Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and, in a break from my usual format, I'm writing about my impressions from Kyiv after spending a few days there last week.

The Briefing: Kyiv In The Sunshine -- For Now At Least

Last week, I visited Ukraine for the first time since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. It was just a short visit, two nights in Kyiv to attend a conference, so I can't draw too many meaningful conclusions about the state of the country. But the one thing that struck me (and many foreigners who have visited the city over the last couple of years) is how normal everything seems to be, at least in the capital city.

Trendy and vibrant cafes and restaurants were buzzing in the summery weather, reminding me of the Kyiv I had visited before. And, during my brief time there, there were no air-raid sirens -- an almost daily occurrence for Ukrainians across the country.

But look a little closer and you start to notice how war has changed things. For a city with a prewar population of 4 million, I didn't see many middle-aged men. Later in the evening, as the midnight curfew approached, the city lights that had once lit up the sky were substantially dimmed.

In the regions, I was told, these two phenomena -- a lack of men and night light -- is even more pronounced. The Ukrainian recruitment drive is firing on all cylinders, with persistent rumors that the minimum age for the draft may be lowered below 25.

Despite the good vibes on the streets, most indicators point to a rather grim final few months of the year for Ukraine.

EU Enlargement Enthusiasm

I was in Kyiv to attend a one-day conference, the EU Accession Exchange Forum, organized by two of the city's most relevant think tanks, the New Europe Center and the International Renaissance Foundation.

The event was set up three years ago when Ukraine, together with Georgia and Moldova, applied and almost immediately got an invite to join the EU. It brings together politicians, officials, and analysts involved in the process.

At least on this particular topic, the mood was upbeat. Katarina Mathernova, the EU's Ukraine ambassador, noted that there is a "sense of inevitability now on enlargement. It is in the air." But she was quick to caution that the quick march to getting candidate status in 2022 and officially opening talks just two years later will inevitably slow down. "We are now going from a sprint to a marathon. It is simply hard to shortcut technical work," Mathernova said.

Yet it didn't prevent the Ukrainian minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, Olha Stefanishyna, who recently also took over the tricky justice portfolio in a recent government reshuffle, from claiming that Ukraine would join both the EU and NATO by 2030.

Coming fresh from a successful trip to Brussels, where the European Commission was happy with progress made by Kyiv on justice-related reforms, she exuded confidence. The hope in Brussels is that negotiations on at least five out of 33 accession chapters can start during the first half of 2025, although Ukraine is pushing for at least half of all the chapters to be opened in that period.

Ihor Zhovkva, the powerful deputy presidential chief of staff, also made a credible sales pitch on why the EU should embrace Ukrainian membership quickly by noting that the bloc "will be more of a geopolitical player after Ukraine's military victory."

He also noted that the "deep state in the EU bureaucracy was not on the side of Ukrainian membership" back in 2022, saying there was originally talk of semi-candidacy or pre-candidacy instead of being offered regular candidate status. That upgrade, he said, was due to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's close personal rapport with EU leaders and Kyiv's performance on the battlefield.

A New Polish-Ukrainian Spat

Ukraine is clearly banking on this dynamic (Zelenskiy and battlefield strength) to continue propelling it toward the West. But will it be tested soon?

Just before my visit, there was a lot of talk in Kyiv about an ill-tempered meeting between Zelenskiy and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski.

According to press reports, the Ukrainian president complained about Warsaw being slow to transfer military equipment, whereas Sikorski played down Kyiv's chances of joining the EU anytime soon, saying the process took Warsaw a decade.

Sikorski also reportedly pressed the Ukrainian side on the 1943 Volhynia massacre of ethnic Poles by Ukrainian nationalists, demanding a proper exhumation and burial of the victims.

I also heard from two Western diplomats, who didn't want to be named, that another source of friction was that Sikorski, before their meeting, had met with Petro Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president and rival of Zelenskiy.

As both Sikorski and Poroshenko belong to the powerful pan-European center-right European People's Party group, a meeting made perfect sense. But it did increase speculation, at least among the diplomats I spoke to, that Poroshenko may challenge Zelenskiy in elections in 2025, potentially teaming up with Valeriy Zaluzhniy, the former commander in chief and one of a few Ukrainians who can match the incumbent's popularity.

Elections, however, may not be even held next year. Many Ukrainians have been quick to point out that the country's constitution prevents holding elections in wartime and that it would be logistically impossible to organize due to the amount of people serving on the front lines and the large number of Ukrainian refugees living outside the country.

