Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on the key decisions taken at a historic pre-Christmas EU summit -- and all of the problems that remain.

Brief #1: A Historic EU Enlargement Decision, But Tougher Times Ahead

What You Need To Know: The EU summit on December 14-15 brought good and bad news for Ukraine. Before the summit, most diplomats I spoke to thought it would be easier to agree on fresh EU funding for the war-torn country than to green-light the start of accession talks with Kyiv. Even the European Council President Charles Michel, speaking to RFE/RL a couple of days before the big pre-holidays meeting in Brussels, hinted as much.

But the historic decisions on EU enlargement -- not only related to Ukraine but also opening accession talks with Moldova and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as bestowing candidate status on Georgia -- ended up being the easiest decisions of all, with agreement reached already by early evening on the first day of the summit. So much for all the talk before -- including mine -- about the summit dragging on well into the weekend.

Instead, EU leaders couldn't agree on the 50 billion euros ($55 billion) of fresh funding for Ukraine for the next four years. The best they could do, after hours of fruitless talks, was to agree to come back to the issue in late January when a new EU summit is scheduled.

The tricky part of the enlargement decision was expected to be how to circumvent a Hungarian veto. (Read more about Hungary's objections here.) And, in the history of EU summits, it was solved in a completely new way. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban simply stood up and left the room. Before, during, and after the session, Orban kept repeating that he didn't agree with opening of talks for Ukraine -- but he did allow the other 26 to vote for it.

In the end, this meant that Hungary didn't actively veto the enlargement decision. For a conclusion to be agreed in the European Council -- which is made up of all the EU heads of state or government and defines the EU's political direction and priorities -- a quorum is needed, which in this case meant just two-thirds of the council needed to vote. Why hasn't this been done before, many EU officials and diplomats were asking. Was this a way for the EU to break impasses in the future?

While Orban maintained during the summit that neither Hungary nor the EU as a whole were ready to open EU accession negotiations with Ukraine, in remarks before the meeting he hinted that there would be a compromise. What he accentuated in those earlier remarks was that he was against the "rapid" or "fast-tracked" accession of Ukraine. And with this, he opened up the opportunity for a deal.

According to EU officials I spoke to during the summit on the condition of anonymity because they weren't allowed to speak on the record, that deal was hammered out over breakfast on the morning of the first day of the summit between Orban, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel, respectively. That was the deal that the 26 leaders eventually agreed on, while Orban, presumably, was taking a bathroom break.

Deep Background: To understand the compromise, it's helpful to look at two sentences in the EU summit conclusions that the leaders signed off on. The sentences relate to the accession of Ukraine and Moldova, as these countries are paired in the enlargement process.

"The European Council decides to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and with the Republic of Moldova. The European Council invites the Council [of the European Union, where EU government ministers discuss, amend and adopt laws] to adopt the respective negotiating frameworks once the relevant steps set out in the respective Commission recommendations of November 8, 2023, are taken."

The first sentence is a clear win for Ukraine (and Moldova). When I spoke to Ukrainian officials before the summit, what they wanted most was clear and crisp language confirming that accession talks are opened. They got it -- and Hungary relented.

The second sentence, however, seems to already be kicking the can down the road and leaving some wiggle room. To start accession talks, you need to adopt a negotiation framework -- and, with that, you open up the EU candidates once again to potential delays and further Hungarian vetoes.

The European Commission actually opened itself up for this "solution" when they presented their big enlargement report in November. There they noted that they would report back to EU member states by March 2024 at the latest on the conditions that remained for Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The remaining issues for Ukraine were to adopt laws to make its National Anti-Corruption Bureau function better; address the outstanding recommendations highlighted by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission on state language, media, and education -- a sore point for Budapest as it claims that Ukraine is discriminating against its ethnic Hungarian minority; and, finally, to enact a law regulating lobbying.

Kyiv says it has already passed the first two laws and will soon enact the lobbying legislation. Addressing the EU leaders via video link from Kyiv on December 14, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said Ukraine is expecting the negotiation framework will be adopted in March. That would appear to be the most logical scenario, as EU leaders are due to meet that month for a summit in Brussels. But, as ever with Brussels, don't count on it. Orban was of the opinion at the summit that Ukraine hadn't fulfilled any of the remaining three conditions. And in the end, he has a veto and is prepared to use it.

