Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm focusing on the upcoming European Parliament elections and how they will impact the EU.

Briefing #1: Europe Votes

What You Need To Know: The European Parliament will hold elections across the 27 EU member states on June 6-9. There are an estimated 370 million eligible voters across the bloc, but don't expect all of them to turn up. In the last elections, back in 2019, the turnout across the EU was 50.7 percent. And that was regarded as respectable, a singular uptick that reversed the downward trend in voter turnout.

Of course, the turnout varies considerably across the member states. In Belgium and Luxembourg, where casting a ballot is compulsory, nearly 90 percent of the voting populations went to the polling stations five years ago; in Slovakia, in the same vote, only 22 percent went to the polls.

Citizens of the EU are electing 720 members of the European Parliament (MEPs), with the number of seats allocated to each country according to population size. So, with 96 MEPs, Germany will send the most lawmakers to the parliament; Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta will have a mere six each.

First, a few basics. While the elections are called "European" they are actually contested by national political parties, such as the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) or the Spanish conservative People's Party (PP).

But once MEPs are elected from national lists, they tend to become part of Europe-wide political families or groups. In the 2019-2024 parliament there were seven political groups, which all must contain a minimum of 23 MEPs from at least seven EU countries. It's expected that most, if not all, of the groups will remain. It's also possible that new groups might emerge.

Deep Background: The biggest group in the European Parliament is the broad center-right European People's Party -- the home, for example, of the German Christian Democratic Union and the Polish Civic Platform -- followed by the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), which brings together center-left and social-democratic parties.

There are a host of other groups, starting with Renew, which brings together centrist, liberal parties such as French President Emmanuel Macron's Renaissance. Then there are the Greens, which, in addition to parties with an environmental focus, are a grouping also made up of Pirate parties -- which advocate for civil rights, direct democracy, information privacy, and transparency -- and Catalan separatists. Lastly, there is The Left In The European Parliament (GUE/NGL) group, which brings together far-left and communist parties.

On the other end of the ideological spectrum, there is the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which some see as nationalist, others as sovereignist. The group furthest to the right is Identity and Democracy (ID), whose members include Marine Le Pen's National Rally, the Austrian Freedom Party, and Matteo Salvini's Northern League.

Those parliamentary groups are often bolstered by unattached MEPs, many of whose parties were kicked out of mainstream groupings and haven't yet found a new home. For instance, right-wing Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Fidesz party was ejected from the EPP in 2021, and the Smer party of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico was cast out from the S&D last year.

Political groups in Brussels are highly influential. The larger the group, the more speaking time MEPs get in the chamber. Key roles in the European Parliament, for instance, chairpeople of influential committees, usually go to representatives of the major political groups. Those MEPs who do try their luck on their own, without joining a group, tend to operate somewhat in the political wilderness, holding little sway over policy or proceedings.

Drilling Down

• The EPP will almost certainly finish on top again as they have done in every European Parliament elections since 1999. However, their popularity is slowly dwindling. Polls indicate they will likely get around 170 MEPs out of 720 seats in the new chamber, a slight proportional decrease from five years ago and a long way from their previous heyday when they regularly got north of 200 MEPs.
• S&D will likely finish second, as they have done in the last few elections, probably with about 140 MEPs, which would be a similar result to 2019.
• It then gets a little more interesting, as the other five political groups are projected to get somewhere between 30 and 80 seats each, all vying for third and fourth place. Renew and the Greens will likely drop seats compared to five years ago, whereas ECR are likely to gain.
• There might be over 100 MEPs unattached to a political family. Many of these will be populists of various hues and -- if they haven't already burned their poitical bridges -- will likely be mopped up by the ID or ECR groups. It's also possible a new rightist parliamentary group will be formed.
• One of the big media stories in the run-up to the elections has been the rise of the populist right. If you count the projected seats for ID, ECR and the unaffiliated members, who tend to be mostly right-wingers, and then add the EPP you get over 400 seats -- a majority.
• Talk, however, of a new Euroskeptic supergroup is probably a little premature. The EPP is pretty mainstream with a strong federalist streak and might be reluctant to get into bed with populist and far-right MEPs, who tend to be spread between two groups, the ECR and ID. Plus, ideological unity on the right remains elusive. Populist and far-right MEPs may agree that Brussels should have less power, but that's where the consensus ends. Relations with Russia and China tend to divide the right, with some being super hawkish and others maintaining friendly relations with both countries. Nothing illustrated the right-wing divisions in the parliament better than in May when the Alternative For Germany (AFD) party was kicked out from the ID group after one of their leaders said in an interview that not every member of the Nazi SS during the Third Reich was "automatically a criminal."
• The move to expel the AFD was led by Le Pen, who has been trying for years to moderate her image. There have been rumors for a while that she might want to join the more "palatable" ECR in the future.
• There is also speculation that Giorgia Meloni, whose rise to power two years ago prompted fears by some that Italy was descending into fascism, could try to soften her image by taking her Brothers Of Italy party to the EPP.
• Despite a shrinking of support for the four leading groups (EPP, S&D, Renew, and the Greens), they will still likely get a majority of over 400 seats.