If reports of the possible Polish-Ukrainian spat are true, it would be a good indicator of how Ukraine's EU accession is not going to be the cakewalk some in Kyiv believe it to be. Hungary is normally the main wrench in the works when it comes to EU support for Ukraine, but there are 26 other member states with vetoes.

Poland will increasingly see its eastern neighbor as a competitor, notably in the agricultural sector, so it's unlikely the sniping between the two countries will go away.

Meanwhile, Back In Brussels...

Back in Brussels, the new European Commission lineup was unveiled for the next five years. While the European Commission has emphasized that enlargement is now a priority, the candidate for the enlargement portfolio went to the Slovenian politician and diplomat Marta Kos, the only presumptive commissioner who still hasn't been confirmed by her own capital, after her nomination got caught up in political spats in Ljubljana.

The fact that Kos is neither a political heavyweight nor does she come from a country that is one of the most ardent Ukraine-supporters, didn't go unnoticed in Kyiv.

But there was another crucial issue that wasn't touched upon much here. During the unveiling, there was little talk about how the EU must reform to take in new members. These reforms would encompass anything from agricultural funds to how the bloc should function politically.

As always, the bottom line is about money, and, in this regard, it is telling how quickly rich countries like the Netherlands and Germany have shot down ideas about the EU going more into debt to allow for a bigger budget.

Jana Kobzova, who worked as the adviser to the former Slovak President Zuzana Caputova, noted in one of the panels at the event that "you don't want to end up in a small United Nations. The EU must have the conversation about internal reforms also with Ukraine. But it needs to happen in parallel with the accession process."

NATO And Zelenskiy's 'Victory Plan'

Interestingly, the idea of Ukraine joining NATO before the EU seems to have resurfaced in Kyiv with several experts at the conference pointing out that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe first joined the military alliance and then, shortly afterwards, the EU.

Zelenskiy is due in the United States this week and is expected to present a so-called Victory Plan to U.S. President Joe Biden as well as the presidential candidates, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump.

Little is known about the content of the plan, but there was a lot of talk at the conference about the possibility of Ukraine pressing to get a NATO invitation now to get the ball rolling even though that membership couldn't happen until after the war is over.

The thinking from the Ukrainians is that this would be part of Biden's foreign policy legacy before he leaves the White House in January. If the United States did support formally inviting Ukraine, it would be a huge boost, but Kyiv still needs the other 31 members on board. There are several vocal skeptics, including Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia, and, even if Ukraine did secure a invitation to join the military alliance, it would be mostly symbolic and not an indication that NATO membership is coming anytime soon.

The other thing Zelenskiy will seek is permission from the United States to use Western weapons to strike deeper inside Russia. As one diplomat rather dryly put it: "Allowing long-range strikes appears to have been days and weeks away for days and weeks already."

One possible scenario is there would be a partial green light on the quiet without any big announcements. Even if that happened, there are still plenty of other issues to grapple with.

Not all of the Patriot missiles promised to Ukraine at the July NATO summit in Washington, D.C. have arrived yet. At the same time, there is no evidence that the Iranian ballistic missiles that Russia has received from Tehran have been used yet. That, however, is probably only a matter of time.

To complicate matters further, the crucial city of Pokrovsk may very well fall within months. For the Russian Army, that would open up the way to major cities such as Dnipro and Zaporizhzhya.

A Long Winter To Come

What appears clear is Moscow will target the Ukrainian energy grid, especially when the heating season starts in a couple of weeks. That's partly why the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen came to Kyiv last week, bearing gifts including some 160 million euros ($178 million) to cover around 25 percent of Ukraine's energy needs for the winter ahead.

But will this be enough? Air defenses are still lacking in many areas of the country to cover vital energy infrastructure, and this could get dire this winter, especially if the temperatures dip below -10 degrees Celsius for longer periods.

More Western money is on the way -- with von der Leyen also announcing in Kyiv that the European Commission had adopted proposals to lend 35 billion euros ($39 million) backed by frozen Russian state assets in the West. This loan doesn't need consensus from EU member states to go ahead, so it is unlikely to be blocked. But this money is just part of a wider scheme in which the United States could chip in as well.

On this, Washington has been noncommittal so far, as most frozen Russian cash is in the EU and the sanctions are rolled over every six months -- which is too often, according to the United States.

The European Commission has now suggested to EU member states that sanctions on Russian Central Bank assets should be rolled over every 36 months, while other sectoral sanctions are prolonged every six months to allay American fears and allow them to send money to Ukraine as well. The decisions on sectoral sanctions are taken by unanimity in Brussels, and, EU diplomats speaking on background, told me that Hungary won't approve this until after the U.S. presidential election in November -- preventing Kyiv from getting much-needed cash during a critical period.