Drilling Down

• In Orban's talks with Michel and company, there was also an understanding that the leaders will come back to the issue in one year, meaning in December 2024. This does have some logic. Firstly, there are European Parliament elections coming up in June, and after that there will be an entirely new European Commission and a fresh European Council president.
• Some EU officials fear that to give the de facto green light to Ukraine a few months before the European Parliament elections gives populists in some EU countries a potent electoral weapon, especially with the reported rise of "Ukraine fatigue." A way around that, according to the EU officials I spoke to, would be to put the accession question on hold for a few months, with the idea being that a new European Commission could look at the situation with a fresh pair of eyes.
• While Orban didn't ruin the party this time around, most likely he will still try to slow the process down for Ukraine and will use every possible veto at his disposal as leverage to get what he wants -- namely, the EU funds for Hungary, caution on Ukraine, but also a shift toward conservatism in the bloc. That shift is happening already, as populists with strong anti-Ukrainian views won recent elections in the Netherlands and Slovakia, and there is growing reluctance among Republican lawmakers in the United States to commit more funds to arm Kyiv.
• If the sands shift in Orban's favor over Ukraine, the EU might have to backtrack -- either with a reduction in funding for Ukraine or enlargement at a snail's pace. While Orban was alone in opposing the opening of accession talks with Ukraine, several member states would probably prefer if Ukraine wasn't fast-tracked into the club. An official from an Eastern member state, who wished to remain anonymous as they weren't authorized to speak on the record, recently told me: "Officially, we support Ukraine's entry by 2030. But, in reality, we wouldn't mind if it was closer to 2040." That, the official said, was because there are fears that the EU wouldn't be able to reform quickly enough to accommodate new members and that Ukraine will soak up too much of the bloc's budget.
• With Ukraine's EU accession bid finally given the thumbs up, the other EU hopefuls were also approved, as no member states had any objections. Moldova will face the same uncertainty as Ukraine as to when the accession can start.
• For Georgia, there is now candidate status -- which was given to Ukraine and Moldova in 2022 -- meaning that Tbilisi continues to be one step behind Chisinau and Kyiv.
• There was also more positive language on Bosnia than was previously expected. What Sarajevo got was, in effect, a conditional opening of accession talks. The language was vaguer than that used with Ukraine and Moldova, with the summit conclusions noting that, "The European Council will open accession negotiations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved."
• But, after strong lobbying from Austria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia, another sentence was added that at least gives a bit more clarity regarding when the next step can be taken: "It invites the Commission to report to the Council on progress at the latest in March 2024, with a view to making a decision."
• The day before the summit, the European Commission released over 10 billion euros to Hungary that previously had been frozen over rule-of-law concerns. While Orban said that he wasn't leveraging his vetoes to secure the funds, it certainly looked like a very convenient coincidence that the cash started flowing to Budapest just as Orban needed to green-light a few decisions.
• Hungary has indicated that it wants to receive all the EU funds that are currently being withheld -- worth nearly 20 billion euros. It's more than possible that Budapest will use future veto opportunities to try to get the frozen EU funds. And there will be plenty of opportunities to veto, as all the 30-plus negotiation chapters need unanimity from all 27 EU member states to be opened and closed.
• The first opportunity for Hungary to use another veto will be on the decision to green-light a 50 billion euro kitty for Ukraine. The other member states couldn't convince Budapest to support the kitty last week, but the issue will be discussed and voted on again in late January.
• In case Hungary won't blink, the other 26 member states might have to get creative again, with perhaps Orban popping out for a coffee when the vote is taking place. Of course, Orban can abstain, but Budapest has to agree to it first. And while unanimity on decisions is much preferred by Brussels -- as it ensures the full weight of the EU budget is behind the loans and grants to Ukraine -- the national budgets of the 26 member states could also guarantee those Ukrainian loans. Legally it's much messier, but it might just work.
• While the member states not agreeing on funding for Ukraine before the end of the year was a big setback for the EU (and Ukraine!), time is on their side, as Kyiv won't reportedly run out of money until the second quarter of 2024.