Briefing #2: What Impact Will The Vote Have On The Rest Of The EU?

What You Need To Know: For years, the European Parliament has tried hard to make itself more relevant for the average European voter. And in some ways, it has succeeded.

Take, for example, the "lead candidate" idea -- known in Brussels under its German name, Spitzenkandidat. This was devised for the 2014 European Parliament elections and means that all political groups nominate one candidate and then the candidate from the political group that finishes first in the elections will be the nominee for the top EU job, the European Commission president.

Prior to that, the three top jobs -- European Commission president, president of the European Council; and EU foreign policy chief -- were selected by the leaders of the 27 EU member states in backroom deals. In addition to party affiliation, geography (where the candidate was from) and gender were part of the calculus. Essentially the three top roles needed to be occupied by both men and women who represented the geographical diversity of the bloc.

Normally, the EPP, S&D, and Renew parties take one of the three positions each -- with the EPP usually taking the presidency of the European Commission.

In 2014, the EU leaders followed the Spitzenkandidat system by selecting the former prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, the EPP's top candidate, as the European Commission president. However, EU leaders stepped away from it in 2019, provoking the anger of the European Parliament, when the German MEP Manfred Weber was the EPP's lead candidate. Instead of choosing Weber for president, they chose then German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, who was plucked from relative obscurity as a compromise candidate. This year, von der Leyen is seeking re-selection and is the lead candidate for the frontrunner, the EPP.

Deep Background: Will von der Leyen get a second term? If the EPP gets a decent result, say over 170 MEPs, the German politician will be hard to ignore. But they could still ignore her, particularly as many grumble that she has too much power. Macron is reportedly keen to promote former Italian prime minister and European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi, although he is not a member of a political group.

It might be that another person from the EPP could emerge. Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and the Bulgarian head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kristalina Georgieva, might also be in the running.

The position of European Council president will likely come from the S&D, as they are the likely runners-up. The leading candidates appear to be former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa and his Danish counterpart, Mette Frederiksen.

If the Renew group manages to take third place, they will rightfully claim the role of EU foreign policy chief, now held by Josep Borrell. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas is a strong favorite. However, if ECR takes third place in the elections, we could even see someone like Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala taking on that role.

Drilling Down

• It is not only the EU leaders that will decide the fate of von der Leyen (or an alternative candidate for the commission's top job). It is the newly elected European Parliament that will vote on the proposed candidate via a simple majority.
• In 2019, von der Leyen scraped through by nine votes. This time, the European Parliament might want to flex its muscles and reject whomever the European Council, where the EU leaders meet, puts forward. That would be unprecedented but not unsurprising.
• Remember that it doesn't end here. Later in the year, each EU member state will propose their candidates for the 27 European commissioners, the president of the European Commission will assign them a portfolio, and then it's up to the European Parliament to grill the candidates.
• Per tradition, the European Parliament will reject a few commissioners. Last year, the initial candidates from France, Hungary, and Romania were nixed. It could take until the end of the year for parliament to approve the entire commission.

Looking Ahead

Also keep an eye out this week for the EU ambassadorial meeting in Brussels on June 5. Representatives from the 27 member states will try to agree on the EU accession negotiation frameworks for Moldova and Ukraine. This should have been a formality with accession talks with the duo opening at the end of June, but recently Hungary signaled it wouldn't give a green light to Ukraine's framework, noting it has 11 outstanding bilateral issues with Kyiv concerning the rights of the ethnic Hungarian minority in Ukraine.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: the meeting this week of NATO foreign ministers in Prague and the hard choices the EU needs to make regarding Georgia.

Briefing #1: How Can The EU Respond To Georgia's 'Foreign Agent' Law?

What You Need to Know: EU foreign ministers will discuss the situation in Georgia when they assemble in Brussels on May 27. Brussels is still hoping that the country's controversial "foreign agent" law, which is expected to be finally passed this week, will be withdrawn or sufficiently watered down. The bill has been heavily criticized by Western countries and rights groups for creating a framework to clamp down on civil society and free media.

