Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two big issues: Ukraine and Moldova's negotiation framework and the European Commission's view on pre-enlargement reforms.

Brief #1: The Next Steps For Ukraine And Moldova

What You Need To Know: Earlier in March, the European Commission sent over the so-called "negotiation framework" for Ukraine and Moldova to European Union member states for approval. The 19-page-document, seen by RFE/RL, covers both countries as they so far are paired in the EU enlargement process and outlines the basic principles of European Union accession talks.

One Ukrainian official described it to me as "very broad," adding that "as of now, it causes no concerns to us as there is nothing particularly good or bad in it." That appears to be a fair description as it is essentially a copy-and-paste of the negotiation framework that the European Commission wrote up for Albania and North Macedonia in 2020.

The big issue now is when the 27 EU member states, via unanimity, will approve the framework. Here Albania and North Macedonia offer a sobering tale. For Tirana and Skopje, it took two years to get the approval, largely as Bulgaria was raising bilateral historic and linguistic disputes with the latter that in fact still aren't fully resolved. So, while the frameworks were amended by EU member states to reflect Sofia's worries and then passed in 2022 as accession negotiations were officially launched, neither North Macedonia nor Albania have to date opened any of the 33 negotiation chapters.

Skopje's inability to include references to Bulgarians as a founding people in its constitution, coupled with a bilateral Greek-Albanian spat over the imprisonment of an ethnic Greek mayor in the southern Albanian town of Himare, has prompted a double veto that so far has meant that neither of the Western Balkan couple has advanced on their respective EU path.

Deep Background: For Ukraine and Moldova, the hope among diplomats in Brussels I have spoken to is that EU member states will give a green light at the end of June. The draft right now doesn't offer any concrete hints of what member states might object to, if anything, but it does give plenty of indications that the enlargement process will be far from smooth sailing.

The paper immediately points out that "by their very nature, the negotiations are an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand" and adds that "the pace of accessions must take into account the union's capacity to absorb new members" -- a perennial discussion that the bloc first must look after its own functioning, especially regarding decision-making in various institutions before additional countries can join.

There are also no surprises in terms of the demand that a new member state must adopt the euro as its national currency but that the decision when that will happen depends on the country fulfilling all necessary economic criteria.

As an example, look at Croatia joining the EU in 2013 but only adopting the currency a decade later. Or take membership into the passport-free Schengen Area. It is clearly stated Ukraine and Moldova will have to adopt all relevant EU laws in the field of home affairs in order to become EU members, but other member states and the European Commission will decide when they are ready for Schengen. Here, you can take Bulgaria and Romania as examples, both having joined the EU in 2007 but only partially joining Schengen at the end of March this year.

Drilling Down

• So, what are the problems that tend to slow down the negotiation process? The EU's Copenhagen criteria, which sets down key requirements for membership, states that any new member state must guarantee "respect for and protection of minorities." For many years now, Budapest has been vocal about what it sees as reduced rights for the ethnic Hungarian minority in Ukraine.
• That is likely to continue. In a debate held last week in the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, Hungarian Foreign Ministry State Secretary Peter Sztaray hammered home that the issue of Ukraine's Hungarian minority is not a bilateral issue but "an issue of human rights and security."
• In a Hungarian government discussion paper -- seen by RFE/RL and circulated to fellow EU member states at the same time the European Commission was distributing the negotiating framework -- Budapest made clear that it will continue to press the minority issue. "Since 2015 there has been a shift in the policy of Ukraine regarding the rights of national minorities that resulted in narrowing, or in some cases even annulling the rights of national minorities previously guaranteed in the Ukrainian national legislation or in Ukraine's international obligations. We expect the national minority rights of the Hungarian community in Ukraine to be restored to the same level as they were before 2015."
• The ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine are essentially demanding three things: restoring the status of the national minority school system; restoring some language rights when dealing with state authorities; and restoring the right for political representation on a regional as well as national level.
• Broadly speaking, Budapest fears that more than four subjects in schools could become obligatory in the Ukrainian language. Another concern is the reshaping of administrative units in Ukraine that has reduced the number of Hungarians below the 10 percent threshold to claim language rights. Hungarian officials also want to secure an automatic delegate in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament.
• The issue of minority rights is one of the four remaining conditions set out by the European Commission for Ukraine to complete before proper accession talks can be launched. The main demand was that all of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission recommendations on Ukraine's law on national minorities and on media and education be addressed.
• Several EU member states, as well as Ukraine, believe this has already happened. But the European Commission -- and notably the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi, who is Hungarian -- noted in a speech to EU member states earlier in March that these steps haven't yet been fully completed.
• According to several Brussels sources I spoke to on background, the European Commission will still monitor implementation of the Ukrainian laws. Another report on these matters by the Venice Commission is due in June. Regardless of what it says, it is to be expected that Budapest will want the negotiation framework to reflect these minority rights concerns.