Looking Ahead

On December 20, the EU's sanctions regime on Russia will face scrutiny from the bloc's supreme court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). First, it will rule on the legality of the visa ban and asset freeze imposed on one of the most high-profile Russians, the former owner of Chelsea Football Club, Roman Abramovich. A win for the billionaire could potentially lead to other high-ranking Russians being taken off the Brussels blacklist.

That same day, the Luxembourg-based court will also rule on how widely applied the EU's flight ban on Russia, which was adopted last year, should be. The EU has banned all Russian-registered aircrafts from landing on, taking off from, or flying over EU territory. That ban also applies to planes not registered in Russia but owned or chartered by Russian citizens. The applicant in the case is a Russian-Luxembourgish national with a private pilot's license who is challenging the European Aviation Safety Agency's decision to prohibit him from flying.

That's all for this year! I wish you all the best for the holiday season and thank you very much for all your support and feedback throughout 2023. Feel free to reach out to me on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, which will come on January 8, 2024, please subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on what's going to be a crucial week in Brussels, with possible movement on EU enlargement and support for Ukraine.

The Briefing: A Week Of Historic Decisions Or A Week Of Kicking The Can Down The Road?

What You Need To Know: This week is crunch time in Brussels. Starting already on December 11, EU foreign ministers meet to take stock of support for Ukraine and to consider more Russia sanctions. The following day, the bloc's Europe ministers gather and could -- if the stars are all aligned -- agree on a historic enlargement decision.

Most likely, though, nothing will be resolved before European leaders come to Brussels for their annual pre-Christmas summit on December 14-15. EU officials are already warning that as the agenda is so packed, the summit is likely to extend into the weekend. The key decision will be whether to give Moldova, Ukraine -- and possibly Bosnia-Herzegovina -- the green light to start EU accession talks.

But there are also other issues to tackle before the winter holidays: most urgently, a new proposed package of sanctions on Russia and financial support and arms deliveries for Ukraine. And at the center of all of these decisions -- which mostly means standing in the way of them -- is Hungary.

As always when it comes to the EU, a lot of knots can be untied with the help of money. This year might be no different. Even before the Brussels summit, the European Commission could approve the release of between 10 billion euros ($10.8 billion) and 13 billion euros ($14 billion) of funds for Hungary that previously have been blocked by Brussels due to concerns about the state of the country's rule of law.

Some Hungarian judicial reforms undertaken in recent weeks might be enough to see some of the cash flowing soon and thus soften any enlargement objections Budapest might have.

Most of the money, however, will be spread out over a seven-year period. While this is certainly a lot, there is still another 9 billion euros that remains frozen and Budapest won't be getting its hands on it anytime soon, unless the country undertakes various other reforms in areas such as academic freedom, LGBT rights, and migration.

Deep Background: Will cash alone be enough to convince Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to sign off on the next proposed steps regarding enlargement?

In previous years, getting the money was enough, as the Hungarians -- after earlier objections -- ended up agreeing to Russia sanctions or Kyiv's advancement toward the EU.

This time around, though, things could be a little different. The Hungarian economy is growing again after a couple of years of contraction. And several diplomats I have spoken to -- who have knowledge of the process but who aren't authorized to speak on the record -- said they think that Hungarian resistance is now more ideological and certainly more personal.

On the first point, Orban supposedly feels that the sand is shifting, both in the EU and across the Atlantic, with dwindling support for Ukraine. The winners of recent elections in the Netherlands and Slovakia both support stopping weapons deliveries to Ukraine. And in the United States, similar sentiments are on the rise among some Congressional Republicans.

Back in Europe, for over a year now, farmers in EU countries bordering Ukraine have voiced complaints about Ukrainian agricultural goods that are flooding the market. Now truckers -- notably but not only in Poland -- are blocking substantial parts of the Ukrainian border, unhappy that Ukrainian haulers are being allowed to undercut their prices within the European Union.

On the second point regarding Hungarian objections, that is a reference to Orban's supposed intense dislike of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who has criticized the Hungarian prime minister publicly on numerous occasions.