Looking Ahead

Most high-level politicians are spending this week in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, but there is also the EU's General Affairs Council, where ministers from all member states come to Brussels to discuss and coordinate issues related to the bloc's policies.

At the council on September 24, Europe ministers from the 27 member states will welcome their counterparts from the EU candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to discuss the state of the rule of law in their countries. It is not usual that ministers from non-EU countries participate in the council in this way, but it will become more common the closer candidates get to the bloc.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two big issues: the meeting of NATO's military committee in Prague and the continued weakening of the EU's Russia sanctions.

Briefing #1: NATO Military Committee Chair On Ukraine's Request To Strike Deep Into Russia

What You Need To Know: The NATO Military Committee gathered in Prague for its annual conference over the weekend (September 13-14) taking stock of two things: the continued Western military support for Ukraine and the readiness of the alliance in case of a military threat. The committee brings together the defense chiefs (usually the country's top military officer) from the 32 members of the alliance and is NATO's highest military authority, tasked with giving advice to NATO's strategic commanders and the civilian side of the organization led by the secretary-general.

After the Prague meeting, I spoke to the chair of the Military Committee, Dutch Navy Admiral Rob Bauer, who has been in the role since 2021 in a period dominated by Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine. Naturally, our conversation centered on Ukraine, especially amid signs that key allies are ready to allow Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia with Western-made weapons.

Deep Background: Admiral Bauer was keen to point out that the discussion on allowing Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia did not take place during the meeting in Prague and that he hasn't been part of these talks, ultimately because it is a political discussion taking place in various national capitals, notably Washington, D.C.

But he quickly added that Kyiv's request has merit from a strategic perspective: "If you ask me as a military person, if it is a logical thing to ask for the Ukrainians, then the answer is yes, because basically, in accordance with the UN Charter and, in accordance with the law of armed conflict, if you are attacked by a nation, then you are allowed to defend yourself. That defense doesn't stop at your borders."

He likened the situation to that of someone being targeted by an archer, with Ukraine having the air defenses to protect itself against the arrows but also needing an opportunity to hit the archer too. "That is basically what you do if you attack them, attack their launchers, attack their ammunition storage sites. If you attack their fuel storage sites, then you limit their ability to hurt and attack you in the future. So, militarily, that's the logical thing to do," he said.

Drilling Down

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that a decision to allow Western-made weapons to hit deeper inside Russia would entail a direct war between Moscow and NATO. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was even more explicit, saying that the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, could be targeted by a nuclear strike.
• Bauer, however dismissed this as Kremlin saber-rattling: "I think it's primarily a proof of how frustrated they are because Russia has not achieved any of their strategic goals in Ukraine, and that is now ongoing for 2 1/2 years." He added that "you have to take every threat seriously. But I don't think necessarily this discussion will change that threat immediately."
• So, going into fall and winter, what do things look like on the Ukrainian front lines? The admiral noted that both Russia and Ukraine essentially are grappling with similar problems: "Both sides are looking for more personnel, more weapons systems, more ammunition. And both sides do not have an easy task finding those three elements. And once you have the people, you need to train them. Once you have the weapons systems, you need to maintain them. Once you have the ammunition, you have to be able to use it properly. So those are things both sides are working on now."
• Bauer praised Ukraine's summer incursion into the Russian region of Kursk, calling it "a strategic dilemma for Putin," who has pledged "to defend the motherland but can't." He did caution, however, that it remains to be seen how long Ukraine will be able to hold on to the occupied territory.
• In a similar vein, the Dutch admiral also cautioned against too much negativity regarding Russia's recent advances around the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, which could open up the front perilously close to one of Ukraine's largest cities, Dnipro. "It's moving forward slowly," he told me. "But it's moving forward at the cost of a lot of casualties. But they haven't taken everything they want. So, it's difficult for them as well. The Ukrainians are defending themselves very courageously and professionally."
• We also touched on NATO's own readiness. While alliance officials have said they still plan to defend "every inch of allied territory," NATO diplomats have told me on background in recent months that there are elements missing, notably when it comes to sufficient air defense, ammunition, and prepositioned equipment in the eastern part of the alliance. These will be some of the issues NATO defense ministers will discuss when they assemble in Brussels on September 17-18.
• Bauer said that NATO now has 500,000 troops at high readiness compared to only 300,000 two years ago. "There's a number of things that we still need to improve on that [have] been discussed. I'm not going to talk of all the details, of course, as you can understand, but I think we can be proud of what we have achieved and...we are readier than ever before," he concluded.