Brief #2: European Commission: This Is What's Needed For A Bigger EU

What You Need To Know: Without much fanfare, the European Commission on March 20 published its ideas on what reforms the bloc needs to undertake in order to take in more members. Numbering only some 22 pages, it is far from comprehensive. Rather, it gathers some initial thoughts ahead of several upcoming reviews in various policy fields that the commission will undertake later in 2024 and in 2025. Once again, EU enlargement appears to be enjoying some momentum as EU leaders in recent months have decided that membership talks should commence with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Deep Background: The document starts by tackling the perennial question for Brussels officials and wonks: whether to first add new countries to the club or to start by changing internal EU rules.

"The EU must deepen as it widens. We must start preparing today for the union of tomorrow and use enlargement as a catalyst for progress," the paper states.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the text concerns the commission's thoughts on EU governance going forward. Debates have raged for years as to whether the EU needs a treaty to change to accept more members or not. Here, the document appears to come down in favor of the latter by noting that "while the commission has indicated its support [for] treaty change, "if and where it is needed," it believes that the "EU's governance can be swiftly improved by using to the full the potential of the current Treaties."

This is the view held by most EU member states as well, no doubt shaped by the trauma from when Dutch and French voters rejected a new EU constitution in referendums held in 2005, and then Irish voters did the same for a revised treaty a few years later. It's a Pandora's box few want to open again.

The main issue, as always when it comes to the running of the EU, is the question of unanimity. Most decisions are these days taken by a qualified majority (55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the total EU population), but unanimity remains in crucial areas such as foreign policy, taxation, and, notably, enlargement policy. The paper notes that "in a larger union, unanimity will be even more difficult to reach, with increased risks of decisions being blocked by a single member state."

Drilling Down

• So, what can be done without actually rewriting the entire EU rulebook? The European Commission notes that so-called passerelle clauses in the current EU treaty would allow for the shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in all sorts of fields. But for that shift to happen, you need to have unanimity. In other words, a vote of unanimity to end unanimity.
• This is a circle that will be hard to square as it is precisely the veto that makes smaller member states as relevant as the bigger ones in practice. And it's via the threat of vetoes that EU member states can "bargain" to get something in other policy fields. Hungary angling for more EU money withheld from it due to rule-of-law concerns while blocking decisions in other fields is a prime example. Why would Budapest -- or anyone else for that matter -- give up such a powerful tool?
• The document doesn't quite answer that, although it tries. One is the use of "constructive abstentions" -- meaning that a country doesn't actively say "no" or "yes" but lets the decision pass. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban simply leaving the room at a recent EU summit when leaders decided to open accession talks with Ukraine is a good example. But can that happen on a more regular basis?
• Another idea floated is to provide for the possibility for one or several member states to invoke exceptional national interest grounds to continue discussions in order to reach a satisfactory solution on an issue. Yet, this raises the question of how long this could go on and if this really would make the bloc move faster on crucial policy files.
• There are also some ideas on how to speed up the enlargement process as well -- perhaps the most cumbersome of all EU policies and beset with veto opportunities. Every time one of the 33 policy chapters -- the bones of the accession process -- is opened, unanimity is required from the 27 EU member states. And so does their closing, as well as interim benchmarks in some of the chapters. That means that for each country's accession process, there are well over 70 opportunities to block the whole process. Albania and especially North Macedonia are perfect examples of EU hopefuls seemingly stuck forever in the waiting room, simply due to various single-country vetoes.
• The European Commission proposes doing away with unanimity for opening chapters as well as interim benchmarks but keeping them for closing chapters and for the final decision on the actual accession of a new member to the European Union. So, this would reduce the veto opportunities by more than half.
• The bigger question, however, remain if member states wanting to slow down the enlargement process -- either due to bilateral spats with a candidate country or just to squeeze out a more favorable deal in a completely unrelated policy field -- will continue to take advantage of the remaining veto opportunities. In short, reforming the EU and letting new countries join is no cakewalk.