While Hungary is the only EU member state openly questioning whether the EU is ready to accept Ukraine in the future, there is plenty of grumbling in the background. Other members also share concerns about the potential folly of bringing Kyiv in too quickly. There are fears of a Russian response but also misgivings about the enormous political and financial upheaval further enlargement would entail, not to mention the redistribution of funds to accommodate relatively poor new members. It may well be that Orban, sensing he is not alone in his beliefs on enlargement, will push others to air their true feelings.

There is also talk of Orban wanting to prevent a second term for Ursula von der Leyen as the European Commission's president. (In the build-up to the June European Parliament elections, Orban vilified her in an anti-Brussels billboard campaign.) While the Hungarian prime minister can't veto the selection of the commission's president -- the 27 EU heads of state decide via qualified majority -- he is already positioning himself as the de facto leader of a Euroskeptic movement that is growing within the bloc.

Drilling Down

How Will The Enlargement Decision Play Out?

• In its annual enlargement report in November, the European Commission recommended that Ukraine and Moldova start EU accession talks and Georgia become an official EU candidate country.
• For Bosnia-Herzegovina, it's a little more complicated. According to the draft of this week's European Commission summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, "The Council [of the European Union] recommends that the European Council decides [to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved.]" This reflects the fact that Bosnia has made only limited progress, fulfilling just two out of the 14 conditions set by Brussels.
• Take Georgia and Moldova out of the equation for a moment. Unanimity is needed for member wannabes to move to the next step, and my understanding, from talking to EU officials and diplomats of various European countries, is that everyone is generally OK with Tbilisi getting candidate status and Moldova moving one step ahead by opening accession talks. But those countries' EU statuses could be at risk if they become "collateral damage" in the debate over Ukraine. Most EU countries -- at least publicly -- want Ukraine to start accession talks as well. Hungary is the key exception. To complicate matters further, the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all countered that if Ukraine fails, then everyone fails.
• So, who will blink first? In a December 4 letter from Orban to the European Council President Charles Michel, the Hungarian premier appears unyielding, noting that "the commission's recent proposal related to the accession process of Ukraine marks the end of the European Union's enlargement policy as an objective and merit-based instrument. The European Council is now called upon to endorse this proposal, without previously having the opportunity to discuss it." The letter concludes by saying, "I respectfully urge you not to invite the European Council to decide on these matters in December as the obvious lack of consensus would inevitably lead to failure. The European Council must avoid this counterproductive scenario for the sake of unity, our most important asset."
• So, where does Bosnia fit into all of this? Well, instead of vetoing Ukraine's next step, Hungary might prefer to horse trade. Hungary -- along with Croatia and Slovenia and, most vigorously of all, Austria -- have lobbied for Bosnia to start accession negotiations. Their main argument is what they call "a balanced approach" -- meaning that if you go ahead with the eastern countries, you should also embrace the EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans.
• On December 13, just before the main EU summit, there is an EU-Western Balkans meeting in Brussels. With no steps forward expected from any of the other countries in the region, Bosnia is the only one that could get something. And Brussels is desperate not to be seen as neglecting these countries yet again -- especially as extra funding for the Western Balkans to the tune of 6 billion euros ($6.45 billion), as proposed in November by the European Commission, is still far from being agreed by all member states.
• In terms of meeting the EU's targets, Kyiv and Chisinau have managed substantially more than Sarajevo -- a difference that their supporters are keen to highlight. Hungary and Austria, however, would like Ukraine's and Moldova's candidacies to be linked to Bosnia. Yet, being linked is something Ukraine's supporters fear, especially wary that for Budapest it could just be a delay tactic. Just look at North Macedonia and Albania, which are interlinked on their respective EU paths. Right now, Skopje can't move forward because it's unable to get the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to change the constitution to mention Bulgarians as a founding people of its nation -- a key Bulgarian demand. This has meant Albania has had to wait as well. Bosnia could very well slow down Ukraine's path and some EU diplomats think that this is exactly what Budapest wants.
• To make things even more complicated, the Netherlands has been vocal in Brussels over the last few days about Bosnia not deserving to start accession talks at all and has expressed its readiness to veto any such move.
• In its enlargement report a month ago, the European Commission did note that it would report back by March on any progress made on outstanding issues in Bosnia, Moldova, and Ukraine. While March isn't directly mentioned in the European Commission's draft summit conclusions seen by RFE/RL, it's possible that may change and that a March date could be used again to buy time and to allow the member states, if they can't agree in December, to keep kicking the can down the road.

