences with Moldova and Ukraine on June 25 in Luxembourg will mark the official opening of EU accession talks with the two countries. The talks will likely last for many years, but it is a symbolic and historic moment for Chisinau and Kyiv.

A day later, on June 26, Aleksandar Vucic and Albin Kurti, the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo, respectively, will meet in Brussels for an EU-mediated dialogue for the first time since September 2023. A few days after that unsuccessful meeting last year, an armed group of Serbs attacked Kosovar police in the northern town of Banjska killing one officer. Three Serbs were also killed in the clashes.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

Please note that, starting next week, this newsletter will be published -- or arrive in your inbox if you're a subscriber -- on Tuesday mornings.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: Ukraine and Moldova opening EU talks in June and the so-called Czech ammunition initiative.

Briefing #1: Ukraine And Moldova Set For Late June EU Accession Talks

What You Need To Know: Everything is set up for Ukraine and Moldova to officially open EU accession talks on June 25 in Luxembourg, with the bloc keen to hold what are known in EU parlance as Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) to mark the occasion.

The European Commission, the executive branch of the EU, presented an oral update on both countries to representatives from the 27 EU member states on June 7 in Brussels. According to the update, later distributed in written form to EU capitals and obtained by RFE/RL, the two countries had completed all the reforms that were required of them, which largely dealt with rule-of-law issues.

In the case of Moldova, all of the 27 EU member states agreed with the assessment that the country had completed its reforms. For Ukraine, 26 countries agreed, with one exception: Hungary.

Budapest has continued to argue that Ukraine still hasn't done enough to safeguard the rights of its ethnic Hungarian minority in the country. Ensuring the rights of national minorities was one of the four conditions Ukraine had to fulfill.

For a moment, it looked like no IGC would take place at the end of the month for either country. (Their paths are coupled in this process.) What needs to happen for the two IGCs to go ahead in June is for EU members to unanimously agree on Ukraine's and Moldova's respective negotiation frameworks, which will essentially plot the path of the enlargement road ahead. EU ambassadors were hoping to adopt these frameworks on June 12, but Hungary insisted it wasn't ready to sign off. There was, however, a late reprieve on June 14 with a compromise that Budapest, the rest of the EU, and Ukraine could all live with.

Deep Background: To understand the process, it makes sense to start with what was said in the oral update on Ukraine's progress regarding national minorities.

Firstly, the written version of the document outlines what Kyiv did in early 2024 to comply with the European Commission's requirements, including adopting a methodology for the use of national minority languages, producing a road map on education for minorities, and the creation of a Council of Public Associations of National Minorities.

The update also notes that Kyiv recently set up a financial compensation mechanism for translations of election material between minority languages and Ukrainian. The document notes that Ukraine has "enacted several laws and taken implementing measures in order to address the remaining [European Commission's] Venice Commission recommendations from June 2023 and October 2023 linked to the law on national minorities and to the laws on state language, media, and education."

It then concluded that "while noting that the Venice Commission has not pronounced itself on the follow-up given to its recommendation, the commission considers that Ukraine has taken all the necessary measures. This step is thus completed."

Drilling Down

• According to many accounts of the meeting on June 7, representatives from all countries present gave their clear support for the commission's assessment on Ukraine and asked that the framework be quickly adopted so that the IGC can go ahead on June 25. Hungary, however, remained a stickler, mentioning 11 issues that Budapest said Ukraine hasn't addressed.
• Broadly speaking, those issues can be boiled down to three main areas: restoring the status of the national minority school system; restoring the right to speak minority languages when dealing with state authorities; and restoring the right to political representation on a regional as well as national level.
• What Hungary essentially wants is to go back to what Ukrainian legislation looked like before 2015, when Kyiv started amending laws on national minorities and state languages. Those amendments, which were driven by a desire to reduce the amount of Russian spoken, led to the increased usage of Ukrainian in public institutions, such as schools.
• In this respect, Budapest wanted to add two amendments to the negotiation framework and in the opening statement of the potential IGC. First, Budapest wanted it noted in both documents that Ukraine needs to produce an action plan dedicated to the protection of the rights of national minorities. And second, Budapest asked for written references in the negotiation framework to two documents from 1991: the Treaty On The Foundations Of Good Neighborly Relations And Cooperation, signed by Ukraine and Hungary in 1991; and the declaration on the principles of cooperation between Hungary and Ukraine in guaranteeing the rights of national minorities.
• In the compromise text, agreed on June 14, the action plan required by Hungary is included along with a statement that the "the right of persons belonging to national minorities should be protected, in line with the constitution of Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine is expected to implement relevant bilateral agreements with EU member states."
• Also noted in the compromise document was that the European Commission will monitor Kyiv's implementation of minority rights reforms and report regularly to EU member states.
• This might not seem like too much to ask for, but other member states are unhappy that bilateral issues are being dragged into the enlargement negotiations at such an early stage. They fear -- with some foundation -- that Budapest can veto every step of the way by suggesting that Kyiv isn't protecting national minorities enough.
• Bilateral issues between a member state and a candidate country often slow down the EU accession process. Just look at Bulgaria's refusal to sign off on North Macedonia opening accession talks due to Skopje not amending its constitution to reflect Bulgarians as a founding people.
• On the other hand, many diplomats I spoke to are at least happy that the concrete references to specific bilateral treaties between Hungary and Ukraine are gone from the document. They also noted that a compromise on this issue always looked possible, especially as Hungary is taking over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, one of the main decision-making bodies of the bloc, on July 1 and is expected to not keep Ukraine high on the agenda for the next six months. So, there was pressure to finalize everything by the end of June.
• There is now just one small hurdle that needs to be cleared before the IGC can go ahead: a debate and vote on the frameworks in the Dutch parliament on June 20. (The Netherlands is the only country taking this step.) This should be a formality with a pro-Ukraine majority in parliament, but since the Dutch general elections in November 2023, lawmakers have become more enlargement skeptic.