Looking Ahead

Look out for the meeting of EU agriculture ministers in Brussels on March 26. Several EU member states have been rocked by farmers' protests in recent months over rising production costs in the bloc and the influx of cheaper agricultural products from abroad. The ministers will look into ways to channel more EU funds to farmers and cut red tape.

This issue is also high on the agenda as the Polish and Ukrainian governments meet in Warsaw two days later. Polish farmers have for months blocked Ukrainian farm produce from entering the country, and it will be a hot button issue when Poles vote in local elections on April 7.

That's all for this week. I'll be taking a break next week, so the next issue will come out on April 8. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing, please subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm looking at the key job vacancies in Brussels, as well as Jens Stoltenberg's last NATO report.

Brief #1: Klaus Iohannis Gets In The Mix

What You Need To Know: Four big political jobs are up for grabs in 2024: the European Commission and European Council presidencies, now occupied by Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel, respectively, as well as the bloc's foreign policy chief post, held by Josep Borrell for the past five years. And then, in another part of the Belgian capital, NATO is looking for a replacement to Jens Stoltenberg as secretary-general with the Norwegian departing after a decade in the post.

Two EU summits in June, already penciled in for June 17 and June 27, featuring the 27 EU heads of state and government, will decide the three posts in closed-door negotiations. It's a complicated jigsaw in which candidates will be selected that reflect a balance of gender, political affiliation (often divided between pan-European political parties representing the center right, center left, and liberal), and geography.

The European Commission president usually hails from the political group that wins the most votes in the parliamentary elections taking place across the bloc on June 6-9. In the last four elections, this has been the center-right European People's Party (EPP), and polls indicate they're on course to win this time as well. Their lead candidate, crowned at the EPP congress in Bucharest last week, is Von der Leyen. Logic would dictate that she's a shoo-in for another five years heading the European Commission.

Deep Background: This is where outgoing Romanian President Klaus Iohannis comes into the picture. Last week, he officially announced that he wanted to become NATO secretary-general. This position is officially separated from the three EU positions. But considering that 23 out of 27 EU member states also belong to the military alliance and that the NATO secretary-general should be European, the two organizations are fishing in the same talent pool.

Sources at NATO say they want the decision to be made in April, well before the NATO Washington summit in July -- and, crucially, well before the process becomes "too entangled" in the EU's own recruitment timeline.

Only a few weeks ago, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (known collectively as the "Quad"), as well as up to 17 other countries, largely in the West, rallied behind outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Considered a safe pair of hands with lots of experience, well-liked in Washington, and famously adept at dealing with former U.S. President Donald Trump, in Brussels, he seemed a decent, if perhaps uninspiring, pick.