Until the law is adopted, the EU is unlikely to do anything. But what then are the bloc's options? The European Commission will be tasked with drawing up a paper, and there are roughly four major things that could be done: cut EU money to the country, sanction high-ranking Georgian politicians, stall the country's EU accession process, and suspend visa liberalization.

The perhaps most obvious option, and one that the U.S. Congress is currently considering, is to slap asset freezes and visa bans on leading Georgian politicians. The potential wrench in the works here is that you need unanimity among EU member states, something that will be hard to achieve.

Cutting funds from the EU budget is something the European Commission can do without a green light from member states, but there is an obstacle here as well. Georgia gets some 85 million euros ($92 million) a year in grants, some of which goes directly to the state and some to organizations within the country. A lot of that money supports the country's civil society sector -- something Brussels wants to protect now more than ever.

Deep Background: What about Georgia's EU accession process? When the Georgian Parliament voted in favor of the controversial legislation for the third time on May 14, the EU issued a statement noting that "the adoption of this law negatively impacts Georgia's progress on the EU path."

At the moment, Georgia has official candidate status, and the next step is to open accession talks. In many ways, though, the point is moot as no enlargement decisions are expected anytime soon. The European Commission's big report on the issue is due in October, and then, based on that, EU member states will decide in December.

One slight complication is that most likely at the end of June, the EU will aim to formally start accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine, as well as advancing the EU integration processes of Serbia and Montenegro. There is already a lot of tricky political choreography in trying to please various camps of EU member states that are advocating for the EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. Very few EU officials I have spoken to want to complicate matters further by adding Georgia to the mix.

Some members of the European Parliament have called for Georgia's candidate status to be reversed, but that is something that has never happened in EU history. And to do that, you would need to secure the ever-illusive unanimity.

The most likely scenario is maintaining the status quo: Georgia would remain a candidate to join the EU but without accession talks starting anytime soon. The question for policymakers is whether the Georgian government would even see this as a setback. Negotiations take years even with the best candidates, and the ruling Georgian Dream party can always point to the fact that it was actually them that delivered Georgia's candidate status in 2023.

Drilling Down:

• It's worth remembering that the Georgian government has friends in high places that could alleviate the pain: Hungary, Slovakia, and Oliver Varhelyi, the Hungarian enlargement commissioner and ally of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, have all been supportive of Georgia's bid to join the EU.
• As an illustration of their influence, it took 21 hours for the EU to issue a statement condemning the May 14 vote to approve the bill in the Georgian Parliament. Hungary and Slovakia blocked multiple drafts before the statement was signed on behalf of the 27 EU members states.
• Diplomatic sources in Brussels from various member states told me Hungary believes the EU shouldn't interfere in internal matters. Slovakia's new populist government is also pondering a "foreign agent"-style law, which could be used to target civil society.
• When member states couldn't agree on the wording, it was up to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to issue a statement instead. But that statement was held up by Varhelyi, who, in the end, withdrew his name from it, reportedly objecting to text linking the passing of the "foreign agent" law to Georgia's EU accession process. It will be interesting to see how much of a Georgia supporter Varhelyi will be going forward. After the Georgian prime minister accused him of threatening Georgia in a phone call last week, Varhelyi apologized, saying his words had been taken out of context.
• That just leaves us with suspending visa liberalization. This is a solid option, as it doesn't require unanimity. To pass, it requires only qualified majority voting (QMV) -- meaning 55 percent of member states, normally 15 out of 27, representing 65 percent of the total EU population -- would suffice.
• This, however, could be a controversial move as the visa-free regime, which went into effect in 2017, is perhaps the single most popular EU policy among Georgians. And many diplomats from EU countries feel it would be unfair to target the entire population this way.
• My understanding, however, is there is a growing number of countries -- though possibly not yet enough for a QMV majority -- that are considering this option or at least haven't ruled it out completely.
• For the visa suspension mechanism to be triggered, it is enough that one EU member state signals to the European Commission that there are problems with a specific third country enjoying visa-free travel to the EU. The commission must then issue a report on the matter. If the commission sides with the complainant, EU member states can temporarily suspend visa-free travel for a limited period of time via QMV, and then, if the issues persist, fully suspend it again via QMV.
• The EU has only suspended visa liberalization once. That was in the case of Vanuatu, an island country in the South Pacific. In March 2022, the visa waiver was temporarily suspended due to the country's use of investor citizenship schemes, known as "golden passports." As Vanuatu didn't do anything to address Brussels' concerns, a decision to fully suspend visa-free travel was taken in November of that same year.
• From EU officials I have spoken to, it seems there is a consensus that visa suspensions should only be considered when there are clear "home affairs issues" -- say, for example, third-country citizens using visa liberalization to seek asylum in the EU, or there are too many overstays from the 180-day limit. But there is also the so-called democracy criteria, and other diplomats I have spoken to believe that enacting the "foreign agent" law would be a clear case for tightening visa requirements.