Briefing #2: The Limitations Of Czech Ammunition

What You Need To Know: Much has been said about the inability of the West to provide Ukraine with enough artillery ammunition in its war against Russia. There was much consternation in Brussels when the European Union failed with its initiative, announced in early 2023, to provide Kyiv with 1 million 155 mm shells by March of this year.

In the end, around half of the proposed amount was delivered, with another pledge that the EU provide the remaining ammunition by the end of 2024.

Ukraine is still being outgunned on the battlefield. During last summer's offensive, it fired 7,000 artillery shells a day, which fell to below 2,000 in the early spring of this year compared to Russia, which at some point was pounding Ukrainian lines with between 10,000 and 20,000 shells daily.

It was during this critical time in early spring that a new ammunition enterprise hit the headlines, led by the Czech Republic. The country's president, Petr Pavel, told the audience at the Munich Security Conference on February 17 that Prague had identified 800,000 artillery shells globally that could be directed to Ukraine at very short notice.

There are a few points worth clarifying here. Firstly, acquiring ammunition from non-EU states and sending it to Ukraine is not a new thing. The mechanism has been around since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The initiative has only recently caught the media's attention, however.

Secondly, it is not just the Czechs but actually a joint Czech-Danish-Dutch initiative. And thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the 800,000 figure mentioned by Pavel was just a "milestone," as one Czech government official who wanted to remain anonymous told me. It was not an amount of ammunition that the Czech Republic and its two partners already had in their possession and were ready to provide to Ukraine.

Deep Background: After media coverage of the "Czech ammunition initiative," more Western countries have gotten on board. But have they really? And will it have much impact? The jury is out on both counts.

Since the war broke out, the Czechs, Danish, and Dutch have provided Ukraine with over 1.3 million rounds of different types of caliber ammunition. This month, the first batch of shells will go to Ukraine since the initiative became an established enterprise. It is expected that Ukraine will receive between 50,000-100,000 shells, with another around 80,000 ordered. By the end of the year, Czech government officials have said that figure should reach 500,000 rounds worth 1.7 billion euros ($1.8 billion).

At the end of May, the three countries, along with Canada, Germany, and Portugal, were the only ones that had actually sent money to Ukraine for the purchase of ammunition, with another 10 in the process of doing so but still grappling with government bureaucracy or parliamentary and budgetary committee approvals.

Officials in Prague estimate that Kyiv now needs some 200,000 shells per month in order to just be able to hold the Russians at bay. This costs an estimated 7 billion to 10 billion euros per year. There are also other ammunition initiatives in place, including one by Ukraine itself and one led by the United States.

Drilling Down

• So why is it proving so hard to steadily supply Ukraine with sufficient ammunition? Surprisingly, it is not so much about production capacity, even though that is an issue in Europe. According to Tomas Kopecny, a Czech diplomat who is very much at the center of the initiative, there are "single digit of millions of rounds of ammunition that we are competing for." Speaking recently to a group of journalists in Prague, including RFE/RL, he said it was first and foremost a coordination job among allies to make sure they weren't overpaying.
• It all really comes down to money -- essentially making sure there is enough cash flow to make prepayments and then the ability to come up with the funds quicker than Russia and its partners. That is largely what determines what side of the conflict the shells end up in. Essentially, the ammo market is like any other, with producers selling to the highest bidder. And since the war started, the price of shells has quadrupled.
• Diplomats have been reticent about saying where the ammunition is coming from as the sellers prefer to keep a low profile, partly out of the fear of being pressurized by the other side in the conflict, either by diplomatic or economic means.
• It's not just about money, though, but also political will. France has been reluctant to use EU money to purchase military equipment and ammunition outside the bloc, and Cyprus is reluctant that any cash go to Turkey, a significant producer of ammunition and military equipment.
• With enough money and enough political will, the West can still help Ukraine. The EU didn't hesitate, for the first time in its history, to utilize joint borrowing -- where the bloc collectively raised funds by issuing bonds on behalf of all its member states -- to the tune of 800 billion euros to counter the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Kopecny noted that just a fraction of such a figure, meaning contributions in tens of billions of euros or dollars, would "totally change the landscape in Ukraine's favor in the war."

Looking Ahead

This evening, on June 17, there will be an informal meeting of EU leaders. This is the first time the 27 heads of state and government will assemble in Brussels after the European Parliament elections on June 6-9 to assess the results. There will also be an initial discussion on who should be the next European Commission president, European Council president, and EU foreign policy chief, although it is expected that the leaders will take the final decision on those key posts at another EU summit in Brussels next week.

That's all for this week. And just a reminder that, starting next week, this newsletter will be published -- or arrive in your inbox if you're a subscriber -- on Tuesday mornings.

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.