Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on what's going to be a crucial week in Brussels, with possible movement on EU enlargement and support for Ukraine.

The Briefing: A Week Of Historic Decisions Or A Week Of Kicking The Can Down The Road?

What You Need To Know: This week is crunch time in Brussels. Starting already on December 11, EU foreign ministers meet to take stock of support for Ukraine and to consider more Russia sanctions. The following day, the bloc's Europe ministers gather and could -- if the stars are all aligned -- agree on a historic enlargement decision.

Most likely, though, nothing will be resolved before European leaders come to Brussels for their annual pre-Christmas summit on December 14-15. EU officials are already warning that as the agenda is so packed, the summit is likely to extend into the weekend. The key decision will be whether to give Moldova, Ukraine -- and possibly Bosnia-Herzegovina -- the green light to start EU accession talks.

But there are also other issues to tackle before the winter holidays: most urgently, a new proposed package of sanctions on Russia and financial support and arms deliveries for Ukraine. And at the center of all of these decisions -- which mostly means standing in the way of them -- is Hungary.

As always when it comes to the EU, a lot of knots can be untied with the help of money. This year might be no different. Even before the Brussels summit, the European Commission could approve the release of between 10 billion euros ($10.8 billion) and 13 billion euros ($14 billion) of funds for Hungary that previously have been blocked by Brussels due to concerns about the state of the country's rule of law.

Some Hungarian judicial reforms undertaken in recent weeks might be enough to see some of the cash flowing soon and thus soften any enlargement objections Budapest might have.

Most of the money, however, will be spread out over a seven-year period. While this is certainly a lot, there is still another 9 billion euros that remains frozen and Budapest won't be getting its hands on it anytime soon, unless the country undertakes various other reforms in areas such as academic freedom, LGBT rights, and migration.

Deep Background: Will cash alone be enough to convince Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to sign off on the next proposed steps regarding enlargement?

In previous years, getting the money was enough, as the Hungarians -- after earlier objections -- ended up agreeing to Russia sanctions or Kyiv's advancement toward the EU.

This time around, though, things could be a little different. The Hungarian economy is growing again after a couple of years of contraction. And several diplomats I have spoken to -- who have knowledge of the process but who aren't authorized to speak on the record -- said they think that Hungarian resistance is now more ideological and certainly more personal.

On the first point, Orban supposedly feels that the sand is shifting, both in the EU and across the Atlantic, with dwindling support for Ukraine. The winners of recent elections in the Netherlands and Slovakia both support stopping weapons deliveries to Ukraine. And in the United States, similar sentiments are on the rise among some Congressional Republicans.

Back in Europe, for over a year now, farmers in EU countries bordering Ukraine have voiced complaints about Ukrainian agricultural goods that are flooding the market. Now truckers -- notably but not only in Poland -- are blocking substantial parts of the Ukrainian border, unhappy that Ukrainian haulers are being allowed to undercut their prices within the European Union.

On the second point regarding Hungarian objections, that is a reference to Orban's supposed intense dislike of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who has criticized the Hungarian prime minister publicly on numerous occasions.

While Hungary is the only EU member state openly questioning whether the EU is ready to accept Ukraine in the future, there is plenty of grumbling in the background. Other members also share concerns about the potential folly of bringing Kyiv in too quickly. There are fears of a Russian response but also misgivings about the enormous political and financial upheaval further enlargement would entail, not to mention the redistribution of funds to accommodate relatively poor new members. It may well be that Orban, sensing he is not alone in his beliefs on enlargement, will push others to air their true feelings.

There is also talk of Orban wanting to prevent a second term for Ursula von der Leyen as the European Commission's president. (In the build-up to the June European Parliament elections, Orban vilified her in an anti-Brussels billboard campaign.) While the Hungarian prime minister can't veto the selection of the commission's president -- the 27 EU heads of state decide via qualified majority -- he is already positioning himself as the de facto leader of a Euroskeptic movement that is growing within the bloc.

Drilling Down

How Will The Enlargement Decision Play Out?