Briefing #2: Chipping Away At The EU's Russia Sanctions

What You Need To Know: On September 11, the European Union approved the rollover of the asset freezes and visa bans that the bloc has imposed since February 2022, mainly on Russians, for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine. But with the six-month prolongation, there were also two deletions to the blacklist of over 2,300 people and companies: Nikita Mazepin, a former Formula One driver and son of the Russian oligarch Dmitry Mazepin; and Violetta Prigozhina, mother of the late Russian oligarch and Wagner mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Deep Background: These deletions follow a pattern in which a few people are delisted every six months ahead of the formal rollover dates in mid-March and mid-September. This time around, the discussions on the removals were concluded on a lower political level already in July in what some diplomats in Brussels refer to as the biannual "sanctions dance."

Normally, the discussions are initiated at the behest of Hungary, which has been publicly critical of the bloc's sanctions policy. Typically, Budapest presents a number of sanctioned people to the other member states in political working groups that it wants taken off the lists in order to give its go-ahead. (Rollovers require unanimity from all 27 EU member states.) These have tended to be heavy-hitter oligarchs with extensive Russian business interests and Kremlin ties such as Alisher Usmanov, Pyotr Aven, Viktor Rashnikov, Mikhail Fridman, Dmitry Mazepin, Grigory Berezkin, and Vyacheslav Moshe Kantor.

Previous rounds have shown that most other member states militantly oppose taking such people off the lists. They have argued it would undermine the whole idea of EU sanctions if people close to President Vladimir Putin were removed and have countered by suggesting that the sanctions should only be prolonged once a year instead of twice. Compromise has always been reached, but the result is a weakened sanctions instrument. Plus, Budapest usually manages to leverage its veto, extracting political favors from Brussels in other policy areas.

After this diplomatic tug-of-war, lawyers from the Council of the EU, one of the bloc's main decision-making bodies, usually step in to resolve the issue by proposing a list of so-called "weak cases" with less legal justification to be sanctioned.

As the EU claims to be an entity guided by the rule of law, its lawyers must be able to present evidence that can be found in the public domain. And like with every other EU policy, those on the sanctions list can -- and do -- take the EU to court. Some of those sanctioned have already won cases against Brussels, and they include both Prigozhina and Nikita Mazepin.

Drilling Down

• This is, of course, a slight blow for the Russia sanctions regime, but the EU has been here before. In March, three other names were removed -- Arkady Volozh, co-founder of the Russian Internet giant Yandex; Russian businessman Sergei Mndoiants; and Jozef Hambalek, a Slovak national and head of the Russian nationalist Night Wolves motorcycle club in Europe.
• In my conversations with them, EU diplomats have tried to play down the latest deletions, saying it could be much worse. Prigozhina and Mazepin weren't that big of players anyway, they say, and the important thing is that the high-rolling oligarchs -- such as Mazepin's father -- are still blacklisted
• There is already talk about who will be delisted at the next opportunity in March 2025. During the EU ambassadors meeting in Brussels on September 11, the Hungarian and Slovak diplomats pledged that, for the next rollover, they will aim to remove Gulbakhor Ismailova, the sister of Usmanov who has been linked to various key Russian assets.
• The statement, circulated among diplomats and seen by RFE/RL, noted that "in our view, the grounds on which the listing of Ms. Ismailova have been based, no longer hold. Ms. Ismailova should be removed from the sanctions list." Based on this, Slovakia and Hungary will maintain this position during the next review.
• Will there be any more? It seems like family members of oligarchs are increasingly seen by EU lawyers as "weak cases," as it is legally difficult to prove that spouses and children are directly connected to the Russian war machine.
• Two possible candidates for the removal would be Galina Pumpyanskaya and Aleksandr Pumpyansky, the wife and son of Russian oligarch Dmitry Pumpyansky. An EU court annulled the sanctions against Aleksandr Pumpyansky in 2023, so he is certainly seen as being a "weak case."
• Two others on the blacklist, Aven and Fridman, have both won cases in EU court against their sanctions. The same as with Pumpyansky junior, they remain blacklisted because Brussels has argued that the cases they won in EU courts concern old listing criteria and refer to a previous sanctions period.

Looking Ahead

On September 19-20, I will be in Ukraine for the first time since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. I will be in Kyiv for the EU Accession Exchange Forum to meet with politicians and policy analysts from around the region. I'll be reporting back with my thoughts in next week's briefing.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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