Drilling Down

• Iohannis's candidacy also poses a more pertinent question: Is he the "Eastern" person who will fill one of the four top vacancies? "Eastern" here is far from a coherent geographical or political concept, but it covers the countries of the former Soviet bloc or ex-Yugoslavia that joined the EU (and NATO) in the past 25 years: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (and, additionally for NATO, Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia).
• No NATO secretary-general has ever come from any of these countries. In 2019, when the EU last picked the three heads, the eastern flank was completely overlooked. In fact, the only "Easterner" who has ever held a high position in Brussels was current Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who was president of the European Council from 2014 to 2019. So, one of the four positions on offer in 2024 should really go east.
• Some arguments truly favor Iohannis. There have already been three Dutch NATO secretary-generals. The Netherlands has struggled to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense, a NATO goal for over a decade and something many Eastern European countries, including Iohannis's Romania, have managed. Rutte, while being supportive of Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, is considered a "softie" on Russia. His support for Gazprom's Nordstream 2 pipeline is a case in point.
• Then there is the need for unanimity. All 32 NATO allies need to be on board. Hungary has already indicated it's against Rutte, especially after countless spats between The Hague and Budapest over Hungarian rule of law. Turkey hasn't voiced a preference, but Ankara has had its own issues with Rutte, notably after Turkish efforts a few years ago to hold political rallies in the Netherlands that resulted in The Hague barring Turkish officials from arriving.
• As one NATO official recently told me, "Turkey and Hungary showed with Sweden's NATO accession that they are willing to go the extra mile and more to get what they want." The question remains: Is it Iohannis they want?
• The consensus among NATO officials seems to be that Rutte will carry the day. It's hard to get around "the Quad." Additionally, in some quarters, Iohannis's move appears a little desperate, and there has been annoyance expressed that the NATO selection process might now continue for months. Others were rather bemused at Iohannis's 10-point plan -- presented in Politico on March 13 -- that included things that the military alliance is already doing.
• There is speculation in Brussels that Iohannis, in fact, isn't aiming for the NATO role but rather putting himself in the "shop window" for one of the three EU positions. The issue here is that he belongs to the EPP, the same as Von der Leyen. If she gets the commission presidency, it's unlikely another EPP candidate could get anything else. The center left, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), will likely finish second in the European Parliament elections and demand the European Council or the foreign policy job. The liberals (Renew) or the more conservative and euroskeptic ECR group could also stake out positions depending on the June vote.
• Most of the other Easterners who might be gunning for EU jobs belong to the EPP, too. There's Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic; the Bulgarian managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Kristalina Georgieva; Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski; and his Lithuanian and Latvian counterparts, Gabrielius Landsbergis and Krisjanis Karins, respectively.
• Von der Leyen is widely considered a successful commission president, especially for her steadfast support for Kyiv. But some in Brussels are a little down on her: There is concern that she's made the European Commission too powerful and that she runs it with an iron fist, not letting other commissioners shine.
• Then there is the issue with the European Parliament. The candidate for commission president needs to be approved by a majority of members of the house. Last time, Von der Leyen scraped by with eight votes. It might be even tighter this time. Perhaps that means it's time for a consensus candidate. And that could be Iohannis or someone else from the eastern part of Europe.

Brief #2: Stoltenberg's Last NATO Report

What You Need To Know: On March 14, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg presented his annual report for 2023, a common rite of spring in Brussels. It will be the Norwegian's last, as he is set to depart later this year (as discussed above). The report looks back at 2023, concluding it was "a challenging but successful year for the alliance," with Finland becoming member No. 31 and Sweden well on the way. (The latter became member No. 32 on March 7.)

The challenges come mainly from Russia, with the text noting that "in 2023, Moscow continued its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, bringing violence and death to the heart of Europe while, at the same time, seeking to divide NATO." However, the text goes on: "In doing so, it underestimated both the determination of the people of Ukraine and allied unity."

Perhaps the most poignant line in the entire 172-page report underlines that, "If Putin wins, this would send a dangerous message to authoritarian leaders around the world that they can achieve their objectives through war and violence. Supporting Ukraine is not charity, it is in our own security interest."

Those words could be aimed at politicians in some NATO member states who, in recent months, have questioned why the West is supporting Kyiv both politically and militarily.