• In its annual enlargement report in November, the European Commission recommended that Ukraine and Moldova start EU accession talks and Georgia become an official EU candidate country.
• For Bosnia-Herzegovina, it's a little more complicated. According to the draft of this week's European Commission summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, "The Council [of the European Union] recommends that the European Council decides [to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved.]" This reflects the fact that Bosnia has made only limited progress, fulfilling just two out of the 14 conditions set by Brussels.
• Take Georgia and Moldova out of the equation for a moment. Unanimity is needed for member wannabes to move to the next step, and my understanding, from talking to EU officials and diplomats of various European countries, is that everyone is generally OK with Tbilisi getting candidate status and Moldova moving one step ahead by opening accession talks. But those countries' EU statuses could be at risk if they become "collateral damage" in the debate over Ukraine. Most EU countries -- at least publicly -- want Ukraine to start accession talks as well. Hungary is the key exception. To complicate matters further, the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all countered that if Ukraine fails, then everyone fails.
• So, who will blink first? In a December 4 letter from Orban to the European Council President Charles Michel, the Hungarian premier appears unyielding, noting that "the commission's recent proposal related to the accession process of Ukraine marks the end of the European Union's enlargement policy as an objective and merit-based instrument. The European Council is now called upon to endorse this proposal, without previously having the opportunity to discuss it." The letter concludes by saying, "I respectfully urge you not to invite the European Council to decide on these matters in December as the obvious lack of consensus would inevitably lead to failure. The European Council must avoid this counterproductive scenario for the sake of unity, our most important asset."
• So, where does Bosnia fit into all of this? Well, instead of vetoing Ukraine's next step, Hungary might prefer to horse trade. Hungary -- along with Croatia and Slovenia and, most vigorously of all, Austria -- have lobbied for Bosnia to start accession negotiations. Their main argument is what they call "a balanced approach" -- meaning that if you go ahead with the eastern countries, you should also embrace the EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans.
• On December 13, just before the main EU summit, there is an EU-Western Balkans meeting in Brussels. With no steps forward expected from any of the other countries in the region, Bosnia is the only one that could get something. And Brussels is desperate not to be seen as neglecting these countries yet again -- especially as extra funding for the Western Balkans to the tune of 6 billion euros ($6.45 billion), as proposed in November by the European Commission, is still far from being agreed by all member states.
• In terms of meeting the EU's targets, Kyiv and Chisinau have managed substantially more than Sarajevo -- a difference that their supporters are keen to highlight. Hungary and Austria, however, would like Ukraine's and Moldova's candidacies to be linked to Bosnia. Yet, being linked is something Ukraine's supporters fear, especially wary that for Budapest it could just be a delay tactic. Just look at North Macedonia and Albania, which are interlinked on their respective EU paths. Right now, Skopje can't move forward because it's unable to get the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to change the constitution to mention Bulgarians as a founding people of its nation -- a key Bulgarian demand. This has meant Albania has had to wait as well. Bosnia could very well slow down Ukraine's path and some EU diplomats think that this is exactly what Budapest wants.
• To make things even more complicated, the Netherlands has been vocal in Brussels over the last few days about Bosnia not deserving to start accession talks at all and has expressed its readiness to veto any such move.
• In its enlargement report a month ago, the European Commission did note that it would report back by March on any progress made on outstanding issues in Bosnia, Moldova, and Ukraine. While March isn't directly mentioned in the European Commission's draft summit conclusions seen by RFE/RL, it's possible that may change and that a March date could be used again to buy time and to allow the member states, if they can't agree in December, to keep kicking the can down the road.

What Else Is On The Table?