What Else Is On The Table?

• The EU's 12th Russia sanctions package is likely to get green-lighted in the coming days, largely because it is fairly weak and doesn't touch Russian energy. While Hungary has so far vetoed the entire package, there is an expectation in Brussels that -- after plenty of horse-trading -- its objections will be lifted. This round of sanctions will likely be the last for a while. The EU has run out of ideas and energy to produce more, and it is becoming increasingly hard to achieve unanimity on new measures.
• Something that almost certainly won't fly is common EU funding to arm Ukraine. So far that has been done via the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget mechanism that the bloc has used to channel 4.6 billion euros ($4.95 billion) worth of military equipment to Kyiv. But the 8th tranche, worth 500 million euros ($540 million), has been blocked by Budapest since the summer. First, Hungary said that Kyiv needed to remove the Hungarian bank OTP from a blacklist produced by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption, where it was labelled an "international sponsor of war" as it continues to do business in Russia. While Ukraine complied, Budapest now wants assurances from Kyiv that OTP won't be re-listed again -- another potential deadlock that might not be resolved anytime soon.
• Then there is the question of topping up the EPF by 20 billion euros for the next three years. That is also unlikely to be approved, especially as the German Constitutional Court recently ruled that the country's use of special funds to finance various subsidies violated its constitutional "debt brake." This ruling will have an impact on other member states. Right now, the EU is in the middle of its seven-year budget cycle (2021-2027), and while many countries in the bloc would like to increase the budget to finance anything from the bloc's green transition to the functioning of the Ukrainian government, it will be trickier when the EU's biggest cash cow (Germany) has new legal restraints on how it uses its money and is cutting its own domestic budget. Going forward, arms to Ukraine from EU member states will most likely be funded on a bilateral basis.
• What about other funds for Ukraine? Earlier this year, the European Commission proposed 50 billion euros ($53.9 billion) for Ukraine for the period 2024-2027. Hungary is -- unsurprisingly -- against this, and, with Germany's new constraints, there might have to be some creativity. Instead of taking money from the EU budget and battling constant Budapest vetoes, 26 EU governments could loan Ukraine money on a monthly or quarterly basis.
• Among EU officials and diplomats from member states, there is perhaps more annoyance with Hungary than ever before. There isn't a mechanism to kick a member out of the EU; a country must leave voluntarily, as the United Kingdom did after its 2016 referendum. But there is a way to suspend a member states' voting rights in the Council on the European Union, which can amend or veto European Commission proposals, by using the so-called Article 7 procedure.
• The European Commission and the European Parliament have invoked these articles against Poland and Hungary before, but they have never been approved because to pass they need unanimity and Budapest and Warsaw have always had each other's backs. But with an impending government change in Poland, the procedure might be dropped against Warsaw. Will Budapest then be cornered? Or can it rely on its old ally Slovakia, which could take a more Euroskeptic course with Prime Minister Robert Fico back in power.

Looking Ahead

On December 12, the European Commission is presenting its "Defense Of Democracy" legislative proposal. The commission has said the measures are mostly to make the 2024 European Parliament elections more transparent, but there has been criticism from civil society groups of the EU's "foreign agents' law," where organizations operating in the bloc will have to declare any links or funding coming from non-EU countries. Foreign agents' laws in countries such as Russia have been used to crack down on media and NGOs, and Brussels has been outspoken about "foreign agents'" initiatives in member states such as Hungary and aspiring members such as Bosnia and Georgia.

Also on December 12, the European Commission is set to present its long-awaited proposal for how the EU could use some of the money generated from the sale of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine financially. It is estimated that up to 300 billion euros have been frozen since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The question now is how much of that money can be used for grants to finance the rebuilding of Ukraine. An estimated 3 billion euros a year would be available, although eurozone countries fear that it would diminish the appetite for nonmember states to keep savings in the European Union.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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