Briefing #2: Ukraine Tops Agenda Of NATO Meeting In Prague

What You Need To Know: The foreign ministers of the 32 NATO countries are coming to Prague this week for an informal ministerial meeting. These annual "informals," where they meet somewhere other than NATO headquarters in Brussels, have become something of an annual tradition for the military alliance.

In order to "break the pattern," as one NATO official described it to me, they do one off-campus meeting, often ditching their formal attire, with the goal that ministers will speak more openly and without any pre-scripted notes that tend to be the norm for regular ministerial meetings. In 2022 they were in Berlin, last year in Oslo, and next year they will convene in Ankara.

This year, it's the Czechs' turn to host. Right from the off, it's worth noting that they aren't expected to take any real decisions. They will, however, have plenty of time to exchange views, first at a dinner on May 30 and then at a working session the following day.

The upcoming summit in Washington, D.C., on July 9–11 will be the main order of business at this week's meeting, in particular what sort of aid for Ukraine can be delivered ahead of the summit. NATO tends to be rather conservative at such times and prefers issues to be settled and agreed on, at least informally, before a summit in order to avoid any last-minute surprises falling into the laps of the leaders.

Deep Background: Essentially, there are three things that the NATO foreign ministers will touch upon in Prague when it comes to Ukraine: Ramstein, training, and price tags. Ramstein refers to the American air base in western Germany that, for the past two years, has hosted many of the meetings of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a gathering of about 50 nations coordinating weapon deliveries to Kyiv.

The idea is that NATO will take over the coordination of the contact group from the United States. That's likely to happen in the near future; however, it's not clear if the military alliance will be more efficient in cajoling countries to send military equipment to Ukraine.

Patriot missile-defense systems are a good case in point here. Ukraine desperately needs to bolster its missile defenses, but no country has so far rushed forward. Eyes have turned to Greece, Spain, and Sweden, who all have missile systems. But so far none of those countries seems ready to send them.

Speaking on background, NATO diplomats say the reluctance is due to the fact that Patriot systems can take years to produce and replace. France and Italy have equivalent systems, like the SAMP/T, but those are apparently needed to protect the Olympic Games in Paris and the summit of the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrial nations in Italy later this year.

Drilling Down:

• What about the training of Ukrainian troops? The United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland have been doing this for the past two years on their home turf. Would it make sense for NATO to coordinate more or even put everything under the NATO flag? Possibly, although there is the very sensitive issue of whether there should be NATO or NATO member state military trainers on the ground in Ukraine.
• Some countries, notably Estonia and France, have not ruled deploying noncombat troops to western Ukraine, although that will probably be a tough sell. It's worth remembering, though, that there were NATO trainers in Ukraine for several years before and even in the run-up to Russia's full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.
• Then there is the price tag. This will be a sticking point and one that is expected to become a political hot potato given the reluctance of some members of the U.S. Republican Party to green light more aid to Ukraine.
• Ahead of the July summit, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg is pushing the 32 NATO members to commit to giving Kyiv $100 billion for the next five years. Details regarding who would contribute what though are still in short supply, and nothing has yet been agreed.
• NATO has failed to fulfill commitments before. Take the "Wales pledge" from 2014, where NATO allies pledged to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense in a decade. Ten years later, only 18 out of 32 member states have done so, and there are no real consequences for the laggards.
• Two other issues could also come up in Prague. First, there is Ukraine's possible NATO membership. Nothing is moving on this front. The unofficial line is that Kyiv will become a member sometime in the undefined future. Don't expect much more ambitious language than that in Washington in July. And then there is the selection of the next NATO secretary-general. The smart money is still on outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, but outsider Romanian President Klaus Iohannis hasn't yet thrown in the towel. We should have some clarity on this in the weeks ahead but probably not at this week's ministerial meeting.

Looking Ahead

EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on May 27 are expected to approve a new sanctions regime targeting people and entities committing human rights abuses, specifically in Russia. Known as "Navalny sanctions" in Brussels after the slain Russian opposition leader, the first batch of restrictive measures will target those the bloc believes are responsible for his death in February.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter, @RikardJozwiak, or by e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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