• The EU's 12th Russia sanctions package is likely to get green-lighted in the coming days, largely because it is fairly weak and doesn't touch Russian energy. While Hungary has so far vetoed the entire package, there is an expectation in Brussels that -- after plenty of horse-trading -- its objections will be lifted. This round of sanctions will likely be the last for a while. The EU has run out of ideas and energy to produce more, and it is becoming increasingly hard to achieve unanimity on new measures.
• Something that almost certainly won't fly is common EU funding to arm Ukraine. So far that has been done via the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget mechanism that the bloc has used to channel 4.6 billion euros ($4.95 billion) worth of military equipment to Kyiv. But the 8th tranche, worth 500 million euros ($540 million), has been blocked by Budapest since the summer. First, Hungary said that Kyiv needed to remove the Hungarian bank OTP from a blacklist produced by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption, where it was labelled an "international sponsor of war" as it continues to do business in Russia. While Ukraine complied, Budapest now wants assurances from Kyiv that OTP won't be re-listed again -- another potential deadlock that might not be resolved anytime soon.
• Then there is the question of topping up the EPF by 20 billion euros for the next three years. That is also unlikely to be approved, especially as the German Constitutional Court recently ruled that the country's use of special funds to finance various subsidies violated its constitutional "debt brake." This ruling will have an impact on other member states. Right now, the EU is in the middle of its seven-year budget cycle (2021-2027), and while many countries in the bloc would like to increase the budget to finance anything from the bloc's green transition to the functioning of the Ukrainian government, it will be trickier when the EU's biggest cash cow (Germany) has new legal restraints on how it uses its money and is cutting its own domestic budget. Going forward, arms to Ukraine from EU member states will most likely be funded on a bilateral basis.
• What about other funds for Ukraine? Earlier this year, the European Commission proposed 50 billion euros ($53.9 billion) for Ukraine for the period 2024-2027. Hungary is -- unsurprisingly -- against this, and, with Germany's new constraints, there might have to be some creativity. Instead of taking money from the EU budget and battling constant Budapest vetoes, 26 EU governments could loan Ukraine money on a monthly or quarterly basis.
• Among EU officials and diplomats from member states, there is perhaps more annoyance with Hungary than ever before. There isn't a mechanism to kick a member out of the EU; a country must leave voluntarily, as the United Kingdom did after its 2016 referendum. But there is a way to suspend a member states' voting rights in the Council on the European Union, which can amend or veto European Commission proposals, by using the so-called Article 7 procedure.
• The European Commission and the European Parliament have invoked these articles against Poland and Hungary before, but they have never been approved because to pass they need unanimity and Budapest and Warsaw have always had each other's backs. But with an impending government change in Poland, the procedure might be dropped against Warsaw. Will Budapest then be cornered? Or can it rely on its old ally Slovakia, which could take a more Euroskeptic course with Prime Minister Robert Fico back in power.

Looking Ahead

On December 12, the European Commission is presenting its "Defense Of Democracy" legislative proposal. The commission has said the measures are mostly to make the 2024 European Parliament elections more transparent, but there has been criticism from civil society groups of the EU's "foreign agents' law," where organizations operating in the bloc will have to declare any links or funding coming from non-EU countries. Foreign agents' laws in countries such as Russia have been used to crack down on media and NGOs, and Brussels has been outspoken about "foreign agents'" initiatives in member states such as Hungary and aspiring members such as Bosnia and Georgia.

Also on December 12, the European Commission is set to present its long-awaited proposal for how the EU could use some of the money generated from the sale of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine financially. It is estimated that up to 300 billion euros have been frozen since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The question now is how much of that money can be used for grants to finance the rebuilding of Ukraine. An estimated 3 billion euros a year would be available, although eurozone countries fear that it would diminish the appetite for nonmember states to keep savings in the European Union.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on Brussels' proposal for another round of sanctions on Russia and looking at what's left of the Eastern Partnership.

Brief #1: Can The EU Agree On More Russia Sanctions?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission presented a new Russia sanctions package in mid-November -- the 12th since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The hope in Brussels is that the 27 EU member states will sign off on the package by the end of the year, preferably ahead of or at the EU summit in Brussels on December 14-15.

At first sight, getting a green light looks possible, considering there is still time. There have already been a few rounds of discussions among high-level diplomats, and the sanctions package isn't perhaps the most controversial of proposals. It doesn't, for example, hit the Russian gas or nuclear sectors.

Yet, it took nearly seven weeks for the member states to agree on the 11th sanctions package back in the summer, and those measures were equally unambitious. The ongoing issue is that certain member states want to water down the proposals, claiming that the sanctions hurt their economies more than Russia's.

For example, Slovakia has asked to extend the exemption that it and other landlocked countries were given, meaning the country could continue importing Russian oil via pipeline until the end of 2025. Germany is also keen to get an exemption on the ban on Russian vehicles entering the bloc and the Czech Republic wants to be able to import Russian steel until 2028. All these measures were already agreed in previous sanctions packages -- and the exemptions that has been sought could very well be agreed again.

Deep Background: Exemptions aren't the biggest threat to the deal. Predictably it is Hungary, which has questioned the EU's sanctions regime on Russia from the very start. Diplomats I have spoken to on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak on the record say they believe that Budapest will block the new deal in order to gain leverage on the European Commission releasing 13 billion euros ($14.2 billion) of EU funds so far held by Brussels over Hungary's backsliding on the rule of law.