Deep Background: The big question, however, is what NATO-Ukraine relations will look like going forward. The annual report highlights the key reforms the alliance made in 2023 that have benefited ties with Ukraine. For example, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, which oversaw collaboration between Kyiv and the alliance, was upgraded to a council, meaning that Ukraine now can call a meeting at any level -- head of state, ministerial, or ambassadorial -- with its NATO counterparts.

Plus, at the Vilnius NATO summit in July 2023, it was also decided that Kyiv doesn't need the usual Membership Action Plan (MAP) to join NATO, which would make Ukraine's path toward membership a little easier. And NATO has committed both politically and financially to help Ukraine make its armed forces interoperable with NATO troops, reform its institutions, notably the Defense Ministry, and assist with the general reconstruction of the country.

But is all that enough? And can Ukraine expect anything more at the NATO summit in Washington in July?

The annual report simply notes that "allies will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when they agree and conditions are met." From speaking to NATO officials, I don't think this line will change much going into the July summit. The mantra from alliance officials is still: "As long as the war goes on, little will change politically."

Now that Finland and Sweden are both members, Ukraine is probably the closest country to joining. That day, however, is unlikely to come any time soon.

For the other two aspirant countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia, the language in the report is sparse and not particularly encouraging: "Allies remain committed to supporting the eventual NATO membership of Georgia. Bosnia-Herzegovina continued its close cooperation with NATO, including through the Reform Program, without prejudice to a final decision on NATO membership."

While NATO will likely emphasize again in Washington that it remains open to new members, the summit won't be the time or the place when the alliance agrees to let them in.

Drilling Down

• Perhaps the most interesting section of the report deals with China. For years, NATO has been sharpening its language toward Beijing -- and it takes it up another notch here: "China is watching our actions closely. China does not share our values, it challenges our interests, and Beijing is increasingly aligned with Moscow. We will continue to trade and engage with China, but we must manage the risks and prepare for enduring competition."
• Ominously, the report warns that "as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated allies' dangerous dependence on Russian gas, NATO is working to assess potential dependence on other assertive authoritarian regimes for sustaining NATO's supply chains, technology, or infrastructure."
• The report also includes the results of polls taken throughout 2023, where citizens of NATO member states were quizzed on issues related to security. Perhaps the most reassuring result for NATO is that 77 percent of respondents overall think that defense spending should either be maintained at current levels or increased. In 2022, that figure was 74 percent; in 2021, it was 70 percent.
• Otherwise, there are a few small but worrying indicators for the alliance. In 2023, 73 percent of those polled in NATO countries agreed that other allies should defend their country if attacked, down from 75 percent in 2022. And in 2023, 61 percent of those polled agreed that their country should defend other allies if attacked, compared to 69 percent in 2022.
• And last year, 63 percent of those polled considered Russia's invasion of Ukraine to have affected the safety and security of their country. That number was higher, at 64 percent, in 2022. And across NATO, only 22 percent of those polled worried that war will break out in their country; the biggest concern for most people (58 percent) was the high cost of living.
• Perhaps the most pertinent question is whether people in NATO member states would vote to remain in the military alliance if there was a referendum. In 30 out of the 31 allied countries, a majority would opt to stay in. Montenegro is the only outlier, with only 46 percent of respondents saying they would vote "yes" to continued membership. Curiously, 100 percent -- yes, 100 percent -- of all Albanians said they would vote in favor of continued membership.

Looking Ahead

The European Commission will present a paper on March 20 on what it calls "pre-enlargement reforms and policy review." This is an internal exercise showing what the bloc needs to change in order to welcome new members from the Western Balkans and Ukraine. The briefing will be followed by various forums and debates in the future to discuss how an EU with up to 37 members would operate.

A day later, on March 21, EU leaders gather in Brussels for another EU summit. They are expected to endorse the European Commission recommendation to open accession talks with Bosnia, even though they will remain noncommittal on when the negotiations will begin. The leaders are also expected to evaluate Ukraine's and Moldova's progress toward membership; urge the European Commission to work on further sanctions against Belarus; and sign off on earmarking 5 billion euros ($5.4 billion) to purchase arms for Ukraine.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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