In a recent letter, seen by RFE/RL, addressed to European Council President Charles Michel, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban asks for a "strategic discussion" on the EU's approach to Ukraine in a number of fields -- not only Russia sanctions but also financial aid to Kyiv and the country's potential EU accession. The letter notes that "the European Council is not in a position to make key decisions on the proposed security guarantees or additional financial support for Ukraine, endorse further strengthening of the sanctions regime or agree on the future of the enlargement process unless a consensus on our future strategy towards Ukraine is found."

Specifically on sanctions, the letter notes that "we must also have a clear view [of] what the European Union has actually done to mitigate the obvious adverse effects of the sanctions on individual member states." Everything is essentially coming to a head, ready for those last critical weeks before Christmas.

Drilling Down

• So, what is actually in the sanctions package? The top line is probably the proposed ban on Russian diamonds, something that many EU member states have pushed for. Belgium, however, with its diamond-trading hub of Antwerp had pushed back on this -- until now.
• If approved, the ban would apply to both Russian natural diamonds and diamond jewelry from January 1, 2024. Then, starting on March 1 and with the aim of being completed by September, there will be an indirect import ban of processed Russian diamonds, meaning stones that have been cut or polished in third countries. For this, the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrial nations will have to come up with a workable global traceability mechanism, something that Belgium has asked for in order for its sign-off on the diamond ban. There will also be an EU import ban on Russian copper, aluminum wire and foil, as well as Russian liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
• The export ban has been further widened to include EU companies providing cryptocurrency wallets. The mostly digital applications, used to store cryptocurrency keys, can also be used for the design and manufacture of certain dual-use goods, which can have both a civilian and military purpose, such as lithium batteries and thermostats for drones.
• While not touching the actual price cap on Russian oil set late last year in conjunction with the G7 at $60 per barrel, the latest sanctions proposal introduces tougher financial reporting requirements that extra costs, such as for insurance and freight, must be declared, as regulators fear such extras are being inflated as a way of creating more revenue for Russia.
• And in order to try to thwart Russia's "shadow fleet" -- unlicensed vessels carrying and selling Russian oil above the price cap -- the European Commission will now ask member states to notify the competent authorities of any sale or export of tankers concluded since 2022. Both this measure and the one concerning more detailed financial reporting, however, could be watered down by EU maritime nations fearing too much red tape.
• Perhaps the most interesting part of this latest sanctions proposal -- and one that will almost certainly be softened -- is a requirement for the EU subsidiaries of Russian companies to transfer all their funds either back to Russia or to a third country. Firstly, it is not an outright ban, which is important to note; and secondly, there are exemptions to ensure critical energy supplies are not interrupted -- so, for example, the subsidiaries of Russian gas companies would likely be spared. But it could affect other EU subsidiaries, making it much harder for them to survive.
• As always in these packages, there are also 48 people and 73 entities that the bloc wants to slap visa bans and asset freezes on -- adding to a list that already consists of over 1,800 names in total. Included on the new one are several high-ranking Belarusian military officials; Rady Khabirov, the head of the Russian republic of Bashkortostan; Viktor Afzalov, the commander of the Russian Air Force; and Putin's cousin, Anna Tsivileva.
• Interestingly, there is also a proposal to keep dead people on the sanctions list. Normally, a deceased person is removed, but Brussels is hoping that an asset freeze can remain, as funds can still be generated to financially aid Russia's war in Ukraine. (For obvious reasons in such cases, there will be no more need for a visa ban.)

Brief #2: The Eastern Partnership Is Still Hobbling Along

What You Need To Know: Perhaps it was the zenith of the European Union's Eastern Partnership. It was the end of November 2013 in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, and EU leaders were gathering for a high-level summit together with their counterparts from the bloc's six eastern neighbors: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (represented by then-Foreign Minister Uladzimer Makei as authoritarian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka was persona non grata), Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

The latter trio was supposed to initial association agreements with the EU that would bring them closer to the bloc. The international press was out in force at the conference center, not for the Georgian or Moldovan leaders but to see whether Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych would sign the association agreement. There had been reports the evening before saying he wouldn't sign, which turned out to be exactly what happened.

Meanwhile, more and more protesters had gathered in Kyiv, angry that the Ukrainian government appeared to prefer closer ties with Moscow than the European Union. The next day, riot police dispersed the crowd, which reoccupied the square shortly afterward. The protest, later known as "Euromaidan," eventually forced Yanukovych to step down and flee to Russia.

Deep Background: Exactly a decade later, on November 28-29, I was back in the Lithuanian capital to participate in a seminar that dealt with the future of the Eastern Partnership. The key takeaway was that, in many ways, the Eastern Partnership had been a victim of its own success.

The partnership was created after a Polish-Swedish initiative in 2009 and had the goal of bringing the six former Soviet republics closer to the EU but not putting them on the same accession path as, say, Turkey or the countries of the Western Balkans. Wary of antagonizing Russia and the growing enlargement fatigue in the bloc, Brussels chose an easier, softer path -- the Eastern Partnership.

In the end, despite the initial intentions, half of the Eastern partners did follow that traditional route, in the sense of moving along an accession pathway. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moldova and Ukraine became official EU candidate countries and, if EU member states agree in the coming weeks, will start EU accession negotiations next year. Georgia, one step behind the other two, is set to become an official candidate country by the end of 2023. Those three countries have all gone beyond what was promised by the Eastern Partnership.

Drilling Down

• The question then is whether the format has outlived its purpose. Officials from Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, all speaking on background, told me that they don't like to be grouped with the other three Eastern Partnership countries -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. While they are all publicly positive about the Eastern Partnership, the more advanced candidates can see less need for the initiative these days, because, to their minds, the only thing that unites them now is a Soviet past.
• Armenia, which is making moves away from Moscow but is not yet ready to apply for EU membership, might be the keenest of the six to keep the partnership going. Azerbaijan still prefers bilateral deals with Brussels, notably in the energy sector; and Belarus unilaterally pulled out of the framework in 2021, after its standoff with the EU following the presidential election in 2020, which was widely seen as rigged, and the subsequent crackdown on civil society and opposition in the country.
• Possibly the biggest sign that the Eastern Partnership is in decline is that there hasn't been a high-level summit for two years now. Normally, the EU would hold a summit every other year, and Sweden, which held the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union earlier this year, was approached. However, Stockholm -- which co-conceived the whole idea of the partnership in the first place -- declined the offer, with Swedish diplomats telling me that there wouldn't be any deliverables.
• There has been talk in Brussels that Poland, the other co-founder of the Eastern Partnership, is keen to host a summit when they have the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2025. But the question is if the six partners are keen and if it won't end up being another "box-ticking exercise," as some diplomats fear.
• That was what essentially happened at the last summit, held in Brussels in December 2021. There was a working session that lasted a couple of hours and then a short working dinner. Then the whole thing was over with minimal fuss. Looking at the summit declaration, there was no mention of Russia whatsoever. Nor were there any specific lines dedicated to any of the many frozen or hot conflicts in the territories of the eastern partners. Looking back at media reports from the time, most of the focus was given to Belarus's empty chair and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy trying to cajole EU leaders into adopting sanctions on Russia immediately, due to the build-up of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine.
• What holds the Eastern Partnership together, other than just a bureaucratic reluctance to kill it off? Some point to the fact that the foreign ministers of the five current members will meet their EU counterparts in Brussels on December 11 with the hope of agreeing on a cell-phone roaming zone among the five countries that would eventually be extended to the EU. So, there is that.
• The Eastern Partnership will probably hobble on for a while. The framework has already borne fruit, with increased cooperation between the EU and partner countries, particularly in the energy sector. The more sanguine diplomats and EU officials see other areas, such as security, that can be explored further.

Looking Ahead

On December 7-8, the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, respectively, will head to Beijing for the EU-China summit. Expect the EU to ask for China to play a more constructive role in the Ukraine war, notably by pressuring Russia on abducted Ukrainian children or prisoner exchanges, as well as taking a harder line on sanctions circumvention. In return, Beijing will likely ask the EU for more cooperation on research and development and for an increase in trade between the two sides.

EU interior ministers assemble in Brussels on December 5. One of the items on the agenda is whether a green light can finally be given to Bulgaria and Romania to join the visa-free Schengen zone. It is expected that the pair will be disappointed once again. Some EU officials, speaking on condition of anonymity as they weren't authorized to speak on the record, were annoyed that the Bulgaria and Romania request was even on the agenda, especially as one of the key opponents, the Netherlands, doesn't have a functioning government yet after Geert Wilder's far-right party got the most seats in recent parliamentary elections.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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